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Abstract 
Inventing a Capitalist Region: Upper Silesia/Poland 
Economic Transformations in Old-Industrial and Post-Socialist Spaces of Central 
and Eastern Europe 
The thesis explores economic, political and social processes in fonner socialist countries 
with a case study in one of the biggest conurbations in Europe, Upper Silesia. The ongoing 
but selective economic processes of global and macro-regional economic integration have 
been identified as a main issue in geographical research. In particular the nexus between 
the global and the local seen as a dialectical relationship, composed of multiple and 
asymmetric interdependencies has stressed the necessity of utilising relational analysis in 
economic geography. The question emerges in what ways and to what extent increasing 
economic integration may lead to a socio-economic convergence of places or the 
development of 'indigenous capacities', spatial peculiarities and legacies to establish 
themselves in capitalist networks of production. 
With empirical reference to the Polish conurbation of Upper Silesia and drawing on the 
analytical framework from Michael Storper's 'Holy Trinity' ("The Regional World", New 
York, 1997), this thesis analyses post-socialist urban and regional transformations from 
three angles. l. While Storper analysed mainly 'successful' regions in the West, the 
research tries to identify the main challenges that face any simple attempt to adapt western 
(theoretical) approaches within a post-socialist, Central East European context. 2. The 
thesis then identifies the fabric of political-economic actors and the path dependent 
'invention' of a region, here Upper Silesia, and analysis locally and regionally embedded 
and recombined informal institutions and their capacity for restructuring of an old 
industrial space. 3. While inter- and intra-regional competition is growing in an 'era of 
globalisation', the thesis finally investigates the scope for action and 'reflexive' 
interrelations between administrative, political and economic actors in an 'ordinary region' 
prior to the accession to the European Union. 
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1 Transitions and Transformations 
he first transition period from planned to market economies in Central and 
T Eastern Europe (CEE) has been perceived as traumatic.' The rush toward market systems was initially destructive, as production levels collapsed while inflation 
emerged, eroding the living standards of large segments of the population. A few years into 
the transition, the expected 'blossoming landscapes' remained a/ala morgana, apart from a 
few 'bright spots' on the map of the 'new Europe'.2 The early second half of the 1990s 
improved the picture substantially, leading to "a U-shaped response of output, the initial 
decline in output followed by recovery" (Blanchard 1997: I). While growth rates declined 
again by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new decade, they gained a fresh 
momentum from 2003 on. However, while the ups and downs of macro-economic data 
might inform observers about general trends, they contribute little to an understanding of 
the mechanisms underpinning the development of the 'post-socialist' economies or the 
ways in which their institutional arrangements have changed. 
The success of the last 15 years 'in transition' lags behind early expectations.3 The shift 
from state control to pluralistic societies and internationally competitive market economies 
has been described as partial and "still far from being achieved" (Ekiert 2003:97), because 
"economic restructuring requires much more time than revolutionary political upheaval" 
(Tumock 1997: 136). The material living standards of large parts of the population, notably 
, 'Central and Eastern Europe' is an inaccurate term, but mostly used for a block of former socialist countries 
including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (the so called Visegrad countries) and the three 
Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. All of these countries joined the European Union (EU) on 1st 
May 2004. Usually, the 'first transition period' is understood to cover the years between 1989/90 and 
1992/93, characterised by economic decline, an annual average contraction of real GDP between -3.1 per 
cent (Poland) and -20.0 per cent (Lithuania) (Hamilton 1999:137). However, this time classification is 
misleading as it suggests a 'zero hour' in 1989/90 and neglects the economic process prior to the fall of 
communist regimes in Europe (see Kolodko 2000: 19-27). 
2 The infamous bon mot 'blossoming landscapes' (,blUhende Landschaften') was used by Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl in 1990 describing the economic future of the merged GDR. See Offe 1994 on why the East German 
journey from socialism to capitalism can be seen as unique in contrast to what has happened in other 
countries of CEE. 
3 The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) summarises the last 15 years in a six-page 
glossy brochure rather grimly: "Much has been achieved since then, even if transition has proved a long and 
sometimes painful process" (EBRD 2004:2). 
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the socially weakest groups, have significantly declined, at least during the first transition 
phase, when "the social costs [ ... ] were quite high and were not distributed equally" 
(Adam 1999:7).4 This has occurred even as opportunities and choices for the better-
qualified and for younger population groups have expanded. The positive outcomes of the 
reforms have been less than expected. at least using official statistics. According to the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). the average real gross 
domestic product for CEE in 1998 was 72 per cent of that for the pre-transition level, with 
only the economies of Poland (118), Slovenia (103), and the Slovak Republic (100) above 
the 1989 level (EBRD 1999; see also Kolodko 2001:286). Far from experiencing rapid 
recovery over the last fifteen years, the transition economies have fallen further behind the 
former EU-15, a development that has largely come as a surprise to eastern and western 
observers.s 
1.1 Shock Therapy versus Gradualism 
Early proposals for transition strategies moved around two poles.6 The neo-liberal school 
of thought viewed the transition by analogy with the structural adjustment problems and 
'backwardness' faced especially by so called less developed economies. The conceptual 
framework on ways of shaping the transition process was guided by modernisation theory, 
"adopted by the great majority of works concerned with the historical transition to a socio-
economic and political system with the modern [ ... ] image of the DECD-world" (Altvater 
1998:591-592). 
4 Adam notes that Poland has the highest level of poverty among the countries ofCEE, an outcome primarily 
caused by the application of 'shock-therapy' (Adam 1999:35). Williams and Balaz (1999:183) claim that the 
privatisation process. "perhaps more than any other process, has contributed to the deepening of social 
inequalities, particularly in terms of wealth". Detailed data for the 1990s are provided by Szulc 2000. 
s By 1997, the GNP per capita level (EU-15 = 100) in Poland and Slovakia only reached 16 per cent, in 
Hungary 20 per cent, in the Czech Republic 23 per cent, while the level for the Baltic states is even lower: 
Lithuania 10 per cent, Latvia 11 per cent, and Estonia 15 per cent (Petrakos/Maier/Gorzelak 2000:4). 
6 At this point I will limit myself to the most influential schools of thought bearing in mind that many 
divergent concepts and diagnoses have been in contention. However, none of the 'dissenters' have exerted 
significant influence in policy advisory circles (for an overview see special edition of East European Politics 
and Societies 15(200 I )2). 
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As a result, the macro-economic reforms applied to those economies - rapid and 
comprehensive liberalisation of prices, wages, foreign trade and capital markets; 
convertibility of exchange rates; conservative fiscal and monetary policies; privatisation of 
state assets and cut of state expenditure - were also expected to 'cure' the transition 
shortcomings. The transition approach that came to be labelled 'shock therapy' dominated 
the early debate and is still strongly promoted, particularly in Anglo-Saxon academic and 
policy advisory circles, as two of the main protagonists of this camp suggest.7 
..... both the economic logic and the political situation [in CEEl argue for a rapid and comprehensive process 
of transition. History in Eastern Europe [CEEl has taught the profound shortcomings of a piecemeal 
approach, and economic logic suggests the feasibility (?f a rapid transition" (LiptonlSachs et al. 1990:99). 
Neo-liberal reforms aim to dissolve the socialist past by the fastest means possible. This 
school of thought insists that markets can spontaneously create a new world if the old can 
first be destroyed. This 'revolutionary' act is meant to be the most effective one in 
overcoming the socialist past and creating a capitalist future, "based not so much on inner 
efforts as it is on borrowing from abroad" (Poznanski 2001 :211). Despite different political 
experiences and economic heritages in Central and Eastern Europe the neo-liberal 
approach has been presented as a hegemonic western economic blueprint for development, 
which it was believed could be applied in all transition economies "on the way to 
commonwealth" (Janos 2001 :231). In practice, of course, the unexpected effects of these 
reforms produced different outcomes in the early stage of the transition process and let 
"Central and Eastern Europe became a crisis zone of modem Europe" (Berend 2001 :251 ). 
7 Jeffrey D. Sachs is frequently identified as one of the world's most influential economists and has advised 
more than 100 governments over the last 20 years. In 1989, Sachs advised Poland's Solidarity movement on 
economic reforms, and at the request of the Solidarity leadership, prepared a draft programme of radical 
economic transformation. He advised Poland's first post-communist government on the introduction of 
economic reforms between 1990 and 1991. Meanwhile, Sachs is heavily engaged in debates about the 
development in Africa, portraying "extreme poverty as a dreadful but not fatal disease, for which the only 
true remedy is a dose of strong western medicine" (John Vidal reviewing Sachs' latest book "The End of 
Poverty" in The Guardian Review, 23.04.2005: I 0). 
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Among the leading reformers Poland - the "guinea-pig for big bang/shock therapy" 
(Jeffries 2002:269) - has been frequently labelled as "the most successful transition 
economy in Eastern Central Europe" (Rapacki 2001: 1 07), an achievement which led to full 
membership of GA TT/WTO (1994/95), OECD (1996) and finally to the European Union 
on 1st May 2004 (see also Belka 2001; Michalek 1999).8 The radical economic reform in 
Poland included an intertwined macro-economic stabilisation which was carried out 
alongside a major liberalisation programme and followed by extensive privatisation 
measures (Poznanski 1996). In January 1990, a stabilisation reform package - the 
Balcerowicz plan (named after the then Finance Minister) - was introduced and aimed at 
the achievement of internal and external market equilibrium and inflation containment. The 
anti inflation measures were a necessary (and unexpected) consequence of the impact of 
the initial reforms. A strict monetary and fiscal policy and an austerity incomes policy 
were introduced, so that prices were left uncontrolled alongside the restriction of money 
supply, increases in interest rates, and the imposition of credit ceilings. But freeing prices 
at a time when the economy was still monopolised, at the same time as cutting subsidies, 
alongside a devaluation of the domestic currency, led inflation to shoot up dramatically, 
while wage growth was running far behind inflation. This unintentional economic 
destabilisation was later labelled as a 'transformation recession' - an 'inevitable decline on 
the way to equilibrium'. 9 
8 Adam Krzeminski, essayist and commentator of the Polish weekly 'Polityka', labels the EU-accession as a 
historic watershed, comparable with the adoption of Christianity 1000 years ago or the establishment of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Union in the 14th century. However, critics of the accession point instead to Poland's 
~artitions in the 18th century as a starting point for historical comparison (Krzeminski 2003:36). 
In the second half of the I 990s when the return of growth seemed to confirm neo-Iiberal macro-economic 
policies, some economists tried to conceptualise the earlier slump and later upswing by blaming the rise of 
unemployment on the disjunction between. the growth in private sector employment and the impact of the 
restructuring of the old state-owned enterpnses. Once the growth of the private sector has taken off then it is 
believed the problems will be solved. The conclusions drawn by these economists have been su~marised 
relatively simply: "Private sector growth decreases unemployment. Restructuring of state firms increases 
output but increases unemployment. Unemployment in turn affects both private sector growth and the speed 
of restructuring" (Blanchard 1997:99). Slump and upswing are described as a logical and mathematical 
process with phase I creating high unemployment which prevents restructuring and phase 2, when "the 
economy proceeds along a balanced path" (ibid.), absorbing employment losses from the restructuring 
process. In the end, that "transition will indeed succeed seems plausible for Central European countries" 
(ibid: I 00). 
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All these measures, which were aimed at the renewal of market equilibrium, had the effect 
of impeding economic activities and led to a 'double depression shock', co-triggered by the 
dismantling of the Comecon area and initial macro-economic policies, accompanied by a 
simultaneous institutional vacuum (Gowan 1995: 17-23). Fiscal policy which aimed at 
balancing the state budget by restricting tax breaks and subsidies had a similar effect. The 
austerity incomes policy, combined with a loss of purchasing power of savings because of 
increased prises, reduced the real purchasing power of the population and limited demand. 
The liberalisation of trade included the opening of the CEE economies to the world market, 
especially to the EU.IO Foreign trade was also liberalised with the aim of creating a rational 
price system. The national currencies were devalued to increase exports and to limit 
imports and internal convertibility was introduced to make importers and exporters 
independent of state bureaucracy, so that they could make decisions on the basis of market 
considerations, as well as aiming to prevent alleged local and regional oligopolies from 
raising their prices in an extensive manner (Gowan 1995:14). 
Liberalisation of imports made it possible for foreign products to compete in the domestic 
markets of the CEE countries, to put pressure on enterprises to adapt western technological 
development and to promote efficiency and competitiveness (Zielinska-Glebocka 
1999: 180). However, as a result many domestic enterprises, which could not stand the 
pressure, simply vanished from the market. On the other hand already in 1993 the newly 
emergent private sector contributed half of the Polish GDP, while its share of total 
employment was 60 per cent (Kondratowicz/Maciejewski/Morawski 1997:143). The 
'shock therapy' reform package simultaneously included attempts to privatise state 
enterprises and to introduce new legislation - with uneven success, since the '"formal 
10 In the case of Poland - along similar lines to other CEE countries - the evolution of a common trade 
regime between the EU and Poland started already in 1989 with a Free Trade Agreement and was deepened 
with an Association Agreement in 1991, the first important step of economic integration which later led to 
full trade reciprocity and the start of negotiations on EU accession in 1997/98 (see Zielinska-Glebocka 
1999: 174-176). However, the 1990s were also characterised by protectionism on both sides including the 
implementation of tariffs and non-tariff barriers - but mostly in favour for the EU (Gowan 1995:24-28). 
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privatization of large enterprises has been slow and contentious, owing to factors such as 
political wrangling, powerful workers' councils and the desire to link privatization with 
pension reform" (JetIries 2003:276). This tends to undermine any confident labelling of 
Poland as a neo-liberal 'model pupil'." 'Privatisation' - and the breaking-down of 
'artificially large units' - has been singled out as the primary issue of 'transition'. For 
Komai, one of the most influential neo-liberal thinkers of post-communist change, 
transition is valued as a project of utopian social engineering. 
"F or privatization to work. you need hundreds of thousands of small businesses. and tens of thousands of 
medium-sized enterprises. Large firms would then evolve. as would a new entrepreneurial class. A new 
bourgeois class would be created, with all of its stratification. which was completely liquidated in socialist 
countries. You cannot appoint this class; it has to evolve" (Kornai interviewed on 4 May 1990 in Bush 
1991:124). 
Neo-liberal orthodoxy, its radical utopianism and end-point driven neo-classical 
assumptions of balanced markets and economic rational actors are of course not 
uncontested. A rival strand of thought, the institutional economy approach which is closely 
linked to evolutionist approaches to the economy, has increasingly questioned the notion of 
'capitalism by design' and the interpretation of transition as a problem of structural 
adjustment and 'getting the policies right'. The two approaches, institutionalist and 
evolutionist, share the assumption that human action and interaction need to be understood 
as the behavioural result of shared habits, thoughts, and socio-cultural 'routines' and so 
they reject 'maximisation' as a process description of what humans actually do (Nelson 
2002:19). 
\\ At the end of 1992 about 14 per cent of the 8453 companies owned by the Polish central state (on 31 st 
December 1990) had been approved for 'changed ownership' (this includes so called 'commercialisation', 
liquidationlbankruptcy and direct and indirect privatisation). By the end of 1999. there were still 2599 fully 
state-owned enterprises contributing around 25-30 per cent to the GDP. These were mainly firms of the 
heavy and mining industries, construction, transport. wholesale, energy, and finance (Ministry of the 
Treasury - Republic of Poland 2000:23-40; own calculations). 
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They argue, instead, that the nearly complete absence of markets and market-supporting 
institutions in the countries of CEE limits the key advantage of efficiency gains that might 
have been expected by the (abstractly attractive) attempt to open up markets, creating a 
market economy by fiat. The transition is viewed as a problem requiring more emphasis on 
micro-economic, gradual reforms over the macro-economic tabula rasa radicalism of neo-
liberal blueprints, because "In almost all societies, the socio-economic framework has been 
built up in a gradual process of accumulating small changes" (Murrell 1992:4). Rather than 
promoting a plan of destruction (which in turn is expected to generate the creation of a new 
economy), they argue for an open-ended establishment of the new within the framework of 
the old. In contrast to the neo-liberal approach, this strand of economic growth theory 
argues that socialism is not completely inefficient and that some of their institutions, in 
particular those relating to the redistribution of resources, worked quite well (Poznanski 
2001 :211). From this perspective, the state-monopolised economy lacks the ability to 
innovate. For this, a stable institutional environment - which has to evolve gradually - is 
needed, one that encourages risk taking under competition and is supported by the citizens. 
As one of the commentators suggests, 
"Capitalism cannot be introduced by design in a region [Central and Eastern Europe] where the lessons of 
forty years of experimentation by a rational hand have made the citizenry cautious about big experiments. A 
new social order cannot be created by dictation - at least not where citizens themselves want a voice in 
determining the new institutions" (Stark 1992: 19). 
In contrast to the grand design of (big-bang) capitalist systemic change, the proponents of 
gradualism, such as Stark, point to the complex nature of capitalism and thus not only 
accept, but advocate the time coupled and parallel existence of new and old elements in 
economic arrangements. This, they suggest, will make it possible to maintain support 
among the electorate and to buffer the shocks of quick macro-economic 'recovery'. This 
incremental and rather conservative approach calls for a focus on immediate problems, the 
10 
use of existing institutions (for the time being) drawing on their accumulated practical 
judgement, and is characterised by a rather sceptical attitude towards radical new 
approaches and the idea of the reversibility of implemented reforms (see Murrell 1992: 13). 
Institutional and evolutionary theorists have identified a range of legacies inherited from 
the socialist order. These legacies have been explained through notions of path 
dependency, cultural persistence, and the circulation of elites (StarklBruszt 1998). This 
approach directs its attention towards the ways in which the future development of an 
economic system is affected by the past within which it is located. In contrast to utopian 
neo-liberalism, while the 'zero-hour' of 1989 is certainly conceived as a break, the socialist 
legacy is not simply dismissed as a sweeping burden. Instead, evolutionists suggest there is 
a continuing process of economic development whose legacies also have the potential to 
shape the future in a positive way by supporting transition processes. So in contrast to an 
emphasis on economic genesis, institutional and evolutionary approaches focus on the 
reconfiguration of elements from the present and the past. In these analyses, the 
recombination of 'social institutions', such as property regimes, laws, economic behaviour 
etc., is seen to offer a means of minimising transaction costs. Instead of a mono-structured 
economic environment, artificially created by a 'clean the slate' privatisation strategy 
(MurrellI992:14), they argue for a 'compartmentalised' two-track approach, within which 
inter-linked state owned firms still exist alongside private small scale companies. 12 This 
buffering, they suggest, has the potential to create a high diversity of economic forms and 
an economic environment that has the adaptability to react toward unexpected effects and 
allow "not only for competition among firms but also competition of forms" 
(Grabher/Stark 1997:536; original emphasis). 
12 The neo-Darwinist term compartmentalisation describes a biological process through which inefficient 
sub-populations (e.g. state-owned companies) become isolated ('buffered') from more efficient ones (e.g. 'the 
private sector') in order to allow the former population more time tor adaptation thus lowering the pressure of 
selection for the time being (see GrabherlStark 1997:536). 
11 
Stressing the role of social relations in economic life implies that markets are socially 
constructed and that economic behaviour is 'embedded' in networks of interpersonal 
relations, within which 'relational assets' such as habits and norms, co-operation or trust 
"are not tradable, nor are they easily substitutable, since they draw on the social properties 
of networks in which economic agents are implicated" (Amin 1999:369). Research in 
network analysis assumes a relationship between the density and intensity of the coupling 
of the network and their openness to the outside environment (GrabherlStark 1997:537). 
The indirect connection of rather isolated groups of actors, labelled as 'weak ties' 
(Granovetter 1973), becomes decisive for the adaptability of networks in particular and for 
local or regional development in general, because of the greater dynamism of innovating 
networks and their ability to learn quickly. Furthermore, an important starting point for the 
critique of utopian social engineering and the adoption of blueprints from outside is the 
acknowledgement that economic actors are not only endowed with technical, explicit 
(codified) knowledge, but with what Michael Polanyi called 'personal knowledge', that is, 
a tacit knowledge which is gained through experiences and activities, embedded in a 
peculiar set of - often place-bounded - socio-economic arrangements. 13 
Most neo-classical approaches analyse economic developments by looking at macro-
economic institutions, supported by a particular micro-economic theory of the firm, and 
focus on policy development at the scale of national and even macro-regional economies. 
In contrast to this account, institutional and evolutionary studies bring places into focus as 
sites of economic action - and provide evidence for a plurality of transformations 
embedded in particular space/time conditions. This approach starts from the recognition 
that processes of globalisation do not equalise the properties of localities but make their 
socio-cultural and socio-economic uniqueness still more significant for economic 
13 Murrell argues that foreign advisors who played a crucial role in the first transition period did not succeed, 
because they lacked this practical knowledge of a set of old arrangements which still persisted, before the 
blueprint was implemented (Murrell 1992:7). 
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development. The specificity of local culture, knowledge and networks give shape to new 
and particular forms of economic specialisation, which form the socio-economic assets of 
places. 
If one critique of the neo-liberal approach relates to its failure to predict the economic 
events that actually followed regime change in Central and Eastern Europe a more 
fundamental critique arises from the ideological, ahistorical and spatially unbounded view 
of the world that is central to neo-liberal approaches and strategies. This can be illustrated 
in the distinction that may be made between economic transformation and transition. 
Whereas 'transition' (the term favoured by neo-liberal analysts) suggests an end-driven 
and triumphant outcome of systemic change, 'transformation' points instead to the 
procedural and open-ended, or at least lengthy, nature of the project, as well as 
characterising this institutional change as problematic, potentially abortive, and sometimes 
impassable. Although the latter approach is the one generally favoured in this thesis, the 
term 'transition culture' will regularly be used to refer to the institutional and 
organisational arrangements which have been generated as part of the process of 
implementing neo-liberal thinking in Central and Eastern Europe. As Kennedy contends, 
"This {transition} culture is open to anyone. Transition culture is multinational. It thrives on the a.uimilation 
of those from outside the . Western' experience. It is improved to the extent that more people from across the 
world embrace its presumptions and act in such a way as to reinforce the power of its presumptions. It even 
looks beller when those who articulate transition culture speak with accents that come from Tashkent or 
Tirana rather than London or New York" (Kennedy 2002:95). 
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1.2 Doing Research in Old Industrial Areas in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
The ongoing but selective economic processes of global and macro-regional economic 
integration have been identified as a main issue in geographical research. 14 In particular the 
nexus between the global and the local - seen "as a dialectical relationship, composed of 
multiple and asymmetric interdependencies" (AminlThrift 1997:147; original emphasis)-
has stressed the necessity of utilising relational analysis in economic geography, in contrast 
to the "territorial idea of sequestered spatial logics - local, national, continental and global 
- pitted against each other" (Amin 1999 [1997]:44-45). The question emerges in what 
ways and to what extent increasing economic integration may lead to a socio-economic 
convergence of places or the development of 'indigenous capacities', spatial peculiarities 
and legacies to establish themselves in a global and macro-regional capitalist network of 
production. IS 
As a geographer, the author assumes that places are unique and that global changes in 
economic development have differential impacts on localities. Nevertheless, it is not 
deniable that places are faced with shared processes of economic change that derive from 
economic and 'revolutionary' technological meta forces. 16 The question is how strong the 
14 In this context, 'macro-regional' may be characterised as an economic integration process between 
countries which belong to a supra-national body with the aim of implementing legislative harmonisation, free 
trade, common (sectoral) policy, and a common currency such as the European Union. The author is fully 
aware of the significance of discursive constructions and the powerful but 'chaotic' term of 'globalisation', 
used as an inevitable process and a (neo-liberal) vision of a barrier-less and open world. 
IS Hudson identifies an increasing convergence towards the US/UK neo-liberal economic policy model in the 
EU which encourages the privatisation of former state assets and opens the way for foreign direct 
investments - a result of the increasing economic integration of the EU and the 'shareholder value economy' 
(Hudson 2002:20). Fitoussi argues that the rise of neo-Iiberal thinking is directly linked to the downfall of 
state socialism, which led to the disappearance of competition between capitalist and socialist ideologies 
(Fitoussi 1997). In terms of the increasing internationalisation of production, Storper et al. stress that classical 
Ricardian trade theory as well as new economic geography predict - for different reasons - more specialised 
economies of places (Storper/Chen/DePaolis 2002:73-76). Research on the geographical concentration or 
spread of industries on EU and OECD levels points to the existence of a "network of metropolitan 
agglomerations as the key spatial architecture of the global economy, and the questions of evenness and 
unevenness and specialization are, in effect, redirected to the subnational level" (ibid: 105). 
16 The notion of revolutionary technical development, such as the Industrial Revolutions between the 18th and 
19th century or the quick rise of information technologies at the end of the 20 th century and a gradual 
perspective on the history of human life is not necessarily contradictory. "The history of life [ ... ] is a series 
of stable states, punctuated at rare intervals by major events that occur with great rapidity and help to 
establish the next stable era" (Gould 1980, quoted in Castells 1996:29). 
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effects of these forces are in shaping local development and change and what exactly the 
impacts of and relationships between these processes might be. A starting point might be to 
recognise that local economic change is best understood through the incorporation of 
different analytical levels; the peculiarity of the locality with its inherited set of socio-
spatial formations and the meta narrative of global/macro-regional integration affecting a 
particular place. Both characterisations and processes are necessary to understand the local 
transformations and impacts of a wider economic change, because impacts are different 
and depend on the specific contexts of place. An analysis of the relationship between these 
forces, their balance and meaning in local socio-economic processes is an important way in 
which to understand why places develop differently. Moreover, the "multi-sited 
articulation of economic and non-economic practices" (Smith 2004:22) has the potential to 
deliver a "non-centred ontology of European regional economies" (ibid:21) and thus 
provide evidence that helps to explain the diverse developments on this continent. 
It is not enough simply to conclude that places are unique and develop differently, but is 
also necessary to specify the nature of that uniqueness and to gain an understanding of the 
reasons for the divergent processes of uneven development that generate it. Through this 
analytical process a number of implications and opportunities emerge. Not only will the 
spatial analysis of peculiarity help to explain how a particular place 'works', but it will also 
make it possible to identify some of the reasons for 'unsuccessful' development, or more 
positively, the areas in which action might be taken to build a balanced social and 
economic fabric. But an acceptance of the importance of peculiarity also means that it is 
necessary to recognise that only a locally adapted set of prerequisites is capable of 
delivering success. Moreover, the analysis of a specific set of local political-economic 
regimes also creates an understanding of how a place fits into global/macro-regional 
networks of production by highlighting local potentials and resources on the one side and 
shortcomings on the other. In this way the nature of a place relates both to itself and to the 
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world outside, as it is affected by it. In stressing the uniqueness of place, the author 
acknowledges that broader generalisations of social, economic and cultural change are 
possible and necessary for understanding the varieties of human endeavour, embedded in 
"space-time as a configuration of social relations within which the specifically spatial may 
be conceived of as an inherently dynamic simultaneity" (Massey 1994:3). The 'specifically 
spatial' in this thesis is analysed as a peculiar set of continuously recombined formal and 
informal institutions, which shape the transformation processes in post-socialist societies, 
but might only be observed there in a more intense and dynamic articulation than in other 
capitalist contexts. 
After the end of the cold war and the breakdown of nearly all communist regimes in 
Central and East Europe, many observers have sought to assess the transformation process 
of the last fifteen years. Many scientific studies have been produced within which the 
whole bloc of CEE states is scrutinised according to the economic, social, and political 
changes that have taken place since 1989. These macro-spatial narratives of transformation 
neglect the fact that the quantity and quality of change between the former socialist states 
is different because of the different starting points that were already defined in the socialist 
period. Moreover, a comparison of whole states (or even macro-regions as is done in 
World Bank publications) carries with it the danger that considerable sub-national 
peculiarities and processes that diverge from the national standard will be neglected. Thus, 
it is also necessary to investigate transformation at local and regional levels, not only to 
give evidence that 'place matters' but to show that different places behave in different 
ways and therefore need different approaches for managing change. But the specificity of 
local development like that in the old industrial areas, is understood particularly poorly and 
one might ask how evolutionary and institutional approaches can contribute to a better 
understanding. What aspects of the economic transformation are specifically path-
dependant as 'post-socialist'? Which result rather from the general decline of Fordist mass 
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production (,structural change'), which has been described as ' time-lagged ' in the case of 
Map 1: Poland 
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1.2.1 Reflection on the Research Process 
Institutional and evolutionary approaches are powerful In challenging the neo-liberal 
project and give important ontological evidence to explain and to understand the 
implications of economic transformation in CEE. They analyse what is typically absent in 
neo-c1assical mainstream studies: socialist institutional legacies and their meaning in ' post-
socialist' contexts, recombined economic-political networks embedded in local and 
regional settings or path-dependent technological change. When neo-liberal analysis 
17 The post-Fordist meta narrative takes into account that the former socialist countries run through a process 
of de-industrialisation - similar to the western world since the 1970s - after the collapse of the Warsaw 
Treaty countries. In this view the transformation can be traced back to the wider shifts in the world economy, 
the intensification of international competition or the acceleration of tertiarisation. Agglomerations fulfil the 
economy's need for an increasing flexibility of production in uncertain times through the proximity of 
possible transaction partners. The results of this structural change are said to lead to the flexible 
specialisation of firms with consequences for space and place and the emergence of post-Fordist urban 
economies. Although the post-Fordist hypothesis is more concerned with 'hard' transactions, such as the 
input-output relations of firms and formal institutions which are necessary within this process, this approach 
has a strong link to space as an important element of economic change. 
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focuses on macro-structures, evolutionary research in particular emphasises the importance 
of local or regional economic micro- and meso-structures. 
Although this focus is legitimate and necessary as a powerful counter theoretical approach 
to challenge the 'one size fits all' neo-liberal project, the neglect of the national scale can 
be problematic, because it sets the political and economic framework of localised 
transformation. Moreover, the micro/meso perspective at least carries with it the danger of 
overlooking international economic currents, which increasingly influence localities, as it 
is suggested in the term of' glocalisation' (Swyngedouw 1992, 1997). On the other hand, it 
seems to be nearly impossible to encompass all geographical scales in a single research 
project capable of understanding the full range of spatial transitions and transformations. 
However, at the very least, research in CEE at a local or regional level should reflect 
macro-scale aspects in trying to analyse the connectivity. competitive potentials and 
economic leeway of localities in a 'shrinking' world. This point is particularly relevant to 
the countries of CEE, because of their completely different mode of production in the past, 
inherited institutions and their increasing openness and integration into the EU and global 
production chains. 
Although institutional and evolutionary analysis has been applied to the study of micro- or 
meso-structures, such as political and economic networks, and has the potential of 
understanding the relevance of place and space on this scale, some authors suggest that this 
analytical scale is still not sufficient to understand local transformations and 'unexpected 
behaviour' of actors and citizens. Instead of studying economic local processes, authors 
such as Burawoy and Verdery argue for the analysis of the everyday life of people who are 
affected by economic change. 
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"These descriptions come close to the micro foundations (if the new economic order, but even they fail to 
grasp theoretically the specijicity of the transition as a process. A focus on the day-to-day realities of 
postsocialism reveals a much more ambiguous account (if the tramformation announced with suchfanfare by 
theories of modernisation and afmarkets and democratic transition" (BurawoylVerdery 1999:6). 
From this perspective, it is only possible to understand the procedural depth 'on the 
ground' by drawing on the perception of the 'locals', who have to cope with economic 
decline, but who also have the ability to set up survival strategies and resistance to 
transitional processes. The value of developing an ethnographic 'bottom-up' account 
should not be underestimated but is a challenge for geographical research in CEE. 
Moreover, an emphasis of people's ability to resist change includes a rejection of the 
'grand narratives' of capitalist development, either from a neo-liberal perspective or an 
institutional one, which both believe in economic, technological or institutional 
modernisation, but have different recipes and starting points. The account of 'geographies 
of resistance' is important, if applied on specific places, like old industrial areas, both in 
east and western Europe. 
However, in contrast to Buroway and Verdery, it is not clear that either these general 
abilities to resist neo-liberal transition or the search for strategies of survival are 
specifically post-socialist. While it might be conceded that there are specific forms of 
resistance in certain communities or that particular survival strategies occur at the 
household level in the countries of CEE, old industrial areas in all Europe have been or still 
are populated by social groups, such as (ex) miners or steelworkers, and they, too, have a 
long history of organising labour interests as well as a distinct understanding of solidarity 
and protest which gives them a capacity to resist or to initiate change. This sort of 
resistance might provide evidence for the emergence of social movements, the struggle for 
economic justice and democratic participation in the process of systemic change. But the 
portrayal of the striking and street-fighting miner as a resistance fighter against 
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'globalisation' and capitalist transition falls short as a means of comprehending the 
complex shifts of post-socialist power and redistribution and in particular the loss of 
political influence and economic privileges for workers of the former socialist model 
industries. While the analysis of labour relations is crucial for understanding ongoing 
transformations in the countries of CEE, there is a risk that a one-sided romantic 
juxtaposition of labour and capital may distract attention from the enormous formal and 
informal institutional changes, which are also being faced by the new 'profit-maximising' 
entrepreneur and political-economic networks. From this perspective, the 'emergent' 
capitalist is seen as an economic actor who tries to cope with a quickly changing business 
environment with the application of strategies, skills and routines deriving from the old 
socialist regime and recombined with well-known features of a capitalist system. 
A similar question relates to the specific impact of post-socialist economic transformation 
and its connection to what has been labelled as 'globalisation'. While both processes are 
closely interconnected, mutually reinforcing each other, it is important to avoid seeing 
'globalisation' as an inevitable 'natural' phenomenon. In this thesis, therefore, the 
increasing internationalisation of capital will be analysed when political and economic 
actors address this issue and thus reveal specific interests and discourses in the process of 
neo-liberal 'transition'. 18 From this perspective, "the state continues to participate in 
capital's internationalization in order to reproduce itself' (Yeung 1998:293), rather than 
itself being faced with inexorable decline in the face of inevitable globalisation. 
In order to explore the range of aspects, problems, and necessities in geographical research 
in east European old industrial areas, which have been discussed above, an attempt will be 
18 In this thesis, the use of the term globalisation will be limited to its meaning as an increasing interweaving 
of multinational capital and the resulting power of definition of how 'the economy' becomes fit for stiff 
competition in international markets. In other words, 'globalisation', rather than capturing the learning 
processes of actors and regions in becoming 'capitalist' and competitive on international markets, is used to 
point to neo-liberal actors and their account of radical 'transition' in CEE. 
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made to analyse locally embedded economic and political actors and networks with all 
their historical and cultural idiosyncrasies. In what follows 'economic transformation' is 
understood both as an ongoing process of shifting social relations and the emergence of 
new actors struggling for influence and power. In using institutionalist and evolutionary 
approaches, it is acknowledged that the process of transformation has to be seen in a 
historical and cultural context, embedded in social relations and framed by specific spatial 
identities. This spatial peculiarity creates a place-bounded form of transformation, 
providing evidence of a broad range of diversity and variety in this process. 
However, the difficulty of exploring the full range of informal as well as formal 
institutions through fieldwork needs to be recognised. The status of a 'western' researcher 
in former socialist countries is difficult, as in any research conducted in unfamiliar cultural 
contexts, in particular if one's focus lies on informal institutions, such as unwritten rules, 
routines and habits. But the severity of deciphering cultural codes may also be partly 
balanced with some of the advantages of being an outsider. Access to some of the high-
profile interviews conducted in the research process, such as those with Hula Kalowice, 
Kompania W~glowa, Opel and Fiat Polska, were only possible because of the author's 
outsider status, as Polish-based researchers are not yet able to penetrate these 
organisations. 19 While the effectiveness of reading in between the lines might occasionally 
be misleading, the outsider perspective at least creates the potential for identifying crucial 
aspects which have been overlooked by 'indigenous' researchers, because they take certain 
socio-cultural norms and formations for granted. Moreover, the stranger is often perceived 
as rather unchallenging and naive by the insiders being interviewed. This makes it possible 
to ask uncomfortable questions and may result in answers which are more frank and 
expository, because the foreign interviewer is handled with more care and it is understood 
that more explanation may be required. 
19 This has been claimed by Richard Woodward, Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw (CASE), 
in an informal talk in summer 2003. 
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As a researcher with German nationality, undertaking research in former German 
territories is not without its complications and there is a danger of exposing oneself to the 
risk of being seen negatively, particularly expressed through reflections on 'Polishness" 
'Silesianness' and 'Germanness', even though areas such as Upper Silesia have been 
Polish for more than 80 or 60 years. The fact that the author conducted research with a 
British university affiliation (providing the label of 'Britishness') has enormously helped 
not only in terms of formulating questions, which would have been different if asked in a 
German or Polish research context, but in terms of subjective and objective distance from 
the research field, helping to shape how Polish interviewees perceived the author and vice 
versa. The research process has hugely shaped and emotionally contributed to shaping the 
author's European identity, moving beyond the 'German'. 
The following section of the introduction identifies first some departure points for 
conceptualising economic transformation in post-socialist contexts and seeks to integrate 
these processes into broader debates of geographical inquiry. This effort leads to a 
preliminary set of research questions, a substantiation of the case study, an overview about 
the theoretical design, and an outline of the main chapters of this thesis. 
1.2.2 A Case Study in G6rny Slqsk: Theoretical Design 
Storper's concept of the 'holy trinity' can be seen as one of the most powerful articulations 
of the 'heterodox paradigm' in economic geography (Storper 1997) since its emergence, 
with Massey's seminal work - "Spatial Divisions of Labour" (1984) - which breaks 
economic development in regions, nations, and on a global level into a series of empirical 
and theoretical dimensions with the aim of formulating a problem-oriented multi-level 
explanation for growth and decline. 
22 
Storper's work offers an analytical framework for conceptualising spatial-economic 
change and the heterogeneous structures of labour and capital. He sets out to construct an 
integrated theory of economic space consisting of the interrelations between 
organisational, technological, and geographical spaces. Storper argues that there is an 
important association between social learning and spatial agglomeration, which has two 
main roots. The first of these is localised economic input-output relations, articulated as 
'traded interdependencies', and the second, 'untraded interdependencies' between actors, 
which mediate processes of economic and organisational learning and encompass, for 
example, rules of action, customs and norms, understandings and values (see ibid: 19). 
In contrast to preViOUS attempts to conceptualise economies of space he calls for the 
analytical integration of untraded interdependencies, their conventional and relational 
qualities and the ways in which these conventions and relations organise traded 
transactions and learning. A main driving force of this interpretation of the nature of 
capitalism lies in its new meta-capacities such as the technological revolution in 
production, the rise of information and communication technologies, the extension and 
social deepening of market relations and the application of sophisticated organisational 
management qualities in firms (see Storper 1997:28-29). The analytical focus lies 
"( .. .) on how individual and collective reflexivity operate in the contemporary economy, through cognitive, 
dialogic and interpretative processes, with the substantive goal of understanding how relations of 
coordination between reflexive agents and organisations are established ( .. .). The learning economy is 
therefore an ensemble of competitive possibilities, reflexive in nature, engendered by capitalism's new 
metacapacities, as well as the risks or constraints manufactured by the reflexive learning of others" (Storper 
J 997: 3 J .. original emphasis). 
Storper identifies worlds of production and innovation which incorporate the relationships 
of one of the principal motors of changing territorial patterns (technology) with 
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organisations (firms). This sub-world conceptualises the conditions of the rise and fall of 
new products with a definition of physical and intellectual possibilities on the one side 
(technology) and the institutional possibilities for an economic implementation in a 
feasible manner (organisations). The regional worlds of innovation focus on the 
relationship and conditions of innovation (technology) and its spatio-economic diffusion 
(territory). This geography of innovation is shaped by collective private and public co-
ordination which highly depends on the specific locality and its capacity to organise the 
localisation of knowledge and learning. The regional worlds of production acknowledge 
that organisations shape space through their locational behaviour, but in turn, that 
organisations are also shaped by territorial institutions. What emerges is a localised 
relational environment of untraded interdependencies based around sets of economic and 
social conventions. 
The thesis aims to explore the extent to which Storper's interpretation of the 'reflexive 
turn' in the interrelations of organisations, technologies and territories is applicable to old 
industrial districts in post-socialist settings. The assumption, however, is that the 
specificity of the post-socialist transformation process produces considerably different 
balances and meanings within this 'holy trinity' than in mature capitalist contexts. 
Although Storper's assumptions and empirical work are based mainly on western 
experiences, in particular new industrial districts, the aim is to show that his open concept 
of economic spaces is helpful in exploring change in the new capitalist territories. Yet the 
application of the 'western-tested' concept means that his approach must be adjusted to the 
account of the specificity of post-socialist transformations and transitions.20 In particular, 
20 Roberts (2004) is right to highlight the conceptual stretching of the tenn 'socialism', describing at the same 
time eastern totalitarian (or at least authoritarian) regimes and western social democracies, spanning "the 
spectrum from Stalin to Fran~ois Mitterrand" (Roberts 2004:357), which usage "has grown to mean 
everything and therefore nothing" (ibid:361). Nevertheless, in this thesis socialism with the prefix 'post-' will 
be used in a rather pragmatic way, acknowledging that communism as a utopian dream and ideology was at 
no point reached in history. Instead, the tenn rather points to 'real existing socialism' in (fonner) Soviet-style 
regimes with its incomplete and sometimes contradictory institutions, such as the single mass party led by 
one person, the high degree of centralisation and hierarchy, the state-ownership of the means of production, 
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the relevance of power relations in addition to social, historical and cultural processes in 
the realm of 'the economy', all have to be refocused when conceptualising institutional 
change in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Upper Silesia (G6rny Sl,!sk) is a region where the transfonnation process represents a 
major challenge, not only for Poland, but for the whole of Europe and its ongoing 
integration process since the end of the Cold War. The rich and complex history of (Upper) 
Silesia mirrors the imperialistic era of Europe in a spatial microcosm, as a territorial bone 
of contention over the centuries, becoming subject of 'internal colonisation' and 
exploitation (Kiihnemann 1993; Cybula 2004).21 The history of this peripheral 'border 
region' shows how it has had to integrate and accommodate itself more than once into new 
political and economic realities (see W6dz 1993; Cordell 1995; Riley/Tkocz 1999). The 
intricate historical context and the region's economic identity as one of the remaining but 
fading, old industrial power houses of Europe has generated pessimistic estimations about 
its future and its status as a peripheral and 'backward' area. As Blasiak et al. suggest, the 
or the commitment to revolution and massive transformation of existing society. For a discussion of 
pluralism in Poland before and after the fall of state socialism and the question of whether the People's 
Republic should best be understood as authoritarian or totalitarian, see G6rski 2002. 
21 In this thesis it is acknowledged that 'regions' "are 'made' and 'constructed' as much in imagination as in 
material form and that though entity-like, regions crystallize out as a distinctive form from some mix of 
material, social and mental processes" (Harvey 200 I :225). For a historical account of Silesia as a microcosm 
of central Europe, see Norman Davies' seminal case study of the city of Wroclaw/Breslau (Davies 2003). 
The political and administrative borders of (Upper) Silesia have changed frequently over time, in particular 
over the last 250 years. After the downfall of the three European empires - Germany, Austro-Hungary and 
Russia - at the end of the First World War and Poland's achievement of independence - for the first time 
since the 18th century - parts of the ceded territories of the dissolving empires (which spatially met each other 
at the 'three emperors' triangle', at today's Myslowice) - became the Polish G6my Shtsk (Cybula 2004:226-
245; see also maps in KUhnemann 1993:263). Thus, the usage of 'Upper Silesia' (in German 'Oberschlesien') 
today often indicates a blurred historical region rather than a clearly defined territory and is frequently linked 
to certain separatist or reactionary political circles, both in Poland and Germany. In this thesis, G6my 
SlltSklUpper Silesia is roughly defined as the highly industrialised agglomeration belt between the city of 
Gliwice in the west and D'lbrowa G6micza in the east (approx. 22 miles I 35km air line), although this 
(functional) definition excludes historically associated rural parts (e.g. in today's Voivodship of Opole) and 
includes historically non-associated parts (e.g. the D/tbrowa Basin), it is consistent with the area defined for 
planning purposes under the socialist regime as GOP (G6moslltSki Okr~g Przemyslowy - Upper Silesian 
Industrial Area). Today, this agglomeration is administratively situated in the Voivodship (province) of 
Silesia (Wojew6dztwa Slltskiego). 
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"( .. . ) Silesian syndrome - that is, serious degradation of the regional natural environment system, technical, 
socio-cultural and also political systems is frequently sa id to be the consequence of internal colonisation 
processes. ( ... ) In these unfavourable circumstances, the long grounded peripheral position of a country and a 
region and the mimetic development ( . .. ) serves to worsen the unfavourable economic, political, social and 
cultural effects and tendencies" (BlasiaklNawrocki/Szczepanski 1994: 18+20). 
Map 2: The Core Industrial Area of Upper Silesia (w/o Gliwice) 
Cl 
Source: Mapa Samochodowa Polski. Warszawa: PPWK, 1992. Exact Scale Unknown, ca. 46km WE and 25km NS 
Without any doubt, the extension of the European Union, the early opening of domestic 
and world markets in the progression of shock-therapy not only influenced this region, but 
changed it dramatically. As a result of the second industrial revolution in the 19th century 
and a further intensification of heavy industrial production during the socialist period, 
Upper Silesia is one of the most industrialised and agglomerated areas in Europe today. 
The change from a state-planned economy to a capitalist system of production has had 
serious impacts on the overall socio-economic fabric of the region. The regional and local 
economies are in a process of dramatic restructuring, reorganisation and reconfiguration 
"1, 
which highlights the importance of investigating the nature of the transformation in this 
'difficult' but also extraordinary and interesting place. 
The difficult restructuring process in Upper Silesia leads to an ongoing decay of sectoral 
spatial-economic activities, particularly of heavy industry and its associated businesses. 
The question arises then, which of the old economic sectors are capable of restructuring 
themselves in order to become competitive in domestic and international markets and how 
is such restructuring to be realised? Which of these businesses will completely vanish and 
what kind of economic activities will emerge? Thus, an attendant focus of the thesis lies in 
the identification of the potential for a (post-) heavy industrial future. This focus also leads 
to a consideration of how this region fits into the global/macro-regional system of capitalist 
production and what role its specific combination of institutional, economic and social 
factors will play within this wider game. Moreover, this analysis also leads also to an 
identification of the extent of economic and political leeway in shaping its future. 
In analysing the realm of 'the political' and 'the economic', the thesis follows a two-tier 
strategy, although it is, of course, questionable whether such a clear-cut distinction is 
always possible or desirable, in particular in analysing the countries of CEE. As already 
indicated, the main analytical framework employed in the thesis draws on Storper's 
concept of the holy trinity; which guides the work, but is modified as felt necessary. 
Informed by Storper's work the thesis has two main aims. 
First, it aims to analyse the interrelated 'worlds' organised around the competition over 
products and between organisations (mainly firms), technology and territory. This 
combines the worlds of production and innovation (between organisations and 
technology), the regional worlds o/innovation (between technology and territories) and the 
regional worlds 0/ production (between organisations and territories). In contrast to 
27 
traditional analyses of specific industrial sectors and their input/output relations, this thesis 
is working towards a rather broad if not completely comprehensive understanding of the 
different layers of economic development. The transformation process is mainly perceived 
as an informal institutional change, which is guiding socio-economic relations in a given 
territory. In this thesis, the city region of Upper Silesia (administratively integrated in the 
Voivodship of Silesia) as an economic space has been conceptualised as "open, 
discontinuous, relational and internally diverse. ( ... ) a construction in space-time: a 
product of a particular combination and articulation of social relationships stretched over 
space" (AllenlMassey/Cochrane 1998: 143). This means that in contrast to more 
conventional analyses, a definition of the region is employed, which allows the narrative of 
multiple, open-ended and sometimes apparently contradictory processes - perceived as the 
provisional outcome of human association and conflict over space and time. 
The economically transformational nature of this region has created a set of divergent 
actors. These emerged from the socialist legacy as well as the historical industrial base of 
the 19th and 20th century. The former socialist and state-owned flagships of heavy 
industrial development are still detennining the overall economic character of the region, 
although they are in a process of ongoing restructuring, closing-down, or privatisation. 
Besides this 'old industrial', smoke-stacked and mono-structural heritage of coal and steel 
production, the region has been faced with intense foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
global players, in particular from the automotive sector. Additionally, the establishment of 
private small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been flourishing since the early 
1990s, a development which has been constantly supported by local, regional and supra-
national authorities, in particular with reference to the sector of 'knowledge industries'. 
The different historical layers of industrial production have evolved particular sets of 
spatial divisions of labour and certain forms of spatial inequality, each of which produce 
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spatial effects and overlay old 'rounds' of investment. Consequently, they prepare the 
ground for new 'rounds' of inward investment. Altogether, this has methodical 
implications, because "In any empirical work ( ... ) it is necessary both to analyse this 
complexity and to isolate and identify those particular divisions which are dominant in 
reshaping the spatial structure" (Massey 1994 [1979] :52). These particular divisions, the 
different rounds and historical layers of investment are represented in this research by a: 
• Focus on 'old industries' (e.g. coal and steel), still state assets or prior to 
privatisation, sometimes unprofitable mass production. 
• Focus on 'new economies' (e.g. IT), highly technological and knowledge-based 
oriented and their systems of support. 
• Focus on industries at the interface between 'new' and 'old' modes of 
production, innovation-oriented and knowledge-based respectively but still 
producing material commodities (e.g. automotive) for export markets, thus 
world market oriented. 
Examples of these diverse players, their intra- and inter-relational 'ways of doing business' 
are covered in this thesis through the analysis of their economic routines, norms of conduct 
and cultural-historic, recombinant approaches towards becoming part of capitalist networks 
and their material and immaterial flows of products, ideas, skills and information (chapter 
5). The cities of Upper Silesia and the region as a whole are in this perspective conceived 
as "moments in spaces of flows, as relational places entangled in webs of connections" 
(Smith 2004:9). 
Second, the thesis also engages with the change of formal institutions and the political 
process guiding economic transitions and transformations. In the case of Upper Silesia and 
the Voivodship of Silesia, this process encompasses the emergence of new institutions, 
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such as an elected regional parliament and its administration, elected mayors, and the 
setting-up of local and regional agencies and organisations supporting, advising, and 
lobbying industrial restructuring and economic strategies of the region. These actors and 
their underlying institutional network of action are conceived as important, because they 
set a spatially bounded political-economic framework which co-defines the region's 
identity, but also its prospects of overcoming its alleged peripheral and economically 
'backward' character. Moreover, the political process of devolution of authorities leading 
to de-centralisation can be seen as a major driving force of democratisation in the 
aftermath of an over-centralised bureaucracy during state socialism, which is also a 
prerequisite for Poland's accession to the 'Europe of Regions'. Thus, the analysis of 
regionally based institutions is undertaken to provide evidence of the diversity of 
transformations, neo-liberal transitions and the political struggle which takes place for the 
power to define and so how to shape the economic future. The representation of this future 
and spatial identity to a wider audience is not limited to the region itself, but includes 
possible investors from outside as well as, of course, foreign researchers. While dealing 
with constructed spatial and interest-led identities, the observer is at least required to be 
cautious in interpreting space/time, as Harvey might suggest. 
"Being, suffused with immemorial spatial memory. transcends Becoming (. . .) Is this the foundation for 
collective memory. for all those manifestations of place-bound nostalgias that infect our images of the 
country and the city, of region, milieu, and locality ( ... ) And if it is true that time is always memorialized not 
as flow. but as memories of experienced places and spaces, then history must indeed give way to poetry. time 
to space (. .. )" (Harvey 1989:218). 
In this research, the topic of spatial identities and the linked political process is mirrored by 
the struggle for economic concepts, visions, and projects which have been developed since 
the establishment of the elected regional administration (the so called Marshal's Office) in 
the late 1990s and their impact on firms, technological innovations and the overall 
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development of the region. Besides this, inherited institutions such as the Voivod (the State 
Governor) and other organisations will be analysed regarding their interplay and 
compatibility with new structures. Here too, the relational and multi-scale nature of 'doing 
politics' will be analysed, not only on the regional level, but also at a local level with case 
studies in some major cities of Upper Silesia (chapter 6). In doing this, the thesis aims to 
explore the specific nature of the urban political-economic, post-socialist regime. In 
summary, the thesis analyses the effects and roles of old and new urban/regional formal 
institutions within the process of restructuring and tries to identify the specific (power) 
relations (in)between public and private actors and their networks, as well as their 
underlying set of informal institutions, such as economic and political routines and norms 
of conduct. 
For this reason, the empirical focus of the research is the urban and regional elites and 
decision makers (Cochrane 1998). These sets of economic and political actors shape the 
ongoing process of economic transformation in Upper Silesia. To support and inform the 
semi-structured in-depth interviews with CEOs, managers, politicians, civil servants, 
lobbyists, and other regional or local elites, strategy papers and other official material have 
been analysed (Schoenberger 1991, 1992; McDowell 1992).22 
22 In total, about 60 interviews have been conducted. Any material used in the thesis is marked with 'INT:' 
followed by the name of the interviewee and the date. 51 interviews have been recorded with a conventional 
dictaphone, more than 60 hours of data. In ca. nine cases either the interviewees rejected the use of a tape 
recorder or in a few cases the recording failed for technical reasons. Sometimes interviewees rejected the use 
of a tape recorder in the course of an interview, or I offered to turn the dictaphone off, in particular when 
sensitive information was given. Comprehensive notes were taken of all interviews and have additionally 
informed the transcriptions and the interpretation of the data. A good part of the data has been transcribed, in 
particular 'key interviews', which have been used for direct quotation, and non-transcribed data has also been 
used in order to strengthen arguments. Most interviews were conducted between May and July 2003, either in 
English, Polish or German (decreasing frequency), sometimes with professional interpreters or with the help 
of (voluntary) assistants of the organisation within which the interview was taking place. As neither I, nor the 
interviewees were native English speakers, considerable effort has been placed on ensuring the accuracy of 
particular sensitive or significant information during interviews held either with or without interpreters or 
assistants. Direct quotations in the text have only been slightly corrected regarding their grammatical and 
semiotic correctness, in order to preserve the idiom and to understand the content. All interviews in the 
Polish language were conducted with the help of interpreters or assistants, as my command of the Polish 
language is still insufficient for that level of communication. Surprisingly, a number of the interviewees 
offered me the opportunity to conduct the interview in German. 
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Chapter 2 introduces the main theoretical framework of the thesis, which is informed by 
the vast literature of institutionalism and evolutionary approaches. In particular the latter 
strand has been identified as important in terms of a relevant geographical perspective on 
(regional) economic change, innovation and 'learning'. This chapter will also introduce 
into Storper's holy trinity approach and preliminary ideas how to interpret these 
ontological elements for the case of 'newly emerging markets'. Chapter 3 is dedicated to 
the 'post-socialist city' and tries to combine recent efforts to conceptualise (economic) 
transformation in former socialist countries and the latest approaches in urban theory. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview and the 'hard facts' about economic development and 
processes in Poland and Upper Silesia respectively. Additionally, this chapter introduces 
the specific regional questions of restructuring, devolution of authorities and the main 
historical implications guiding and shaping the transformation process and the emergence 
of its institutions. Chapter 5 - the first of two chapters mainly informed by the author's 
fieldwork and interviews - seeks to develop an insight into the currents of economic 
transformation processes, seen from the perspective of actors in the steel and coal industry 
(the state-owned sector), emerging small and middle-sized companies or global 
corporations and the network of organisations involved in regional economic restructuring. 
Chapter 6 provides evidence of the diverse local developments in selected Upper Silesian 
cities and the historical legacies which are politically used to redefine the region's 
economic identity. It will be argued that this process is characterised by a struggle for 
economic and political power and gives reason to speak of an emerging competitive and 
capitalist urban environment. Chapter 7 is dedicated to bringing together the theoretical 
strands and arguments of the research. In doing so, the chapter presents an overview of the 
main outcomes of the thesis and suggests the argument that economic transformation in 
post-socialist territories might be interpreted as an 'invention of a capitalist region'. 
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One significant outcome of the research is the argument that economic, social and spatial 
change does not take the same forms or find the same expression world wide. Most 
certainly, place matters because of the persistence of locally embedded sets of relations and 
conventions and their historical and cultural prerequisites. The case study in Upper Silesia 
also produces knowledge about the specificity and nature of post-socialist economic and 
spatial processes in contrast to western experiences. Furthermore, the thesis shows that the 
distinction between west ('capitalist') and east (,post-socialist') Europe is artificial or 
overstated. Increasingly, such a division, it is suggested, will become obsolete, as both 
economic spaces become ever more interdependently entangled. 
33 
2 Institutional Economic Change and SpacefTime 
uring the two centuries since the publication of Adam Smith's "The Wealth of 
D Nations", neo-classical economists have been engaged in identifying and filling the gaps in the classical framework with the process of abstract analysis 
and the application of complicated mathematical models with an increasingly narrow focus 
on the determination of prices: the emphasis on approach of the 'invisible hand' of the 
market has encouraged the neglect of other aspects of the economic system, which govern 
the process of exchange. The neo-classical theory analyses the system as one of 'extreme 
decentralisation' (H. Demsetz) with a focus on what happens in the market, such as the 
acquisition of factors of production and sales of the goods that these factors produce. It has 
no interest in the internal arrangements of the organisations and institutions involved or 
their change over time, although with his exploration of the 'invisible hand' Smith 
effectively acknowledges that the interests of individuals generate unintended social 
outcomes (see Rutherford 1996:83-84). In practice, therefore, he also acknowledges the 
existence of social phenomena which are not the result of - for instance - positive 
legislation (formal institutions), but of human interaction and agency. 
The main ontological assumptions of orthodox neo-classical theory include a belief in the 
rational behaviour of individuals which collectively generates a tendency towards the 
general eqUilibrium of economic processes. The economic world is generally modelled 
mathematically without any reference to transport costs or the role of place, space and time 
(Krugman 2000:49).23 As Coase puts it, "What is studied is a system which lives in the 
minds of economists but not on earth" (Coase 1992:714). In other words, it can be 
23 Despite a "peaceful revolution" (Krugman 2000:49) of mainstream economics during the 1980s and the 
emergence of (mathematically-based) 'New Economic Geography' (NEG) in the 1 990s, which acknowledged 
e.g. imperfect competition and multiple equilibria, it is no exaggeration to state that "geographical 
economists" (the exponents of NEG) have remained rather indifferent to the cultural/relational turn of 
"economic geographers proper" and their emphasis on non-market transactions and institutions (Overman 
2004). 
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summarised as determinist, reductionist, ahistoric, and teleologic (Barnes 1997:233-234). 
One reaction to the apparent gap between the theories of neo-classical marginalist 
economics and the working of the economy in practice was the development of new 
approaches to economic thinking at the turn of the 20th century, which came to be labelled 
'institutional economics', a generic term that includes many different strands of thinking, 
including evolutionary economics. 
It is useful to distinguish between old and new institutional strands in the historical 
development of economic thinking (see Rutherford 1996). Both approaches are concerned 
to incorporate and understanding of the role of institutions in economics, but they differ 
significantly in philosophical and methodological orientation. What I have identified as the 
old institutionalist approach predominates in the US and draws on a tradition associated 
with authors such as Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell, John R. Commons, and Clarence 
Ayres. Within this old school of thought there are two research programmes of major 
theoretical significance. 
The first of these is associated with Veblen (1857-1929) who is - despite significant 
differences - with Schumpeter (1883-1950) one of the founding fathers of institutionalism 
and evolutionary economics. This approach is built around the identification of a 
fundamental dichotomy between the business or financial aspects and the industrial aspects 
of the economy. It focuses on investigating the effects of new technology on institutions 
and the ways in which established social conventions and interests resist change. These 
ideas encompass a view of the structure of the modem economy that stresses the political 
and economic power of large corporate interests (Rutherford 1996:2). Veblen's approach 
in contrast to the mathematically formal analysis of neo-classical theory bases itself on 
biological thinking and the attempt to conceptualise a 'post-Darwinist', evolutionary 
economic approach. In doing so, Veblen not only applies the principle of variation, as a 
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precondition of selection, to economIC processes, but also a genetic understanding of 
evolution which incorporates principles of heredity or continuity, and the struggle for 
existence (Hodgson 1993: 123-138).24 Veblen and some of his successors suggest that the 
units of selection in economic evolution are institutions, expressed as habits and routines, 
and argue that some of these institutions become extinct because they are not adapted to 
their socio-economic environment (ibid:48). In the last chapter of one of his major works, 
"The Theory of Business Enterprise", Veblen emphasises the provisional and procedural 
nature of institutions as well as the human interaction necessary for their formulation. 
"The institutional basis of business enterprise - the system of natural rights - appears to be a peculiarly 
unstable affair. There is no way of retaining it under changing circumstances, and there is no way of 
returning to it after circumstances have changed. It is a hybrid growth, a blend of personal freedom and 
equality on the one hand and of prescriptive rights on the other hand" (Veblen 1994 [1904]:375). 
The second strand within the old institutionalist school of thought is mainly associated 
with the writings of John R. Commons (1862-1945). This programme concentrates on law, 
property rights and organisations, their evolution and impact on legal and economic power, 
economic transactions, and the distribution of income. Here, institutions are seen largely as 
the outcome of formal and informal processes of conflict resolution, the criterion of 
success being whether the institution has generated "reasonable value" or "workable 
mutuality" out of conflict (Rutherford 1996: 144-146). This approach is in some ways 
complementary to the Veblen approach, which does not address the judicial and political 
processes of conflict resolution central to Commons' work, but there are tensions between 
them, especially reflected in Commons' rejection of any dichotomy between business and 
industry. Moreover, Commons widely rejected biological explanations in his major work 
24 In this respect Veblen's understanding of an evolutionary economy considerably varies from Schumpeter 
who in many of his writings draws from a developmental and not a genetic interpretation of evolution. 
Schumpeter dismissed an over-interpretation of biological-reductionist thinking in economics and regularly 
criticised the American tradition of institutional ism (Hodgson 200 I: 187-189). 
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"Institutional Economics", and noted that the comparison of society with an organism was 
a "false analogy" (Commons 1934, quoted in Hodgson 2001: 167). Instead, he stressed the 
importance of the subjective reasoning of individuals - not as isolated atoms, but socially 
related with others. Commons also emphasised 'customs' and the peculiarity of time-space 
in the process of institution building. 
"The subject-matter with which the economist deals (. . .) is human beings whose activities he can fairly well 
understand by putting himself 'in their place' and thus constructing 'reasons', in the sense of motives or 
purposes, or values, of their activity under all the variable conditions of time and space" (Commons 1934, 
quoted in Hodgson 2001: 168-169), 
In some ways, the Commons tradition of institutional thinking, his perspective on 
institutional change - and emphasis on transactions, property rights, and organisations 
embedded in historical processes, geographical locations and endowed with certain 
routines - has closer links with the new institutional economics than Veblen's approach. 
The new institutional economics IS just as disparate as the old. One major strand, 
associated with the work of Harold Demsetz and Richard A. Posner, lays emphasis on 
property rights (as Commons does) and common law. Another strand is concerned with 
public choice processes, rent seeking, and the impact of pressure groups on economic 
development, expressed, for example, in the work of Mancur Olson. A third important 
element is to be found in agency theory and the work on transactions costs, developed by 
Ronald H. Coase and later by Oliver E. WilIiamson (for an overview see Nelson 2002). 
Although the new institutionalism may at some points have lost earlier understandings of 
markets as social institutions - and developed an ahistorical perspective (Hodgson 
2001 :251) - many earlier and new elements of this interrelated theoretical thinking can be 
found combined in the institutional economic history of Douglass C. North, which is 
probably the most recent integrated approach (North 1990). Thus, the new institutionalism 
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has also made efforts to incorporate earlier Austrian and neo-Schumpetrian thinking, as 
well as the German historical school of the 19th century, to explain various types of 
institutional development and market processes (Gloria-Palermo 2002 [1999]). 
It would be wrong to conclude that the 'new thinking' generated a total opposition toward 
the neo-classical approach. Instead, neo-institutional economists appreciate the 
achievements of that theory in illuminating many aspects of the economic system and so 
seek to integrate the institutional approach into the "blackboard economy" (Coase 
1992:714) in order to build a more realistic and non-mathematical analysis of the industrial 
structure of production (Rutherford 1996:21-22; see also Zimbauer 2001).25 Moreover, 
institutional and evolutionary approaches help to identify the preconditions for innovation 
and economic development in less-favoured regions or cities, as every economic action is 
locally' embedded', a fact long neglected by standard economic theory. 
The different strands of institutional thinking have helped to generate a new pluralism in 
economics and an ongoing debate over the interrelationship of the Natural and the Social in 
explaining economic processes (Mirowski 1994). This process is conceived of as a 
"development of technologies, markets, and institutions as pathways whose historical 
trajectory is governed by the complex interplay between prevailing rules of social order, 
and the probing and experimental character of much economic behavior in the context of 
prior states of the system" (Scott/Storper 1992:5). In the following, I will develop an 
overview of some of the main aspects of institutional thinking in general, before moving 
on to provide a summary of evolutionary concepts (in Section 2.2) and introducing the 
main geographical implications of institutional and evolutionary theory (in Section 2.3). 
25 In fact, many authors who influenced the new institutional school have a neo-c1assical background or are 
architects of neo-classicism, such as Alfred Marshall. who wrote about different categories of firms. the 
importance of proximity in delivering external economies of scale. or the role of entrepreneurship as a 
guiding aspect of industrial progress (see Asheim 2000:414). Other authors. such as Friedrich A. Hayek, who 
are linked with institutionalism, are even protagonists ofneo-Iiberalism. 
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2.1 Elements of the Institutional Approach 
An early attempt to challenge mainstream economics with its mechanical, Cartesian 
economic view of static equilibrium and the imagery of the well informed and thus rational 
acting homo oeconomicus comes from Thorstein Veblen, an 'old institutionalist'. He 
sought to understand the action of individuals and firms with a perspective in which 
economic inertia and habit become interrupted by creativity and curiosity. Instead of 
assuming a linear economic development (like Schumpeter), he stresses a spiral (up- or 
downwards), circular economic process of 'cumulative causation', a concept that was later 
taken up by economic development theorists, such as Gunnar Myrdal in the 1950s (Myrdal 
1957}.26 In Veblen's article "Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science" (published in 
1919) he notes that 
"an evolutionary economics must be a theory of a process of cultural growth as determined by the economic 
interest, a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in terms of the process itself 
(Veblen 1919, quoted in CookelMorgan 1998: 197). 
He takes up a similar view to Joseph Schumpeter with his notion of 'the economy' as an 
evolutionary process. Where Veblen stresses the process of 'cultural growth' as a 
determinant of economic performance and institutional change, it is Schumpeter who 
describes technological innovation as a 'creative destruction' and both thus deliver a 
starting point for modern economical thought (Nelson 2002: 19). 27 Later articulations of an 
evolutionary theory of the firm, technological change and its underlying and procedural set 
of institutions form the main elements of this chapter. 
26 Originally, the 'circular causation' was introduced by Schmoller in 1900 (Hodgson 200 I: 116). 
27 Together with Schumpeter ('innovation and entrepreneurship'), other important authors who were directly 
engaged in this early discussion about 'non-economic' impacts on the economy are Max Weber ('protestant 
ethics and capitalism') and Frank H. Knight (,uncertainty and perceptiveness') (see Brouwer 2002). 
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2.1.1 Transaction Costs 
An important input into institutional economy came through the formulation of what was 
later called the transaction cost theory, developed by John R. Commons and Ronald H. 
Coase in the 1930s, and elaborated by Oliver E. Williamson in the 1970s and 80s. In "The 
Nature of the Firm" (1937) Coase identified 'transaction costs' which arise from 
negotiations between possible business partners, the procedures of contracting, mutual 
inspection, and arrangements to settle disputes between them. 28 At this time most 
economists were focused on the analysis of price systems and neglected the internal and 
external arrangements of firms or saw them as 'black boxes' in their research. Coase's 
main research question was focused on a contradiction: management, co-ordination, and 
planning are taken for granted within firms, so "Why was it needed if the pricing system 
provided all the coordination system?" (Coase 1992:715), as was assumed by his 
colleagues. The answer - that costs are evolving by using the pricing system and a firm can 
be described as an organisation which is founded to reduce these costs by efficient 
management and co-ordination - implies that in a competitive system, 
..... there would be an optimum of planning since a firm, that little planned society, could only continue to 
exist if it performed its coordination function at a lower cost than would be incurred if it were achieved by 
means of market transactions and also at a lower cost than this same function could be performed by another 
firm" (Coase 1992:716). 
In other words, the existence of transaction costs is the main reason for the existence of 
firms. Moreover, these costs also affect what goods and services are produced, because if 
the costs of making an economic exchange are higher than the expected profits, that 
exchange will not take place. It is the role of institutions to reduce these transaction costs 
28 In practical terms these are costs arising from "defining, protecting, and enforcing the property rights to 
goods" (North 1990:28), e.g. through banking. insurance. finance. accountants lawyers. wholesale, retailing 
etc. North notes that the total costs of production result from the sum of transaction and transformation costs. 
The latter costs accrue from "resource inputs of land. labor. capital involved ( ... ) in transforming the physical 
attributes ofa good" (ibid.). 
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to a minimum in order to strengthen economic activities and growth. This 'contractual 
approach' to the study of economic organisation is based on two behavioural assumptions: 
a bounded rationality (limits of what agents can know) and opportunism (the self-interest 
seeking agent). The key argument in this approach is that when exchanges between firms 
involve high transaction costs (e.g. through frequent 'uncertainty') these exchanges 
become transferred from markets to alternative governance structures, such as hierarchical, 
vertical structures or long-term-contracting (Cooke/Morgan 1998:14). A weakness of this 
approach is the assumption of given in- and outputs as well as technology. Although this 
concept helps to understand the organisational shape of a firm, it describes the firm only as 
a vehicle to reduce transaction costs, and not as a carrier of institutional change and 
innovation in spatial arrangements. 
Later efforts to elaborate transaction cost theory are mainly associated with Williamson, 
who aimed to develop an understanding of the internal organisation and function of firms 
and market structures, in particular vertically integrated production processes of larger 
corporations and alternative disintegrated input relations (through market transactions). 
From his perspective, the mode of organisation and hierarchy of production can be best 
understood as an internal effort minimising transaction costs, whereby a "set of 
transactions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relative 
efficiency of each mode" (Williamson 1975:8). Additional extensions of Williamson's 
approach focus on aspects of network embeddedness, time and trust in internal and 
external input/output relationships of firms and their suppliers, concepts which are taken 
up later in this chapter (BergerlNoorderhavenINooteboom 2002 [1995]). Williamson's 
approach has been widely taken up in geography, in particular in terms of an explanation 
of spatial clustering of firms, necessary for reducing (besides transport costs) transaction 
costs taking place between them (Scott 1988). Transaction cost economics has linked the 
theory of the firm with that of the production system and thus has "shown that the 
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geography of transaction costs helps explain agglomeration and spatial divisions of labor" 
(Storper 1997:35). Other observers are less enthusiastic, as Williamson's conception of 
markets and the "primeval identity" he gives them is said to have "robbed [them] of their 
historical, structural and institutional characters" (Hodgson 2001 :251 ).29 
2.1.2 Institutional Change 
Generally, institutions can be described as organisations which are endowed with authority 
"( ... ) to perform some specific tasks on behalf of society as a whole" (Castells 1996: 152). 
The economic historian Douglass C. North, a neo-institutionalist, emphasises a clearer 
distinction between organisations and institutions with an analogy from team sports: 
..... what must be clearly differentiated are the rules [institutions} from the players [organisations). The 
purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the objective of the team within that set of 
rules is to win the game- by a combination of skills. strategy. and coordination; by fair means and sometimes 
by foul means" (North 1990:4-5). 
Organisations can be political (parties, council etc.), economic (firms, unions etc.), social 
(churches, associations etc), or educational bodies (schools, universities etc.). They all 
depend heavily on the institutional framework and are influenced by it: institutions are 
" ... humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990:3) and can be 
formal (rules, legislation etc) or informal (conventions, codes of behaviour etc.), created or 
evolving, prohibiting or permitting (ibid:4), fundamental (e.g. a constitution) or secondary 
(by-laws, amendments etc.) (North 1971:122f). In North's view, institutions are important 
in understanding the source of agency in processes of co-ordination and co-operation for 
reasons of motivation, norms of behaviour, and stability. Motivations "structure incentives 
in human exchange, whether political, social or economic" (North 1990:3) - hence they 
29 Hodgson's statement targets Williamson's biblical claim that "in the beginning were markets" (Williamson 
1975:20). 
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shape actors' decisions as to whether it is in their mutual interests to co-operate. 30 It is 
useful to distinguish between soft institutions, such as patterns of economic behaviour, 
from hard institutions, such as written legislation. As institutions influence economic 
performance by creating costs of exchange (transaction costs) and production 
(transformation costs), economic bodies are interested in changing the institutional 
framework according to their objectives and interests, in particular in terms of profitability 
(North 1990: 118). Thus, there is not a simple one-way dependency of economic 
organisations, but an interaction which determine the opportunities in a society with 
changing institutions by time. 
In North's approach, one major role of institutions is to reduce the uncertainty involved in 
human interaction by structuring and simplifying exchanges and thus helping to enable the 
making of (limited) choices, because "The more complex and unique the issue we 
confront, the more uncertain the outcome" (North 1990:22). The reduction of uncertainty 
provides stability within particular systems across space and time and determine the 
opportunities in society, but it does not guarantee that formal and informal constraints are 
efficient in an economic sense (ibid:83). Economic organisations are created to take 
advantage of those opportunities, and as they evolve, they alter and aim at the changing of 
institutions, fuelled by changing relative prices or preferences, which are the most 
important sources driving this process (ibid:84).31 
30 North rejects rational choice theory which typically assumes that actors "posses cognitive systems that 
provide true models of the worlds about which they make choices ( ... )" (North 1990: 17; original emphasis). 
Instead, he advocates a behavioural model which integrates a) the motivation of humans and b) their 
strategies for deciphering the environment. Drawing from socio-biology, the evolutionary terms used 
underline the non-wealth maximising values of humans (in order to survive under certain circumstances) and 
the incomplete processing of information in the progression of decision making, a fact which leads to 
uncertainties and a limited choice set - or in other words to multiple equilibria where a number of solutions 
are possible and the outcome is indeterminate (see North 1990: 17-26). 
31 North mentions changes in factor prices such as changes in the ratio of land to labour, labour to capital, and 
capital to land. Other price changes include changes in the cost of information and changes in cost of 
technology (North 1990:84). 
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The complex process of institutional and technological change - "the basic keys to societal 
and economic evolution [exhibiting] the characteristics of path dependence" (North 
1990: 103) - is typically incremental in nature. North identifies wars, revolutions, conquest, 
and natural disasters as sources for 'discontinuous' institutional change as a consequence 
of radical change in the formal rules (ibid:89). But while the formal rules change, the 
informal constraints do not. 
"In consequence. there develops an ongoing tension between informal constraints and the new formal rules. 
as many are inconsistent with each other. ( .. .) Although a wholesale change in the formal rules may take 
place. at the same time there will be many informal constraints that have great survival tenacity because they 
still resolve basic exchange problems among participants. be they social. political. or economic. The result 
over time tends to be a restructuring of the overall constraints - in both directions - to produce a new 
equilibrium that isfar less revolutionary" (North 1990:91). 
This raises a number of general questions concerning the path of historical change in 
different societies. What explains and what accounts for the divergence and gap between 
rich and poor nations? How have these nations, regions, or cities diverged? (see North 
1990:92). An 'institutional answer' to the question of why there are economies which are 
not successful can be found in the interaction between organisations and institutions which 
shape the path of institutional change: the resultant path of institutional change is shaped 
by the lock-in of the resultant organisations as a result of the dependence on that 
institutional framework. 32 
32 The term lock-in was originally introduced by Arthur (1989) who observed that technology develops along 
pathways or trajectories. The choices and decisions made in this process are often irreversible although the 
outcomes may be unpredictable. This technological pathway can lead as a consequence of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms to an inferior product or even to a blind alley - a lock-in from which it is difficult to escape (see 
North 1990:94). Both, 'path dependency' and 'lock-in' can also be applied to the analysis of institutional 
change (and not only technological change). In geography these evolutionary terms have been taken up in 
general to explain "how the future development of an economic system is affected by the path it has traced in 
the past" (Grabher/Stark 1997:535) and in particular the implications for technological change in regional 
economies (Storper 1997: 18-22). 
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..... (I) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organi=ations that 
have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions and (2) the feedback 
process by which human beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set" (North 1990: 7). 
A question which flows from this analysis is which economic spaces are affected by these 
lock-ins with high transaction costs and how it might be possible to break open the 
'symbiotic relationships' and 'unholy alliances' that lead to the formation of economically 
deprived areas. The concept of path dependency in institutionalist thinking involves -
besides its biological terminology - a strong historical determination which emphasises the 
importance of cultural inheritance from the previous order, but typically lacks the 
explanation of institutional innovation. Unsound political and economic decisions as well 
as institutional arrangements of the past lead to certain (irreversible) trajectories of the 
economic performance in the future and different levels of 'efficiency' today, a perspective 
which implicitly denies "the possibility of political control over the process of 
transformation" (Beyer/Wielgohs 2001:362). Newer analysis of comparative institutional 
change (and transformation processes) tends to stress the potentials of past institutional 
arrangements for present and future developments, rather than to see these legacies as a 
burden (StarklBruszt 1998:7). 
But is it really like this, so that the 'historical wheel' cannot be pushed back in order to 
create a more sound economic and social institutional setting for the next generations? In a 
brief dialectic account of economic history, Douglass North draws a euro-centric picture of 
progress starting with the "primitive" place-bounded village trade dependent on a "dense 
social network of informal constraints" (North 1990: 120) and leading over time to long-
distance trade, the creation of capital markets, and specialisation, hence "the creation of 
more sophisticated institutional arrangements" (ibid: 122). While there is no doubt about 
the evolution and refinement of (formal) institutional arrangements over the last centuries, 
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the notion of 'place' as inferior against 'distance' (and thus space) in tenns of institutional 
development might be overstated, because the villages which grew to cities were not only 
the hubs of emerging long-distance trade, but also the centres of institutional economic, 
political, and social change. 
The tenn 'institution' is typically used in two senses. Either it means, in Douglass North's 
sense, infonnal and fonnal institutions such as common habits, routines, established 
practices, rules or laws that constitute and organise the relations and interactions between 
individuals, groups and organisations. In a more practical sense, 'institution' is also used to 
mark an arrangement for the promotion of a public project, e.g. the co-ordination of 
economic and political action in specific geographical and historical contexts. If political-
economic arrangements take the quality of institutional change - as expressed, for 
example, in the transfonnation from socialism to market economy - the meaning and 
relations of power in this process as well as the direction of this change have to be 
recognised. 
In neo-classical economics, 'power' is often used in the one-dimensional and simplistic 
sense of dominance - in particular the 'power over' markets, prices or monopolies, "but 
there is really little analysis of the process by which such power is established or 
explanation of what exactly allows the dominant finn to continue to exert such market 
power" (Young 2002 [1995]:52).33 Institutionalist thinking has tended to focus on diverse 
criticisms of mainstream economic theory rather than producing an alternative perspective 
of the meaning of power in economic and political relations (ibid:49). However, AlIen 
argues that power - besides being an exercised ability in the fonn of 'power over' - also 
33 Some of the Austrian economic thinkers even denied the existence of power in market economies. Hayek 
stressed the voluntary nature of exchange with reference to competitive capitalism. because "to believe that 
power is thus conferred on the state is merely transferred to it from others is erroneous. It is a power which is 
newly created and which in a competitive society nobody possesses" (Hayek 1944. quoted in Young 2002 
[ 1995]:55). 
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exists as a networked agency, as the 'power to', a medium or "resource for achieving 
diverse ends ( ... ) - be they concerned with entering hitherto closed markets, exploiting the 
latest technology or whatever - rather than upon how power constrains social or individual 
action" (AlIen 1997:62). In contrast to the "instrumental" form of power (the 'power 
over'), "associational" power ('power to') yields a form of collective empowerment, "a 
means of enablement where all those taking part may benefit in some way" (Alien 
2003:5).34 Individuals and organisations collectively engage with others in networks in 
which diverse lateral as well as vertical modes of power - such as domination, authority, 
coercion or seduction - being used to define and to establish a collective orientation with 
significantly different pronouncements and consequences over space-time in general and 
questions of proximity and distance in particular (AlIen 2003:10). This form of power -
seen as a collective capacity for resource mobilisation and co-ordination - is increasingly 
important in a 'network society' where information processes and knowledge creation 
become crucial for economic success.35 In terms of economic transformation in former 
socialist countries, the network capacity of all kinds of actors - political and economic -
and their socially created forms and modes of power in the process of institutional change, 
its direction and consequences over space-time have to be an aspect of analysis. 
The following section focuses on evolutionary theory with a short introduction to the 
Schumpeterian tradition and the discussion of some central terms, such as knowledge, 
learning, social capital, embeddedness, and networks to explain and understand economic 
34 Alien notes that the theorisation of 'networked power' - in particular by Castells and Mann - and their 
notion of 'power' as a fluid medium which "'travels' or flows through the multiple networks that comprise 
society" must be seen with caution (Alien 2003 :8). Instead of 'power' being perceived as a '''thing or attribute 
that can be possessed" and transmitted across space and time, Allen suggests that 'power' is a constitutional 
part of space-time and a relational consequence of social interaction (ibid.). In doing this, Allen takes the 
view of Foucault and Deleuze, where "Subjects are constituted by the spacing and timing of their own 
p.ractices as much as they are by those who seek to shape their conduct" (Allen 2003:8-9). 
5 Cumbers et al. criticise the extent to institutional approaches in economic geography have become one-
sided, by "privileging processes of interfirm cooperation and collaboration (power to) over the relations of 
conflict and dominance (power over) which were recognized (if not conceptualized) within the older tradition 
of institutionalism" (Cumbers/MacKinnon/McMaster 2003:328). Peck (1995) stresses that institutional 
approaches typically neglect the shaping of economic discourses as one form of exercising power. 
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processes. This approach has recently become influential in economic geography in terms 
of conceptualising the region as a geographical and social nexus of territorial economic 
development - and institutional change. While the importance of place-specific cultural 
formal and informal institutions in path-dependent economic trajectories has been stressed, 
some commentators point to the need for a 'cultural turn' or even a 'new economic 
geography' (see Hudson 2000: 16-18 for a short summary). 
2.2 Evolutionary Economics and Regional Development 
The evolutionary economy approach draws on Veblenian and Schumpeterian thinking with 
its notion of innovation and its use of institutionalist concepts. As noted above, the two 
approaches, institutionalism and evolutionary economics, are historically interlinked 
(Nelson 2002: 18-20), although the evolutionists have a different focus which additionally 
encompasses actors, network learning, knowledge creation and technology in economic 
processes. The microeconomic foundations of evolutionary theory are - like institutional 
theory - based on a theoretical critique of the neo-classical conception of the firm. The 
approaches share a central interest in understanding the determinants of economic 
performance and patterns of actions, understood in behavioural terms as well as rejecting 
'maximisation' as a process that characterises what humans do. The theoretical 
understanding of economic evolution and industrial transformation has been enhanced by 
the relatively recent reintroduction of concepts such as path dependence, increasing returns 
to scale, technological trajectories, and historical lock-in and is linked to the notion of a 
knowledge based economy. Before this recent development in theoretical production is 
outlined, some aspects of the historical sources are introduced. 
Schumpeter, one founding member of evolutionary political economy (see Hodgson 
1993:139-151; CookelMorgan 1998:10-13) emphasises both an individualist and a 
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socialised model of the economic agene6 and understands economic processes as 'creative 
destruction' which embraces much more than just technological innovation, but includes 
"( I) the introduction of a new good; (2) the introduction of a new method of production; (3) the opening of a 
new market; (4) the conquest ofa new source of supply; and (5) the development ofa newform of industrial 
organisation" (Schumpeter 1934. summarised in CookelMorgan 1998: 10). 
In Schumpeter's seminal work "Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung" [theory of 
economic development], the economics of technology and its 'new combinations' of the 
above mentioned elements (Schumpeter 1911: 146-154, translated in BeckerlKnudsen 
2002:408-414) provides an explanatory framework for the analysis of the sources of 
growth: the institutional environment and historical trajectories in fostering and guiding 
technological change induce productivity growth and 'quality competition' among firms: 
..... economic development is not a phenomenon to be explained economically. but that the economy. in itself 
without development. is dragged along by the changes in the surrounding world. that the causes and hence 
the explanation of development must be sought outside the group of facts which are described by economic 
theory (Schumpeter 1911: 103. translated in BeckerlKnudsen 2002a:405). 
Although a linear model of economic development is theoretically dead in our times, 
which has been corrected by neo-innovation theory (Cooke/Morgan 1998:13), Schumpeter 
focuses on the path dependency of economic processes and hence lays the foundation of 
modem evo lutionary thinking. 
"Every concrete process of developmenr7 creates the prerequisites for the following. Thereby the form of the 
latter is altered. and things will turn differently from what they would if every concrete phase of development 
36 The early Schumpeter focused more on the owner-managed firm, whereas the late Schumpeter focused 
more on large corporations and their networks as national innovation motors. This "is an unresolved tension, 
between the individual and social, running throughout his work" (Cooke/Morgan 1998: I 0). For an overview 
of this conceptual process in Schumpeter's thinking see Becker/Knudsen (2002:392-395). 
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would be compelled first to create its own conditions" (Schumpeter 1911: 107, translated in BeckerlKnudsen 
2002a:408). 
What emerges from evolutionary analysis is an aspect of economic development, which 
has been differently interpreted and conceptualised by contemporary authors. Putnam 
focuses on 'social capital' (Putnam 1993), while other authors introduce terms such as 
'untraded interdependencies' (Storper 1997:5), 'institutional thickness' (AminlThrift 
1994:14) or 'associational capacity' (Cooke/Morgan 1998:33) as important carriers of 
economic processes. Summarised in Douglass North's sense as informal institutions (North 
1990), they shape the capability or incapability of economic action and innovation as an 
ensemble of social relations in which different actors of all sorts interact.38 Concepts such 
as embeddedness, trust, networks or knowledge and learning play an important role in this 
evolutionary view, which goes much further that what might be labelled as an evolutionary 
economy approach, as scholars from all the social sciences have contributed to the 
development of this research field. 
2.2.1 Knowledge, Learning and Innovation 
Knowledge, learning and innovation processes are at the centre of evolutionary analysis, 
which seeks "to understand how this trinity contributes to uneven processes in capitalist 
development" (Morgan 2004:6). In contemporary evolutionary thinking, firms are no 
longer simply seen as a tool for efficient economic transactions, what might have been 
suggested in Coase's transaction cost theory. Instead, recent efforts have been focussing on 
37 Schumpeter defines 'development' as "only such changes in economic life as are not forced upon it from 
without, but arise by its own initiative from within" (Schumpeter 1911: \03, translated in Becker/Knudsen 
2002a:405). In contrast to Veblen, in many of his writings Schumpeter's interpretation of 'evolution' has 
'developmental' connotations, to the extent that his complete work has been classified as a 'genetic' approach 
of economic evolution (see Hodgson 1993:39). 
38 It is probably dangerous to 're-brand' different terms under one heading, as abovementioned authors utilise 
considerably different focuses and concepts in elaborating their ideas. But it is at least safe to say that North's 
concept of informal institutions plays a crucial role in understanding later efforts to conceptualise and widen 
the process and prerequisites of economic development in evolutionary thinking. 
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the firm as the "repositories of competences, knowledge, and creativity, as sites of 
invention, innovation, and learning" (AminlCohendet 2004:2).39 Knowledge plays a role in 
establishing and sustaining the long-term capabilities and performance of firms and 
organisations, because it is "path-dependent in the usual sense that directions for future 
development are foreclosed or inhibited by directions taken in past development" 
(Nooteboom 1997:57) so that "decisions are made in the middle of uncertainties amongst 
which it is practically impossible for a sure case to be guaranteed" (AkrichlCallonlLatour 
2002 [1988]: 194). The focus on knowledge creation and continuous learning processes has 
not been limited to firms and economic actors, but widened to spatial economics in 
general, and in particular to regions as an important nexus of those relational dynamics 
which in turn is seen to stimulate economic growth and development (Cooke/Morgan 
1998:60-82). 
Terms such as 'regional learning', 'regional innovation systems' and 'knowledge 
economy' are not only highlighted in academic writing, but have become the standard 
repertoire of the European Union and its regional economic policies - in Central and 
Eastern Europe already before the official accession in 2004. This development reflects the 
widely shared view "that knowledge is the most important resource in innovation and 
learning is the most important process, an interactive and socially embedded process which 
cannot be understood outside its cultural and institutional context" (MorganfNauwelaers 
1999:6). Despite the claim of specific place-bounded contexts in the process of knowledge 
creation, 'innovation through imitation' - "the comprehensive adoption of institutions and 
39 Amin and Cohendet (2004:5-6) identify three major approaches concerning knowledge in firms: first, the 
strategic-management approach, which focuses on the structure of firms, their procedures and managers; 
second, the evolutionary-economics approach, a "hybrid theory ( ... ) including the principle of heredity . 
played by routines, the principle of generation of variety, and the principle of selection - and an emphasis 
upon routines as the key collective organizational device for cognition" (Amin/Cohendet 2004:5-6); third, the 
social-anthropology-of-Iearning approach, which is concerned with knowledge creation through social 
interaction. In the following, only the evolutionary approach to knowledge is explored. 
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policies that have proved their value over the years in the West" (Keune/Kiss/T6th 
2004:586) - has been on the agenda in Central and Eastern Europe. 4o 
In contrast to information. knowledge - seen as a specific know-how or skill - is the "rare, 
scarce, not easily imitable heart of the competitive process in contemporary capitalism, the 
source of superprofits and the key to relations of domination and subordination" (Storper 
1997:238).41 Knowledge has been defined as a "dynamic framework or structure from 
which information can be stored, processed and understood" (Howells 2002:872) or as "a 
set of organized statements of facts or ideas, presenting a reasoned judgement or an 
experimental result, which is transmitted to others through some communication medium 
in some systematic form" (Bell 1973, quoted in CastelIs 1996:FN27). Drawing from 
Foucault and Cassirer, AlIen argues that the abovementioned definitions mainly focus on 
the easily transferable cognitive, codified, and abstract forms of knowledge and thus 
neglect the expressive symbolic and representational aspects of knowledge creation, 
underlined with Cassirer's demand that "knowledge must convey the totality of cultural 
forms" (Cassirer 1957, quoted in AlIen 2000:20). 
The relational nature of knowledge - the 'knowing self - has been stressed in the context 
of events or entities (Plotkin 1994:40) - and in terms of its spatial qualities. Law and 
Hetherington argue that "knowledge, objects and people ( ... ) are relational effects or 
40 In a comprehensive quantitative study of 'innovation capabilities' in the (former) EU accession countries 
the authors identified three major groups of indicators alongside general economic conditions 
(MickiewiczlRadosevic 200 I). The first of these is human resources such as the structure of qualifications 
and employment; the second, knowledge creation and investment, in particular research output measured in 
patents and scientific papers; and the third, the transmission and application of knowledge, i.a. 
operationalised by IT infrastructure and 'innovation activities'. However, the impact of EU-funded 
programmes in CEE has been estimated as rather minor because of the scale of restructuring problems and 
the complex nature of innovation processes. "Together with large local and inter-regional coordination 
problems [it] may explain why in CEE we cannot find regional systems of innovation and cooperative 
networks but only local centres of industry excellence and loose project networks" (Radosevic 2002:94). 
41 Despite high asymmetries and hierarchies between focal transnational corporations and their SME 
suppliers organised in supply chains, recent studies suggest that forms of explicit knowledge and their limited 
diffusion might nonetheless create learning processes and innovation through close interfirm collaboration -
and "significant levels of subsidiaries' embeddedness within the host country", even in less favoured 
European regions (Vale 2004: 138). 
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emergent phenomena" (Law/Hetherington 2000:39; original emphasis), because "making 
action and knowledge at a distance not only makes action, knowledge and global 
asymmetry ( ... ) [but] also makes distance and space, performs these into being" (ibid.). 
Because "something gets lost, or degraded, when individuals and organizations 
communicate at a distance" (Morgan 2004:8), geographical proximity, tacit knowledge and 
face-to-face-communication have increasingly been on the agenda of evolutionary analysis 
in urban and regional contexts, alongside the economic co-ordination embedded in the 
existence of cities and agglomerations (Storper/Venables 2004).42 
Polanyi (1958, 1967) argues that a distinction can be made between explicit (also labelled 
as codified or cosmopolitan) and tacit knowledge, but this dichotomy can be misleading 
because explicit knowledge involves tacit knowledge for its interpretation (Howells 
2000:53).43 Codified knowledge, being standardised, can be transferred over long distances 
and across organisations at a low price, facilitated and accelerated by information and 
communication technologies (Morgan 2004:4). Tacit knowledge however, being personal 
and situated, is not easy to pass on other than through personal interaction in a context of 
collective experiences, whereby "A local culture with specific norms, values, and 
42 Storper and Venables draw their conclusions from the analysis of 'buzz' cities, identifying four functions of 
face-to-face contacts (F2F): face-to-face contact as a communication technology; the possibility of enhancing 
trust and incentives in (economic) relationships; F2F for reasons of screening and socialisation (examination 
and certification of possible network members); and to "generate the rush that pushes us to make greater and 
better efforts" (StorperiVenables 2004:357). The authors suggest (ibid:365) that the agglomerative force of 
some cities is based on classical network agglomeration efficiencies and interactive knowledge activities 
including creative and cultural functions, finance and business services, science, research, high-technology, 
and power and influence: "The cities' attraction for talent and their efficiency in socializing individuals 
confer important advantages on their participants. Buzz cities continue to have such force today because they 
are the places where, more than ever, critical problems of coordination in the modern economy are resolved 
through F2F contact" (StorperiVenables 2004:366). 
43 The interrelation between explicit and tacit knowledge in a 'knowledge-creating company' has been 
emphasised by NonakalTakeuchi (1995) who focus on the emergence of knowledge out of conversations 
between people's explicit and tacit knowledge. They identify two dimensions of knowledge creation. First, an 
'epistemological dimension' explained through the social interaction between both forms of knowledge and 
second, an 'ontological dimension', emerging from knowledge interaction across different levels, such as 
individuals, groups, organisations (see Amin/Cohendet 2004:5; Castells 1996: 159-160). The process of 
codification has been compared with a spiral movement where tacit knowledge is transformed into codified 
knowledge, "followed by a movement back to practice where new forms of tacit knowledge are developed 
and this spiral movement lies at the core of individual and organizational learning" (Morgan 2004:4). The 
source of intra-firm innovation is the organisation's capability "to establish bridges to transfer tacit into 
explicit knowledge, explicit into tacit knowledge, tacit into tacit, and explicit into explicit" (Castells 
1996:159). 
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institutions (formal and informal) makes it possible to transfer tacit forms of knowledge 
from one actor to another" (Malmberg/Maskell 2002:433). 
Howells summarises five aspects of interrelations between geography and 
knowledge/learning activities (Howells 2002:873-874). The first relates to the impact of 
place-dependent social, cultural, and economic circumstances on the 'knowing self, the 
individual and human development; the second to the influence of proximity and distance 
on human interaction and thus, the emergence of an place-bounded individual knowledge 
set; the third to the spatial constraints for an individual externally acquiring codified and 
tacit information; the fourth to the process of learning in a situated geographical, social 
and economic context; and the fifth to the process of filtering and interpreting information 
with the help of tacit and locally embedded know-how. 
Learning has been defined "as a change in a person's or organisation's capability or 
understanding" (Cooke/Morgan 1998:68). Concepts focused on learning have been 
increasingly adopted as a solution to innovation and organisation deficits. Learning firms, 
the learning economy and recently also learning regions have been propagated as concepts 
for successful economic development. Economic geographers such as Malmberg even 
speak about the 'learning turn' in economic geography (Malmberg 1997:576), although 
others see this turn as exaggerated, in emphasising that learning is not the only route to 
corporate and regional economic analysis, because "the case for a regional political 
economy that remembers the lessons of a Marxian political economy and recognises 
capitalism as structurally and necessarily, inherently and unavoidable, characterized by 
uneven processes of growth and decline remains as valid as it ever did" (Hudson 2000: 106-
107). Hart shares this position pointing to the "multilinearity of capitalist development and 
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its inherently political character" which remams relevant m the contemporary market 
economy (Hart 1998:337-338}.44 
Contemporary approaches to regional studies like the learning region have been criticised 
as vague because empirical evidence is scarce or collected in an 'anecdotal' way and based 
on 'fuzzy concepts' (Malmberg 1997:578; Markusen 1999). This assertion sparked off a 
productive debate not only about the currents in regional analysis, but also about economic 
geography in general (see Hudson 2002c; Peck 2002; Lagendijk 2003}.45 However, 
advocates of the learning regions model assume that, with the help of particular policy 
measures and the emergence of a suitable institutional environment, it is possible to 
increase companies' dependence on regional partners for technological learning and thus 
on the location itself. The idea is that firms rarely innovate in isolation, but through 
interaction with their environment, which is shaped by formal and informal institutional 
structures.46 Due to the many different functions and tasks of a firm and its internal and 
external relations (e.g. production, marketing, logistics etc.) learning can take as many 
different forms such as know-what. know-why, know-how or know-who (Lundvall 2002 
[1998]:28-29). 
In a broader context, on a national and international level, economic learning processes 
propelled through trade, mergers, foreign direct investments etc. are said to be related 
through increasing socio-economic integration and convergence between the three recently 
44 However, the 'learning region' is rather a hybrid concept, borrowing from earlier debates of regional 
development since the early 1980s. In the first chapter of Storper's Regional Worlds (1997), the author 
summarises and discusses the three major strands in regional studies: first, the flexible specialisation school, 
a neo-Marshallian industrial district approach originally drawing their empirical evidence from the 'Third 
Italy' and other successful, specialised regions in the west; second, the 'California school' around Scott and 
Storper theorising the link between the division of labour, transaction costs, and agglomeration; third, the 
innovation school, mainly focussing on the development of high technology as an explanation for regional 
economic success. 
45 Section 2.3 introduces a broader reading into the current debates in economic geography. 
46 Borrowing from Franco-Italian-Swiss regional analysis of the late 80s and early 90s (see Storper 1997: 16) 
this approach suggests that a certain economic-political 'milieu' is advantageous for achieving regional 
learning, "characterized by a specific set of material (firms, infrastructure), immaterial (knowledge, know-
how) and institutional (authorities, legal framework) elements that ties firms, customers, research institutions, 
the school system and local authorities to each other" (Malmberg 1996:397). 
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distinctive national economic models, the Anglo-American, the Rhenish, and the Japanese 
model. Proponents of this argument point to the ongoing decline of national (formal) 
institutions, an intensification of competition on a global scale and an increasing meaning 
of transnational corporations for national markets (see MartinlSunley 1997:281-283). 
Furthermore, it is said that 'best practice' solutions, as a key concept of management 
consulting, produce a kind of universal economic learning culture, which does not 
acknowledge the specificity of space and place (Gertler 2001). 
2.2.2 Trust, Embeddedness and Networks 
Certain characteristics of social structure and social relations that not only assist but are an 
integrative part of collaborative action and, as a result, improve economic performance 
have been identified as social capital.47 The term has been popularised by the American 
political scientist Robert Putnam in his seminal work "Making Democracy Work" (1993).48 
Putnam's concept of social capital (1993, 1995) mainly consists of three key aspects of 
social organisation which have a strong affinity to institutional and evolutionary thinking. 
In Putnam's view, those aspects - networks, norms and trust - are seen as a public property, 
because they are likely to serve broader interests when they link large parts of a 
'community' and thus enhance communication and co-operation. 
47 The term was introduced by Coleman (1990) whose definition covers all kind of human actions, not only 
economic ones, because "for Coleman, social capital is to be found in any sort of social relation that provides 
a resource for action" (Foley/Edwards 1997:552). From this perspective, social capital interacts with other 
forms of capital, such as financial capital, human capital, symbolic capital, cultural capital etc. in the process 
of entrepreneurship. 
48 Putnam's assertion of social capital as decisive for successful economic development has also been applied 
in post-socialist Central and Eastern European spaces (see CybulalSzczepanski 1998; Aberg 2000; 
Raiser/Haerpfer et al. 200 I; Tatur 2004:29-30). However, a comprehensive analysis of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) concludes that "the stock of social capital is low in the 
transition countries. The relationship between ( ... ) social capital and economic performance is not clear, 
however. We find that extended trust ( ... ) is not related to growth. This distinguishes the transition countries 
from countries with a fully evolved market economy where this correlation does exist. Active participation in 
various civic groups. on the other hand. does correlate positively with growth. as does trust in public 
institutions" (Raiser/Haerpfer et al. 200 I: I). 
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"(.,) features of social life - networks, norms, and trllst - that enable participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives (..) Social capital, in short, refers to social connections and the 
attendant norms and trust" (Putnam I 995:664-665), 
Norms and networks are created through high levels of participation in diverse forms of 
associational and civic activity which involve face-to-face interaction, generating a greater 
propensity towards mutual trust. Social capital is a (priceless) resource which emerges 
through membership of a social group and the social interrelations within such a group. 
The practice of dense social interrelations creates informal institutions, such as specific 
conventions, norms and routines - and thus provides high levels of mutual trust which 
"leads to an outcome better for the collectivity" (Granovetter 2002:39). These 'network 
properties' facilitate economic co-operation between organisations: 
"( .. .) market actions are constituted and shaped by the social relations, institutional norms, and 
interpersonal networks in which they are embedded-which amongst other things provide the glue of 'trust' 
and mutual understanding that in the final analysis makes many markets workable and sustainable" (Peck 
2004: //), 
The notion of trust has not only been linked with a firm's capacity for organisational 
learning, but with the reduction of transaction costs through cheaper contracts and other 
negotiated arrangements (Lundvall 2002 [1998]:40-42). Networks and co-operative norms 
between firms may create trust that also facilitates the rapid flow of information about best 
management practices or technological innovation, an increasingly important feature of 
contemporary capitalism. While Putnam's conceptualisation of complex social processes, 
summarised in one rather simple term - social capital - has received wide-ranging and 
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justified critique, it is also widely accepted that some of his ontological assumptions might 
play a crucial role in understanding the functioning of economic transactions.49 
While Putnam's work is only one starting point - and of course not the earliest - in 
conceptualising the meaning of 'the social' in 'the economy', far-reaching research beyond 
the new institutional economics school of thinking has been conducted in recent years. In 
many respects, the emerging 'new economic sociology' (NES) (Granovetter 1985, 2002; 
Guillen et al. 2002) can be seen as "entirely complementary" to the new institutional 
economics (NIE) and evolutionary analysis but, "The key difference is that new economic 
sociologists invoke networks as part of the initial conditions, whereas economists take 
these conditions as given" (Hart 1998:339). In economic geography, questions about the 
spatial embeddedness of social actions are, of course, not a novelty, because "it would 
seem reasonable to argue that the quality of relationships between individuals is shaped by. 
and itself shapes the character of, the contexts in which they live" (MohanlMohan 
2002: 193). Amin and Thrift claim that economic geographers' "understanding of open 
systems, appreciation of context, and qualitative techniques" is closer to heterodox 
economics where the "work on evolutionary political economy, economic sociology ( ... ) 
all constitute examples of the rise of economic knowledges outside [orthodox] economics" 
(AminlThrift 2000:5). In following these arguments and recent trends (see also Peck 2004), 
the next sections further explore central terms of NES, such as the 'networks-and-
embeddedness framework'. 
49 In general, critiques of Putnam's work point to his shortcomings in conceptualising civic politics and the 
role of formal institutions or structural forces in creating (or destroying) social capital (Mohan/Mohan 
2002: 194-195). Another fundamental strand of critique dismisses social capital as cultural-deterministic and 
argue that trust in institutions is 'politically indigenous' - rather than being. in Putnam's terms, a "cultural 
legacy and a 'politically exogenous' feature of the social micro-structure" (Tatur 2004:30). In contrast to 
Putnam. Stark and Bruszt (1998:231. FN54) note that the relational aspects of asset interaction (between the 
different forms of capital) should be in the foreground and underpinning an analysis of network properties -
rather than networks as properties. 
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The emphasis of the influence of social relations on economic life implies that markets are 
socially constructed and thus "economic behaviour is embedded in networks of 
interpersonal relations" (Amin 1999:336) which depend on "network properties, such as 
mutuality, trust and cooperation, or their opposite" (ibid:337). Research in network 
analysis assumes a relationship between the density, intensity and types (e.g. vertical and 
horizontal) of the couplingldecoupling of the network and their openness to the outside 
environment (Granovetter 2002:42-49). The 'strengths of weak ties' "seen as indispensable 
to individuals' opportunities and to their integration into communities" (Granovetter 
1973: 1378), indirectly connecting relatively isolated groups of actors, become crucial for 
the adaptability of networks and for local or regional development because of their higher 
dynamic and their ability to 'learn' quickly. In contrast, 'strong ties', the resilient or 
multiple connections between actors, often with similar attitudes or moral values, can 
cause lock-ins or even hamper spatial-economic innovation processes. 50 Thus, the quality 
of networks and emerging social capital as resource must be optimised and not maximised, 
because it is "not just the density of associational life that matters for economic (or 
political) outcomes, but the structure of its ties" (Granovetter 2002:52). Spatial-economic 
processes imbued with social relations also have a complex continuously (de-)constructed 
cultural content, what has been theorised with the term of embeddedness (Sayer 1997: 19-
20). 
The term embeddedness was first introduced by Karl Polanyi in "The Great 
Transformation" (1944) and has been used as a concept to challenge neo-classical 
assumptions of free and rational individuals acting as solely profit-seeking and markets as 
50 Mohan and Mohan (2002: 195) give some examples for 'negative social capital', or better strong ties such 
as organised crime in Italy - the Mafia. In Central and Eastern Europe, the notion 'from plan to clan' has 
suggested - here in the case of Ukraine - that "The old elite transformed itself into a monopolist/capitalist 
elite and became rent-seekers, relying on state financial support and privileges and devoting considerable 
effort to 'lobbying' the government for these privileges" (Sabic/Zimmer 2004: 117). But whether financial-
political groups - oligarchs and their networks with assumed strong ties - unequivocally hamper or help in 
the process of restructuring and reform is at least disputed (see Swain 200 I and informal conversation with 
Swain in Newcastle upon Tyne 141 15 February 2005), 
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the only institution establishing the social order. 5 I By that notion he strengthens the early 
critique that economIC thinking is highly 'undersocialised' and not capable of 
understanding economIC processes. Instead, Polanyi suggests an 'organic' relationship 
between economic and social processes under specific historical arrangements (Peck 
2004:8). Polanyi's 'organic rationalities' (Glasman 1994: 193) refer to the assertion that 
human rationalities are not taken-for-granted attributes of societies, but imposed on them 
with the establishment of the capitalist system (see Polanyi 1957 [1944], chap. 4). In his 
view, economic development can be regarded as a creative, undetermined, and 
unpredictable or cumulative process of the interplay of individual action, predominantly in 
the domains of labour, culture, and land distribution, whereby "The key factor of any 
transformation, the rate of change, is the outcome of the conflict between tradition and 
change" (Glasman 1994: 197). Alongside formal institutions, informal institutions in form 
of conventions, or in his words, 'routines', embedded in all social organisation may also 
emerge from individual negotiations and dealings. Although embeddedness has allegedly 
not been properly defined and theorised - at least in geography (MartinlSunley 2001:153)-
it can be broadly understood as the social, cultural, and spatial dimensions, which underpin 
any economic relations. 
Granovetter has taken up Polanyi's work and developed it further. To avoid both, the 
'undersocialised' (neo-}classical trap of an atomised rational individual and an 
'oversocialised' mechanical view on the individual behaving according to normative rules, 
he uses a network concept of embeddedness, because 
51 During the first transformation period in Central and Eastern Europe, Karl Polanyi's work has experienced 
a revival, because "Then [19th century] and now we have to consider what happens when economic utopia 
[neo-Iiberalism] ( ... ) and abstract model meet social reality and the need for social protection" 
(8ryantlMokrzycki 1994:6). For Polanyi-inspired research on Poland see in the same volume Kowalik (1994) 
and Glasman (1994). 
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"Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script 
written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy" (Granovetler 
1 985: 487). 
His argument for embeddedness is that human behaviour and institutions are so 
constrained by ongoing social relations that any view of them as independent is seriously 
misleading (Granovetter 1985:481-482). Instead, "'most behavior is closely embedded in 
networks of interpersonal relations" (Granovetter 1985:504) and this observation includes 
of course economic actions and markets, affected by actors' 'dyadic' (mutual) relations 
and by the structure of the overall network of relations - 'an anthropology of markets' 
(Callon 1998). Besides the behavioural assumption of the (neo-)classicists who believes 
that individuals who behave rationally "will survive, and those who do not, will fail" 
(North 1990: 19) and Coase's bounded rationality as a cause of limited available 
information, a preference structure emerges which internalises social aspects and relations 
in economic actions. The methodological individualism, the fundamental axiom of neo-
classicism, has thus been seriously contested, or at least expanded. 
"Economists trace economic behaviors to human instinct-to greed. Sociologists trace behavior to 
institutions, or conventions that constrain what we can do and what we can imagine doing; networks, or 
social groups and their roles in creating identities as well as behavioral norms and constraints; power, or 
the use of position and coercion to determine how people can behave and how they see their own interests; 
and cognition. or how people's perceptions of the world shape their behavior in it" (Dobbin 2001:4-5: 
original emphasis}. 52 
52 Dobbin (200 I :5) stresses the relationship between formal and informal institutions, networks. power, and 
cognition. In his view, informal institutions provide models for economic behaviour while networks 
disseminate those conventions as well as networks function as power bases for transfonning fonnal and 
infonnal institutions. This transfonnation process again shapes the cognitive orientations of individuals. 
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The concept of network has also been increasingly mobilised in the field of economic 
geography.53 In the present era of the 'network society' and the 'network enterprise' 
(Castells 2000, 1996), in which innovation and technological developments are 
fundamental to the determination of economic growth, the concept of network is often 
praised as the ultimate treatment for lagging economic performance and regional 
competitiveness. 
"Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies. and the diffusion of networking logic 
substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production. experience. power. and 
culture" (e as tells 1996:469). 
Networks are key elements of fairy-tale like success stories of innovative and competitive 
regions such as Silicon Valley and other high-tech regions in Europe, Japan and the USA, 
although the hype of the 'new economy' in the 1990s has already vanished since the 
beginning of the new decade.54 But the list of selective achievements in regional growth 
and prosperity is the reason why geographers and policy-makers still see networks as a 
success formula in the definition of intervention policy for local and regional economic 
development (see KitsonlMartinlTyler 2004). Whether this approach provides a realistic 
incentive for growth, innovation and increased competitiveness, especially in economically 
'less-favoured' regions or cities remains on the research agenda, particularly in the case of 
post-socialist territories (see MorganlNauwelaers 1999). 
53 Grabher and Powell (2004) distinguish four types of networks: first, informal networks "based on shared 
experience, pre-existing social ties ( ... ) that draws participants together" (Grabher/Powell 2004:xviii) and 
have a particular relevance in post-socialist settings; second, project networks with a higher level of 
hierarchies and co-ordination where complementary skills are assembled; third, regional networks producing 
'regional assets' with the help of mutual trust, skills, reputation, facilitated by face-to-face contacts in social. 
economic, and political groups, regionally embedded; fourth, business networks covering interorganisational 
relationships which have a more formal, strategic, and centrally organised character and may be horizontal or 
vertical. 
54 A good part of the literature of the 1990s on regional development using institutional and evolutionary 
approaches reviews the same success stories (see e.g. Storper 1997; chap.6; Cooke/Morgan 1998; chap. 4-7). 
Nevertheless, Markusen states that "in most regional accounts, networks are presented generically and 
extolled without examining the motivations of participants, mapping who might be included and excluded, 
analysing unequal power relations among members or gauging the durability or fragility of relationships" 
(Markusen 1999:877-878). 
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The new economic sociology occasionally provides a more cartoon-like take on spatial 
settings, and has "yet to appreciate the significance of geographical context and spatial 
embeddedness, tending to reduce place and space to stylized or system-like characteristics, 
while paying practically no attention to uneven geographical development, place-making, 
or scalar constitution" (Peck 2004:28). But in contrast to orthodox and neo-liberal 
approaches, institutional, evolutionary and new sociological economics have the potential 
to bring localities into focus as sites of economic action (see Grabher/Stark 1998:66-68). 
These perspectives suggest that so-called globalisation does not equalise the properties of 
localities but makes them all more unique. The specific local knowledge, local culture, and 
local networks give shape to new and specific forms of economic specialisation which 
depend on the relational and continuously (de-)constructed social qualities of place and 
space. 
2.3 The Institutional Turn in Economic Geography 
One of the most significant recent developments in economic geography is the analysis of 
contrasting local and regional trajectories which look behind conventional explanations of 
regional differentiation to issues such as informal institutions, leaming, trust, networks, 
and historical path-dependency, which have an impact on locally embedded exchange 
relationships (see AminlThrift 1994; Scott 1998; Storper 1999 [1995]). In general, this 
trend can be exemplified by the emergence of a strand within the 'new economic 
geography' (NEG). The 'cultural turn' in geography has led to a new interest in 
agglomeration and social/cultural/geographical proximity effects on knowledge spillovers 
(see Perrons 2001; Boschma 2005).55 The analysis of the behaviour of firms, the 
5S For an overview of the debate on NEG see Antipode (2001) 33(2). In contrast to the more extreme notions 
of NEG as being 'culturally over-killed' on the one side (research focus on 'the economy') or as being 
'undersocialised' on the other side (research focus on 'culture'), the author takes the view of a relational 
perspective, similar to ongoing debates in the discipline, e.g. the relation between 'nature' and 'society', or 
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mechanisms of cumulative development. or the relevance of path dependencies are 
important tools for the explanation of the emergence of geographical clustering with 
economic activities. If physical proximity was in former times valued as a means for 
reducing costs (e.g. transport costs). today it is valued as a means for enhancing learning 
capacity. the reduction of uncertainty or the increase of trust through face-to-face 
interaction. 
Storper (1999 [1995] :214) argues that there is an important association between social 
learning and spatial agglomeration, which has mainly two roots. First, localised economic 
input-output relations, or 'traded interdependencies' (the traditional focus of economic 
geographical analysis), and second, 'untraded interdependencies' between actors. which 
mediate processes of economic and organisational learning . 
.. Where these /-0 [input-output] relations or untraded interdependencies are localized, [which] is quite 
frequent in cases of technological or organizational dynamism, then we can say that the region is a key, 
necessary element in the 'supply architecture' for learning and innovation. It can now be seen that 
theoretical predictions that globalization means the end to economies ofproximity have been exaggerated by 
many analysts because they have deduced them only from /-0 analysis" (Storper 1999 [1995]:214). 
Storper argues that the analysis of complex social interrelations and processes of 
knowledge transfer between firms and agencies within regions is important in explaining 
the emergence of specific material and non-material regional assets and thus differences in 
economic performances (ibid:209). An important critique of this view within the research 
field of 'new regionalism' is that the focus on firms as the unit of analysis leads to analysis 
physical and human geography respectively (see Massey 1999 & 200 I; Raper/Livingstone 200 I). For a 
broader critique of 'radical geography' and post-modern approaches in cultural studies see Storper (200 I). 
The 'Krugman strand' of the 'new geographical economics' (also labelled 'new trade theory'), a model-
centred approach predicting. e.g. the ongoing specialisation of regions in Europe and a spatial-economic 
pattern more similar to the regions in the US due to increasing trade liberalisation. is neglected in this thesis, 
because "When it comes to complexly organized production systems and locational processes among highly 
developed countries, trade theory cannot be used to explain locational patterns and processes" (Storper 
2000:147). 
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of spatial clusters or development within regions and not of the whole region (Perrons 
2001). However, business enterprises play an important role in organising space/time in 
regional and local contexts so any neglect of such an analysis would "belittle the profound 
influences which enterprises transmit through their networks of intra- and inter-firm 
transactional relationships" (DickenlThrift 1992:288). 
It has also been argued that the 'new regionalism' limits the significance of overriding 
institutional contexts (e.g. macroeconomic regulation, welfare regimes) which shape the 
way global processes take different forms in different geographical locations (Lovering 
1999:385-387). However, more traditional approaches to identifying long-term regularities 
in the development of regions and their geographical 'patterns' or 'cycles' frequently 
generated little more than descriptive models (e.g. the rank-size rule, Christaller's central 
place theory, Loschian market geography) with geo-deterministic notions: "they describe 
uneven patterns of growth and decline as normal and allow us to prepare ourselves for the 
inevitable" (Storper 1997:59). In the case of economic transformation in Central and East 
Europe there is a particular danger of developing a narrative of evolutionary and geo-
determined 'backwardness', in contrast to western 'modernity' and progress (Wydra 
2000:84). 
2.3.1 The Analytical Framework: Storper's Holy Trinity 
The emergence of the 'heterodox paradigm' which breaks economic development in 
regions, nations, and on a global level into a series of empirical and theoretical dimensions 
with the aim of formulating a problem-oriented multi-level explanation for growth and 
decline has found its most complete articulation in Michael Storper's ontology of the 'holy 
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trinity' - elaborated in "The Regional World" (1997).56 Storper's work offers an analytical 
framework for conceptualising spatial-economic change and the heterogeneous structure of 
labour and capital as well as avoiding the perception of technology as a black box. He 
applies most of the theoretical attempts discussed earlier with the aim of constructing an 
integrated theory of economic space focused on the interrelations between organisational 
(firm-related), technological, and geographical spaces. In this context, Scott and Storper 
(1992) identify three interdependent dimensions of industrialisation and regional 
development. 
The first is a necessary institutional context, involving the organisational logic of 
production, the nature of the firm, as well as markets and hierarchies co-ordinating 
production systems and labour markets. Markets, technologies and the organisation of 
production are perceived as interdependent systems embedded in 'durable' institutional 
contexts. The second focuses on the evolutionary dynamics of industrialisation and 
regional development (Storper 1997:61-65). This dimension sets out the development of 
technologies, markets and institutions as 'pathways' 
"whose historical trajectory is governed by the complex interplay between prevailing rules of social order. 
and (. . .) the experimental character of much economic behavior in the context of prior states of the system .. 
(ScottlStorper 1992:4). 
The third dimension confirms that institutional contexts and evolutionary pathways are 
locally bounded, have geographical foundations, and thus a territorial specificity. 
Moreover, the central argument is that in the evolution of capitalism, territory plays a role 
as important as technological change and firm or labour behaviour. Storper asserts that 
56 It is widely accepted that the 'heterodox turn' starts with Massey's "Spatial Divisions of Labour" (Massey 
1984). While this seminal work attempts to understand the de-industrialisation of old industrialised areas, 
curiously enough. the research agenda that has followed has generally focussed on the analysis of high-tech 
industries (Storper 1997:26-27). 
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territory matters because locally embedded human relationships are fundamental to 
creating a stock of relational assets that are essential to acquire and using knowledge 
(Storper 1997: 170). 
The interest in regional economics reflects the growing importance of regional economies 
as fundamental units of the world economy. The argument is that dynamic regional 
economies, and cities, can not be understood through mechanical analogies (e.g. the city as 
a 'machine') but should be reconceived as stocks of relational assets (Storper 1997:244-
252). These relational assets also support the building and maintaining of organisations 
that are capable of learning, thus creating and using technology productively. These factors 
are critical for a firm (or region) to adjust to increasing uncertainty in product markets and 
to continuously create and recreate imperfect competition and economic differentiation. 
The stock of relational assets, the endogenous regional capacities, is defined as the set of 
historically developed interdependencies among actors, organisations (firms) and 
formal/informal institutions. 
Contemporary regional specificity lies in actors' knowledges and cognitive skills. The 
reason for this, according to Storper (1997:29), is that there has been "an enormous leap in 
economic reflexivity" which refers to the ability of groups of actors to shape the course of 
economic evolution by taking a critical distance from their activities and constructing 
interpretations which become real through their actions. However, this new reflexivity also 
produces new risks for other actors. In the context of uncertainty, effective economic 
action depends on conventions which are routines, practices and taken-for-granted 
assumptions which co-ordinate action (Storper 1997:30). 
While some ofStorper's earlier works draws from a Marxist informed development theory, 
world systems analysis and regulation theory (see Storper/Walker 1989:6-35), he later 
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argues that many approaches trying to understand contemporary reflexive capitalism and 
competitiveness have struggled and only produced 
"descriptive monikers for the new economy: postindustrialism. the information economy. flexible 
specialisation. and post-Fordism. Though each of these labels helps in understanding some dimensions of 
contemporary economic activity. the logic of the most advancedforms of economic competition ( .. .) can hest 
be described as that of learning" (Storper 1997:265). 
The learning economy is, in Storper's view, an ensemble of competitive possibilities, 
reflexive in nature, influenced by capitalism's new 'meta-capacities': the technological 
revolution in production, information and communication; the spatial extension and social 
deepening of market relations and new organisational methods (ibid:30-31). Those spatial-
economic entities that can learn faster or better become competitive because their 
knowledge is scarce or uncodified and thus cannot be immediately copied by competitor 
firms, regions or nations. But local or regional competitiveness is only temporarily immune 
to relocation: economies have to be prepared for the global forces of standardisation and 
imitation by a continuous process of learning. In a climate of increasing globalisation, the 
turn towards neo-liberal forms of regulation has exposed regions to increased competitive 
pressures. Thus, the analytical focus lies on how individual and collective reflexivity 
operates in the current learning economy through "cognitive, dialogic and interpretative 
processes with the substantive goal of understanding how relations of co-ordination 
between reflexive agents and organizations are established" (Storper 1997:31; original 
emphasis). 
Storper criticises the industrial districts literature and transaction cost theory for being 
unable to distinguish between dynamic, technologically innovative regional economies and 
undynamic agglomerations (Storper 1997:7-8). He prefers an interactive 'holy trinity' of 
technologies, organisations and territories, which produces a path dependent process of 
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regional development and, in places, yields coherent regional worlds of production which 
act as innovational learning economies. The interactions mean that regional economies are 
likely to have unpredictable and characteristic development trajectories. The concept 
envisages the product as lying at the core of this trinity, and the variety of possible 
products means that regional worlds of production will have different conventions and 
relations. In contrast to previous attempts to conceptualise economies of space he demands 
the analytical integration of untraded interdependencies, their conventional and relational 
qualities and the way in which these conventions and relations might organise traded 
transactions. 
Storper aims to analyse the interrelated 'worlds' organised around the competition over 
products and between organisations, technology and territory. This combines the worlds of 
production and innovation (between organisations and technology), the regional worlds of 
innovation (between technology and territories) and the regional world" of production 
(between organisations and territories) (Storper 1997:50-51). 
"When all the elements of the holy trinity are considered equally and simultaneously, there is no theoretical 
'bracketing' for the purpose of simplification. As a result. only the most complex and concrete problems of 
economic development can be considered. But we can build up to them using insights gained through 
rigorous theorizing of the individual elements of the trinity (. .. ) .. (Storper 1997:51). 
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Figure 1: The Holy Trinity 
Worlds of Production 
andi~~n~~~~~o~ (act~k 
Technology 
• Codifiability/noncodi 
fiability of 
knowledge 
The Holy Trinity 
of the Reflexive 
Turn. (adapted from 
Storper 1997:42) 
Organisations 
• Untraded 
interdependencies 
• Conventional-
relational linkages 
Territories 
• Geography of 
untraded 
interdependencies; 
relations; 
conventions 
• Relational assets, 
regionally specific 
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The worlds of production and innovation incorporate the relationships of one of the 
principal motors of changing territorial patterns (technology) with organisations (firms). 
This sub-world conceptualises the conditions of the rise and fall of new products with a 
definition of physical and intellectual possibilities on the one side (technology) and the 
institutional possibilities for an economic implementation in a feasible manner 
(organisations). The regional worlds of innovation point to the relationship and conditions 
of innovation (technology) and its spatial-economic diffusion (territory). This geography of 
innovation is shaped by collective private and public co-ordination which depends highly 
on the specific locality and its capacity to organise the localisation of knowledge and 
learning. The regional worlds of production acknowledge that organisations shape space 
through their locational behaviour, but in turn, that organisations get also shaped by 
territorial institutions. What emerges is a localised relational and conventional environment 
of untraded interdependencies. 
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Storper's world of production suggests certain sets of conventions which provide a 
framework of action - for each basic kind of a product. From this perspective, products are 
either supplied standardised or specialised and demanded as generic or dedicated products 
respectively. As a consequence, the world of production consists of four different worlds 
which demand certain frameworks of action and underlying conventions, if these worlds 
want to draw from their innovative capacities. 
So, first, specialised-dedicated products are 'personalised' (dedicated) products oriented 
on a particular (often niche) demand, whereby the qualities are defined by the needs of a 
particular client. The development of new technologies and know-how is restricted to a 
community of specialists with rare and costly knowledge, thus "innovation must consist of 
inventing new dedicated qualities requiring specialized resources" (Storper 1997: 116). 
Second, standardised-dedicated products (of what Storper calls the Market World) draw 
from the advantage of codifiable ('cosmopolitan') information and combinations of already 
standardised products, whereby the outcome is oriented on quickly changing markets and 
their (dedicated) demand. Thus, "innovation in this world consists of inventing new 
dedicated qualities that are amenable to standardization" (ibid.). Third, specialised-generic 
products of the World of Intellectual Resources can be sold directly on the market in an 
'anonymous' way (generic), because their production processes are well known. The 
technological input draws from widely known knowledge, but products cannot be 
produced by standardised methods, hence they are specialised. In this world, innovation is 
reached by developing "new generic qualities via the exercise of specialised capabilities" 
(ibid.). Fourth, in the Industrial World, standardised-generic products which draw their 
technological input from codifiable (cosmopolitan) knowledge are produced with widely 
diffused standards of quality and client expectations for a mass market. Innovation can be 
generated by "inventing new generic product qualities amenable to standardization" (ibid.). 
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2.3.2 Short Critique of the Holy Trinity 
Storper's assumptions and empirical work are mainly based on western experiences of new 
industrial districts (Storper 1997; chap. 6). But the claim of a new heterodox paradigm in 
economic geography is only justified if this approach is capable of explaining and 
understanding spatial-economic transformation in a broad range of regional worlds, 
including old industrial and/or post-socialist settings. Certainly, the configuration of the 
'Upper Silesian trinity' might look different to the glittering blue-chip interfirm relations of 
California or the highly flexible niche production of haute couture in IIe-de-France. But 
the question is whether the ontological assumptions developed in regional economic 
development studies in western Europe and north America since the early 1980s are a 
priori transferable to transformation economies with emerging new institutions and 'non-
western histories', providing evidence of what Hart calls the multilinearity of capitalist 
development (Hart 1998:337). 
While many aspects of the holy trinity spin around the question how regions can conserve 
or enhance their competitiveness with a constant process of learning in times of a 
deepening global economy, it is at least questionable whether this focus is applicable in 
post-socialist areas, where both old state-owned and newly established private firms, are 
fighting for bare survival in times of restructuring or deepening recession. Thus, many of 
Storper's guiding questions and terms may have to be adapted or translated into post-
socialist realities. Storper criticises the way in which institutionalist research is reproducing 
'state versus markets' dichotomies with the remark: 
'The ideological content o/these theoretical disputes should no longer blind us to the new historical reality; 
in many ways, markets were once opposed to states, rules, and other institutions, but this is not longer 
largely the case" (Storper 1997:29-30). 
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However, the complex transformation of former socialist economies into capitalist ones, 
the 'protraction' of privatisations in old economic sectors, is exactly what can be called a 
free(d)-market-versus-state-case and becomes tangible in the face of distinct resistance 
against the severe social and economic impacts of economic transformation and applied 
neo-liberal shock therapies (StarklBruszt 1998: 1 09-112). 
Storper's emphasis on reflexivity, and the 'loose constraints' on economic actors 
incorporates a strange silence on the uneven power of, and distributional conflicts between, 
economic actors, which affect all regional trajectories: 
"( .. ) the spatial as the sphere o/Juxtaposition, or the co-existence, 0/ different narratives, as the product 0/ 
power-filled social relations; it would be a view 0/ space which tries to emphasise both its social 
construction and its necessarily power-filled nature" (Massey 1999a: 21-22). 
Applying the trinity, the integration of locally and regionally embedded power relations 
seems to be crucial in understanding spatial-economic transformation, especially in an era 
of neo-liberal discourse. Thus, the relational approach, the focus on reflexive actors should 
be expanded to the understanding how these relationships are shaped through the unequal 
distribution of power. As networks of economic actors indicate reciprocity of social 
relations through the generation of dyadic trust, they are also realms of resource 
dependence and different modes of power relations. From this perspective, the specificity 
of the post-socialist transformation process is likely to produce considerably different 
balances between the main parts of the trinity than in other parts of the world. 
It is hard to see where conventions actually start and stop. As all economic activity, 
including 'hard' market transactions, involves relational conventions of some sort, further 
research needs to explain why specific mixes of regional conventions are successful and 
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others not. Moreover, it is not only necessary to analyse the ways in which these 
conventions or other informal institutions constitute economic relations and action, but also 
to explore where they come from and how they developed. Despite the notion "that 
conventions are best understood in terms of how they render accessible or deny access to 
different kinds of action" (Storper 1997:45), little is said about the fact that conventions are 
constantly shaped by action and change over time. This is particularly relevant to societies 
in transformation, the emergence of new capitalist economies. 
Storper starts from the notion that regional economies are based on formal (official) 
economic and social relationships. The holy trinity is an analytical framework, which 
assumes differentiated actors in political and economic spheres. A problem occurs when a 
regional economy might instead be based on informal economic relationships, such as the 
emergence of mafia-like clans who represent both local/regional political and economic 
power. The argument that there has been a shift 'from plan to clan' in former socialist 
societies has implications that might play an important role in a 'post-socialist trinity', for 
example, in the existence of shadow markets or informal non-monetary exchange 
relationships. It is not enough to say that these kind of unofficial economic activities and 
their networks are difficult to analyse (in fact to uncover). If they exist, it is necessary to 
assume that official and unofficial regional trinities are interwoven and interdependent, 
thus not separable within an analysis. 
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3 Becoming a Post-Socialist Space 
he collapse of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 198911991 
T was first of all marked in the streets of the cities, giving rare historical evidence for overcoming human passivity and rebellion against the state institutions and 
its monuments (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]). Indeed, the cities and their inhabitants were the 
initiators of the political, economic, and social changes that followed. In the process of 
'becoming post-socialist', the most radical changes were first felt in bigger cities, 
dependent on their economic, financial, administrative, and cultural status (Kiss 2002:70). 
They were increasingly exposed to and involved in the global economy and other 
externally induced processes, making them at the same time "the location through which 
change is mediated" (Kostinskiy 2001 :451). Yet, the suggested transformation of the 
'socialist city' to the 'post-socialist city' is not a linear process that started in the year of 
1989.57 On the contrary, the contemporary shape of many post-socialist cities is the result 
of pre-transformation period and also pre-socialist structures, physically, and, more 
crucially, in institutional terms. This chapter focuses on the most important issues in 
'becoming a post-socialist space' and sets out to integrate institutional and evolutionary 
work on post-socialism with Storper's suggestion of the reflexive turn in economic 
geography in general and his analytical framework of the trinity organisations-technology-
territory in particular. The chapter ends with a preliminary account of the socialist and 
post-socialist city and the relationship between them. 
57 The author is aware that the differentiation between 'socialist' and 'post-socialist' (defined by the year 
1989 as the watershed between these two concepts) might be questionable and thus has to be seen as a 
(preliminary) framework for analysing urban institutional changes and the pathways of economic 
transformation. For example, 'socialist' elements survive in 'post-socialist' times and 'capitalist' modes of 
production were introduced in some former socialist countries before 1989. 
75 
3.1 Conceptualising Post-Socialist Places and Spaces 
The most far reaching attempts to theorise economic and social transformation in post-
socialist countries do not explicitly focus on place and space. However, this development 
in academic production is apparently not the fault of 'post-socialist studies' itself, but, 
rather, a reflection of "the loss of the urban as both a subject and object of study" (Lees 
2002: 1 02), because urban geography "is seemingly not seen to be at the forefront of 
innovative work in the discipline any more" (ibid.). This pessimistic view reflects a general 
trend of uneasiness in contemporary work on urban theories, because they are 
predominantly occupied with a focus on 'world' and 'global' cities, concepts which are 
unhelpful in explaining or understanding what happens in the 'ordinary' cities of the rest of 
the world CAminlGraham 1997). As Robinson suggests, "There are a large number of cities 
around the world which do not register on intellectual maps that chart the rise and fall of 
global and world cities. They don't fall into either of these categories, and they probably 
never will C ... )" CRobinson 2002:531). 
Robinson's unease with the obsessive categorisation of cities into hierarchical urban 
networks on the one side and the omission of 'ordinary' cities on the other side, which do 
not fit into analytical frameworks, is also justified when looking at current accounts of 
post-socialist cities. The focus has been on the capital cities of Europe, but what happens in 
the second, third, fourth, and fifth biggest cities of these countries, which do not appear on 
the maps of post-socialist transformation?58 Additionally, most of the urban research in 
Central and Eastern Europe is still concentrated on descriptive analysis of spatial 
58 Certainly, the research focus on capital cities can be explained with high(er) dynamics and thus interesting 
developments triggered by the political-economic transformation after 1989 and the linked symbolic re-
definition in the course of neo-Iiberal policies and re-integration into world capitalism (see e.g. 
Brade/Rudolph 2004; Regulska 2000; Cochrane/Jonas 1999; Dingsdale 1999; Sykora 1999 Surazska 1996). 
Additionally, it can be argued, that the western academic knowledge gap regarding urban development in 
(post-)socialist countries makes it somehow necessary to look first at what happens in the capitals before 
starting to analyse and understand the processes of other cities. Only recently, this gap in the research 
programme has begun to be filled, with, for example, notable research on the cities of Nowa HutalKrak6w 
and Novosibirsk by Stenning (1999; 2000; 2003), and with (comparative) research on Manchester and L6di 
by YounglKaczmarek ( 1999) and LiszewskilY oung (eds., 1997), although the latter authors tend to reproduce 
the spatial organisation approach of the 1970s and 1980s. 
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organisation and its change, such as the transformation of city centres or suburbs, or the 
emergence of new retail or housing (see e.g. Wolaniuk 1997; Sailer-Fliege 1999; Duke 
1999; Tasan 1999). 
However, in regional studies, by contrast, institutional economic and political change has 
been emphasised in developing a conception of post-socialist spaces. Here, the focus is on 
the formation of traded and untraded interdependencies, the evolution of learning regions 
and their political-economic networks. From this perspective, the emergence of the 'new 
Europe' has been on the agenda in the course of the privatisation process of former state-
owned assets, inward investments, or emerging supply chains and their impact on regional 
development (Smith 1994; PavlineklSmith 1998; Pavlinek 1998; 2004; Domisch 1999; 
2002; Hudson 2002a). Drawing on the evolutionary concept of path dependency and 
bricolage, the following paragraph sees to substantiate the emergence of post-socialist 
spaces. 
3.1.1 Spatial Path Dependency and Bricolage 
Smith and Pickles suggest that the spatial transformation in emerging capitalist economies 
"is both evolutionary and path-dependent in the sense that it is based upon institutionalised 
forms of learning as well as struggles over pathways that emerge out of the intersection of 
old and new" (Smith/Pickles 1998: 13). In doing so, they draw from evolutionary and 
institutional political economy and the observation that 
"(. .. ) post-socialist trajectories are heavily dependent on a dense and complex institutional legacy such as 
the (often invisible) remnants of previous economic and political orders still shape expectations and patterns 
of conduct (...) [SJocietal innovation depends heavily on recombining old elements as much as, if not more 
than, it does on introducing wholly new social forms (Nielsen/Jessop/Hausner 1995:4). 
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Opposing the 'myth of designer capitalism', Stark (1992; 1995), one of the most influential 
proponents of path-dependent analysis, emphasises the continuities between state socialism 
and its capitalist successor. 59 Stark's central idea is that social-economic structures and 
networks can be reproduced because these assets are not system-specific, so that, "It is in 
the ruins that these societies will find the materials with which to build a new order; 
therefore, differences in how the pieces fell apart will have consequences for how political 
and economic institutions can be reconstructed in the current period" (Stark 1992:20). This 
perspective acknowledges the differences in resource distribution between socialism and 
capitalism, but argues that in terms of stratification and power structures, the continuities 
are often greater than the changes. For example, the emergence of new ownership 
structures in the course of privatisation by the division of former state-owned large 
enterprises may be devices to maintain existing power structures in the position of 
industrial managers, who capitalise on their network properties and "might be able to 
utilize positional resources to gain effective ownership rights" (StarklBruszt 1998:87). In 
short, asset conversion enables well-placed actors under one accumulation system to retain 
their position under another, which is why the mode of privatisation - seen as a path-
dependent process - is crucial for post-socialist analysis (Poznanski 1996:223).bo For Stark, 
path-dependent analysis is a "method for grasping the recombinant character of social 
innovation" (StarklBruszt 2001: 1133), a process which might result in a new type of mixed 
economy as a distinctively Central and East European capitalism. 
59 The early debates of the 1990s revolved around the concerns of an 'institutional vacuum' after the fall of 
state socialism, which made economists and political scientists likewise demand quick 'system change' and 
shock therapy, an assessment which has been opposed by evolutionary thinkers such as Stark, who argues 
that institutional legacies not only continue to unfold in capitalism but that the "paths of extrication from 
state socialism shape the possibilities oftransfonnation" (Stark 1995:71). 
60 In order to avoid both the Marxist critique of 'from plan to clan' and the neo-Iiberal narrative of 'from plan 
to market', Stark and Bruszt instead suggest a more sober analysis in asking "Will the infonnal networks that 
got the job done despite institutional barriers in the earlier socialist system promote economic restructuring or 
will they inhibit it?" (StarklBruszt 1998:79). In their seminal work "Postsocialist Pathways" (1998), Stark 
and Bruszt suggest four independent dimensions in analysing privatisation: first, foreign versus domestic 
ownership structures; second, spontaneous versus privatisation controlled by state agencies; third, 
institutional versus 'natural' ownership; and fourth, concentrated versus dispersed ownership (StarklBruszt 
1998:53). 
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The idea of recombination can be defined as "innovative adaptations that combine 
seemingly discrepant elements" (StarklBruszt 1998: 103), a process which might also be 
labelled bricolage.61 The re-assembly of old and new formal and informal institutions such 
as organisational forms, concepts, networks, routines, or other socially constructed features 
guiding economic and political behaviour has the aim of finding solutions in uncertain 
transformation periods. CampbeU suggests that "the concept of bricolage captures how 
institution building is a process of dynamic innovation whereas the concept of institution 
building with historical legacies alludes more to a process of mechanical imitation, 
although the two are not necessarily incompatible" (Campbell 1997:22; original emphasis). 
In this perspective, social change is interpreted as a recombination of existing resources 
into new combinations.62 The idea of "playing capitalism with noncapitalist pieces" 
(StarklBruszt 2001: 1129) is an alternative to the mainstream suggestion that the collapse of 
state socialism left a tabula rasa, or vacuum in which new institutions, formal and informal 
likewise, could be built up from scratch. 
As the evolutionary concepts of path-dependency and bricolage have a more distinct 
attitude towards time, it is necessary to ask how these conceptions could be integrated in a 
wider approach to theorise space/time in economic change. This can be reached in 
identifying industrial networks and their vertical and horizontal relationships as crucial 
features for setting the space/time framework of economic change. While economic actors 
and networks handle the uncertainties of transformation and new forms of exchange by 
61 Deriving from French, the term hrico/age can be translated as 'improvised patch-work', usually undertaken 
by a bricoleur, a casual labourer or DIVer. In social sciences, the term was introduced by Levi-Strauss ( 1966 
[1962]) who contrasted the 'wild' forms of thoughts during the Neolithic age with that in sciences of the 
modem times. Levi-Strauss interprets Neolithic bricolage "as an attempt to make sense of the world as a 
whole by blending together whatever is available into a complete story, whereas the scientist is more 
restricted in what can and cannot currently be claimed as knowledge" (Hammersley 2003:575). 
62 With a case study in financial economics, MacKenzie notes that the process of bricolage follows neither 
rules nor a set methodology, but performs in a creatively ad hoc fashion (MacKenzie 2003:856). In analysing 
the Danish wind turbine industry and their technological innovations, Garud and Kamee note that the process 
of bricolage involves relational and spatial characteristics, because "It is a process of moving ahead on the 
basis of inputs of actors who possess local knowledge, but through their interactions, are able to gradually 
transform emerging paths to higher degrees offunctionality" (Garud/Kamee 2003:296). 
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maintaining, recombining and developing relationships built on trust, learning and mutual 
interests, the 'carriers of history' in the process of path-dependency obey at least two 
interlinked sets of rules of undividable space-time.63 The past is perceived as a set of 
possibilities, whereby the present controls what possibility is to be dealt with 
(HAkanssonlLundgren 1997:124), and second, in terms of spatiality, it can be argued that 
the simultaneous coexistence of inter-relational activities, resources, and actors set the 
rules for treading new paths, because "The ties, links and bonds existing between these 
three categories give obvious 'path dependence' features carrying history, containing 
technological, economic, social and knowledge barriers to exploiting new avenues" 
(ibid: 132). As sites of complex ( and messy) institutional change and learning across 
different social logics, routines and practices, post-socialist localities offer an excellent 
context to study the transformation not only of business firms, but the overall political and 
economic process of recombined traded and untraded interdependencies in an urban or 
regional environment ofretlexivity and mUltiplicity. 
3.1.2 Local Reflexivity and the Distanced Urban Economy 
As stated above, world and global city approaches might only offer a limited access to 
understanding internal urban economic transformations in post-socialist countries.64 It has 
been contended that these approaches are predisposed to be too hierarchical and 
mechanical (Storper 1997:223) and only replicate exc1usionary dualisms which are not 
63 In institutionalist and evolutionary perspective, the carriers of history are interpreted as the change of 
formal and informal institutions and technological innovations. In a more specific account, Hlikansson and 
Lundgren additionally identify sources of feedback and reinforcement in this process, such as economies of 
scale, learning. technological interrelatedness and network externalities (HlikanssonlLundgren 1997: 124). 
64 It can be argued. of course. that the world city approach might be applied to explain how cities of the post-
socialist world find their way within a global city system. thus focusing on the global capacities of cities. 
defined as concentrations of expertise and knowledge (BeaverstocklTaylorlSmith 1999: 446). However. the 
approach of measuring world cities with the help of simple in-out ratios describing the relations among them 
and emerging city networks do not question "the fundamental contradiction that the theories they follow were 
never designed to take the idea of networks seriously" (Smith. Richard G. 2003:575). 
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perceived as helpful in understanding the nature of cities (AminlThrift 2002:51 ).65 
Moreover, none of these approaches - including the accounts of the post-Fordist and 
informational city - put current economic phenomena together "in a way that effectively 
accounts for what it is about them that might drive the degree or nature of urbanization 
today" (Storper 1997:244). 
In order to avoid the narratives of urban and spatial theory since the late 19th century, 
which framed urban economies in points, lines and boundaries, Amin and Thrift suggest an 
"understanding of cities as sites in spatially stretched economic relations" AminlThrift 
2002:63). Despite the reservations of presenting cities as adventurous in terms of local 
reflexivity and geographical or social proximity, the following paragraph tries to emphasis 
the complementary nature of both attempts - Storper's city reflexivity and Amin and 
Thrift's 'distanced' city. 
Storper provides insights into the nature of firm strategies. He argues that the global 
fixation of organisations on regulation and flexibility of investment is only addressing part 
of the issue, because "These external economies are not simply economic in nature; they 
are to an important degree, territorial" (Storper 1997:295). From his perspective, capital 
accumulation still requires more than easy 'entry and exit' regimes that set up a global 
'locational tournament' among countries. What these strategies largely ignore (and often 
erode), are the same proximity effects and territorially based networks and relations that 
lead to optimal resource use and profitability. The solution, Storper argues, is to expand the 
reform agenda to develop also "the bases of conventions and relations of learning in 
regions and firms" (Storper 1997:300), to foster, what he terms, territoriality based 
relational assets of regions and firms. In other words, effective long term strategies for 
65 Amin and Thrift give three examples of unhelpful dualisms in contemporary urban theory: first, the world 
perceived as a space of flows versus the urban as a space of fixity; second, the global as remote space versus 
the local as localised proximate; and third, small face-to-face versus a distanciated large (Aminffhirft 
2002:51). 
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regional development will only be successful if they are based on an understanding that 
"what firms do is inherently tied up with what regions do, and vice-versa" (ibid:299). 
In embedding the notion of reflexivity into an understanding of the nature of urban 
economics, Storper offers a more generalised account of cities which focuses on the 
economic creativity of agglomerations. In his account of the 'reflexive city' he suggests 
that 
"The economies of big cities (...) should be analysed as sets of partially overlapping spheres of reflexive 
economic action. and the structures of those activities. in addition to traditional economic descriptors. must 
include their conventional and relational structures of coordination and coherence" (Storper 1997:245). 
Storper stresses the need for proximity in economic interactions and competitiveness, as 
important to stabilise relations of trust between (and within) organisations and individuals 
and thus helping to reduce transaction costs. The city is seen as a matrix for such 
reflexivities, where tacit knowledge and untraded interdependencies can unfold in 
economic life. Storper suggests that: 
Important and distinctive dimensions of this reflexivity. in both production and consumption. in 
manufacturing as well as in services. take place in cities; they are dependent on the concrete relations 
between persons and organizations that are formed in cities; and they are coordinated by conventions that 
have specifically urban dimensions and in addition are ojien different from one city to another" (Storper 
1 997:222). 
However, Amin and Thrift dismiss the common assumption that agglomeration advantages 
such as proximity and density generate specific economic effects. Instead, they plead for 
an understanding of economic organisation as distanciated with the request "to interpret the 
economic significance of cities in institutional terms ( ... ) through the routinization of 'site 
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practices' ( ... ) and the density of informal institutions ( ... )" (AminlThrift 2002:52). In this 
account of the city, proximity advantages such as personal face-to-face contacts, local 
transactions or shared knowledge do not have a primary importance for doing business in 
the knowledge economy (ibid:60). Amin and Thrift provide three interrelated reasons for 
this argument. First, managers of knowledge industries do not rely on local (tacit) 
knowledge a/one, while tacit and explicit knowledge cannot be separated from each other 
(see also chapter 2.2.1). Thus, "constellations of distributed know-how and reflexivity 
within communities of practice [operate] at different spatial scales" (ibid:61) and third, the 
local usage of tacit conventions in 'circular networks' is rather an organisational 
endowment than a place or space asset (ibid:62).66 However, the authors suggest two 
important exemptions - first, the case of small and medium-sized companies (SMEs), 
which still rely on localised informal institutions in order to survive (ibid:76) and second, 
the case of 'unique' localities where industry and society coincide, such as heavy industrial 
areas (ibid:62). 
Instead of seeing a contradiction between Storper's and AminlThrift's account of urban 
economies, it is suggested that it is possible to understand the city as both localised and 
distanciated. While this combined approach can hardly be named innovative, the question 
emerges in which cases 'the local' still holds important assets, which go beyond Amin and 
Thrift's suggestion of the remaining 'petty institutions' of cities perceived as "not central 
for core business activity, but advantageous for tracking opportunity ( ... ) [and] relay points 
for dispersed network spaces, not sites of economic containment" (AminlThrift 2002:72). 
With the aim of embedding the notion of the reflexive and distanced city in the post-
66 Amin and Thrift draw their conclusions from three examples how distanciated networks of economic 
organisation materialise: first, the case oftransnational corporations, seen as 'circulatory networks' with "no 
distinctive pattern of spatial connections" and thus no "territorial integrity for cities in this context" 
(Amin/Thrift 2002:65); second, the case of advertising and creative industries and their changing project 
teams which have "little to do with the economics of agglomeration and local association" (ibid:66); third, 
the case of telematics which produces a "new form of space-time", which "enables economic transactions 
and routines to be spatially and temporally stretched, so that proximate actors are no longer reliant on 
economic relationships with each other" (ibid:66+67). 
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socialist context and bearing evolutionary understandings of path-dependency and 
bricolage in mind, the following implications are suggested for post-socialist spaces and 
places. 
First, social and economic change can be described as a re-assembly of existing resources 
with new combinations, but these combinations do not draw from an optional menu of 
creative possibilities (as Storper might imply), but are heavily dependent on surviving 
modes of power relations inherited from socialist legacies. 
Second, Storper's 'overlapping spheres of reflexive economic action' are fundamentally 
limited to a specific network of actors, which might partly try to exclude emerging possible 
entrants. The implementation of innovative regional or urban processes might therefore be 
blocked. 
Third, in addition to Storper's and Stark's evolutionary, sometimes biologistic notions 
which suggest that innovational processes can be implemented by 'organising diversity', 
the political economy approach still plays a significant role in understanding 
transformations, especially in CEE as a neo-liberallaboratory. The influx of FDls and the 
emergence of global players are important aspects of emerging capitalist spaces. 
Fourth, the analysis of holy trinities in post-socialist settings should emphasise processes 
of privatisation, the transfer of state-owned assets into private ownership and combined 
forms of properties. These recombinations, not only in terms of assets, but also in terms of 
re-combinant (or re-cycled) economic and political networks and their informal set of 
institutions have the potential to inform different modes of power relations within the 
different sub-worlds of the trinity. 
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Fifth, post-socialist spaces are both, localised and distanciated, but it is important to 
identify the economic and social contexts in which geographical, social and cultural 
proximity matter and equally the ways in which distanciated relations and their set of 
informal institutions shape transformation processes. 
Sixth, the constitution of new forms of self-governance and the emergence of newly 
articulated regional identities clearly play an important role in economic and social 
transformation in post-socialist countries. The political-economic representation of these 
identities as well as an identification of certain routines associated with them, interpreted 
as untraded interdependencies, should be integrated in the analysis of the trinity. The next 
section makes first suggestions on ways of rethinking the (post-)socialist city in terms of 
institutional change. 
3.2 From the Socialist to the Post-Socialist City 
French and Hamilton some time ago asked the basic question "whether or not the socialist 
city is fundamentally different from the city in ( ... ) capitalist societies" (French/Hamilton 
1979:3).67 Meanwhile, at least in Europe the differences are not seen as fundamental, 
because "They share much of the same historical and physical legacy, and are subject to 
the same forces of modem industrial society" (Smith, D.M. 1996:73). While there is no 
doubt that differences in the urban fabric do exist, the early western debate about the nature 
of the socialist (or socialised) city has been predominantly occupied with the spatial 
organisation of the city and linked questions of planning, urbanisation processes, 
67 A year earlier, Friedrichs edited a comprehensive study in German, comparing the cities of London, 
Hamburg, East Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow with the aim of identifying similarities and differences in urban 
development between capitalist and socialist countries (Friedrichs 1978:8). 
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functional structures, mobility or socio-economic segregation (see also Musil 1980; 
Szelenyi 1983; Turnock 1989, chap.S; Ruoppila 2004).68 
In some respects, the early debate on the characteristics of the socialist city has seen a 
revival of urban geography by suggesting the emergence of the 'post-socialist city' after 
the fall of centrally planned economies not only in Central and Eastern Europe (Kovacs 
1999; Scarpaci 2000). It can be claimed that the alleged (post-)socialist city has only been 
vaguely theorised, in particular regarding the spatial nature of institutional change and 
economic transformation. Moreover, the efforts to integrate the post-socialist city into 
extensive discussions in urban theory are rare or insufficient. 
3.2.1 The Socialist City 
The debates over the socialist city in terms of its spatial organisation can be regarded as 
settled. Drawing from neo-Weberian theory and analysing the socialist capitals of 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, Szelenyi (1996) summarises the debate of the 
1970s and 80s in suggesting three main characteristics of the socialist in contrast to the 
capitalist city. First, the socialist economic regime eliminated private property and 
redistributed resources in particular to the heavy industries. As a consequence of extensive 
industrialisation and austerity on non-productive infrastructure socialist cities tend to be 
'under-urbanised' which "means that under this pattern of industrialization and 
urbanization, the growth of the urban population falls behind the growth of urban industrial 
and tertiary sector jobs" (Szelenyi 1996:295). As a result, socialist cities have significantly 
smaller and less dense populations than capitalist cities. Second, socialist cities produce 
68 One reason for this theoretically limited research programme might be a general tendency in western urban 
studies (at that time), focusing rather on the built environment, and reproducing "attempts to pull out certain 
elements of cities as primary forces, with the result that they freeze cities in place" (AminlThrift 2002:3). 
Another reason for the descriptive western approach to the socialist city may have been the view that there 
were (spatial) planning lessons to be learned from it. In other words, "Socialism ( ... ) gave rise to the 
expectation of a different kind of city from those of the Anglo-American textbooks ( ... ) and city planning 
was viewed as an important means of achieving political purposes" (Smith. D.M. 1996:71-72). 
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less urbanism in their inner districts expressed in the diversity of urban services, spatial 
density, positive and negative urban marginality (e.g. dynamism, deviance, poverty) of its 
population than cities in capitalist economies (ibid:299-303). Third, applying an ecological 
approach, Szelenyi identifies different levels of segregation. because, socialist cities, "by 
restricting markets and by regulating regional processes, primarily through central 
planning, did produce and reproduce asymmetrical allocation of social classes, 
occupational and ethnic groups in space" (ibid:303). 
Since Marx's and Engel's "Manifesto of the Communist Party" (1848) it has been argued 
that socialist ideology has an anti-urban bias in demanding the gradual abolition of town 
and country distinctions for avoiding the excessive and degrading spatial density of the 
industrial proletariat in capitalist cities (Scarpaci 2000:663). The 'anti-metropolitan 
syndrome' of state socialism (and capitalism likewise) is meant to "hinder the urban 
phenomenon, prevent urban development, reducing it to growth" (Lefebvre 2003 
[1970]:167). Somehow ironically, the communist revolutions as well as the fall of the 
socialist regimes by the end of the 20th century would not have been possible without the 
urban base, presenting itself as "( ... ) a place of conflict and confrontation, a unity of 
contradictions" (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]:175). While generalisations (not only) of the 
socialist city remain difficult as urban processes have different dynamics over time and 
space, it can be concluded that formal institutions such as the non-existence of land 
markets, the far-reaching absence of private property, and the overall control of the central 
state in planning, organising and allocating resources and infrastructure produce a city type 
which has peculiar features and distinctive characteristics (Musil 1993). 
It has been claimed that "In the socialist economy the non-economic factors of production 
- political, ideological, symbolic, social, military, technical - had enormous, if not over-
riding importance" (Kostinskiy 2001 :451). The central state realised its desire for socialist 
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symbolic meaning and 'glittering icons' (Dawson 1999), in particular, in already existing 
heavy industrial cities, often leading to an excessive expansion of those industries which 
were perceived as socialist model sectors such as coal and steel production in Upper 
Silesia. In some cases, green-field development led not only to the establishment of new 
industrial plants, but at the same time to the planning of new towns such as Nowa Huta or 
Tychy in Poland.69 Indeed, the locational decision of Poland's fonner biggest steelwork 
Hula fm. Lenina (today Hula Sendzimira) in Nowa Huta, newly erected in a district of 
Krak6w in 1949, can be seen to a great extent as political, ideological and symbolical with 
the aim "to create a working class in a notoriously bourgeois city" (Stenning 2003:763).70 
As Bauman suggests, socialist society "was to be artificially designed and constructed, by 
freeing humankind from constraints of scarcity, ending human dependence on the limited 
gifts of nature, subordinating miserly nature to human needs - and forcing it to deliver 
more with the help of political will, science and technology, working in unison to magnify 
human productive forces" (Bauman 1991 :263). 
69 In contrast to the USSR, where about one third of today's cities were planned and founded after 1945 
(Treivish/Brade/Nefedova 1999: 115; NefedovalTreivish 2002:20), the planning of new towns in socialist 
countries of central Europe remained marginal. This can be explained by a higher pace of urbanisation in the 
USSR fuelled by the increasing exploitation of natural resources east of the Ural mountains. In the case of 
Poland, the share of the urban population rose between 1945 and 1970 from 31.8 to 52.2 per cent, mainly in 
industrial agglomerations (Musil 1980:77) and slowed down in 1980s. 
70 Stenning (2000:100) notes that the USSR co-funded this project with a US$ 450 million loan to 
compensate Poland for the non-access to the US American Marshall Aid Fund. which was implemented in 
non-socialist countries and can be seen as a starting point in the economic and political division of Europe 
after WWII. It can be said that the locational decision of Hula fm. Lenina was enforced by Stalin in order to 
increase economic dependency, so called 'horizontal integration', according to the 'socialism in one country' 
policy of the USSR (Cheshire/Hamilton 2000: 124). Dawson identifies this steelworks as a cultural symbol, 
because "its purpose was in part to symbolize the intention to transform southern Poland's largely rural 
economy into one in which industry was to be dominant, and to change the economy of the country as a 
whole ( ... )" (Dawson 1999:157). Indeed, industrial investments between 1949 (lOO) and 1956 (330.5) rose 
dramatically following the Six-Year Plan, which "put forward the construction of socialist foundations in 
Poland ( ... r (Landauffomaszewski 1985:217, data:22 I). 
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Photo 1: Huta Irn. LeninalHuta Nowa, 1967 
Source: Dawson 1999: 1 S9 
This utopian social engineering aimed at the expansion of major cities and their industries, 
which were regarded as focal points for the catch-up modernisation and economic growth 
of socialist countries. But despite the claim of overriding ' non-economic' forces in 
socialist economies, the often gigantic industrial expansion followed the universal 
economic rationale of the 20th century, searching for economies of scale and the 
efficiencies of agglomeration (Sailer-Fiege 1999:8V1 The socialist adoption of the 
capitalist utopia of modernity had far-reaching consequences on the individual , as Buck-
Morss identifies the differences for capitalist and socialist societies: 
71 The development of a socialist economic theory is linked with the diverse political ' undercurrents ' in the 
Soviet Politburo in the 1920s, which stretched from Bukharin 's gradualist approach during the transformation 
period (here of course the transformation from capitalism to communism) with the demand "we shall reach 
socialism by no other ways than through market relations" (Bukharin 1925 quoted in Lewin 1975:46) to the 
more radical, peasant-hostile programmes of Trotsky and Stalin (of the 1930s) who demanded accelerated 
industrialisation. 
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Industrial modernity in both really existing forms. capitalist and socialist. created a hostile environment for 
human life. precisely the opposite of the dream of modernity. (. .. ) In its construction of desire. industrial 
modernity offers a substitute for human fulfilment the illusion of omnipotence. Its form under capitalism is 
the consumer illusion of instant gratification. while long-term needs go unattended and social security is so 
precarious that unemployment strikes with the fate of a natural catastrophe. Under the Soviet style of 
socialism. the situation is reversed: the illusion is that the state will provide total security (in return/or total 
dependency). while there is no control over immediate satisfactions. Whether you happen to collide with 
bread tomorrow is left totally to chance" (Buck-Morss 2000:205). 
The claim of food shortages might be overstated in describing the overall nature of 
consumers' everyday real socialist experience between Vladivostok and Prague in the 
second half of the 20th century. But without a doubt, the unintended shortcomings of 
centrally controlled socialist economic planning generated a growing dissatisfaction among 
the working population, which materialised in bigger industrial cities, triggered by 
consumer goods shortages and price inflation in the face of an aggravating economic and 
political crises in the 1980s.72 
The expansion and symbolic meaning of the heavy industries and the underlying socialist 
accumulation model leads to a unique set of formal and informal institutions, which define 
the socialist industrial city and its spatial-relational routines over time. In analysing the 
socialist peCUliarity of organisations, technologies, and territory, at least five main 
characteristics of formal/informal institutions, spatial divisions of labour, and network 
properties can be identified. 
72 In Poland, the failed economic refonns of the 1970s and 1980s and the intensifying political and economic 
crises led to a growing protest against the socialist state and its institutions. In the course of the famous 
strikes in the shipyard at Gdansk and the rise of Solidarity, the opposition also grew in Upper Silesia where 
miners started an underground occupation strike in the Wujek coal mine (Katowice) at the outset of martial 
law in December 1981, which ended with nine miners killed by the riot police ZOMO (Cybula 2004:244; 
Ascherson 1987:223). During the sunset of the Polish socialist regime in the 1980s, between 60 and 80 per 
cent of the adults supported the introduction of free markets and competition into the economy while 
remaining hostile towards private businesses (Gomulka 1993: 188). 
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First, the centralised state and its organisations generated a political elite, the state-
appointed nomenklatura, which governed the large-scale state-owned enterprises in the 
planned economy (FrydmanlRapaczynski 1994: 12). The economic-political elite shared 
common ideals and routines, which were learned in mass organisations and practised in 
horizontal and vertical economic-political networks of trust and mutual help. Second, due 
to the centrally planned nature of socialist economies and the state control of the 
enterprises, political local and regional decision makers remained weak in shaping the 
future of their cities and urban economies. Quite the contrary, "enterprises exercise 
relations of dominance and control over the communities ( ... ) and are paralysed ( .. ) in this 
hierarchy of power" (Pickles 1998: 176).73 Third, the far-reaching lack of a competitive 
market and private business ownership74 and thus the irrelevance of transaction costs 
heightened the mono-structural economic fabric of the socialist city and the dominance of 
large-scale enterprises, which became self-sufficient and "highly vertically integrated in 
order to ensure adequate inputs of raw materials that were not easily accessible" (Oughton 
1997: 164). Additionally, in order to fulfil the official economic plan of the enterprise in an 
environment of scarcity and creative chaos, the management was forced to consider non-
monetary transactions with other enterprises. Fourth, the high level of vertical integration 
and historically unprecedented concentration of economic assets created formal and 
informal strong ties not only between suppliers and customers (Elster/Offe/Preuss 
1998: 159), or between different production parts of the plant, but also between the 
enterprise and the workforce. The establishment of enterprise-owned social and 
educational infrastructure, housing, transport facilities, and the privileged provision of 
73 This lack of control was most visible in the absence of local authority'S intervention due to the disastrous 
ecological damages and space consumption of the heavy industries. The emerging environmentalism in 
unofficial civic action groups of the 1970s and 1980s led to bottom-up movements for local and regional 
concerns (Pickvance 1996:236-243). 
74 In analysing the socialist regime of property laws in different countries, Marcuse (1996) reminds us that 
some property rights indeed existed in form of social ownership, such as rental housing, which was state-
guaranteed. Moreover, private owned businesses started to emerge in several socialist countries during the 
1980s. In the case of Poland, this happened in the course of the economic crisis of 1979-1982, when "setting 
up new enterprises by citizens were simplified, the burden of accounting was lessened, and permission was 
given to private enterprises to freely contract with the state sector" (Poznanski 1996: 102). 
91 
scarce consumer goods for the socialist model workforce created labour relations 
characterised by interdependence and high levels of identification, but also with risk 
aversion and 'grab-and-run' behaviour on both sides (ibid: 158). Fifth, official output 
targets which could not be met and the lack of price flexibility generated 'creative' (or 
parallel) economies on the one side, but disincentives on the other side internal 
technological innovation in plants due to the unwanted requirement of managerial routine 
change (Nielsen 1996:62; Poznanski 1996:254).75 
Like French and Hamilton in the 1970s, it can be asked in what ways the claimed post-
socialist city is different from the socialist city, as the capitalist mode of production is the 
new paradigm after the fall of the communist accumulation model. Incorporating 
institutional and evolutionary thinking, it can be assumed that this shift is not limited to the 
transformation of spatial organisation, but involves a gradual change in, but also 
continuation of, formal and informal institutions, which define and shape the post-socialist 
economic-political space. 
3.2.2 The Post-Socialist City 
The last section of this chapter briefly highlights the main topics and problems in defining 
the emergence of the post-socialist city in terms of its formal and informal institutional 
change after the fall of the socialist one-party state and the introduction of the capitalist 
mode of accumulation. As stated above, the main reasoning is to understand the urban 
economic transformation process as a complex and path-dependent recombination of 
institutions, instead of describing the perceived change in terms of new patterns of spatial 
organisation. However, a few examples will illustrate changes in spatial organisation as a 
cause of institutional change. 
75 Cheshire and Hamilton (2000) note that technological modernisation processes started in the Warsaw 
Treaty countries by the 1970s. which stimulated closer ties between socialist and capitalist cities through 
technology transfer (Cheshire/Hamilton 2000: 125). 
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In describing the transformation process of post-socialist cities, the standard narration has 
been to identify the spatial organisation as deeply affected by the ongoing political and 
devastating socio-economic changes. In a UNDP publication published by the end of the 
1990s, the local 'success' of coping with negative effects of the transformation process is 
perceived as decisive for the overall reintegration of former socialist countries into the rest 
of Europe. 
While the view that efforts to find solutions at the level of the individual. household. community or firm will 
be defeated without successes at wider economic scales has been accepted as truism. it is equally the case 
that without establishing the basis at the local and grass root level for the organizational strengths to carry 
out the routines of provisioning and maintaining human settlements. initiatives at the macro-scale will 
themselves be undermined by social conflict and divisive politics (UNDP wlo year: 5)76 
In an overall atmosphere of crisis, 'managing transformations' is the malO concern of 
action for international development agencies, because "the real issue is not to blame 
specific institutions [organisations] for failures in predicting or managing transformations. 
The issue is the need to learn from the experience of the nineties and to develop efficient 
patterns of management of continuing transformations" (Genov 1999: 129). In addition to 
the focus on management skills and 'best practices' in urban contexts, these accounts of 
transformations reduce urban processes to a re-organisation and improvement of all kinds 
of settlement infrastructure, in particular housing, water and electricity, transport and 
health with the assumption "that investments in improving the physical conditions of 
human settlements vastly improve economic potentials and life chances for industry and 
citizens alike" (UNDP w/o year: 1 02). 
76 The quoted UNDP publication identifies six spheres of transformation: first the growth and distribution of 
population and human activities at local, national and international levels; second, the transformation from 
command to capitalist economy; third, the transformation of state-civil society relations; fourth, the 
destruction of the natural environment; fifth, the transformation of the built environment; and sixth, changes 
of social institutions such as family, household. community "that are shaking the foundations of daily life and 
attachment to place" (UNDP w/o year:S). 
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The author does not suggested that improvements in urban management and infrastructure 
are not necessary, but that post-socialist urban change is much more than re-organising and 
re-designing the city to fit with the new capitalist accumulation mode. Moreover, in this 
approach the city and its formal and informal institutions are taken for granted or described 
as fixed 'black boxes', which mediate change. These perspectives even stumble to 
introduce the capitalist management practices they wish to, because specific urban post-
socialist transformation processes and their iriformal institutional contents are not taken 
seriously enough. In what follows, therefore, the main political and economic events in the 
aftermath of the collapse of state socialism are linked with their effects on cities. During 
the first transformation period, early studies on post-socialist cities mirrored the 
overwhelming political and economic changes in CEE, in particular processes of 
democratisation and marketisation, although they barley focused on the interrelation 
between these two mega forces of change or took them for granted (Stenning 1999:592). 
The following paragraphs highlight the most crucial formal institutional changes and their 
impacts on the post-socialist city. The final paragraph suggests a first assessment of 
changed and recombined informal institutions in the case of urban post-socialism and its 
political-economic framework, because "It is at the local scale that processes of 
transformation are lived and it is often at this scale that popular assessments of the 
achievements of political and economic changes are made" (ibid.). 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the re-establishment of political sovereignty in 
the former member countries had the effect that cities, previously focussing on economic 
relations to other socialist spaces, were now trying to re-integrate to the European urban 
network - and at the same time experienced the rise of 'western-style' urban social 
problems (Scarpaci 2000:664). In terms of urban formal institutional changes, one of most 
important was the return of self-governance and the division of power between local, 
regional and central levels after decades of fused party and state institutions (see chap. 
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4.3). The devolution of authorities, and thus a partial transfer of control and power from 
the central to the local and regional level aims at increasing political accountability, but has 
been realised rather late in the transformation process, because these so called second 
generation reforms initially "fell to the bottom of already crowded political agendas" 
(Y oder 2003 :263). Despite significant differences of local and regional transformation 
policies in former socialist countries, it can be said that the central state has been 
weakened. But this does not necessarily mean that elected local or regional self-
governments have been strengthened at the same time, giving evidence for incoherent 
reform efforts and political/administrative fragmentation what resulted in difficulties of 
implementing urban development programmes (Surazska 1996; Kovacs 1999: 1-2; 
O'Dwyer 2002:17-18). 
The second meta event with a direct impact on the economic and social fabric on cities was 
the breaking up of the socialist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
alongside the introduction of capitalist markets and legislation. This event was part of the 
implementation of shock-therapy and proved to be an initial disaster for the national 
economies involved, which suddenly lost their most important trading partners and 
production linkages, leading to bankruptcy and mass-liquidation of then still state-owned 
companies (Gowan 1995: 17). 'One-industry cities', such as the cities of Upper Silesia, 
were the most affected by this process and "are stagnating, declining or facing difficulties 
in restructuring their economic base" (Cheshire/Hamilton 2000: 125). As a parallel 
development, western corporations start to penetrate former socialist markets, bringing 
foreign capital and new technology to these cities and this still remains a driving force in 
economic restructuring. In addition to the arrival of global capital, the introduction of 
market mechanisms and capitalist modes of production, processes of commodification and 
the privatisation of surviving state assets are most relevant in terms of urban development 
(Grime 1999). The emergence of new property rights through privatisation must be seen as 
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a major formal institutional change in post-socialist societies. In analysing both. socialist 
and post-socialist property rights, Marcuse concludes that 
The new directions towards which [Central and] Eastern European countries are moving thus involve both 
changes in ideology and changes in the distribution of power. The result has been seemingly neat general 
declarations about 'the rights of private property' adopted in constitutions and legislation, followed by more 
specific but often contradictory legislation regulating specific aspects of property rights ( ... ), followed by 
even more concrete and even more contradictory administrative actions (. .. ). Consistency becomes of less 
importance as the complex impact of changes in property rights on specific interests become clear" 
(Marcuse 1996: 183). 
Last but not least, as an effect of the abovementioned formal institutional changes, private 
businesses started to freely develop and the increasing number of small- and medium sized 
enterprises, in particular urban service industries, significantly changed the economic 
spaces of post-socialist cities, giving at least limited evidence of a "convergent trajectory 
towards their West European counterparts" (Cheshire/Hamilton 2000:125).77 
These radical formal institutional changes have had wide-ranging impacts on former 
socialist cities and have been changing many aspects of their economic and social life. In 
the course of the ongoing privatisation process, the emerging domestic or foreign 
enterprises have usually taken over only parts of the previous large-scale enterprises, in 
particular in the heavy industries, shutting down unprofitable production lines.78 As a 
result, large inner-urban derelict areas with serious problems of contamination have been 
77 The academic debate over the convergence of post-socialist cities towards western cities is not settled. 
Sailer-Fliege argues that "A simple convergence of urban development in the direction of the US or 
continental European pattern is ( ... ) not to be expected - regardless of the design of institutions - as a general 
rise in the affluence of the masses of the population was of fundamental importance for each of these patterns 
of urban development. As demonstrated by the impact of the recent dynamic of globalisation process on the 
capitalist states of the west, this process goes hand-in-hand with a widening of the social gap and the 
tightening of the public purse strings" (SaiJer-Fliege 1999: 15-16). 
78 Most of the privatisation efforts in CEE (with exception of former Czechoslovakia and Hungary) led to so 
called 'insider privatisations' with a majority ownership by workers or by workers and managers (Estrin 
1996: 13). The case of Poland and Upper Silesia will be discussed with more detail in chapter 4.1.1. 
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created, so that most local self-governments are not in a position to implement essential 
time- and cost-intensive re-development measures because of their tight financial situation 
(Sailer-Fliege 1999: 12). 
Moreover, in the course of economic restructuring and privatisation stiff competition 
between the different local authorities occurs, in particular to attract foreign direct 
investments. The escalating demand for space from private local and global enterprises 
results into a process, where scarce municipal funds are often absorbed by the 
establishment of green-field manufacturing, warehousing and shopping areas with 
business-friendly infrastructure on urban fringes (Cheshire/Hamilton 2000: 123). These are 
sometimes risky public investments, because firms enjoy a freedom of choice in locating 
their activities, a fact which can be abused by investors in tenns of articulating exaggerated 
preconditions of their investments. As a result, post-socialist cities are experiencing spatial 
polarisation of economic activity and a "complex struggle between contending groups for 
economic advantage, political power and social position" (Harloe 1996: 15). The 
transfonnation in the economy also includes changes in the social sphere that have 
influenced urban and regional labour markets, inequalities in income and the emergence of 
regions with the highest unemployment rates in the EU-25, all of which have a severe 
economic and spatial dimension, because "low level of productive activity accompanies 
social problems in these [disadvantaged] areas, and may to a degree explain them" (OECD 
2001a:213).79 
The ongoing crisis reflects the "reality that the transition period was likely to be longer 
rather than short [and that] change, in the sense of the collapse of the 'old' and the 
79 This OEeD statement points to recent developments in the location of factors of production and growing 
spatial disparities between areas with low manpower costs and 'successful' high-tech areas. The authors 
observe a changing tendency, whereby "leading-edge production now seems to be going towards areas 
offering the most diversified resources and the lowest transaction costs, that is to say towards the most 
developed areas" (OEeD 2001:213). From this perspective, old industrial and mono-structured areas will 
decline further, because of the highly selective investment strategies of global players. 
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introduction of new political institutions and of market mechanisms, would not be 
achieved in the short term" (Kostinskiy 2001 :451). As Szelenyi observes, by the mid 
1990s, "many features of socialist urban development are now decaying rapidly, and those 
that still survive are increasingly in contradiction with the emergent socio-economic reality 
of the region [CEE]" (Szelenyi 1996:288). The recognition of 'useless' socialist features 
also reflects the idea that surviving informal institutions are seen to be obsolete and 
hindering the new economic urban order, an assessment which is not necessarily shared by 
evolutionist researchers. In a typically negative assessment of 'socialist features' in post-
socialist contexts, Hamilton notes, that 
'faced with steep learning curves regarding unfamiliar or perceived-as-threatening policies and 
organizations under conditions of great risk, uncertainty and dismantling of the socialist state - many 
government and enterprise decision-makers, institutional architects and public administrators 'retreated' 
into the practices, behaviour or positions of the socialist period ( .. .) and actively or passively resisted 
changes and reforms" (Hamilton 1999: 138). 
State-owned enterprises are usually at the centre of attention in terms of the survival of 
socialist networks and their routines and conventions, where 'insecure' managers - the 
former socialist nomenklatura - take advantage of political connections for personal 
enrichment (Poznanski 1996:223-224). In terms of re-combined networks and routines in 
post-socialist urban or regional contexts, the accounts are based on speculation or just not 
studied. Despite the demand, that a "focus only on the development of formal institutions 
is insufficient" (Hamilton 1999: 138), an extensive, path-dependent analysis of informal 
institutional change has still to be conducted. In order to analyse this change along the 
framework of organisations, technology, and territory, the diverse relationships between 
emergmg private businesses, (privatised) state-owned enterprises, transnational 
corporations, and newly established local and regional self-governments is identified as 
crucial in post-socialist contexts. 
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Before turning to these aspects with a case study in Upper Silesia in chapters 5 and 6, the 
next chapter provides an overview of the specific context of Polish economic 
transformation in general and Upper Silesia in particular. 
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4 Polish Economic and Political Transformations 
his chapter sets out some of the major economic and political dynamics of post-
T SOCialist transformation in Poland, interpreted as space-time path-dependent processes. In what follows, therefore, the change of formal economic institutions 
such as competitive markets and capitalist property regimes has allowed the emergence of 
private businesses, the privatisation of state-owned assets and the influx of foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) on Polish territories in the aftermath of socialist modes of 
accumulation. Furthermore, the economic restructuring measures of the heavy industries 
provide evidence of the complexity of transformation and formal/informal institutional 
change in Upper Silesia with its still dominant coal and steel sector. The preliminary 
description of (economic) organisations, their technological pathways and embeddedness 
in economic post-socialist spaces aims to take a first step in seeing to integrate Storper's 
analytical framework into old industrial regions with socialist legacies. 
Triggered by the lost dominance of the socialist central state and the demand for political 
accountability and legitimacy in the process of democratisation since the late 1980s, the 
rise of local and regional self-governments in Poland is also introduced. The process of 
decentralisation is analysed in order to identify the short-comings and problems of 
political-administrative reforms at the regional level and hence to provide first insights into 
the transformation of the different modes of political power. Moreover, the evolution of 
economic development programmes of the Wojew6dztwa S!C:lskiego (Voivodship of 
Silesia)80 is introduced in order to identify the implications for political-economic actors 
and the process of restructuring. The last part of this chapter leads into an assessment of 
the path-dependent evolution of Polish regions and aims to identify their institutional 
80 See footnote 21 for a short historical introduction of Upper Silesia. which is now territorially integrated 
into the regional administrative body of the Silesian Voivodship. and how these terms are used and defined in 
this thesis. 
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capacities for supporting economic development, restructuring and the adoption of 
capitalist modes of production. 
The main reasoning of this chapter is to present post-socialist spaces as both distanced or 
spatially stretched (in the sense of AminlThrift 2002, see chapter 3.1.2) and proximate or 
spaces of propinquity, so that the relationship between these interlinked concepts may be 
explored. At the first glance both the growth of international trade with Poland and the 
dependence on external financial aid in restructuring and transforming the Polish industry 
is striking. The peculiarity of the' Polish way' in dealing with enormous external pressure, 
set up by international development agencies and the European Union on the eve of 
Poland's accession, makes it necessary to consider the internal implications of becoming a 
post-socialist space. 
4.1 Institutional Economic Change in Poland and Upper Silesia 
The establishment of major economic formal institutions in Poland to fit with a capitalist 
economy, can largely be regarded as accomplished, even if their compatibility with each 
other has been criticised (Poznanski 1996:276). In relevant publications of international 
agencies, Poland is regularly presented as a success case of economic transformation, as 
the following OEeD statement suggests. 
"Poland's accession to the European Union on l" May 2004 marks a turning point in its economic and 
political history. Itfollows /5 years of profound change and accomplishment. More than 75 per cent ofGDP 
is now produced in the private sector, the economy is well integrated with those of western nations and 
inflation has been brought down to low levels. After an initial fall, output has been growing continuously for 
more than JO years and on average, Poles are much better offnow than they were then" (DEeD 2004:9). 
The economic transformation has been facilitated by major changes of laws and efforts to 
mainstream the regulatory framework in neo-liberal fashion. Industrial policy and state 
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regulation have given way to market forces, and formal economic relations governed by 
law. "[E]ven where domestic opposition to reform was strong ( ... ), government leaders 
were able to preserve their autonomy domestically using the 'shield' of mandatory 
harmonization with EU policies" (Campbell 2002:499). However, the radical and multi-
dimensional withdrawal of the state, conducted in line with the ideology of shock-therapy 
in order to implement liberal market mechanisms, is faced with an 'orthodox paradox': 
"destatization can only be accomplished by the state and thus presupposes state 
interventions and a 'strong state'" (Elster/Offe/Preuss 1998: 160). 
Many macro-economic indicators suggest that Poland has become a successful European 
capitalist state following only 15 years of transformation. Poland's GDP growth, the 
emergent private sector with over three million independent firms, the Polish stock market, 
which is regarded as one of the most active and the largest in CEE and Poland's 
achievement in attracting substantial foreign investments speak a language of dramatic 
change, if compared with similar indicators at the very beginning of the 1990s, when it 
was, "Nearly written off as the new sick man of Europe - and as evidence that shock 
therapies do not work" (World Bank 1994: 1).81 The snap-shot like ups and downs of 
macro-economic data drive a country's assessment of being either successful or 
unsuccessful in its transformation process, although the gap between these two extremes is 
sometimes only a few per cent. Moreover, in the case of Poland and other transformation 
countries, recent economic development increasingly not only has an internal dimension in 
terms of adequate reforms and policies, but must also be seen in European and global 
contexts. However, the procedural description of macro-economic data on national levels 
81 The average annual volume growth of Polish GDP was 5.2 per cent between 1995 and 2000. Except for a 
significant slump during the first three and a half years of this decade, GDP growth oscillated around 4 and 5 
per cent since the last quarter of 2003, mainly fuelled by increasing exports (OECD 2004:25). By 2002, 
Poland had accumulated more than $45 billion FDls, the highest amount among post-socialist accession 
countries, although in terms of per cent of GDP, the lowest share (OECD 2004:47). The Warsaw stock 
exchange (WSE) is regarded as the largest in CEE with a market capitalisation (2003), which is almost 
identical to the combined market value of the next three largest stock exchanges in CEE, although the WSE 
is equal to only 21 per cent of the Polish GDP (OEeD 2004: 146). 
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does not reveal how economic transformation takes place at meso- and micro-scales and in 
what ways locally based organisations are faced with or deal with the cycles of crisis and 
boom. 
Despite Poland's macro-economic success in becoming the 'east European tiger' over the 
past decade, the difficult economic restructuring and the rise of mass unemployment 
provides a more cloudy picture, which has raised the question 'What Polish miracle?' 
(Guardian/G2: 12.06.2002). More broadly, there is a growing unease regarding the 
increased divisions, inequalities, and poverty within post-socialist societies (SmithiPickles 
1998 :21; Szu1c 2000). Besides the demand for 'sound' macro-economic state policies, 
international development agencies identify three particular problems for 'the Polish 
economy'. These are the functioning of labour markets and the restructuring of state 
enterprises (chapter 4.1.2) alongside the interlinked privatisation process (chapter 4.1.1). 
The sharp increase of unemployment from around 10 per cent at the end of 1998 to 15 per 
cent at the end of 2000 has been largely attributed to a similar slowdown of production in 
western Europe, as well as to the implementation of restructuring programmes in 
unprofitable state sectors such as mining and steel (OECD 2001 :29+32; Bell 2001:6). 
Although GDP growth rates have recovered since then, the growing unemployment rate of 
around 20 per cent and more since 2002 looks increasingly structural in nature and 
"represents the most important challenge facing the Polish economy" (OECD 2004:9-10). 
Labour relations in Poland, seen as traded interdependencies, have also deteriorated, 
because policies "focus almost exclusively on the supply side with the objective of 
reestablishing the perfect market of neoclassical theory, and their measures are designed to 
adapt the labor supply to the new conditions" (Camara 2003:54). The large-scale loss of 
employment in the course of restructuring and labour market policies adapted to the 'new 
conditions', which demand a high degree of flexibility, risk-taking and entrepreneurship 
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from the workforce, have to be set in the broader contexts of neo-liberalisation in post-
socialist countries. The main driving forces of neo-liberalism are international economists 
and financial organisations, which conditionally attach clauses to their lending 
programmes (Rainnie/SmithlSwain 2002:7). This externality of economic transformation 
has forced Poland into tight state budget spending, and macro-economic policies in line 
with neo-liberal ideology.82 
The comparison of regional distribution of GDP generated and unemployment (see map 
below for the fourth quarter of 2003) suggests widening regional disparities in Poland 
(Statistical Office in Katowice 2002a:35), a tendency which mirrors similar spatial 
processes in countries of the western world (OEeD 2001 a:34). In terms of GDP per capita 
(1998) only three regions are above the national average (100) with the Silesian 
Voivodship (111.9) coming second after the capital voivodship of Mazowieckie (146.1) 
(Blazyca et al. 2002:270).83 The unequal distribution of economic activity reflects a 
continuing west-east divide of industrial development. The eastern regions of Poland have 
a strong agricultural economic base and thus contribute less to the national GDP, whereas 
the southern, central, and northern regions are characterised by much higher degrees of 
industrialisation, a spatial pattern, which leads to the suggestion of three major distinctive 
Polish spaces (ibid.). However, Blazyca et al. (2002:271) argue that economic success of 
the 1990s is not so much a matter of regional location, but an urban phenomenon, whereby 
the larger the town, the more successful they are. The regional distribution of 
unemployment mirrors in particular the restructuring of large-scale state-enterprises, down-
sizing and closures of whole plants, in particular in the most industrialised region of 
82 For example, in 2003 only 15 per cent of unemployed Poles obtained unemployment benefits, which 
equals about I per cent ofGDP, one of the !owest ratios in the OECD world (OECD 2004: 104). 
83 These three voivodships, Mazowieckie, Shtskie, and Wielkopolskie (105.6) generated about 43 per cent of 
the Polish GDP in 1997 (OECD 200Ia:94). 
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Poland, Upper Silesia.84 In contrast to the rural eastern areas, western regions such as 
Lubuskie and Dolnosl'tskie also show exceptionally high rates of unemployment, close to 
the highest in EU-25, in particular fuelled by joblessness among youth and older workers 
(OECD 2004:41-43). 
Map 3: Regional Distribution of Unemployment in Poland (last % 2004) 
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The evolution of post-socialist unemployment in the SI'tskie Voivodship (until 1998 
Katowice Voivodship) reveals a contradiction in the picture of Poland as a model pupil of 
neo-liberal ideology. Throughout the 1990s, the unemployment rates in this region 
oscillated well below the national average (Gorzelak 1996:72; CzyZlChurski/Hauke 
2000:35), a fact which changed only recently and makes it possible to speak of a ' regional 
loser' of economic transformation and of ' negative discontinuity ' (Gorzelak 2000: 136). 
Despite different advice from organisations such as World Bank, OECD and EU, the 
84 The industrial sector (including mining, manufacturing, energy) of the SI'lskie Yoivodship contributed with 
17.6 per cent (2000) to the national industrial output measured by the share of the sectoral GDP and has thus 
declined significantly since 1995 (21.4 per cent), but it remains the highest regional proportion in Poland 
(Statistical Office in Katowice 2002:251). 
105 
restructuring and privatisation process pursued a different pace which reflects, "The slower 
than economically justified decline of industrial employment in the Katowice region ( ... ) 
due to the political power of workers and their trade unions" (Gorzelak 2001 :219). The 
following sections highlight the most important features of post-socialist fonnal 
institutional change, mainly seen from the outsider perspective of the international 
development agencies which have significantly influenced this process. 
4.1.1 Privatisation 
The institutional change to a free market and its effective external co-ordination of 
economic agents, supports the logic that state assets should become privatised because "It 
is the rational structure of corporate governance that the state enterprises in [Central] 
Eastern Europe are lacking, and the main task of privatisation is to introduce it. Without it, 
no amount of deregulation and decentralization will produce a well-functioning market 
economy" (FrydmanlRapaczynski 1994:48, original emphasis). Not surprisingly, the pace 
of privatisation has been the favoured indicator for measuring the transfonnation to a 
capitalist economy, although "the goals which are supposed to be advanced by 
privatisation are varied, ill defined, and often tend to be contradictory" (Rutland 
1997:270).85 
The official announcement of implementing privatisation measures was full of drive, 
politically embracing the economic shock-therapies in the so called "Balcerowicz 
Programme" (1990-1991), which promised to implement a functioning capitalist market 
economy within a mere two years (Kowalik 1994: 171). The Polish privatisation 
programme started in August 1990 with the introduction of the Privatisation Law, which 
had "to develop strategies and instruments almost from scratch" (DECD 1992: 100). 
85 This section deals only with privatisation measures of state-owned industries. Other privatisation topics in 
CEE such as the privatisation of the housing sector (Marcuse 1996; Struyk 1996) or private property 
restitution (Blacksell/Bom 2002) are not analysed. 
106 
Already a few years into the first transfonnation period, a World Bank publication notes 
ambivalently that 
"The core problem in transforming Poland into a market-oriented economy is transforming the state 
enterprise sector. Privatization and the enforcement of hard budget constraints have been the mainstays of 
the government strategy since the 1990s, and tremendous progress has been achieved in a relatively short 
time. But the transformation is far from complete. Privatization has been slower than wished for. And much 
of industry is still state-owned. without effective ownership control" (World Bank I 994:63). 
The early neo-liberal blueprint of radical system change led to unexpected macro-
economic de-stabilisation with high inflation (1990: 600 per cent; 1991: 71; 1992: 42) and 
a deepening recession, so called 'slumpflation', all in all a very hostile environment for 
privatisation (Kowalik 1994: 175-177). Accordingly to the overall economic depression 
during the first transfonnation period (chapter 1.1), privatisation measures were met with 
growing societal opposition and triggered fierce political debates, which 'delayed' the 
mass privatisation programme (OEeD 1994:78). 
The first privatisation efforts in a time of nomenklatura capitalism had already started in 
1989, still under communist rule, when "an untold number of apparatchiks landed 
comfortably as the new owners of promising units carved out of the fonner state 
enterprises" (StarklBruszt 1998:94). Under the first democratically elected government and 
first attempts at voucher schemes and employee ownership, the post-socialist privatisation 
path and ownership transfer emphasised sales to strategic investors, with the state retaining 
stakes in many large companies.86 Most of the larger enterprises were indirectly privatised 
(capital privatisation) under the supervision of the central state, represented by the Ministry 
86 The ownership structures after indirect privatisation are extremely diverse and can range from state shares 
of 3.8 per cent in the case of a former state-owned wholesale retailer up to 56 per cent in the case of an 
insurance (OEeD 2001 :84-85). In general, the energy sector, mining and other heavy industries have still the 
highest state shares, if these companies become privatised. See also FN 11 and chapter 6.1.3 for more 
examples and information about privatisation efforts on national and regional level. 
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of the State Treasury (Ministerstwo Skarbu Pailstwa). This means that the enterprise is 
legally commercialised (commercial code companies) before parts of the shares are sold to 
private investors (OEeD 1998:48), a process which will be critically analysed in chapter 
5.1.1 with an example of the steel industry. In contrast to this strategy, direct privatisation 
aims at total transfer of ownership, usually applied to smaller companies, "in which the 
authorities see no policy reason to retain ownership stakes" (OEeD 2001 :82). This level of 
privatisation is handled at the regional level and will be discussed with more detail in 
chapter 6.1.3. 
Besides the political sensitivity of privatisation measures, the relatively slow process 
reflects a privatisation system that includes lengthy consultation with social partners, 
management and workers with ministerial approvals. The OEeD has identified several 
factors as being responsible for the 'delayed' privatisation in Poland, in particular in the 
mining and energy sector (OEeD 2002: 122-l30). 
Table 1: Size of the Private Sector in Poland (as a per cent of the whole economy) 
Sector Emplo ment Gross Output 
1995 2000 1995 2000 
Agriculture 97.7 98.7 88.3 89.4 
Indust~ 50.5 74.8 47.7 71.6 
Mining 3.1 14.0 2.4 29.3 
Manufacturing 60.0 85.9 57.5 82.0 
Electricity, Gas, Water 3.7 6.9 2.0 4.4 
Transport, Storage & 26.7 37.6 40.2 49.9 
Communication 
Financial Services 36.4 72.2 67.4 82.6 
Average of all Sectors 62.8 73.7 61.1 74.4 
Source: OECD 2002:122 
First, they argue that the privatisation process is partly blocked by internal interest 
structures of state-controlled enterprises what often leads to failed consensus between 
management and labour representatives (Poznanski 1996:223-227). Public-enterprise 
insiders use the mechanisms to defend their own interests, which they sometimes perceive 
as being best served by maintaining state-ownership. Additionally, current indirect 
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privatisation rules require that before privatisation negotiations between the Ministry of the 
State Treasury and an eventual buyer begin, both parties have to agree on a restructuring 
package for the enterprise, including an investment and social plan (OECD 2002:123). In 
the case of direct privatisations, a consultative process involves the regional voivodship 
authorities, the buyer, existing management and labour representatives. Thus, Polish 
privatisation measures culminate, according to some observers, in "corruption-generating 
linkages between political parties, politicians and trade unions ( ... ) to wield power in their 
own narrow interest using ( ... ) appointments to firms' and public agency supervisory 
boards as form of patronage" (Macieja 2001: 155). 
Second, it is suggested that the management and logistical problems posed by the large 
number of state-owned or controlled firms weakens the Ministry of State Treasury capacity 
to provide effective governance to firms, in which nearly four thousand individuals 
represent the State Treasury (OECD 2002:129). Moreover, for a Ministry employee, 
representing the state on a firm's board is a lucrative job, which pays as much as 100 per 
cent of the average wage in addition to the regular salary. In such a case, the incentives to 
actively find a buyer for a state-controlled company may be greatly hindered (ibid.). 
A third source of difficulties in the privatisation process points to industrial sectors of 
national (strategic) interest, such as steel, coal and energy, defence, and transport, where 
politicians and authorities demand the presence of 'strong' Polish interests, which 
complicates negotiations with possible foreign investors. Additionally, in order to achieve 
higher sales prices, the strategy 'restructuring before privatisation' has been pursued in 
these industries, a path that still receives much criticism from international development 
and finance agencies, because, "The argument that pre-privatisation restructuring is 
necessary to maximise the sale price of the firm appears to abstract from the costs ( ... ) 
incurred by the government during the restructuring process" (ibid: 130). 
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4.1.2 Restructuring of State-owned Mining and Steel Industries 
Despite more than fifteen years of efforts to restructure state-controlled industries such as 
coal and steel as well as significant improvements in productivity, many of them remain 
uncompetitive and a drain on the nation's resources due to subsidies and high restructuring 
costs (Riley/Tkocz 1998; 1999; Szczepailski 2003). Several governments in Poland have 
suggested that the coal and steel sectors have to be restructured before they are privatised. 
Accordingly, over the past fifteen years, these sectors have been faced with a series of 
restructuring plans aimed at restoring profitability before proceeding with a sale. The 
authorities suggest that unless the firms are restructured to profitability, they will not find a 
purchaser. Indeed, despite repetitive tenders and the sale of some single sites, not many 
private investors have been willing to agree to acquire these firms on the conditions 
demanded by the government (OECD 2002:116). What remains, are many 'unwanted 
assets' with new functions, often close to city centres, as Cybula illustrates dramatically for 
the case of Upper Silesia: 
"Their formal owners neglect the business or cannot afford to keep it running. One can get a sense of the 
gravity of the situation by entering some seemingly abandoned and inadequately policed industrial 
instal/at ions. They are rusting. the equipment is being looted. and the premises are a safe haven for the 
homeless. drunkards. petty criminals and other margina/ised individuals. For several years. an extreme 
example was a steelwork that rusted close to the market square and a main shopping street of a city with 
120.000 residents!" (Cybula 2004:250). 
The Upper Silesian coal-mining industry is still the most important sector in the region and 
the biggest in Europe outside of the former USSR, despite its decreasing share of industrial 
output and employment.87 The sector's excess capacity, over-employment, lack of 
87 In 1998, 91.2 per cent of the Polish sold hard coal output was produced in the voivodship Sl~kie 
Voivodship (2000:31). In 2000, the mining and quarrying sector represented 18.2 per cent (1998:21.4) of the 
industrial output of the region, followed by motor vehicles and trailers (16.9 per cent), basic metalworking 
(16.0), electricity, gas and water (10.2), food and beverages (9.1), metal products (4.8) and other sectors 
(Cybula 2004:248-249). The Silesian figures of mining and quarrying products between 2000 and 2002 
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profitability and heavy indebtedness has been subject to several successive restructuring 
plans, such as the "Coal Sector Reform Programme 1998-2002" (OECD 2001 :89-95).8R 
The programme was introduced with the help of a $1 billion loan from the World Bank to 
support closures of unprofitable mines and reductions in output and the work force. 
Measures included early retirement and severance packages, retraining for workers, 
subsidies to companies hiring former miners and support to local governments. 
Indeed, between May 1998 and May 2001 Polish coal-mining employment fell from 
243000 to 153000, although 8.4 per cent of all jobs in the Sl~skie Voivodship are still coal 
related (Blazyca et al. 2002:264; OECD 2002: 116). Of the lost 90000 jobs, about 28000 
were due to natural wastage and 62000 involved early retirement or voluntary severance 
deals (ibid.). The workforce target level of 128000 was expected to be reached by 2002/03 
and reflects the decrease of coal mines from 72 to 42, through closures and mergers. 
Due to the restructuring, the coal companies were able to reduce their costs per produced 
tonne by -9.2 per cent in 1999 and -4.5 per cent in 2000 (OECD 2001 :94). With the help 
of higher domestic prices the firms' earnings also improved. Currently, about 70 per cent 
of Poland's total primary energy is derived from coal, and exports to Europe remain an 
important source of foreign exchange. Despite the successes, the privatisation of profitable 
mines has stalled. Under pressure from trade unions, the government cancelled 
negotiations on the sale of the KWK Bogdanka S.A. in October 2001 (OECD 2002: 117). 
The sale of WKW Budryk S.A. has been under privatisation analysis (ibid.). The latest 
restructuring plan suggests a merger of the current seven groupings of mines and the 
indicate a stabilised output of hard coal around 100 Mio tons per year (Statistical Office in Katowice 
2002b: 126+ 135). 
88 Already in the midst of economic crisis in 1985. a group of 'independent Polish economists' suggested 
"that for correct economic calculation coal prices should be raised not only to the level of profitability. but to 
the level of prices obtained for exports ( ... ). The mines would then not only cover their own production costs, 
together with the so-called profit overheads. but would yield a profit which had a full economic justification" 
(CRCE 1988: 13). 
111 
creation of a single large state agency, which it is hoped would resul t in a more 
producti vity and reduced costs by providing an overall management of strategic planning, 
sales, materials, logisti cs, and environmental protection (ibid .). 
Photo 2: Mining and Steel Academy Krak6w, 2003 
Source: C. Weis 
The restructuring of the Polish steel sector has been heavily linked with EU intervention 
and its own difficulties of agreeing on capacities levels and employment (Campbell 2002). 
The Siles ian Voivodship accounted fo r 56.8 per cent of the national output of metal 
production in 1998, generated in 18 steel mills (S lqskie Voivodship 2000 :3 1). The 
restructuring of the iron and steel sector began in 1992 with a World Bank loan and was 
prepared by 30 western steel speciali sts, independently fro m the similar programme 
prepared for the mining industry (Blas iak et al. 1994:72; Campbell 2002:5 11 ). As in the 
coal sector, steel production is plagued with overcapacity, over-employment, huge 
indebtedness and a lack of profitability (OECD 2002: 118). After launching the 
"Programme for Steel rndustry Restructuring" in 1998, efforts accelerated with the aim of 
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bringing state aids into line with EU rules (DEeD 2000:87}.89 The initial target to 
restructure and privatise the two biggest steel mills Hula Kalowice and Hula Sendzimira 
(together more than 50 per cent of industry output) by the end of the 1990s failed, triggered 
by the Russian economic crisis and the deteriorated market environment that followed 
(ibid.). The initial programme of 1998 was revised and amended in 2001102 with the aim 
of creating one large steel holding, Po/skie Huty Stali (PHS), encompassing the four largest 
steel producers, three of them in the Silesian Voivodship (DEeD 2002: 118-119). PHS was 
finally privatised in 2003/04 (DEeD 2004: 160), a process that is subject of an in-depth 
analysis in chapter 5.1.1. Between 1990 and 2001, the average Polish steel capacity was 
reduced by 8.5 million of tonnes, which represents about 45 per cent of the initial level of 
capacity (DEeD 2002: 155, FN63). 
The restructuring waves in the Polish coal and steel industries have created difficult labour 
relations between management, labour representatives, and the state. In contrast to many 
statements which suggest strong and resistant trade unions being responsible for the 
'delayed' privatisation process, Stenning concludes that the common cause of the emerging 
trade union movement by the late 1980s has been replaced by increasing fragmentation and 
weakening (Stenning 2003: 775-777). Pickles acknowledges that the restructuring of state-
owned companies, which now have to follow cost-benefits rationalities, might be capable 
of sweeping away socialist legacies, but he remains sceptical, suggesting that: 
89 An agreement between the Republic of Poland and the EU in 200 I allows government subsidises until 
2005 in order to reduce employment with active labour market instruments from 40000 to 30000 by 2003 and 
to cap the steel output at 10 Mio tons per annum (Blazyca et at. 2002:264). In 1990, the iron and steel sector 
employed 147000 workers in 26 enterprises, cut to 91000 workers in 1998 and 25 enterprises (1999) 
respectively (OECD 2001 :95; CampbeIl2002:509). The costs of the steel restructuring programme have been 
partly financed by the EU with the Phare programme (estimated: Euro 20 Mio), and the total costs between 
1999 and 2003 were estimated at PLN 12 billion (roughly 2 billion pounds sterling) (ibid.). Additionally. 
indirect aid to the steel industry takes the form of tax and social security arrears, loan guarantees etc. The 
restructuring programme includes mill modernisation, mill re-capitalisation, environmental protection and 
social packages (CampbeIl2002:513). 
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"Initial indicators point (. . .) to a situation of crisis management that generates protective and cautious 
strategies, little actual technical or organisational restructuring, a severing of formerly paternalistic ties 
with smaller neighbouring communities, and a careful deepening of strategic alliances with larger 
municipalities to mobilise support at the national level for state subsidies, guaranteed supplies and protected 
markets" (Pickles 1998: 190). 
This section has shown that the restructuring measures of Polish steel and coal industries 
reaches far beyond its severe impact on labour markets and relations, but must be seen in 
broader contexts of national and international interests. The euphemistic term 
'restructuring' is used by international agencies and advisors to indicate down-sizing and 
closures of state enterprises, which cannot meet efficiency and profitability targets. But it 
can be assumed that the EU-IS negotiators followed their own interests through the 
imposition of unilateral preconditions for Poland accession. 
4.1.3 Foreign Direct Investment 
Already in the very first phase of the transformation period, foreign investment was 
identified as a major pillar of privatisation and system change aiming to restructure state-
owned companies with capital, technology transfer, and western managerial know-how 
(DEeD I 992a:40). However, the attraction of foreign capital from multinational 
corporations and the set-up of joint ventures and foreign owned firms proved to be difficult 
which was seen as an additional reason for the 'delayed' privatisation programme 
alongside inconsistent formal institutions such as the "unstable bureaucracy, unclear 
ownership status of real estate, uncertainties surrounding tax policies, [and] the mistrustful 
attitude of extreme political forces" (ibid:43). Pavlfnek argues that the role of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), "considered to be vastly superior to domestic capital in generating such 
strategic restructuring, leading to a long-term successful survival of domestic companies 
114 
and by doing so becoming the 'driving force in economic development" has not been 
critically assessed (Pavlinek 2004:48). 
Since the mid of the 1990s, Poland succeeded in attracting a cumulative inflow in FDIs of 
almost $23 billion by ] 998, which represents ] 4.6 per cent of the GDP (1998) and 40 per 
cent of all investments to CEE (DECD 2000:35). The largest investments were made in car 
assembly, food processing, tobacco, financial services, and retail trade (ibid.). By 2002, 
more than $45 billion had been invested, although this record - measured on a per capita 
basis - is significantly weaker than in other CEE countries (OECD 2004:46). The 
relatively very strong inflow of FDIs during the mid of the 1990s has since weakened 
considerably with a drop of 50 per cent between 2000 and 2002, along with the general 
difficult economic situation since 1999 (OECD 2004:46+ 138). 
Indeed, the quantitative description of FDI inflows, used as an indicator of successful or 
unsuccessful transition to a capitalist market economy, does not recognise different types 
of investment and, in particular, their impact on individual companies, regions and national 
economies. It has been claimed that multinational companies generate linkages and 
spillovers with local suppliers, which stimulate higher rates of efficiency, productivity, and 
innovation (AltomontelResmini 2001 :3). Utilising a case study of Poland, it is argued that 
it is possible to find "positive backward and forward linkages accruing from multinationals 
to domestic firms, and hence stimulating growth once multinationals are established, but 
not a significant interaction between upstream and downstream domestic firm, a signal that 
historic ties have been disrupted and (eventually) still need to be reconstructed" (ibid: 18). 
Bevan et al. note that multinational corporations, which move into transformation 
economies, are themselves faced with high costs, because of a lack of (tacit) knowledge 
how to use market mechanisms and sufficient knowledge about potential products, 
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demand, partners, and competitors (BevanlEstrinlMeyer 2001 :7). They confirm that a 
functioning formal institutional framework is a significant incentive for multinational 
corporations to invest in post-socialist countries because of the reduction of transaction 
costs, but that the market size and geographical location of the host country as well as 
labour costs are additional important determinants of FDI inflows in CEE (ibid:23; see also 
Haas/Loboda 1999:399). Accordingly, the international car manufacturers Fiat, Daewoo 
and GM-Opel invested almost $4 billion in Poland (by 2000), which represents about 8 per 
cent of all FDls and the biggest single industrial sector investment in Poland (Dunin-
Wasowicz et al. 2002: 11). 
Most of the automotive sector investment has taken place in Upper Silesia, where 
greenfield investments are granted tax incentives, particlularly in the special economic 
zones created for this purpose (Cybula 2004:254; OECD 2004: 151). In 1999, 65.6 per cent 
of employees in this sector were working for internationally controlled corporations which 
created almost 40000 jobs in 1993-1999, but still did not come close to counterbalancing 
the radical reduction of employment in the heavy industries (Radosevic et al. 2003 :72-74). 
Despite the fact that investment rate of foreign-owned firms is significantly higher than in 
domestic enterprises and that their labour productivity is twice the national average, wages 
are lower than in state-owned companies, although this gap is declining (OECD 2002:33-
35). Moreover, certain vulnerabilities are associated with foreign firms, since their local 
activities are dependent on the world-wide development of their parent companies, as is 
reflected in the cases of the troubled Italian car manufacturer Fiat and US-American 
General Motors/ Ope! which produce in the Silesian Voivodship. 
Following Pavlinek, it is apparent that FDI flows into CEE are sectorally and 
geographically very uneven and subject of stiff interregional competition (Pavlinek 
2004:63). Moreover, the profit-seeking strategies of multinational corporations might not 
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"necessarily coincide with the long-term economIC well-being of host regIons and 
localities" (ibid:63). The transformation of post-socialist economies is highly dependent on 
foreign capital in terms of multinational investors and international credit and development 
agencies, who not only intervene, but mainly shape this process. 
4.2 The Rise of Local and Regional Self-Governance 
In recent work on economic organisation and governance, attention has been increasingly 
focussed on the region as the nexus for development, growth, and innovation (Cooke et al. 
2000). It has been argued that "job creation and growth are not only matters of national 
policies but are the duty of every governor, mayor, and county or town executive" (Savitch 
1998:336). This places more and more pressure on regional and local actors to develop 
greater capacities for negotiating with, accommodating, and adapting to external forces and 
investors (AminIThrift 1994). Additionally, the new EO accession countries of CEE have 
to deal with the adaptation of formal institutions on a short-term basis, if they want to 
absorb EO funds in efficient ways.90 The establishment of "systems of governance that 
embrace, enabling and facilitating institutions within the local state and civil society, and 
bridge the permeable boundaries between them" plays a decisive role in local and regional 
competitiveness (Hudson 1999:6). Accordingly, this section analyses the efforts of 
reforming self-government in Poland in order to adapt themselves to the introduction of 
capitalist economic institutions. 
In the second half of the 1990s, the political issues of post-socialist transformation shifted 
from 'first generation' formal institutional change, such as constitution-making and market 
economy legislation, to 'second-generation' issues such as the reform of local and regional 
90 In the case of pre-accession funds like SAPARD and PHARE (all primarily for local and regional 
development), Poland could only absorb 43 per cent of the latter in 2000 and failed to access any flow of 
resources for the former in 2000/0 I (Blazyca et al. 2002:272). 
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self-administration, although the issue of decentralisation was already addressed as a 
sensitive political topic in Poland in the earliest phase of transformation (Zaucha 1999). 
The regional question - in particular, the importance of regional social resources and 
mechanisms to development - has become salient in economic policy debates in post-
socialist Poland. In mid-1998 a comprehensive self-government and public administration 
law was passed which reflected the growing perception of the need for strong regions in 
accordance with EU norms, in fact a precondition for the reception of structural funds from 
Brussels (Ferry 2003: I 099). This law fundamentally transformed Polish regions by 
consolidating the existing 49 voivodships (Wojew6dztwa) into 16 larger ones, and by 
introducing democratic mechanisms and strategic, policy-making competencies at the 
voivodship level. 
4.2.1 Reform of Regional Self-Government 
Until 1 si January 1999, when the implementation of the Polish Self-Government Law of 
1998 was initiated, the sole institutional representative of regions was the voivodship 
administration (Urz'ld Wojew6dzki or Voivodship's Office). Polish analysts are unanimous 
in their general evaluation of the voivodship in its pre-1998 form: it was ineffective in 
stimulating and supporting the development of regional economy and society. Moreover, 
despite early administrational reforms on a local level in the beginning of the 1990s, by 
1998, the regional unit was even more dependent on the centre than before 1989, which 
has been subject of debates, as Gorzelak suggests. 
"The administrative structure of Poland has not changed since 1989. 49 small and weak regions 
(voivodships) that were inherited from the previous system have been preserved unchanged. It is a paradox 
of history that on the wave of democratisation in Poland [ .. .] a process of centralisation has been observed 
since 1990 f. . .}. The region became even more strongly subordinated to the central government" (Gorzelak 
1998:16-17). 
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While a self-government reform was enacted and implemented with the "Local 
Government Act" in 1990, this did not encompass the voivodships. Voivodships remained 
essentially agents of the central state apparatus, with the Voivod (the 'governor' or prefect) 
not being democratically elected, but instead appointed by the prime minister in Warsaw. 
They possessed no policy-making prerogatives, instead fulfilling the role of monitor of 
central governmental policies. All financial resources were allocated from the central 
budget, with the large majority of funds earmarked as subsidies for specific social services, 
giving the voivodships little flexibility in meeting the needs of their specific regions 
(Piekalkiewicz 1981). After 1990, the only changes made to these general principles were 
the transfer of some competencies previously belonging to voivodships to local 
(municipal) self-governments as part of the local government reforms of 1990 (World 
Bank 1992; Swianiewicz 2003:286). 
There is no doubt that the possibilities of voivodships taking independent developmental 
initiative were politically and institutionally limited. To some extent, the blocking of 
voivodships was intended by national-level politicians and actors in the post-socialist 
period, amongst whom the conviction predominated that the voivodships were bastions of 
conservative political interests tied to the state socialist system, which "triggered 
misunderstandings and distrust between various components of the voivodship' s 
community [Katowice Voivodship] and its relations with the national level of governance" 
(cybula 2004:272). Regions with a historical legacy of self-governance and autonomy, 
such as Upper Silesia, were suspected of following self-serving interests or even 
undermining the nation state (Yoder 2003:280; Nawrocki 1993). Nevertheless, voivodships 
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using the limited resources available to them, have In some regions actively tried to 
influence the economic trajectories of their regions. 91 
Map 4: Administrational Boundaries of the Voivodship of Silesia 
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91 Such efforts have been most visible in old industrial regions characterised by extensive socio-economic 
challenges, such as the former Katowice Voivodship, where the "Regional Contract" (1995) has been 
negotiated not only between voivodship representatives and the central government, but between different 
regional actors, although it produced no significant results (Bierwiaczonek/Zagala 2004:235-237; 
Majcherkiewicz 2000:280-323). 
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After the self-government and public administration reforms in 1998, far-reaching changes 
have been made to the character of institutions representing regions. While the voivod (the 
head of the Voivodship office) himlherself is still appointed by the government as its 
regional agent, the previous competencies they possessed in the areas of health, law and 
order, education, communal services, and regional planning have been eliminated or 
diminished. Instead, their primary area of activity is in the monitoring of other regional 
organisations and agencies, among them, those to which their competencies have been 
transferred on behalf of the central government.92 The new institution, the elected regional 
council (sejmik wojew6dzki, or 'regional parliament'), appoints the regional board (zarzqd, 
or 'regional government'), headed by the Marshal ('prime minister') and hislher 
administration, the Marshal's Office (Cybula 2004:293). The Marshal's Office is the 
second region-level institution created by the reforms, and is an apparatus of experts and 
administrational staff of several hundreds of individuals. Under the law, it is recognized de 
jure as the organ responsible for fulfilling regional strategy and policy-making functions. 
4.2.2 Contradictions and Short-Comings of Regional Self-Government 
The creation of new local and regional institutions such as the Marshal's Office and its 
board means a fundamental shift in regional operational profiles. This profile has been 
transformed from the execution of specific administrative tasks to a vaguely defined 
strategic role, which are supposed "to lay the foundations of a civic society" (Gorzelak 
2001 :221). However, with the introduction of the reforms at the start of 1999 a number of 
serious shortcomings and ambiguities have emerged in the fulfilment of this role by these 
institutions. Most immediately, the question of their competencies, capacities and the 
related question of intergovernmental relations, in particular in terms of funding, have 
92 These include about 2500 local (municipal) self-governments (gminy), 315 powiaty (or counties, an 
intermediate organ between municipality and region), plus 65 cities with county status, public, semi-public. 
and extra-governmental funds designed to administer public funds, health insurance organisations. and the 
newly created 16 regional self-governments (boards) with their administrations (Marshal's Office), elected 
by the sejmiki wojew6dzkie, the regional council (Gorzelak 200 1:224; Swianiewicz 2003 :293). 
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become salient, because the changes also led to a gradual deterioration of local and 
regional government revenues and their structure (Swianiewicz 2003:291). 
Table 2: Changing Structure of Local Government Revenues (in per cent of total budgets) 
Revenues from own 
Sources 
Shares in Central Taxes 
General Purpose Grant 
Municipalities (gminy) Counties (powiaty) 
1992 1995 1998 2000 2000 
47.3 40.1 33.5 33.2 6.3 
22.2 23.1 24.7 16.5 1.4 
11.7 15.2 25.4 32.8 47.7 
Specific Grants 18.821.616.4 17.643.7 
Source: Swianiewicz 2003 :291 
Regions (voivodships) 
2000 
1.3 
14.6 
37.8 
41.4 
The question of financial resources for the operation of regional tasks has become pressing. 
Under the law of 1998, the Marshal's Office was to be financially self-supporting, 
receiving a good part of its revenue directly from a set of new region-level taxes. But as the 
financial structure shows (see table above), voivodships generate only 1.3 per cent of their 
budgets from own sources (2000), whereby the overall budget of regions remains severely 
under-financed caused by the reduction of allocated monies to the regions, leaving a region 
such as the Silesian Voivodship with the same budget as its capital city of Katowice 
(Cymbrowski 2004:59). The bigger part of the budget is still redistributed by the central 
government, as was the case before the reforms, which confirms the continued dependency 
of the regional level. 
While the Marshal's Office has the de jure regional policy-making function, its autonomy 
in pursuing this is unclear. The Voivodship Office also has strategy functions within its 
apparatus and thus there is potential for regular conflict with the Marshal's Office (lNT: 
Kaminski, 12.06.2003). The Voivodship Office is supposed to play an evaluative role with 
respect to the board and the Marshal Office's policy proposals, but regional co-operation 
and network-building between these two regional bodies is completely unregulated in the 
new law. The policies developed at the regional level must be, under the law, affirmed by 
the central government and the oversight by the Ministry of Interior and Administration, 
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which has been perceived as a re-centralisation, "not because of bad intention but owing to 
institutional weakness at the local level" (Blazyca et al. 2002:274). 
Another serious problem has been seen in the politicisation of regional development 
agencies and administrations since the start of regional self-government in 1999. A general 
perception has arisen that the central government's appointment of voivods and their 
deputies has been driven solely by political concerns, with little attention to the 
competency of these individuals in economic policy and development (lNT: G6rski, 
13.06.2004). On the other hand, the Marshal's Office and the regional council have come 
to be viewed as a battleground for political influence by representatives of the varying 
political parties found in them (Bokajlo 2000: 155-158). Severe problems of political 
conflict going beyond the functional tensions between the Offices of the Voivodship and 
the Marshal's Office are emerging. In a number of regions such as Silesia, the 
Voivodship's Office and Marshal's Office are in political deadlock due to the prevalence 
of opposing political options in the one versus the other (Cybula 2004:300-305). 
In comparison with other post-socialist European countries, the new territorial organisation 
and the devolution of authorities and rights to regional and local levels is more far-reaching 
and comprehensive (Kirchner/Christiansen 1999). However, Poland's decentralisation has 
failed to define clear boundaries for the state bureaucracy in the elected regional 
governments and their administrations. Rather, it has increased the size of public 
administration as a whole while introducing new competitive dynamics between the voivod 
and the Marshall and their administrations respectively (INT: Jarosz, 15.07.2003). This 
ambiguity clearly weakens the newly formed institutions, as a public finance expert 
suggests: 
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"The new units of territorial self-government [the regions and districts] are weak. and the central 
government has not gollen any stronger ( .. .). It seems that the opinion concerning the weakening of public 
power during this stage of the transformation is justified. The real course of reform has been rather a 
process of chaotic scallering [of offices and tasks] than of coherent decentralisation" (Gilowska 2000:37). 
It can be said that the reform of local and regional self-government is externally driven by 
the EU, "the most consistent and influential C ... ) actor in the process of CEE transition" 
(Kirchner 1999:209), which aims at political democratisation, the harmonisation between 
the acquis communautaire and de-centralisation policies, and an efficient allocation of 
structural funds. 
4.2.3 Regional Development Strategies in the Slqskie Voivodship 
Since the beginning of the transformation process central, regional, and local governments 
elaborated some relevant programmes of regional economic restructuring, such as the 
"Katowice Project of Industrial Restructuring" (1990, updated in 1992), and independently 
from this the "Programme for Regional Economic Policy in Upper Silesia" (1991), which 
has been criticised for its lack of precision and "highly dubious intellectual qualities" 
(Blasiak et al. 1994:86).93 The recent "Development Strategy of the Sl~skie Voivodship 
2000-20 15" (Sl~skie Voivodship 2000) can be seen as the first serious effort to initiate a 
broader discourse about the socio-economic future of the Silesian Voivodship, as the 
consultation process encompassed local and non-governmental decision makers, 
entrepreneurs, politicians, and academics (BierwiaczoneklZagala 2004:247; SI'tSkie 
Voivodship 2000: 141-146). 
93 The earlier regional strategy plans from the beginning of the 90s may be characterised as of the 
'emergency type' which has led to frustration and partly to rebellion among the affected population 
(Szczepanski 2001). Similar approaches - concerning concept, implementation, and impact - were 
undertaken in attempts to deal with coal mining (1991) and iron and steel (1992). Not until there was massive 
financial support from international bodies could the restructuring of the Upper Silesian heavy industries - in 
terms of reduction of the workforce and output - be realised. For a short summary of the earlier programmes 
see Szajnowska-Wysocka (2000). 
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The current programme follows a language of 'sustainable development', which involves 
economic, social, ecological, and cultural goals. Although these goals are in line with 
current international strategies of development ('Agenda 21 '), the basic assumptions as 
well as the applied mechanisms are rooted in a belief in the market as the nexus of 
modernisation and restructuring, aiming at a "modem and strong Sl~skie Voivodship" 
(Sl~skie Voivodship 2000: 11). In order to acknowledge the diverse spatial-economic 
realities of the voivodship, the document distinguishes four separate sub-regional 
strategies, whereby the analysed core agglomeration of Upper Silesia constitutes the 
central area with following 'vision': 
"It will be an area with a good balance between the functions of civic and economic development; with a 
restructured economy with a high concentration of services ensuring the high competitive global position of 
the region; and with well developed relationships with the revalidated urban and rural environment. It will 
be an area with an efficiently operating internal transport system, it will be accessible by different means of 
transport from the metropolitan centres of Europe and the world as well as from the civilisation centres of 
Poland {sic!}. The well developed metropolitan functions will ensure a high competitive position within the 
country and high attractiveness for external investors (00.). It will be afriendly environment to live and work 
for more than 3 million people" (Slqskie Voivodship 2000:90-91). 
The identified regional strengths reflect a geo-determinist understanding of its technical 
infrastructure and endowment with natural resources (ibid:67-68). An external 
modernisation is assumed within branches which are willing and able to invest in the 
service sector and in new technologies. The internal modernisation describes a process 
within companies and factories, which supports firm restructuring with new technologies 
and products, a new strategic position on the market, and the location of new branches of 
multinational corporations in order to 'open up' the voivodship for Europe (ibid:75). A 
broad space of the document is dedicated to small and medium-sized companies, the 'icons 
of neo-liberalism' (Rainnie et al. 2002:26), which are supposed to counterbalance the loss 
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of employment in old industrial sectors and increase the regional competitiveness in terms 
of innovation and new technology (ibid: 112). However, the implementation of the 
"Development Strategy of the Sl~skie Voivodship 2000-2015" is highly dependent on 
national funds from the Ministry of the State Treasury and structural funds of the EU 
(ibid: 123).94 
4.3 Path-Dependencies of Polish Regions 
While the changing nature of formal (regional) institutions has been introduced in the 
previous sections, the last part of this chapter is dedicated to the untraded 
interdependencies and informal institutions established by regions for supporting economic 
restructuring and development. Given the likely persistence of ambiguity and weakness in 
the regional institutions, this question becomes particularly important. A number of studies 
have demonstrated an undeniable fact: Polish regions differ strongly in their developmental 
potentials and trajectories (DEeD 2001a; Dunford 2000; Gorzelak 1998; Hausner et al. 
1997). There are strong path dependencies characterising Polish regions in terms of tight 
interlocks between cultural and historical legacies, ongoing social and institutional 
structures, and economic performance, whereby "Even the best macro-economic policy 
will not be able to eliminate these problems" (Hausner et al. 1997: 190). 
In order to move the perspective from Poland's historical past to its post-socialist present, 
Gorzelak (1998) suggests dividing the country into a set of differentiated regions with 
distinctive economic trajectories. These are 'the leaders' with high growth rates; old 
industrial regions, perceived as 'the losers'; regions with an agricultural economic base, 
94 The external dependency of the programme implementation is labelled as an 'opportunity' to restructure 
the regional economy. The 'strategic diagnosis' identifies eight major 'weaknesses', which could be tackled 
with external support. These weaknesses are a number of stagnant sub-regional cities (outside of the core 
agglomeration), the low absorption of innovation in old-industries, the high number of poorly educated and 
low-skilled inhabitants. the 'underdeveloped' metropolitan functions in the core agglomeration, the 'poor 
privatisation process', poor research and education infrastructure, the pauperisation of the population, and the 
'underdeveloped' SME sector (SlllSkie Voivodship 2000:71). 
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mainly in east Poland, labelled as 'the backward periphery'; and 'the newcomers', a set of 
regions at the western border of Poland, which "have overcome their earlier isolation 
through collaboration with their more developed neighbours" (Gorzelak 1998: 145). The 
main assumption is that the historical pre-war and socialist legacies of these regions 
explain to a certain extent their 'reaction' during the post-socialist transformation period, 
because "The heritage of history coupled with varying natural endowments placed the 
regions of Central [East] Europe in different positions at the beginning of the 
transformation" (ibid: 144). From this perspective, the socialist legacy and the 
'backwardness' of its mode of accumulation ensures that old industrial regions and their 
'obsolete economic structures' are losers in the transformation process (ibid:146). 
There can be no doubt that historical legacies have a critical impact in determining 
economic trajectories of regions. But what is often forgotten is that these historical legacies 
may also transform into particular informal institutions helpful of economic change, or how 
Stark and Bruszt put it, 
"In contrast to the imitationists, who see in the present only the absent features of an ideal future. we are 
interested in what the present holdsfor the future. In contrast to the involutionists. who see in the present the 
dead weight of the past. we see that the past can provide institutional resources for change in the present" 
(StarklBruszt 1998: 7). 
In order to assess and classify regional efforts at restructuring and institutional change, 
Hausner et al. (1997) suggest a set of qualitative indicators looking at various institutional 
aspects, and in particular relational features between organisations and their network 
properties in eight south-eastern (pre-reform) voivodships. They analyse various local 
governments, established economic development agencies, business associations, financial 
organisations, and the largest enterprises. Hausner and his colleagues identify four 
configurations of institutional set-ups, which emerge in regional restructuring processes 
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(Hausner et al. 1997:200). These are atomistic configurations, in which organisations 
pursue only formal links without developing real co-operation; bipolar configurations are 
characterised by restructuring processes around two organisational poles; hierarchic 
institutional settings, where a dominant regional centre co-operates with smaller regional 
centres; and a network configuration in which many different organisations with close links 
exist. 
The study undertaken by Hausner and colleagues goes beyond national-level statistical 
analysis to explain how formal and informal institutions produce economic outcomes. 
Nevertheless, their work incorporates an analytical shortcoming. The proclamation of fixed 
institutional settings leads unavoidably to an underlying hypothesis of path-dependent 
lock-ins, what represents an over-determinism. Only those voivodships fortunate enough to 
find themselves in a favourable historical position, endowed with dynamic actors and 
capable organisations will possess the regional assets and network properties, necessary to 
produce economic development. But this study does not discuss how regions, which have 
inherited • unfavourable' informal institutions, characterised by mistrust, tensions and a 
lack of co-operation between different actors, can shift out of their downward spiral into a 
progressive developmental trajectory. 
This observation leads to the question of how regions and places can create the formal and 
informal institutions necessary for economic development and restructuring. Such an 
analysis is not primarily interested in the effects of institutions and network properties on 
development, but in the active (re-) construction of social relationships. Such a creative 
social process might lead to the recombination of inherited informal and newly created 
institutions capable of opening up an opportunity to support restructuring and reorientation. 
It is assumed that network building and creative processes of bricolage not only happen in 
buzz places, but in less favoured places such as in old industrial areas, which are limited by 
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their inherited and persistent economic structure and their weak regional assets for the time 
being, but have an interest in creating new opportunities. Having said that, the question 
arises in what way the internal and external factors of restructuring are linked with each 
other. 
Even Gorzelak provides evidence that in a number of Polish localities, some located in 
'loser regions', local governments have autonomously mobilised both local resources and 
external support, such as foreign investment, to generate economic restructuring (Gorzelak 
1998:131-133). Gorzelak associates these local successes with individual self-government 
leaders who, through their dynamism, expertise, and charisma are able to effect 
mobilisation. These urban leaders, an "interactionist-individualist type of elite [who] are 
thinking in terms of entrepreneurship, citizenship, civil society, the market and the public 
sphere" (Bozoki 2003: 229) are undoubtedly important to understand post-socialist 
economic change. But it is also important to acknowledge the significance of the wider 
informal institutional contexts, as well as the many allies and competitors who supported 
or challenged the leader. StarklBruszt suggest a set of distinctive characteristics of 
informal institutions in economic-political restructuring processes. 
"They are associative (with identifiable network properties) and they are deliberative (with identifiable 
discursive properties). Successful economic restructuring to create self-sustaining growth and self-
maintaining social peace can be achieved neither by a transformative state nor by the self-generating market 
but through the transformative politics of deliberate associations" (StarklBruszt 1998: Ill). 
There is no doubt that 'successful cases' describe only a very limited number of Polish 
localities. In addition to isolated cases of dynamism and relative success, there are many 
others which have not been able to develop themselves out of the stagnation and decline. 
Additionally, it seems to be difficult to speak of a region as a monolithic, coherent entity 
except through the use of broad generalisations. Even regions which are seemingly 
129 
industrial monocultures such as the Silesian Voivodship and its industrial core of Upper 
Silesia are complex syntheses of many organising principles characterising their localities, 
sectors, and organisational networks. 
The introduction of Upper Silesia as a case of dramatic economic transformation has 
shown the extent to which restructuring is dependent on external forces. All relevant 
regional economic and political topics, which have emerged out of formal institutional 
change have a strong externality. The interlinked processes of privatisation, restructuring 
of state-owned industries, foreign investment, but also the reform of self-governance are 
financially, organisationally and politically dependent on forces outside of the analysed 
region. However, it can be assumed that regional actors find a peculiar way of dealing with 
such kind of dependence. From this perspective, the different modes of power, which reach 
beyond an analysis of external domination, together with the emergence of a supporting set 
of informal local and regional institutions can be seen to play a decisive role in economic 
transformation. 
This chapter has attempted to introduce a consideration of the developmental capacities 
embedded in institutional change of Polish regions. Despite the undeniable, strong path-
dependencies conditioning regional economic development, it must be doubted whether 
regions such as Upper Silesia simply demonstrate a tight historical, inevitable lock-in. The 
analytical incorporation of the hidden potentials and dangers in path-dependent analyses 
supports a more balanced view of regional development in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Despite this chapter's focus on traded interdependencies, it has identified particular 
circumstances for the change of untraded interdependencies in post-socialist contexts. At 
the same time it can be assumed that Storper's analytical framework, the trinity of 
organisations, technology, and territory, is applicable on cases of post-socialist and old 
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industrial areas, because all of these ontological categories play a distinctive and decisive 
role in economic transformation and restructuring. 
It is suggested that the successful development and implementation of regional policies 
will depend not so much on the effectiveness of the formal institutions, but on the 
incorporation of regional actors and their untraded interdependencies into the process of 
economic restructuring. The newly created representative institutions, for institutional, 
economical, and political reasons, are likely to remain relatively weak for a considerable 
time to come. The extent to which and the way in which regional actors are incorporated 
will determine the effectiveness with which they are implemented, and the developmental 
paths taken by regions. The evidence, even from the more difficult cases such as Upper 
Silesia, is that regions possess considerable resources and assets to support these 
developmental efforts. These efforts will have to be worked out through deliberative 
associations of actors as they pursue the many projects which invent a newly created 
capitalist regional economy. In the following chapter, these patterns of co-operation and 
conflict will be analysed with an in-depth case study. 
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5 Doing Business in a Survival Economy 
his chapter describes the outcome of interviews conducted among businesses in 
T upper Silesia in the year 2003. It is not the aim to analyse one or two specific sectors in a comprehensive way, or to deliver an in-depth analysis of the ailing 
coal and steel industry. The aim is rather to have an overview of the manifold parallel 
economic developments and their interrelations in a transformative space. The most 
profound interpretation of the relationship between 'old' and 'new' economic structures in 
a given territory comes from evolutionary spatial economics. Here, the notion of 'diversity' 
and 'variety' within the 'genetic pool' suggests the evolution of new organisational forms 
between, for example, large state enterprises and small private start-ups (Grabher/Stark 
1998:58). In this understanding, the socialist legacy of doing business recombines itself 
with the evolving capitalist mode of organising markets and production to generate 
something new. Organisational diversity is seen here as a key approach not only in 
understanding post-socialist economies, but as a strategy for efficiency and economic 
progress. While this biologistic approach focuses in particular on the qualitative 
composition of spatial economies, less is said about the interrelations between different 
economic actors and their intra- and interregional connectivity also with political decision 
makers. The study of economic organisations and their actors does not lead to a 
'distinctive' geography of enterprises, but "has a valuable role to play in any research 
agenda concerning the changing geography of production" (DickenlThrift 1992:288). 
In the following, three sets of economic actors and their interrelations will be presented. 
First, examples are given from the coal and steel sector, usually characterised as 'old', 
state-owned, technologically backward and declining industries. Second, a few examples 
from the automotive sector show how global corporations integrate themselves into new 
capitalist territories and whether or how these corporations redefine these economic spaces. 
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Third, a number of small and medium sized firms, especially from the IT and new 
technologies sector, gives evidence for the emergence of local and regional efforts to tackle 
economic mono-structures and the creation of diversity. 
Alongside the question of interrelationships, or rather the traded and untraded 
interdependencies between the above-mentioned sets of 'reflexive' players, other questions 
also arise. How do these actors perceive the economic and social development of the 
region in general and their company in particular and how do they define local/regional 
strengths and weaknesses? Which vision of an economic and social space is employed not 
only but especially in the wake of Poland's accession to the EU? What is the identity and 
peculiarity of the region and in what way do these characterisations hinder or support 
regional restructuring? This set of questions focuses on the specific routines of the region 
and informal institutions structuring the redefinition and renegotiation of the former one-
dimensional and mono-structured economy. 
5.1 The State-owned Sector 
The distinction between the state-owned and private sector is to a large extent for 
analytical purposes only, as mixed ownerships and accelerating privatisation increasingly 
define the dynamic business environment. From the beginning of the transformation 
process, state assets were subjects of privatisation, as demanded especially by international 
advisory panels and credit providers, since this was seen as an important indicator of the 
successful transition from planned to capitalist economy. While Poland and her shock 
therapy has been listed as a 'master pupil' in this direction since the mid-1990s, the 
privatisation process 'delayed' from the second half of the 1990s of what was one of the 
biggest chunks of state assets - the Silesian steel and coal industry - appeared to be a 
complex task for all governments in office since the beginning of the transformation. The 
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overall picture, drawn by international agencies, researchers and politicians can be 
characterised as 'privatisation or dying'. Indeed, many heavy-industrial plants have long 
been closed and others will follow. In the best cases, the remains undergo a privatisation 
process with uncertain outcomes. A successful privatisation is only possible if far-reaching 
restructuring measures - especially dramatic cuts of over-manned workforces - have 
already been undertaken. 
Despite the notion of state-owned companies as inflexible, over-bureaucratic and unable to 
innovate, this section explores their capacity to survive as dinosaurs in the new capitalist 
environment. Interestingly, some of these survival strategies have their origins in the 
socialist planned economy. It might be an exaggeration to state that the survival of some of 
these companies has only been made possible because of these inherited socialist routines, 
habits and skills. But even so, it is fair enough to stress that at least despite these routines 
success in the capitalist mode of production has been possible in the case of the biggest 
steel mill in Poland - although external factors have also played a crucial role. While the 
steel plant case - a show piece of successful privatisation - highlights economic 
opportunities for heavy industry which had until recently been written-off, the second case 
offers quite the contrary example. The case of the biggest coal company in Europe 
provides powerful evidence of the potentially negative impact of over-politicisation and 
abuse for party and other purposes alongside the socialist heritage of certain routines and 
relationships. It shows that this can also lead to lock-ins, as these 'traditions' sometimes do 
not operate effectively in the era of the capitalist mode of production and increasing 
interdependency of regional and national economies. At this point it is important to stress 
that combinations of socialist and capitalist economic behaviours in (not only) state-owned 
companies are vital to an understanding of economic transformation in Central- and 
Eastern Europe defining their new visions and old constraints. 
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5.1.1 The Permanent Transition: Steel Industry 
The Polish restructuring of the steel industry is a permanent one and does not start with the 
year 1989. The General Manager of the biggest steel mill in Poland - Hula Katowice (HK) 
located near the city of D~browa G6micza in the sub-region of Zagl~bie D~browskie95 -
answers the question about the restructuring process in the 1990s: "To understand the 
restructuring process today, it is necessary to outline the entire history of the steel mill" 
(INT: Dzienniak, 17.07.2003). When Hula Katowice started its hot phase in 1975 (by 
decree of the First Secretary, Edward Gierek), the steel mill was not only an enormous and 
costly technical masterpiece, but its location was perceived as innovative, because the 
existing old mills were located in or near the city centres of the region, for example, in 
Katowice, Chorz6w or Dqbrowa G6micza itself.96 The planning of the steel mill as a green 
field development meant that the production process was better organised and allowed later 
extensions in comparison to the mushroomed 19th century production sites. For the 
manager, the year 1989 and after is also seen as a dead end, because of substantial de-
investment;97 
"Then came the year 1989 and aI/further projects were postponed by the government. The hot rolling mil/-
advanced technology during that time - had been sold to the former USSR and works nOW in Magnilogorsk. 
During the last ten years we have not built anything new al Hula Kalowice" (INT: Dzienniak. 17.07.2003). 
95 Zagl~bie Dctbrowskie is a sub-region situated East of Upper Silesia (adjacent to the city of Katowice) and 
is functionally linked with it due to the similar endowment of coal resources and related industries. This sub-
region has retained a different mental and physical identity until today, with a different history as a Russian 
territory (Congress Poland) until the end of the First World War. While Zagl~bie is usually characterised as 
'red' and 'atheist', Upper Silesia is perceived as the reverse (see INT: Olbrycht, 18.07.2003). While both 
areas now belong to the same Voivodship of Silesia (since 1998), significant differences are reflected in local 
and regional elections. For simplifying reasons, when discussing the 'Silesian' coal and steel industries in the 
following, it encompasses the related industries in Zagl~bie as well, because of very similar problems and 
prospects. In continental Europe, the 'easterness' of territories usually encompasses a negative connotation of 
being culturally, politically, and economically backward (Offe 1997:136). This feeling can also be found in 
the 'Silesian' mental perception of Zagt~bia Dctbrowskie. 
96 At the north-eastern corner of Map 2, the production site of HK reveals the enormous physical scale. 
97 In some respects this statement recalls the short period after 1945, when the USSR confiscated and 
dismantled industrial facilities in their influence zones and relocated them to Russia. In west Poland, too, (in 
the former German areas, but then Polish property) factories and investment goods were dismantled and 
relocated by the Russians, a handicap for quick post-war economic recovery (Ascherson 1987: 149). 
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The restructuring, or more precisely, downsizing process has been comprehensive and is 
most apparent: after several rounds the number of employees has fallen from 25000 in 
1989 to 4800 in 2003, mainly caused by the outsourcing or closing-down of non-
production related facilities, such as transport units, social or health services. Although the 
planning of new production facilities was frozen after 1989, HUla Katowice managed to 
modernise some of the key technical facilities that then only produced low quality but at 
the same time expensive semi-finished steel products. 
Not surprisingly, the restructuring period is also characterised by new property regimes of 
the steel plant: since the beginning of 1990s Hula Katowice, then still owned by the state 
(Ministry of the State Treasury), has had to produce under private company law. In 2001, 
HK was incorporated into Polskie Huty Stali (PHS), a conglomerate of four Polish steel 
mills producing 70 per cent of the national output, about 6 million tons per year.98 The 
overall aim of the government was to privatise the whole corporation before Poland's 
accession to the EU, due to limits of public support for the steel sector under the EU's 
acquis communautaire. In March 2004, after a year of negotiating, the takeover was 
finalised with the new owner (Poland Business Review, 8 March 2004): the Anglo-Indian 
Lakshmi N. Miltal Group (LNM), now the world's largest steel producer, purchased a 69 
per cent majority stake for PLN 4 billion (ca. GBP 600 million) with an option to acquire 
an additional 25 per cent and promising further investments for the renamed lspal Polska 
Stal (lPS). The rest of the shares are still held by the state and employees. 
While HK had been partly modernised before its completed privatisation, it is clear that the 
modernisation process could not be completed because of a lack of financial means, 
despite the fact that this process has been widely seen as a pre-condition for successful 
98 Hula Katowice (D<tbrowa Gornicza), Hula Sendzimira (former Huta lrn. Lenina, Krak6w, the second 
largest Polish steel mill), Hula Cedler (Sosnowiec) and HUla Florian (Swi~tochtowice). 
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privatisation. Moreover, policies on how to restructure changed rapidly during the 
transformation process and still evoke unease in the management: 
.. You have to keep in mind that at the beginning of the 1990s, the Ministry of Finance and its policy was very' 
strict with its 'shock-therapy', The main goal was to reduce the inflation suhstantially [ .. .); there has been a 
new approach in industrial policy, They wanted to divide the big companies into smaller units: 'small is 
beautiful' and 'big is bad', In 1999, the non-steel divisions have been removed from H K [ .. .J. There is still 
discussion aboutfurther consolidation [ .. .]. In the West has been globalisation. here in Poland we have had 
de-globalisation" (INT: Dzienniak, 17,07,2003), 
Size Matters 
While the 1990s were characterised by de-concentration processes in the industry, mainly 
supported by centre-right governments (Electoral Action Solidarity and Freedom Union), 
later efforts of restructuring the steel (and coal) sector focused on the opposite, a re-
concentration through the establishment of huge holdings, in the case of the coal mining 
industry, Kompania W~glowa ('Coal Holding'), the biggest of its kind in Europe. These 
seesaw changes in industrial policies tend to be interpreted in a sarcastic way: "After all 
the years of discussions the prevailing idea how to consolidate this industry is [laughter]: 
'A small player never wins' [ ... ] From month to month there are new ideas how to deal 
with the PHS and how to make money out of it" (lNT: Dzienniak, l7.07.2003). The early 
1990s' industrial policy of post-Solidarnosc governments was actually the absence of it, 
best described as laissez-faire style or as the then Polish Minister of Industry Tadeusz 
Syryjczyk put it: "the best industrial policy is no industrial policy" (quoted in Campbell 
2001:503}.99 
99 State-intervention is still perceived as something very much connected to the recently overcome socialist 
regime and thus something to be avoided. In 200 I, a long-term study reveals that up to 58 per cent of Poles 
questioned "believed that state intervention in the economy usually brought more harm than good" (Wiatr 
2003:379). In the first transformation period the large steel and coal giants of the south were seen as the last 
socialist bastions due to above-average pay and privileges received by the heavy industry workers during the 
socialist regime and rather anti-reformist regional party leaders (Ascherson 1981 :268), This national 
perception of the region outbalances the fact that substantial resistance and strikes were organised in Upper 
Silesia in the late 1970s and later against the communist governments and the Polish United Workers' Party, 
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The downgrading process is also reflected in the increase of enormous areas of derelict 
land, partly contaminated due to the reckless handling of environmental issues over 
decades. Pre-1989, Hula Katowice, including a protection buffer zone, was settled on an 
area of 2500 hectares. Today it occupies only 1000 hectares of it [1000 hectares = 2471 
British acres]. While HK invested in technology aimed at reducing pollution in the 1990s, 
a good part of its land and the former buffer zone were cut off by the central government to 
establish a special economic zone for the attraction of 'future industries' through tax 
exemption. As all of these new companies, mostly from the automotive sector, receive tax 
relief of more than 50 per cent for a period of 15 years plus additional subsidies, the 
management of Huta Katowice perceives this privilege for adjacent producers as unfair. 
Without any financial help from the regional or central administration, HK paid the bills 
for the necessary but costly ecological technology and de-contamination efforts through 
equity capital and bank loans, while they had to give the land away for free, for neighbours 
who now profit from good infrastructure, low cost production and political support from all 
sides. Asked about the ways in which regional economic policies are important for HK, the 
general manager advised the author to ask this question the voivodship administration, but 
"Frankly speaking they are not interested in the problems of HK. There is no support from 
this side" (INT: Dzienniak, 17.07.2003). 
Huta Katowice is still the biggest employer in the sub-region of Zag1crbie D~browskie (the 
industrial region East of Upper Silesia) and probably the second biggest in the voivodship. 
The city of D~browa G6rnicza receives half of its tax income from the steel mill (INT: 
Dzienniak, 17.07.2003) and the regional and local decision makers still seem to neglect the 
former model plant of socialist production. Asked about economic policy responsibilities 
The national Solidarity movement substantially drew its strengths from the mobilisation potential of steel 
workers and miners of the region. It was incomprehensible for many of them that the post-1989 governments 
- the newly established Solidarity party A WS - downgraded both sectors in such a radical way, with 
thousands of work places lost (Ascherson 1981: 125, 161; Rileyrrkocz 1999:280). 
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in the regional administration, the general manager of HK admits that he does not know the 
administrative structure or that this structure is blurred, but he leaves no doubt about his 
overall assessment of local and regional polities, because "My impression is that these 
people, on the regional or local level, are only interested in themselves" (lNT: Dzienniak, 
17.07.2003). 
Old Survival Strategies 
A good part of today's business relations in transformation countries is conducted through 
barter contracts, and in the case of Huta Katowice (2003) that amounts to about 15 to 17 
per cent of all transactions (ibid.).IOO Typically, this aspect of a 'parallel economy' is more 
associated with post-Soviet states than with EU accession countries and is seen as evidence 
(besides wage and tax arrears) of the impossibility of restructuring state-owned enterprises 
(Krueger/Linz 2002:31). Russian state-owned companies in the steel and ferrous industries 
perform 'only' an average share of about 10 per cent of barter in total transactions between 
the years 1996 and 2001 (ibid:36). Barter can be seen as an indicator of an economy of 
scarcity where forms of quasi-money transactions are employed when cash is difficult to 
obtain, for example due to an underdeveloped banking system. The scarcity of equity 
capital and other liquidities as well as the difficulty of obtaining bank loans leads to a 
highly constricted capability to restructure a company. 
Barter transactions are nothing new in transformation countries, and barter "has not only 
survived since 1990, but has thrived" (Hamilton 1999: 141). In fact, barter was a 
fundamental aspect and way of doing business in socialist planned economies, not only at 
the domestic level and between socialist states, but between western and eastern 
companies, too (Miller 1981). While this non-monetary transaction routine was frequently 
the only way of doing business and to fulfil the plan, this learnt socialist skill is now being 
100 Barter means here the non-monetary exchange of goods or services, mostly ranging e.g. from manufacture 
to semi-manufacture or raw materials. 
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re-employed to survive in a capitalist environment. In contrast to the socialist era, today's 
barter is more complex, because a higher number of companies is involved in such 
transactions. However, this is not an economic routine limited to state-owned firms. On the 
contrary, HK's management estimates that even more private companies are involved in 
barter than state-owned firms and that this routine is a common practice in the Polish free 
market. Moreover, the size of barter as a percentage of the production, is estimated to be 
much higher for the current economic environment than during the socialist period. 
[. . .] "Before the Roman Empire existed there was Phoenicia and we do it like they did it: goods for goods; it 
means barter economy, it still exists {laughter]. We "sell" steel products and get coal, chalk stone or 
services for it. Sometimes there are up to five companies involved in this barter: traders, middlemen, coal 
mines and so on. But we have some costs that cannot be part of this exchange, especially wages, city taxes, 
national taxes and the minister of economy who wants to be paid with money and not with steel products" 
(INT: Dzienniak, 17.07.2003). 
It is noteworthy that barter deals are not only a handicap for restructuring but also at the 
same time they are often the only way to survive in transformation countries. This survival 
strategy is a social practice highly dependent on trusted contacts with other business 
partners. The disadvantages of this non-monetary practice are well known. For example, 
the high transaction costs in multilateral deals due to large search and different control 
measures as a result of intransparent transactions are regularly mentioned 
(Commander/Dolinskaya et al. 2002:276; Krueger/Linz 2002:34). While disadvantages are 
undeniable, less is said about the ways in which managers try to reduce these high 
transactions costs through contracts with trusted and long-term barter partners, the 
exploitation of regional knowledge and proximity advantages. In the case of Huta 
Katowice, most of these barter partners are based in the region and a good part of them had 
business relationships with the steel mill well before 1989. Asked about the assumed 
reasons for this regional clustering of barter partners, HK's general manager additionally 
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notes the region's rich endowment with natural resources and shorter distances and thereby 
less expensive transport costs. 
New Visions 
Before 1989, Huta Katowice had no business contacts with the West and only produced for 
the domestic market. This market is still important for the steel mill with a share of about 
65 per cent of the whole production. While "there is no money on the Polish market" (INT: 
Dzienniak, 17.07.2003) which is "not so profitable for HK" (ibid.), the company is forced 
to look outside Poland to sell its products on the global market. The survival struggle on 
the domestic market seems to be difficult due to the illiquidity of many players, so the 
global markets promise better profits and at least clients who are willing to pay their bills 
in cash. But this international strategy is only realistic if the steel mill is capable to reach 
certain qualities and standards of their products. During the first restructuring and 
downsizing programmes, HK managed to invest in the modernisation of semi-finished 
steel production lines in the 1990s, a difficult undertaking which paid off because the 
company could qualify itself for the later privatisation process and took its first steps in the 
stiff competitive markets outside Poland. Meanwhile, the management seems to be 
convinced about this difficult route between downsizing, modernisation, and privatisation 
although the pace has been criticised. Moreover, the company is convinced and proud of 
the high quality of its products and its ability to compete on European and other markets 
even before Poland's accession to the EU, suggesting that HK was long ago integrated and 
part of the EU market. 
"The management of Annahiitte in Germany [near Salzburg] which manufactures products for the car 
industry told us that we are their best supplier for semi-finished steels. They even have clients who on(v order 
under the condition that HK will supply the input material. And this is the case since the beginning of the 
1990s" (INT: Dzienniak, 17.07.2003). 
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While the detection of export markets and efficiency gains through the new holding 
company PHS helped to survive - and brought the holding company back into the black 
even before complete privatisation 10 1 - it is clear that the balancing of high debts and a 
further modernisation of production facilities will only be possible with a major strategic 
investor. Victims of this further modernisation and restructuring will without doubt be 
elderly workers who do "not fulfil the requirements set by possible new owners" (INT: 
Dzienniak, 17.07.2003), leading to a further downsizing of the workforce. Asked about 
expected resistance from the trade unions, the management of HK gives an unvamished 
account of Poland's labour market and the well-understood rationale of the capitalist mode 
of production. 
"r .. ] From the economic point of view it is quite simple. Now you can hire young men who speak fluent 
Russian, German or English and who are computer-literate. We can hire these skilled people for half of the 
wage of an old worker, because our unemployment rate is very high in Poland, above 18 per cent, and the 
wages go down and down. From the economic point of view we have to produce at the lowest possible costs; 
the oldest worker do not have any chance to keep their jobs. They would have to be sacked" [ .. .] (INT: 
Dzienniak, 17.07.2003). 
The details of further downsizing of the workforce as well as investments in the (former) 
PHS holding played a difficult part in the 10-months privatisation proceedings with the 
new owner LNM Group. While the negotiating power of the Polish government was 
reduced prior to the accession by EU deadlines, it still managed an acceptable 'last-minute 
deal' with the 'sultan of steel' (Business India, 10-23 May 2004) who specialises in the 
acquisition of state-owned steel mills of former socialist countries and manages meanwhile 
the biggest steel holding of the world, producing on four continents. 102 While L. Mittal' s 
lOl The provisional result for the PHS group amounts to a net profit of PLN 90 million (ca. GBP 13.8 million) 
for the year 2003 in comparison to a loss of PLN 800 million (ca. GBP 122.6 million) in 2002 (Poland 
Business Review, 22 March 2004). 
102 The privatisation contract includes a job guarantee for PHS's 15000 employees until 2009 while 4500 of 
them will be offered jobs in PHS-owned companies or early retirement. All of the employees will receive a 
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merits in restructuring devastated old industries is not undisputed due to a lack of 
transparency, the future will show whether the Polish steel industry will become a "world-
class producer" and a "cornerstone of its [LNM's] European operations" (L. Mittal quoted 
in Poland Business Review, 1 and 8 March 2004). Undoubtedly, as one of the largest 
transactions in Poland ever, the privatisation outcome will affect the entire Polish economy 
and will have an impact on further privatisation efforts. 
The LNM Group is considered to be the most globalised steel corporation, which profited 
from the aggressive acquisition of cheap ailing steel mills worldwide during a time when 
the industry suffered from high over-capacity and low steel prices in the 1990s. While this 
industry was still structured on a national basis, with companies searching for niches and 
profitable high-value markets, LNM acquired and improved underperforming steel mills in 
former socialist countries such as the Czech Republic, Romania, Kazakhstan and now 
Poland. In the meantime, LNM has already emerged as the largest steel producer in Central 
Eastern Europe whose profitable potential it recognised long ago. Many commentators see 
a rather bright future for this industry in former socialist countries (e.g. Financial Times, 
21 April 2004). After the accession to the EU, the lifting of trade barriers smoothes the 
way to the West; more EU-funded investments in infrastructure as well as a further 
extension of the automotive industries in Central East Europe (CEE) and an unquenchable 
Chinese appetite for steel has led to higher demand levels in steel products and higher 
prices. In the end, considerable lower labour costs at comparable qualification levels of the 
workforce guarantee good profits for companies producing in CEE, "definitely one of the 
privatisation bonus between PLN 2500 and 3000 (Agence France Presse, 26 February 2004). The cut will 
concern administrative workers in particular who constitute about 21 per cent of the whole work force 
(Poland Business Review, 3 November 2003). Further parts of the privatisation deal include a deadline for 
the investment of PLN 2.4 billion (ca. GBP 367.8 million) by the year 2009, and, for example, a new hot 
rolling mill at former Hula fm. Lenina (now Hula T. Sendzimira) in Krakow, a continuous steel casting line 
at Hula Kalowice as well as further smaller investments for the modernisation of already existing production 
lines at the remaining two other mills. The larger investments will not start before 2005 (Poland Business 
Review, 22 March 2004). 
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best places to make steel in the long term" (M. Mukherjee, president and COO of LNM 
Group, quoted in Business India. 10-23 May 2004:53). 
International Politics 
One might expect that an industrial sector which has always been controlled by a central 
administration - and has to this day only weak formal and informal links to local or 
regional decision makers - would be a national rather than a regional case in the process of 
privatisation. 103 Privatisation operations on this level happen in secrecy and with the help of 
high-profile politicians lobbying for national or other interests. Business India calls LNM's 
Polish acquisition "the most difficult and rewarding of all" (Business India, 10-23 May 
2004:50). Obviously, the second bidder for PHS - US Steel - received high-pressure help 
not only from the US ambassador in Poland, but even from the president of the United 
States himself. In the middle of the Iraq war, George W. Bush visited Warsaw and not only 
persuaded Poland to provide troops for deployment in Iraq but also tried (unsuccessfully) 
to bring US Steel into play (Independent on Sunday, 25 May 2003). A similar case of 
exerting political influence was revealed in 200 I, when PM Blair helped Mr. Mittal to 
acquire a good part of the Romanian steel industry, state-owned Sidex, in writing an 
encouraging letter to the Romanian PM. Unfortunately this support was linked with the 
steel tycoon's donation of GBP 125,000 to the Labour Party only two months earlier 
(Financial Times,l May 2004).104 The case of PHS and its privatisation process reveals that 
even an old industrial state-owned sector is capable of innovation and is of interest for 
103 Possibly, these local and regional 'weak ties' are an advantage in the process of restructuring. The case of 
the German Ruhr area reveals quite the opposite, a strong regional 'unholy alliance' of old industrial 
companies, trade unions and political decision makers, which until recently led to a lock-in in terms of 
innovating and restructuring the Ruhr. 
104 This political support is a rather delicate matter, because the LNM Group is indeed aUK-based 
corporation, but is registered in the Dutch Antilles, a tax free haven for companies of rather dubious 
character. Beside the fact that LNM does not pay British taxes, it employs fewer than 100 administrative 
workers at its headquarters in London (of a global workforce of more than 125,000). Thus, the case of 
lobbying British national interests in the process of privatisation efforts in CEE is not given (Daily Mail, 24 
October 2003). 
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global players, although severe cuts of the workforce and other downgrading measures 
have to be accepted. 
While local and regional political decision makers gaze at elusive 'future industries' and 
the emergence of SMEs, a good part of the Polish steel industry located in the Voivodship 
of Silesia has become ready for connecting to global markets and stiff competition within 
the last 15 years. 105 A reason for the neglect of this industry by regional politicians is 
founded in their lack of control over it. Most importantly, the capacity to survive in an 
economy of severe (capital) scarcity - after 1989 until the finalised privatisation - is based 
on skills and informal routines acquired during the socialist planned economy - barter -
and the strategic search for new markets in the West. This mixed strategy of socialist and 
capitalist business behaviour 'adorned the bride' for its future owner, despite quickly 
changing economic policies and stiff EU deadlines within the accession process. It can be 
said that the 'delay' of privatisation in this industrial sector - despite enormous pressure of 
international bodies to accelerate these efforts since the 1990s - was an important 
precondition for its final success. This time was needed for necessary restructuring 
measures. Finally, the privatisation was advantaged by a rising worldwide demand for steel 
products and thus a recently developed interest of global steel corporations in the remains 
of former socialist model plants. Nevertheless the latest OEeD Economic Survey of 
Poland is still concerned about the pace of privatisation and stresses the overall importance 
of macro economic aspects in its recommendations: 
"Picking up the pace o/privatisation would not only help limit the accumulation o/public debt. il would also 
help raise overall productivity growth. This will require a much more pragmatic and active approach 10 
asset sales [. . .] that places less emphasis on the sale price and more on the total cost/benefit to society. In 
105 Not all steel mills in the Voivodship of Silesia survived these 15 years. The likely next industrial casualty 
might be Huta Cz~stochowa, if the EU does not accept the restructuring programme - which includes public 
financial aid - and privatisation negotiations fail with possible investor LNM (Polish Press Agency, 9 March 
2004). 
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particular, the authorities should reconsider the strategy of consolidating sectors prior to sale in order to 
create dominant players" (DEeD 2004: /8). 
The establishment of PHS in the year 2002 as by far the biggest steel producer of Poland 
has indubitably created a dominant player in this sector. At the same time it is doubtful that 
the major chunk of the Polish steel industry would have been successfully privatised 
without this consolidating effort. 
5.1.2 The Permanent Decline: Coal Industry 
While some parts of the Polish steel sector could be restructured for the purpose of 
privatisation, the Silesian coal industry is undergoing a further dramatic decline. Despite 
substantial reductions in workforce and output respectively within the last 15 years, large 
parts of the sector remain unprofitable and highly indebted and are thus subjects of further 
cuts (OEeD 2004:161).106 While a repeatedly modified governmental plan envisages 
privatisation efforts after 2006, some of the most unprofitable mines will probably be 
closed by this time. 107 
In socialist times the fulfilment of the output plan had the highest priority without the 
demands of profitable production, thus generating excess capacity until today. Beside the 
socialist coal industry'S task of supplying the domestic steel industry with its main energy 
source it was also seen as a national and strategic sector which partly secured Poland's 
106 The work force of the Polish mining industry decreased from about 300,000 (1989) to 250,000 (1999), 
135,000 (2002) and is intended to reach about 100,000 in 2006. The output has been falling from 173 million 
tons (1989) to 100 million tons (2002), 93,5 million tons (2003) and has to reach a EU agreed limit of 87 
million tons by 2006 (RileylTkocz 1998). Kompania W~glowa alone has been piling up debts of about PLN 
22 billion (2003). 
107 The first draft of the plan "Restructuring of Hard Coal Mining 2003-2006" (July 2002) proposed the 
closure of seven mines, while the parliament's approved plan (November 2002) still intended to shut down 
four mines. After stiff resistance of trade unions and despite the fact that this plan became legally binding, 
only three mines will be closed by 2006. For this purpose the Polish state will provide a budget of PLN 6.2 
billion, 5 billion of this budget will be allocated to personnel measures. Additionally, the Polish state will 
partly freeze debts of PLN 18 billion and increases KW's capital equipment mainly with revenues of the 
privatisation of the Polish Telecom. 
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independency from Soviet natural resources. \08 After 1989 it turned out that Polish coal 
could hardly be produced in a profitable way due to the costly mining in large depth and its 
rather poor quality. On global markets, Silesian coal can only compete with the help of 
high state subsidies. The restructuring steel industry, forced to look for any possibilities to 
reduce similar high costs in their production facilities increasingly acquires its energy 
supply from the world markets and is especially interested in cheap Australian, US-
American and South African sources. 
In 2003 a new corporation, similar to the Polish Steel Holding (PHS), was established. 
incorporating 70 per cent of Polish coal production. The Kompania W~glowa (KW; 'The 
Coal Company') in Katowice is now the biggest employer in Poland and the biggest 
European coal company, with a workforce of nearly 77000 (2004), although about 30000 
of these jobs will be cut by 2006 according to the governmental restructuring plan, 
resolutely opposed by trade unions. While PHS was founded with the aim of privatisation 
and cost efficiency, KW is a conglomerate which has been founded in order to integrate the 
most unprofitable Polish mines into one company with the purpose of closing down the 
worst cases by 2006 and to restructure the rest. 109 
The government decided to pass the management of the new holding to bankers, with Jerzy 
Klima as its chairman who was sacked only after five months in office by the then Minister 
of Finance, professor Grzegorz Kolodko, in June 2003. 110 Obviously, the decision to place 
\08 Nevertheless, the People's Republic of Poland was highly dependent on foreign oil and iron ore resources, 
with 80 per cent coming from the USSR (Davies 2001:33). 
109 In 1995, there were still 66 Polish coal mines, 64 in the Katowice region. The remaining 39 hard coal 
mines (2004) are now organised in three (of former seven) coal companies of which KW is the biggest, 
incorporating 23 mines mostly in Upper Silesia (bold: threatened with closure by 2006): Bielszowice, 
Polska-W/rek, Boleslaw Sm/aly, Makoszowy, Szczyglowice, Janina, Silesia, Rydultowy, Marcel, Jankowice, 
Halemba, Pokoj, Sosnica, Knurow, Brzeszcze, Piast, Ziemowit, Anna, Chwalowice, ZG Piekary, ZG By tom 
11, ZG By tom /11 and ZG Centrum. 
110 Kolodko himself, who was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance between 1994 and 1997, also 
resigned a few weeks after he sacked the chairman of KW. The former Marshal of the Silesian Voivodship, J. 
Olbrycht, characterises J. Klima as an "ardent communist" before 1989 who turned later into a banker (INT: 
Olbrycht, 18.07.2003). J. Klima probably belongs to the influential 'Ordynacka' association, a political 
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a group of bankers as the new management of the Coal Company was influenced by the 
hope of integrating • independent' professionals from "one of the most developed sectors in 
our economy" (INT: Klima, 15.07.2003) into this former socialist model industry. Asked 
about the main differences between working for a bank and working for the mining 
industry, the former chairman spontaneously notes "the lack of trade unions in the banking 
sector" (ibid.) and later substantiates a different set of mentalities. 
"I see so many differences in mentality [. . .} comparing banking and mining industry. [Oo.} In particular 
coalmines, there are certain traditions of co-operation between the management and trade unions. This co-
operation includes agreements of certain points and how to achieve this. There are certain w~s to do this 
and these traditions have been cultivated for years and it is very difficult to get away with it" (INT: Klima. 
15.07.2003). 
Besides the suggested internal lock-ins in co-operation, which follow certain routines 
between management and workforce representatives, external pressures and an overall 
politicisation characterise the continuing existence of central control and the industry'S 
function as vehicle for party and other interests. While a direct political interference in the 
day-to-day business of KW is denied, the political influence on a personal level regularly 
emerges when it comes to financial aspects, for example, to payoff the suppliers of illiquid 
KW. 
"Politicians think by nature that it is possible to deal with and to execute certain actions by the means of 
pressing. But this does not work in the economy. To put it nicely: there are a lot of arguments about this on 
the level of misunderstanding between the politicians and us [.Oo} The politicians were still trying to push 
something by the means of these certain traditions and forms of co-operation. It was like a never-ending 
story" (INT: Klima. J 5.07.2003). 
network of former student activists who were organised in the Socialist Union of Polish Students (SZSP) and 
the Polish Students' Society (ZSP) in the 70s and 80s, with president Kwasniewski as its most prominent 
member. 'Ordynacka' "provides its members [ ... ] with mutual backing and support [ ... ] when times get 
rough" (Poland Monthly, ID April 2003) and is closely related to the dissolving post-communist party SLD. 
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Resistance and Privileges 
During socialist times, miners belonged to the most privileged workers in the People's 
Republic enjoying many other benefits in addition to a well-above-average wage. The so 
called 'traditions' in this sector are related to the high social and economic status miners 
experienced in former times, but have been at risk since the beginning of the 1990s. Some 
of these privileges have still been preserved, like an automatic annual rise of 3 per cent in 
wages by law, the provision with monetary school subsidies, (even if the miner has no 
children) or the free delivery of a 'regenerative meal' after a shift. today in form of a 
coupon. 
From an economic perspective "adding certain social dimensions to coal as a physical 
product" (INT: Klima, 15.07.2003), leads to higher costs per tonne and thus an 
uncompetitive product on the global markets. From the employer's perspective a "vicious 
circle gets created" leading to certain mutual dependencies between unions, workers, 
management, and ministries. Several governments tried to break this vicious circle, but the 
complexity of negotiations seems to be enormous as the management has to deal with 212 
individual trade unions organised in Kompania W~glowa. While the management is legally 
obliged to negotiate with each union individually, the traditionally close relationship 
between miners and their unions is reflected in the way that miners cash their coupons or 
cheques in shops owned by trade unions. 
"These traditions created a web of mutual social help by cashing the cheques. It's very difficult to uproot this 
thinking from the mentality. The worker, their families, the whole society here takes part in this process; it's 
deeply rooted in the mentality. In the end the extra costs are added to the costs of a ton of coal" (Klima, 
15.07.2003). 
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The retrenchment process has been met by tough resistance by miners and trade unions 
respectively, partly accompanied by violent street riots and hunger strikes in Silesia and 
Warsaw. While the famous mobilisation potential of miners could be channelled against 
the communist regime and for an improvement of living conditions in 1980s, the workers 
of yesterday's upheavals are now fighting against governments and politicians who gained 
their positions sometimes with the help of the miners and who later decided that further 
downgrading was necessary. Actually, strikers and union activists draw from the fact that 
in the end the Polish state has to provide them with a reasonable amount of compensation 
that reduces the negotiation power of the government and employers respectively. 
"Additionally. when we talk aboul slale-owned companies. there is always the prospective of the stale who 
will-in Ihe end- buy oul unprofitable working places. 1I is a 10lally differenl siluation if you compare il to the 
private sector (INT: Klima. 15.07.2003). 
Old Visions and the Problem of Time Scales 
The government cannot provide KW with the promised financial means to meet its own 
schedule for the closure of its most unprofitable mines. If in socialist times the company's 
plan constituted its minimum production levels, today's plan outlines a timetable for the 
downgrading of this industry. While "the failure of socialism rested precisely in the 
attempt to organise all economic processes according to a grand design" (Stark 1992:301) 
there is a danger that this kind of thinking reproduces itself in the restructuring of old 
industries. The belief in planning processes and in the achievement of complex business 
objectives in a given time period survives - a planning routine and practical 'socialist' skill 
- which is still in the minds of managers, referring regularly to the notion of "the good 
plan" - now transformed into the capitalist context. According to Jerzy Klima the agreed 
plan was not the best one, not only because the government could not deliver promised 
financial means on time but because of its schedule, which should be stretched from three 
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years to "eight or nine years [ ... ] to get this done and to give the children of the coalminers 
a future in different jobs" (INT: Klima, 15.07.2003), although at the same time he stressed 
the necessity of fast downsizing. 
The most important pressure to reach the plan's goals is created by Poland's accession to 
the EU and Poland's financial dependency on other transnational organisations such as the 
World Bank. In comparison to other (former) old industrial areas in western Europe, the 
Silesian coal industry has only had a short period for its main restructuring and downsizing 
process. Moreover, the case of the steel industry shows that it was indeed favourable to 
'delay' privatisation efforts until the new steel boom increased the selling price and 
especially improved the agreed modalities with the new owner. Despite this new steel 
boom triggered by the growing of the Chinese economy, KW will hardly profit from this as 
the necessary premium coking coal - as raw material for the production of coke which is 
used for steel production - is mainly mined by other Polish coal companies. I11 
Table 3: Estimated Hard Coal Demand in Poland for the years 2006-2020 [mln tons], 
Projected Annual GDP: 1.5-2.5% [the higher the GDP the lower the demand I] 
CONSllMER I YEAR 2006 2010 2020 
ENERGY PRODUCERS 
COKING PLANTS 
OTHER 
TOTAL 
42.1 
10.0 
20.5 
72.6 
38.S 
9.5 
IS.O 
63.0 
Source: Expert Commission of the German Ministry of Economics, quoted in BFAI, I December 2003. 
37.3 
8.0 
8.3 
53.6 
While the domestic demand will substantially decrease within the next 15 years due to 
technical improvements like energy-saving measures, export of Polish hard coal must be 
subsidised because of the high cost price, After Poland's accession to the EU - with more 
I11 The two other remaining coal companies Katowicka Spo/ka W~glowa and Jastrz~bska Spo/ka W~glowa 
manage more profitable mines producing higher qualities. in particular premium coking coal for coke 
production. The latter company produces in Poland more than 90 per cent of this high-value coal product of 
which SO per cent is exported. Poland wants to increase its share of global coke production from 12.3 per 
cent (2000) to 18 per cent within the next years (BFAI. 1 December 2003). 
151 
than 90 per cent the biggest export market for Polish coal - the accession treaty explicitly 
limits this practice. Anyway, the more coal is exported, the more Polish taxes have to be 
paid for subsidies. The Polish coal industry limits their deficits with high domestic market 
prices, a situation that recalls the inter-war emergence of influential cartels in this sector. 
More than sixty years ago the Polish economist Ferdynand Zweig characterised the 'state-
directed' economy and its export policy between 1936 and 1939 based on cartels, whereby 
"Many export branches, especially sugar, coal, steel, oil, zinc were based on the price 
discrimination between internal and export prices, the deficit in export prices being 
covered by the excess of internal prices" (Zweig 1944, Poland Between the Wars: 104; 
quoted in LandaulTomaszewski 1985:124-125). Curiously, this strategy has changed, as 
the following table reveals, although the high inland prices cannot balance the overall high 
cost price per ton of hard coal. 
Table 4: Example of Polish Hard Coal Production [mln tons] & Sales [PLN per ton], Jan.-July 
2003 
OllTPllT TOTAL SALES IN POLAND EXPORT 
57.7 54.40 41.20 13.20 
SALES PRICE 138.11 151.45 96.24 
COST PRICE 142.83 
REVENlIE -4.72 
TOTAL REVENllE (CA. PLN) -256,934,000 
Source: Expert Commission of the German Ministry of Economics. cited in BFAI. I December 2003. 
Asked about the prospect of Silesian coalmining in 20 years time, the former chairman of 
KW sees a rather bright future for the rest of the coal industry and surprisingly links this 
future with world politics or the deployment of Silesian miners to the long gone pits in 
western Europe. 
"/ believe that the coal mining industry will be radically reduced but will survive, because there is always a 
need/or coal as an energy source. There is a certain trend in the EU connected with the existence o/nuclear 
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power stations: the fear of terrorism. As a result. the costs of producing energy are rising The alternative 
ways of producing energy will become more and more important and that 's why I helieve that the role of the 
coal mining industry will still be significant. In the future we also might find our native Polish coal miners 
working in the EU coal mining industry. because we have qualified people here" (INT: Klima. /5.07.2003). 
Programming Decline 
In the beginning of the transfonnation process, downsizing programmes focused on 'buy-
out' strategies for the fonner miners, usually a pay-off sum up to Euro 11000 (ca. GSP 
7400) as compensation for the loss of labour or early retirement. Unfortunately, these high 
amounts of capital were mainly spent on consumption and not on the creation of new work 
places. Until now, the major capital providers for the restructuring process of the Silesian 
coal industry have been the World Bank and the European Union, who invested several 
hundred million of Euros aiming at the reduction of social burdens of increasing 
unemployment in fonn of long-tenn loans. In recent years, the EU-funded 'Initiative I & 
11' programmes for fonner miners and metallurgists focus additionally on the creation of 
self-employed workplaces or lump sums for companies who are willing to employ a 
fonner worker of the heavy industries. 112 The responsible departmental director of the 
regional state agency, the Upper Silesia Regional Development Agency (GARR), identifies 
these kinds of programmes as highly political, with the purpose of calming down workers. 
In the case of Initiative I & 11 the time gap between conception of the programme and 
implementation leads to a situation where the inflexible and over-regulated tools are not 
sufficiently adapted to the dynamics of social and economic change in Upper Silesia (lNT: 
Giemza,07.07.2003). 
112 The Initiative I & 11 programmes were implemented between 2000 and 2003. After submitting a concept 
and business plan as well as an approval of the bank the former miner can claim a maximum soft loan of 
PLN 60000 (ca. GBP 9000). Within three years of running these programmes. a total amount of 511 loans 
have been given while in the second phase 1/3 of the fund remained untouched (PLN 4 million; ca. GBP 
605.000). The loans were usually used for the establishment of small shops. such as internet cafes. groceries. 
pubs etc. In Initiative I only 60 per cent of the loans were paid back. Companies who are willing to employ a 
former miner receive PLN 35.000 for the creation of an additional work place (INT: Giemza. 07.07.2003). 
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While commentators regularly point to the alleged fact that it is not possible to turn a miner 
into an entrepreneur, the most important tool - consultancy - has been cancelled due to a 
lack of financial means in the second phase of the Initiative programme (with only 163 
contracts), which led to an overall poor quality of applications, a high rejection rate and 
only few promising investments. Additionally, due to the generally disadvantageous 
economic situation an increasing amount of contracts has been cancelled because of the 
client's inability to pay back loans. Apparently, the possible success of turning a former 
miner into an entrepreneur is linked to the miner's wife's willingness to support the new 
business, a fact which has not been conceptualised in the programme. The Warsaw based 
lead organisation responsible for the distribution and supervision of enterprise-related EU 
funds to regional development agencies, the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development 
(PARP) has never evaluated the first phase of the Initiative programme nor asked those 
responsible for implementation in Katowice which problems occurred with the aim of 
improving the tools (INT: Giemza, 07.07.2003). 
The Emergence of the Decline-Business 
The restructuring has produced a kind of entrenchment industry which implements 
politically agreed measures to soften the economic and social free fall of the region. Local 
and regional development agencies, business incubators and training/re-qualification 
organisations try to obtain shares of state and EU funds which are provided for the 
restructuring of the old industries. While the different programmes are conceptualised at 
EU and national level, the regional agencies responsible for implementation have to carry 
the burden of executing inadequately adapted measures. The case of the downsizing 
process of state-owned heavy industries - controlled centrally, but implemented regionally 
- in particular shows signs of recurring conflict between centre and periphery. The struggle 
for political control of this process is clearest in the establishment of regional development 
organisations like the Upper Silesian Regional Development Agency (GARR), a 
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commercial company which is mainly owned by the regional administration, the Marshall 
of the voivodship. The private law status of the agency apparently allows easier access to 
EU funds (INT: Giemza, 07.07.2003). While main decisions such as privatisation or 
closure of plants are only partly controllable for the regional bodies, at least the thankless 
implementation of programmes and how to absorb some negative effects of the 
downgrading process remains in the hand of the region. 
An important tool in the development of the region and in the struggle for control over it is 
played by the support for and emergence of private small and medium sized businesses, a 
regionally 'owned' instrument which will be outlined in the next chapter. Regional state 
agencies and their networks - consisting of different educational, consulting or sectoral 
players - are not only in a frontline between regional and national decision makers, but are 
as well a tool for economic policies, playing ball for different political interests on the 
regional level and getting regularly abused also for political reasons (lNT: Wojciechowski, 
06.06.2003; INT: G6rski, 13.06.2003). 
The appointment of GARR executives is "not a matter of qualification, but a matter of 
political connections" (lNT: Giemza, 07.07.2003), an estimation which recalls socialist 
routines when "managers were placed and promoted not for their ability, but for their 
membership in the Party and their willingness to carry out Party dictates" 
(DeDeelFrederickson 2004:299) Thus, strategies and policies of the organisation change in 
line with newly elected regional governments or with the appointment of new regional 
ministers, a fact which is difficult for the employees who stress the necessity of long-term 
commitment to regional development instead of the current "cabaret situation" of quickly 
changing policies and executives (INT: Giemza, 07.07.2003). One further piece of 
evidence for the incomplete establishment of functioning regional institutions is the legal 
construction of loss-making GARR, a company acting under private law. While not all 
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funds for Initiative I & 11 were spent, the company has to pay taxes for the unused funds -
up to 28 per cent per year until 2007 - before GARR will retransfer the rest to PARP, as 
these funds are treated like income. 
5.2 The Emerging Private Sector 
Not surprisingly, the Polish private sector's share in the economy (GDP) has been 
constantly growing from 23.1 per cent (1989), to 58.1 (1995), up to 74.4 (2000) (Macieja 
2001: 147; OECD 2002: 122). Similarly, after more than fifteen years of restructuring and 
privatisation efforts nearly 75 per cent (2000) of workers employed in the industrial sector 
work for private businesses, compared with 85.9 in the manufacturing sector and only 14 
per cent in the mining industry (ibid.). Notwithstanding this impressive emergence of the 
private sector in terms of its share of the gross domestic product, Poland clearly lags 
behind all other countries in CEE, except Ukraine but including Russia. which accelerated 
this share in particular during the second half of the 1990s (OECD 2002:125). The main 
reason for this development has been identified in the relatively slow large-scale 
privatisation efforts of the 1990s. In terms of small-scale privatisation. Poland has reached 
the highest index of 4+ by the year 2000, with "standards and performance typical of 
advanced industrial economies: no state ownership of small enterprises" (ibid.). Alongside 
these small-scale privatisations, the number of newly established businesses has also 
grown in Poland, with the highest creation rate of new enterprises in CEE in the second 
half of the 1990s (MickiewiczlRadosevic 2001 :30). 
Poland's economy has attracted numerous multinational corporations and thus has been 
experiencing huge foreign direct investments since the early 1990s (Tilbke 2003; Pavlinek 
2004). The changing geographies of production have to be seen in a wider context, where 
production has been relocated from western to eastern Europe (Hudson 2002b). In 
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comparison to old industrial areas in western Europe, which has been restructuring and 
downgrading its industries at least since the end of the 1970s, the old industrial areas in the 
East have a chance to profit from recent relocational developments, in order to try to 
counterbalance lost work places in the traditional sector of steel and coal industries 
(RadosevicN arblane et al. 2003). 
5.2.1 Multinational Corporations: The Case of the Automotive Industry 
Many of the international carmakers have started to relocate production from the West or 
to establish new plants and production lines in CEE.IIJ The European automobile 
production system can be seen as organised within networks, qualitatively differentiated in 
western R&D competencies and Eastern lower value routine production (Hudson 
2002b:268). Besides the competitive advantage of lower labour costs in CEE the 
automotive industry profits from a lack of resistance towards the radical reorganisation of 
working practices and the enhancement of productivity in the new capitalist territories 
(ibid.), which "helped redefine 'best practice' and productivity norms in Western Europe" 
(ibid:270), a market with huge overcapacity of production and great financial risks. The 
majority of automotive sector investment has taken place in the Republic of Slovakia, a 
country which will produce 900,000 cars by 2008 - the highest share per capita in the 
world (Financial Times, 27 April 2004). Following Slovakia, Poland - and more precisely 
the Voivodship of Silesia - is the second biggest destination of automotive-related 
investments in CEE (Dunin-Wasowiczl Gorzynski et al. 2002:7-20). 
113 Relocational efforts of production lines are not always decided because of lower tax levels and cheaper 
labour in the emerging capitalist territories, as the recent example of GM Opel's production relocation of its 
'Zafira' model from Ruesselsheim/Germany to Gliwice/Poland shows. While the Polish state purchased (on 
us credits) 48 F16 pursuit planes from the US-company Lockheed-Martin for US$ 3.5 billion in 2003. an 
'off-set' deal agreed by contract US-investments of US$ 6 billion in Poland until the next years to come. 
Fulfilling a part of the contract, Lockheed transferred an unknown amount to Detroit-based GM with the 
purpose of relocating some of their German production capacity to Gliwice. an investment of about EURO 
800 million (Rzeczpospolita. 21 July 2004). 
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In this section, the example of GM Opel's investment in Poland explores why this global 
player started producing in CEE. Moreover, examples of the corporation's commitment to 
the region of Silesia and its linkages to political and economic actors are given. Recently, 
commentators have pointed to the possibility that international car makers perceive CEE 
only as a temporary halt on the way to production destinations further in the East, like 
Ukraine, Russia or the middle Asian states of the former Soviet Union. Thus, this section 
analyses whether these assumptions are accurate or rather, how these corporations 
rationalise their locational decisions, in this case choosing Upper Silesia. Further, from the 
perspective of the region, the example is used to consider the preconditions necessary to 
attract global investors, an important aspect in assessing the region's potential for 
competing with FDIs in Europe and elsewhere. Certainly, the question of how the 
corporation acts in a post-socialist environment and how the management perceives this 
setting reveals business obstacles inherited from the past or positive regional assets which 
are peculiar to that location. However, the major question of this section focuses on the 
spatial-economic effects of establishing foreign investments in a region which is still 
dominated by its heavy industrial complexes and an emerging but tiny SME sector. 
In Poland, most of the automotive-related investments have been in the Voivodship of 
Silesia, notably Fiat, Isuzu and American supplier Delphi in Tychy and Bielsko-Biala, GM 
Opel in Gliwice, or exhaust producer Tenneco in Rybnik. 114 The investment in Gliwice is 
the biggest single foreign investment in Poland since the beginning of the 1990s and must 
be seen as a national prestige case. While state-owned Fabryka Samochod6w Osobowych 
(FSO; 'The Automobiles Factory') and Fiat started their licensed production of the so 
called 'Polski Fiat' with a joint venture already in the mid of the 1970s - thus Fiat looks 
114 All of the car producers in the region maintain certain levels of co-operation, notably Opel and Fia/ who 
develop and produce their engines together in the joint venture Power/rain Motors, Bielsko-Biala. 
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back to a rather long period in producing in Poland - GM started to build its first plant in 
Gliwice as a green field investment in 1996. 115 
The managing director of GM Poland, Romuald Rytwinski, has been working in this sector 
for more than 25 years, employed by FSO, which produced in Tychy and Warsaw the 
(legendary) Polski Fiat 125, Poland's first post-war car. Asked about the differences 
between working in former times for socialist car producers and today for one of the 
biggest global producers, the manager states that "FSO was only a big conveyor belt" 
where identification with the company was difficult, as "the only responsibility was to 
deliver the plan" while "what to produce and prices were given". This attitude and lack of 
corporate identity stands in contrast with today, where "the biggest difference between 
Ope/ and FSO is that we see the vision and have a future" (all quoting: INT: Rytwinski, 
28.07.2003). Indeed, the production in Gliwice advanced within a few years to be one of 
GM's best plants worldwide winning the internal annual prize four times in a row as the 
first plant ever in GM's history, while similarly Newsweek Polska nominated Ope! Po!ska 
as the • Employer of Year 2003'. Its workforce faces "an extremely tough selection process 
to get a job here", as well as a system of positive sanctions for good results and low 
hierarchies cause the success of this plant. About 30 per cent of the workers come from the 
city of Gliwice while the rest originate from adjacent Upper Silesian cities, in total a 
workforce of 1600. 
The manager gives five reasons why GM Ope! invested in Gliwice and not elsewhere in 
Poland or Central-Eastern Europe. First, the proposed site is suitable, and perceived as "a 
nice piece of land". Second, the transport infrastructure with nearby two newly constructed 
highways provides excellent connections. Third, the site is located within the Katowice 
Special Economic Zone (KSSE), and thus provides Ope! with substantial tax concessions. 
115 The detailed story, how the city ofGliwice acquired this major investment is presented in chapter six from 
the perspective of the then involved deputy mayor under the aspect of the 'learning city'. 
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Fourth, The Silesian Technical University of Gliwice is the second biggest of its kind in 
Poland and has an excellent reputation. Fifth, the government has actively been promoting 
this region as a possible production location for GM. 
Surprisingly, the manager does not mention the most important incentive for international 
corporations to invest in CEE: the substantially lower wage levels of workers and 
engineers in comparison to adjacent western counties. A producer based in Poland pays 
only 10 to 15 per cent of the western wage for a worker (in the case of Fiat between PLN 
1100 and 1300 per month) and about 20 per cent for a car engineer (lNT: Wycislo, 
14.07.2003; Economist, 24 July 04; Automotive News Europe, 12 July 04). This location 
advantage is in contrast clearly fonnulated by the Fiat manager who condenses the 
regional assets with "well qualified workers who get low wages" (INT: Wycislo, 
14.07.2003). It is remarkable, that the GM manager instead gives reasons linked with the 
specific location and place assets of Gliwice and does not, for example, mention the 
investment qualities of CEE or Poland. 
In the next sections, the five reasons given will be discussed with respect to their meaning 
for the region and to assess Silesia's potential to compete for further foreign investment, a 
main economic policy content and widely seen as a (necessary) indicator for successful 
regional (and national) development, especially in times of capital scarcity. The acquisition 
of FDIs can also provide infonnation about the region's integration into global capital and 
production flows, an important aspect in tenns of the • invention of a capitalist region'. 
Furthennore, the analysis of regional assets (and shortcomings) points also to its capacity 
to hold international capital providers in a long-tenn perspective, when competition with 
countries further East becomes stiffer.116 The competition over FDls also provides evidence 
116 Indeed, the first relocations of automotive related industries have been reported from the Czech Republic, 
where a supplier moved production to Ukraine. Two sources in Silesia have informed the author that the 
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about the region's capacity for reforms and the state of political-economic transformation, 
as transnational corporations tend to invest in areas with functioning institutions. 
Derelict Land and Green Fields 
First, the "nice piece of land" highlights to the fact that the Voivodship of Silesia or more 
precisely, the agglomeration of Upper Silesia, is characterised by many areas which are 
'not so nice'. The decline of heavy industries left an enormous amount of derelict land 
behind, often contaminated with toxic chemicals and heavy metals, places where no 
company wants to produce, at least not before this industrial heritage is cleaned up at high 
cost. After 1989, the Polish state retransferred land ownership to the communes, but left 
them with the task of cleaning-up this derelict land, a task which financially can hardly be 
dealt with. The agglomeration's endowment with green fields is limited and only existent 
at its fringes, as in Gliwice. 
Transport and Infrastructure 
In comparison with the rest of Poland, the region's transport infrastructure is satisfactory, 
but poor in comparison with other adjacent accession countries, with the lowest density of 
highways in the new Europe of25 member states (DECD 2004:154). Indeed, GM Ope/ has 
expressed dissatisfaction with the overall infrastructure of the region, especially with road 
quality and measurements, beside time-consuming import procedures perceived as the 
biggest problem of producing in Gliwice (INT: Rytwinski, 28.07.04). Nevertheless, 
Gliwice's closeness to a NS/WE highway junction, as well as the region's geographical 
position near the Czech and Slovak Republics, Germany and functionally linked supplier 
networks strengthens Upper Silesia's locational qualities, especially for car producers 
aiming for cost efficiency within their supply chains (see map below). 
physical structure of the GM Ope/ plant in Gliwice makes it possible to dismantle the production hall within 
a fortnight, which has been denied by the general manager (INT: Rytwinski, 28.07.2003). 
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Map 5: Planned Motor Highways in Poland 
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Transport and infrastructure issues are broadly addressed in regional development plans 
such as the " Development Strategy of the SI,!skie Voivodship 2000-2015" because 
"comfortable domestic and international communication [transport] links will be one of the 
most important factors generating its [the region's] development" (SI~skie Voivodship 
2000: I 09). Nevertheless, the benefits of huge investments in transport infrastructure as an 
instrument for regional development are controversial, because there is a danger that scarce 
public capital will be spent on white elephants instead of investing in other relevant aspects 
such as education, the support of emergent small and middle sized companies, or in 
cheaper ' soft assets ' which distinguish a region from other competitors. 
Spatial Tax Relief Zones 
The main regional instrument for the acquisition of FDIs is the establishment of spatial tax 
exemption zones, managed by the Kalowicka Specjalna Slre.fa Ekonomiczna S.A . (KSSE) 
[Katowice Special Economic Zone Co.]. In 1996 until four independently organised sub-
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zones were established in six cities of the voivodship, but with differing results. 117 The 
marketing of brown field sites with severe ecological burdens, namely in Sosnowiec 
adjacent to Huta Katowice, and in the Jastrz~bie sub-zone has faced the biggest problems 
in finding investors (INT: Romanczyk, 17.12.2002). The marketing of a site in the north of 
the voivodship, in the city of Cz~stochowa, has been completely stopped because no 
investor could be found at all. About 80 per cent of all investments are automotive-related, 
mainly in Gliwice (GM Ope!), Tychy (Fiat; Isuzu: De/phi), as well as the Ope/IFia/ joint 
venture in Bielsko Biala (Powertrain Engines). The attraction of service industries was not 
proposed in the first strategy, but was included in 2000. Nevertheless, the overall majority 
of all investments are foreign and automotive-related. 118 There is no doubt that the 
establishment of car producers and their suppliers generates a substantial number of jobs in 
the region, although it is clear that the creation of new jobs cannot in any way balance the 
reduction of the workforce in old industries (Radosevic et al. 2003:74). The attraction of 
FDIs is only possible if a municipality is capable and willing to invest in new 
infrastructure, or the clean-up of heavily polluted brown sites. Moreover, these public 
investments are not matched by an increase in tax income, as companies are exempted 
until the year 2016. The region is still carrying the economic burden of being mono-
structured, and this stigma could even be strengthened because of the danger that a new 
mono-structured industry, the automotive industry, replaces the old mono-structured 
regional economy. 
The Educational Asset 
The Technical University of Gliwice, with more than 30000 students, is regularly 
presented as an important asset for the attraction of high-technology companies, not only 
for the city itself. Indeed, in the beginning of Ope/'s investment the idea was to establish 
117 These sub-zones are Gliwice. Sosnowiec, Tychy and Jastrz~bie Zdr6j/Zory, encompassing about 30 
different sites with more than 1000 ha (KSSE w/o year: 14; INT: Romanczyk. 17.12.2002). 
118 The exceptions are some Polish producers such as Lakuna (chemicals) and the printing house of Gazeta 
Wyborcza (newspaper) as well as a food processor and an American glass producer. 
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linkages with automotive-related departments of the university with the aim of creating 
R&D potential between corporations and public organisations like the university (lNT: 
Wojciechowski K., 02.07.04). In fact, 95 per cent of the technical development of GM 
Ope/ 's products is still conducted in Germany while about 60 per cent of the 
manufacturing process is implemented by engineers employed by the Gliwice plant. The 
professor for automatics and control theory at Gliwice University states that contacts with 
Ope/ and Fiat would be very desirable for the department and its students, but are actually 
non-existent ("zero contact"), a fact which contradicts the Ope/ manager's perception of 
the impact of higher educational organisations for the company's production in this region 
(INT: Wojciechowski K., 02.07.04). However, graduates with this specialisation cannot 
find work in Poland, so the department has gradually reformed its curriculum, becoming 
more and more specialised in computer animation and visual information processing, a 
field with a much better future (ibid.). Asked about why the city of Gliwice is more 
successful in attracting corporations than other cities in the country, the academic does not 
mention the well-known departments and their technical achievements, but the sheer fact 
that it is "nicer to be in a city with educated people around" (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the impact of higher education facilities for a region's development cannot 
be denied, even in the case of Silesia, but it seems questionable whether transnational 
corporations fully draw on this (technical) potential, despite characterising this aspect as 
important for their locational decision, because "we were looking for young, English-
speaking, open-minded, ambitious and very well educated people who are ready to get 
developed" (INT: Rytwinski, 28.07.2003). Instead, it seems more likely that the Technical 
University of Gliwice and its graduates potentially creates a well-established network of 
mutual help and support, a reliable network of political and economic actors from which a 
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multinational corporation can draw functioning co-operation and contacts (this argument is 
developed further in Chapter 6).119 
Distanced and Local Networks 
In the mid 1990s the then government actively promoted the region not only with the 
establishment of tax exemption zones but also with high-profile political support. The 
overall aim was still the support of the restructuring of the region by the attraction of 
"modern' investments. The GM executive still maintains "very good contacts" with the 
central government, such as the ministers of Economy, Finance or Industry on a regular 
basis, meeting them several times a year. When it comes to regional administration - like 
the manager of Huta Katowice - the knowledge about the new structure after the 1998 self-
government reform is rather diffuse, and he mixes up the head of the elected regional 
administration (the Marshal) with the centrally appointed Voivod, whom he never met 
because "frankly speaking I don't care about this contact" (INT: Rytwinski, 28.07.2003). 
In contrast to this indifferent attitude, good relationships with the city administration are 
perceived as much more important and were the "overriding fact" why GM invested in this 
city and not elsewhere. These personal contacts with the mayor and deputy mayor as well 
as to the whole city government are used to "talk about our business and the conditions to 
produce here" (ibid.). Similarly, the Fiat Po/ska manager Henryk Wycislo states that 
although contacts to the regional parliament (the Sejmik) do exist, they do not play an 
important role, "because we have to work". Instead, the direct contact to the mayor of 
Tychy, who regularly visits the plant (and helped in setting up the Fiat interview), is 
perceived as much more relevant as Fiat managers discuss, for example, the lowering of 
119 Most of the interviewees in Gliwice and many other political or economic actors of the whole region have 
studied at the Technical University, e.g. the mayor and deputy mayor of Gliwice, the directors of the Local 
Development Agency or the sales director of Tenneco in Rybnik. All of the comments point to the university 
as an elite organisation with 'tradition', linked to local and regional economic and political leaders. After 
Poland lost its eastern territories after WWII. the university was completely relocated from the Galician city 
of L'wow (today L'viv in Ukraine; until 1918 Lemberg in Austria-Hungary) and re-established in Gliwice. 
This 'L'wow identity' is still present in the city of Gliwice, also represented by the local (sic) newspaper 
'L'wow News'. 
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financial burdens, ecological problems or in what way the company can help the city with 
small performances in kind (lNT: Wycislo, 14.07.04). 
In the following sections, further examples are given to explain how transnational 
corporations (TNCs) are integrated into the region, or rather how they want to be perceived 
as being integrated, with the help of PR, a tool that is utilised to strengthen the perception 
of corporations as local producers. Beside these management tools, some examples are 
outlined of the ways in which transnational automotive corporations are linked with other 
regional, national or global suppliers, to give an impression of the different scales of flows, 
not only material, but the flows of technology, knowledge or expertise. The main reasons 
for this discussion are to assess the capacity of TNCs to adapt to regional or local 
peculiarities, as well as to post-socialist environments, and their contribution to regional 
restructuring and the emergence of new industries. 
Material Flows and Technology 
In the case of GM Ope/, the corporation's integration into the regional input/output system 
of suppliers is limited to other western companies who started producing in the region in 
the 1990s. In contrast to Fiat, none of Ope/ 's suppliers is a state-owned company. While 
Fiat obtains the car steel plates (like its predecessor FSO since the 1970s) from the (now 
privatised) steel mill Huta Sendzimira (former Hula fm. Lenina) in Nowa Huta, Ope/ buys 
from steel mills in the Ruhr/Germany (INT: Wycislo, 14.07.2003; INT: Rytwinski, 
28.07.2003). The GM manager estimates that about 40 per cent of all built-in parts are 
produced in Poland, and the majority of that share comes from Silesia. This share of 
'Polish parts' is substantially higher in the case of Fiat, between 50 and 60 per cent. The 
majority of the car production is exported, in the case of Fiat about 70 per cent and GM 
Ope/ in Gliwice exports 94 per cent to the EU markets (2003). Neither company has its 
own R&D facilities, but obtains most of the technology from the headquarters in 
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Ruesselsheim (95 per cent in the case for Opel) or from Torino. In Tychy, the Fiat 
production site is still the same as in the 1970s, with redundant space rented out to 
suppliers who produce in the same buildings as Fiat.120 Some of the machinery is still from 
the socialist time, especially the punching machines for the sheet material, which came 
from East and West German machine tool producers, but which are now outsourced to 
another company. 
Corporate Cultures 
The guidelines of workflow processes as well as management cultures have usually been 
adapted to follow the traditions of the western headquarters. For example, the main 
working language in the Fiat-Tychy plant is Italian. Similarly, the Anglo-American 
corporate culture of low (visible) hierarchies is also fully implemented in the Ope/ plant of 
Gliwice ("we are all the same - there are no differences"}. 121 The (Polish) GM manager 
links these low hierarchies with the obvious success of the plant, but also admits that 
younger, "open-minded" workers could more easily adapt to this corporate culture. 
Apparently, a transnational player is less forced to adapt all local or regional routines, but 
expects that the workforce is willing to adapt to western habits, and thus by-pass 
negatively perceived inherited (post-) socialist legacies. 122 Especially in the case of Ope/, 
120 Since 1993, after the first restructuring wave the Fiat-Tychy plant has been reorganised. With a plant 
workforce of then about 7000 on the site, only about 2500 are now employed by Fiat itself (some few 
hundreds also work at the management headquarters in Bielsko-Biala), the rest of the workforce is now 
employed by component suppliers, logistics firms, energy, maintenance and service companies. Before 1989, 
FSO employed between 30000 and 35000 workers in Tychy, Bielsko-Biala, and Warsaw where the Polski 
Fiat was manually produced to an extent of 80 to 90 per cent. Half of the production line in Bielsko-Biala has 
been relocated to Tychy due to a lack of expansion space, but the engines are still produced in the Ope//Fiat 
joint venture in Bielsko-Biala, where the Fiat management is also based. 
121 This statement is related to the corporation's culture to provide managers with the same (small) cars that 
workers drive, without the right of a reserved parking space as well as the fact that all workers and managers 
are dressed in the same GM uniform. 
122 A comprehensive discussion of the (post-) socialist mindset is presented in the next chapter, focusing on 
SMEs. Many interviewees stress, for example, that a 'typical (post-) socialist habit' is the lack of 
responsibility, self-initiative, and trust in co-operation, characteristics which are essential in a capitalist 
society. These inherited mindsets often blend with distinctive regional and local peculiarities. In the case of 
Silesia, these routines are entirely perceived as positive, such as 'hard-working' people with 'old traditions' 
and 'high moral (religious) values' etc. In the words of the Warsaw-born GM manager: "I would say their 
[Silesian's] labour attitude is extremely good, reliable, hard-working. In Warsaw, I cannot say that there is a 
culture. Here, they have their own language and they have good habits like beer-drinking in groups, they are 
more family oriented" (lNT: Rytwinski, 28.07.2003). 
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this strategy seems to be successful. On the other hand it is unclear whether the socialist 
battle cry of "we are all the same" is more related to the American low-hierarchy model or 
a new interpretation (and thus adaptation) of the socialist 'classless society'. It could be 
summarised that TNCs tend to incorporate positively perceived characteristics of a region, 
while trying to avoid negative routines. 
The Desire to Be Local 
A different picture emerges for Tenneco, an American exhaust components supplier with 
few hundred employees based at Rybnik. Locally produced parts play only a subordinate 
role for the location in Silesia; rather the location is used as a logistics hub for CEE. In this 
case the closeness to the planned highway crossing AI/A4 (near Gliwice) is also the most 
important aspect of the location decision, together with the fact that Tenneco bought an 
already existing exhaust plant on the site. Tenneco is member of the so-called 'Plato' 
programme, which is organised by the regional administration, the Marshal's Otlice and 
the Regional Development Agency (GARR). Initially, the programme was developed in 
Belgium and was transferred to Silesia as a result of the region's partnership with the 
Limburg region. The idea is to develop SME management skills with the help of 
'godfathers', mostly managers of bigger companies of the region who participate in regular 
workshops and share their insights of good management practices. 123 
In contrast to other multinational corporations based in the region, Tenneco early 
recognised membership in this programme as an opportunity to promote the corporation as 
a locally integrated player and has thus adapted the role of a godfather for the local group 
in Rybnik. The participating Tenneco 'godfather' gives three reasons why Tenneco is 
engaged in this programme. First, the participation provides the corporation with a "better 
understanding of local companies"; second, the supplier uses Plato for a better corporate 
123 The programme will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, as one of the regional programmes focusing 
on SMEs. 
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image within the city, as "they [participating SMEs] see us now in a different way, not 
only as Americans, but as local people who work and live here" and thirdly, Tenneco 
suggests additionally that "we are learning from them as well, how they deal with 
problems from a different perspective" (all quoting: INT: Nowak, 24.07.03), although the 
manager assumes much more knowledge and experience for the corporation itself, in 
comparison to smaller firms. 
While Tenneco is participating in regional development programmes, other TNCs 
implement much less sophisticated PR strategies, although the strategic aims are similar, 
for example, the "people [should] see that Opel cars are locally produced, that Ope! is one 
of the Silesian manufacturers". Asked about how the corporation is integrated into the 
region and what the corporation does for the city of Gliwice, the GM manager proudly 
presents his visiting programme for school classes ("we even do not publish our school 
relationships") and frankly admits that "maybe after ten years, when kids are grown up and 
think about the visit of this good plant with good memories, they will turn to be our 
customers" (INT: Rytwiitski, 28.07.2003). Fiat, which has been based in the region for a 
much longer time, has less straightforward PR projects. While the Fiat manager stresses 
the "historically grown" close business relationships not only to the city of Tychy, but also 
to about 180 Polish small and middle sized companies as suppliers for their car production, 
the company seems to maintain a positive image at least in the city of Tychy with the 
sponsoring of sport teams, music festivals, and art exhibitions and even supports the city 
and the region with the company's fire brigade, in the case of emergency (INT: Wycislo, 
14.07.04).124 
124 The corporation is very popular in Tychy, which is probably the "most Italian' city of Poland. Before 1989 
many Polish cities envied the city's contacts to western (Italian) workers and still today, the most common 
second language spoken in the city is Italian. 
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The question arises what producers will do when special tax exemption zones and low 
wages disappear. There are presently major incentives to produce in CEE. The probability 
that a producer will relocate production can also be linked to the company's functional and 
social integration into the location or the region. Moreover, supplier-dependent automotive 
companies cannot relocate without considering their supply chains, where close co-
operation and "quick contacts are absolutely important because of the just-in-time process" 
(INT: Wycislo, 14.07.04). Another aspect is the important and nearby western sales market 
and increasingly growing CEE markets. The automotive sector is still investing in CEE, 
but the competition is not only growing within CEE, but also at the fringes, a fact only few 
regional actors are aware of. Asked about the probability that GM Opel might move further 
to the East one day, the manager summarises the typical considerations of a globally 
producing corporation. 
"/ think that these fears are completely rubbish. As / said we have at least a 20-years advantage concerning 
wages. Moreover, companies move to countries where they can sell their products. I tell you, Poland will be 
the fifth or sixth biggest market in Europe. As a car producer, we have to be here. There is no doubt about 
this. Talking about Ukraine and Russia: the companies will go there to invest, to produce and to sell their 
products. But due to the customs barriers, it won't be very easy for them to export them to Poland and other 
western European countries {sic!}. / am not afraid of this competition, on the contrary I believe that there 
will be even more investments in the Polish automotive industry from the West. In this industry there is afact 
you should know: we have a very well developed supplier network. All these suppliers deliver to companies 
like Vw, Opel, Fiat etc. There is an extremely large manufacturing base here. If you go to other countries 
where the suppliers are not there, the logistics costs are going to kill you. And I see more and more 
movement that automotive suppliers are investing here. Did you know that the majority of car engines 
produced in Europe come from Central European plants?" (INT: Rytwinski, 28.07.2003). 
Concerning the wage advantage, Mr Rytwiilski refers to the long period of adjustment 
expected to reach western levels, similar to the GDP level - it took about 20 years in Spain 
to reach 80 per cent of the EU average level after the country joined the EU. "There is 
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neither good, nor bad - there are pros and cons"; in the case of a consumer related 
manufacturer, higher wages are also desirable, as domestic customers will buy more 
products. On the other hand, adjacent countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia have 
lower wages than Poland, a competitive aspect that is perceived as a possible burden for 
the attraction of further investments. 
Besides these strategic, more European-oriented considerations the GM manager is well 
aware of specific regional implications of producing and selling in an old industrial region 
and the linkages between old and new industries. On the one hand the executive recognises 
the need of restructuring, the decline of old industries, that "helped the environment", and 
especially the attraction of investments in 'modem' industries, a task that is not sufficiently 
"pushed by the government". On the other, "when 30000 coalminers get laid off, we see 
immediately how the sales of cars decrease" (INT: Rytwinski, 28.07.2003), even though 
the export share is nearly 95 per cent. 
From the perspective of the manager the shrinking of the old industries and the parallel 
emergence of new industries, with opposed but connected waves of development, causes a 
certain low level of confidence which directly influences the overall economic atmosphere 
of the region. These 'low levels of confidence' have different impacts locally. For 
example, the manager recognises a kind of 'awakening atmosphere' in Gliwice caused by 
the GM investment, new housing projects, the highway junction and the perception that 
Gliwice has an important additional asset, the existence of "a lot of different cultures", also 
stemming from the historical German influence until 1945. Despite the fact that the city is 
still a mining city (with at least one of the mines being threatened with closure), it 
apparently has a completely different image to those of the adjacent cities of Chorz6w and 
Bytom, which are similarly structured mining cities, but are like the old industries "in a 
process of downgrading" (ibid.) without having an alternative vision. 
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In the end, it is the size of the comparatively large Polish market, which balances other 
disadvantages such as higher wages (than other CEE countries), poorer infrastructure or 
higher tax levels. From this perspective, it is no coincidence that most of the foreign 
investors are consumer-based industries. Beside the automotive sector, the biggest 
European retailers have expanded quickly in the country, with Silesia and its huge 
population as a main destination of interest. The question arises whether these kind of 
investments are desirable for the region, in terms of future-oriented 'quality' investments 
which support the restructuring of the region and create additional high-skill workplaces. 
In an article addressed to US managers, the authors link Poland's large market with its 
relatively high cultural stability and summarise Poland's comparative advantage as 
follows: 
"Poland's main global advantage is its 38.6 million consumers who are 98% Polish, 90% Roman Catholic, 
and 98% literate, making it one of the most ethnically, religiously, and linguistically homogenous markets in 
the world Because Poland is less likely to experience either religious or ethnic division, it offers a long-term 
market stability that often is questionable in other emerging economies" (DeDeeIFrederic:kson 2004:298). 
5.2.2 Small and Medium-Sized Companies 
Already in the mid 1990s (1996) Polish small and middle sized compaOles had an 
aggregate share of employment of more than 63 per cent and contributed about 65 per cent 
to the GDP in 1999, although this aggregate share of the private sector is not enough to 
determine the outcome of transformation (Winiecki 2003 :8, 11). The emergence of SMEs 
in transition economies not only has a strong influence on the economic performance, but 
they have also been described as the "engines of economic activity" (ibid.). The overall 
majority of Polish SMEs (maximum number of employees 249) is domestic owned 
whereas "the gap between the locally- and foreign-owned corporates remains significant in 
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terms of quality of management, corporate governance as well as access to finance and 
technology" (EBRD 2004a:20). 
In the Voivodship of Silesia, the share of SMEs as a part of the overall economic activity is 
lower in comparison to other Polish regions, which has been linked to the dominance of 
large corporate entities, although the proportion is getting closer to the national average 
over the years (Cybula 1998; 2004:253). The 'problem of diversity' is addressed by 
regional and local bodies with the help of regional development policies. Already in 1990, 
the "Katowice Plan for Industrial Restructuring" acknowledged the role of SMEs, 
"predestined for innovation-development activities directed towards speeding-up 
technological and product assortment changes in the traditional industries and for the 
creation of high-tech industries" (Blasiak et al. 1994:74).125 Also the latest "Development 
Strategy of the Sl~skie Voivodship 2000-20 IS" earmarks a decisive role for SMEs in the 
economic restructuring of the whole region, because SMEs "will replace the jobs lost as a 
result of restructuring of the traditional sectors of the economy" (SI~skie Voivodship 
2000: 113):26 
Before implemented projects and programmes are discussed, the following section tries to 
summarise the main problems of small and middle-sized companies from the perspective 
of their managers and other actors involved in the support of these companies. Again, it is 
not intended to present a detailed picture of one or two industrial sectors, but rather to 
outline typical obstacles for smaller companies in doing business in a survival economy, 
125 The 'plan' was addressed towards the old Voivodship of Katowice, more or less congruent with the 
industrial core of the region, the G6rnoslqski Okrfg Przemyslowy (GOP) [Upper Silesian Industrial Area]. 
126 The improvement of "Innovative Potential and Competitiveness of the Economy" is one of six 'priority 
areas' in the Development Strategy and includes small and medium-sized enterprises. This 'priority area' 
again has five 'strategic goals', whereas one of these goals is solely dedicated to SMEs. The cited 'strategic 
goal' has five 'action targets': (I) "to support the development of handicraft," (2) "to co-ordinate the 
activities promoting the mobilisation of small and medium sized enterprises," (3) to create SME development 
infrastructure," (4) to support the SME sector in obtaining manufacturing licenses," (5) to create an 
integrated system of supporting the SME's in the area of modem management techniques, marketing and 
financing" (SlllSkie Voivodship 2000: 112-115). 
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which is characterised by old industrial complexes and a general scarcity of capital. In 
doing so, it is assumed that smaller companies behave significant differently in this 
emerging capitalist territory and that the economic-spatial perception of these companies is 
distinguishable from bigger players. Information about these 'sets of economic spatialities' 
not only discloses the shortcomings of policies being implemented but could contribute to 
an geographical understanding of how planned economies transform to capitalist spaces -
and what kind of (not only spatial) routines are necessary to survive this 'transformation'. 
Beside the above mentioned handicaps of poorer management skills or the well-known fact 
that SMEs are faced with costly and difficult access to (new) technology, this section tries 
additionally to emphasise the acquisition and maintenance processes of 'knowledge' in 
general. It is assumed in particular that tacit knowledge plays a significant different role in 
survival or post-communist economies than in established 'successful' regions of the West. 
The notion of the survival economy applies particularly to smaller businesses. In the 
following, some aspects of 'scarcity' will be analysed in a more detailed way. The aim of 
this section is not to reproduce the notion of 'backwardness' of the Polish economy, "the 
lack of specific features characteristic of a modernized state or economy of a Western 
type" (Wydra 2000:83).127 Neither is it the intention to point to the frequently lamented 
lack of the Weberianian charismatic economic (and political) leader who rather tends to 
follow an unconventional vision than to imitate successful blueprints of the past (Polityka, 
13 November 1999). Rather it is intended to point to cultural legacies, "patterns (scenarios) 
of behavior or thought that are transmitted from the past and enacted in the present" 
(Kubik 2003:318). These legacies characterise the 'doing business in a survival economy' 
and point to typical 'problems' and routines of smaller firms which could be either helpful 
or less helpful in supporting the restructuring of a former socialist and still old industrial 
region. Moreover, the intention is here to present examples of how smaller firms operate in 
127 Until today, the expression 'Polnische Wirtschaft' [Polish Economy] is used in the German language and 
describes a badly organised process or all kinds of chaotic state of affairs (Krzeminski 2000). 
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a transitional economy and how they survive without well established political networks 
(like state-owned companies) or the endowment of sufficient capital (like TNCs), a fact 
which leads to the question of different levels of economic and political power structures in 
transformation economies. 
The Lack of Confidence 
Frequently, managers of SMEs are described as 'closed', unwilling to co-operate and 
solely engaged in solving business troubles and their "fight to exist" (lNT: Lobzowska, 
23.07.2003). A director of the Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry (RIG) - the 
largest in the region with more than 400 members, most of them SMEs 128 - even 
characterises small and middle sized companies as "claustrophobic" and directly links this 
psychological finding with experiences in the socialist system where "everything was 
arranged" and the 'protection' of the state omnipresent. Doing business in the socialist 
system was a matter of "mutual security" and the "first priority was to secure yourself, and 
not take risks" as well as "focusing on details" caused by the complexity of fulfilling the 
centrally imposed company's plan (INT: Lobzowska, 23.07.2003). Additionally. the 
president of RIG, T. Donocik, quotes a "tradition of being unfair" in Polish society in 
general and in particular in business co-operations that channels itself in a "tradition of 
lying and easy solutions" (INT: Donocik, 28.07.2003), again linked with the socialist 
legacy and inscribed in the (colloquial) Polish verb kombinowac. 129 In the director's view, 
these socialist routines led to a specific human character, self-reflexively described by her 
as the homo sovieticus who is engaged in transfiguring the past while thinking about the 
good old time of socialist cosiness. While this period is definitely over, the routines of the 
past survive to this day and are confronted with different modes of production, new formal 
128 About 95 per cent of RIG's members are SMEs, the rest are large state-owned or former state-owned 
companies, such as Kompania W~glowa (see chapter 5.1.2) or the largest Polish coal trader W~glox in 
Katowice (lNT: Donocik, 28.07.2003; INT: Lobzowska, 23.07.2003). 
129 Kombinowai: describes an individual, 'non-official' action (in particular illegal or semi-illegal) to 'solve 
problems' of all sorts and is frequently associated with corruption of all sorts (INT: Olbrycht, 18.07.2003). 
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institutions, new sets of actors and an overall dynamic process of economic and social 
change. The question is again which sets of old routines are surviving in the 'new era' and 
do they have a potential to transform and restructure regional economies. Clearly, in the 
case of SMEs these old routines are perceived as an obstacle in capitalist markets where 
the learning process of managers is compared with "springing into a swimming pool 
without water" (INT: Lobzowska, 23.07.2003). 
Thus, the regional chamber tries to break with these learned routines and to increasing 
confidence among smaller businesses in co-assisting the organisation and implementation 
of the Plato programme (see also chapter 5.2.1). In the Katowice Plato group, the 
'godfather' is a manager of the large Pascal Group, engaged in hypermarket property 
developing, but the members of the group have a "different language than big companies, 
like between poor and rich people" and leads frequently to a self-estimation of being 
powerless (INT: Lobzowska, 23.07.2003). Besides a lack of communicational skills, the 
chamber's director points to the "narrow horizon" of SMEs in comparison to large 
corporations, which have a "long-term thinking, strategies and perspectives". When the 
Plato group was established the most important point was to generate discussions and to 
break the silence among the businessmen (topics are regulations, taxes, management skills 
etc.), a target which sounds simple to meet but could only be reached through 
psychological means of informality, such as the rule for all participants to call the members 
by their first name (a quite 'un-Polish' aproach) or the organisation of informal gatherings 
afterwards. The outcome of this group is described as successful because the members are 
"more open now" and "started to talk and I cannot stop them" (lNT: Lobzowska, 
23.07.2003). Moreover, some of the members have begun to co-operate on a business 
level, a fact that points to the achievement of a "certain level of trust, if you start to speak 
about problems". 
176 
In the end, whether these gentle efforts to guide vulnerable Silesian businessmen and 
women through the harsh realities of capitalist competition will succeed is unclear. But the 
chamber's director leaves no doubt that the second shock-therapy - Poland's accession to 
the EU - will sweep aside many members of this threatened species ("I am afraid they are 
in danger"): "New legislation and increasing competition will force them to modernise and 
to reach European standards" but many of these firms "do not change or develop new 
products because ofa lack of risk taking" (INT: Lobzowska, 23.07.2003). 
The mission of the chamber is to support and lobby for the interests of small and middle-
sized companies not only in the Silesian region, but also in the political world of Warsaw. 
The strategy is based on close co-operation with foreign chambers of commerce and 
industry, in particular with the Chamber of Industry and Trade (lHK) Essen/Germany, 
which has been training staff from the very beginning in 1990 and organises seminars and 
mutual visits to today. This international strategy of the chamber is perceived as crucial 
and underlines the fact that the chamber is a 'learning organisation', which passes its 
gained knowledge on to members. Furthermore, the chamber frequently organises 
promotional national and 'foreign missions' aimed in particular at their larger members 
who are interested in expanding their business activities to export markets. In this way the 
organisation tries to open up the region for external ideas and business relations, becoming 
an actor of the 'regional world', connecting different scales and a motor of the 
restructuring process in the region. 
The president of RIG, Tadeusz Donocik, who is a trained lawyer and thus "had no ideas 
about economics" when he founded a still existing private management school in 1988 
(INT: Donocik, 28.07.2003) is besides his associational work in Katowice also vice-
president of the Polish chamber of commerce in Warsaw and owner of a firm producing 
aluminium profiles. However, he perceives his associational work as poorly connected 
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with the political players of the region and the city of Katowice. In the latter case, Donocik 
criticises the one-dimensional economic strategy of the city that aims at attracting 
investment by extending the local infrastructure, a strategy "we don't think will work out" 
and instead points to innovative ideas which have been more quickly absorbed in cities 
such as Poziian or Gdaiisk. At the regional level, he stresses the relatively short time since 
1999 when the elected bodies gained responsibility for regional economic policies, but 
stresses the continuing lack of efficiency and a tendency to over-formalise contacts or even 
to get "overlooked", probably because of political differences. '3o Donocik stresses that co-
operation with the former Marshal Olbrycht (post-Solidarity) was much easier and 
informal and also that Olbrycht "was active in representing the region and raising its 
prestige" at an EU level. Today, in terms of concepts and ideas, "the most active is the 
local sphere" (INT: Donocik, 28.07.2003), cities like Gliwice and Tychy, which actively 
shape the restructuring process of the whole region by supporting the interests of small and 
middle-sized companies, a policy which is neglected by the central state administration 
which only spends 2 to 4 per cent of its "economic help" on private businesses, while the 
rest is given to state-owned companies as subsidies and other financial support. 
The following sections are based on interviews conducted with SMEs which participate in 
RIS-Silesia [Regional Innovation Strategy Silesia], an EU co-funded regional project, set 
up in the Voivodship of Silesia in 2002. The analysed project is part of the Innovating 
Regions in Europe (IRE) network, established in 1994, as a joint initiative of the EU 
Commission's Enterprise and Regional Policy General Directorates, funded by the 
Innovation and SMEs Programme of the Fifth Framework Programme and the Innovative 
Actions Programme of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The IRE 
network is organised as a "platform for the on-going exchange of good practice between 
130 The current Voivod. like the Marshal, is a member of the centre-left party SLD. Tadeusz Donocik was 
vice-minister of the Ministry of Economics during PM Buzek's centre-right legislative period in the second 
half of the 1990s. 
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these regions, and for collaboration in the development and operation of transregional 
innovation policies and schemes" (lRC-IRE 2002:5). Since the early 1990s more than 100 
European regions have participated in projects linked to the Regional Innovation Strategy 
"aimed to strengthen regional capacity to capitalise on new knowledge and new 
technologies" (ibid:6) with 'tailor-made' strategies. In 2001/02, 16 RIS projects in 20 
regions -including RIS-Silesia - have been launched in the accession countries (except 
Lithuania), the so-called RIS-NAC projects (RIS-Newly Associated Countries), which are 
'mentored' and 'trained' by 'experienced' EU regions, in the case of Silesia by the French 
region Nord-Pas de Calais and the Dutch Limburg region. D1 RIS-NAC projects are seen as 
a major tool for innovating regions in CEE, because they "lack [ ... ] communities of 
innovative SMEs which, like in the [old] EU, carry out much of this diffusion" (lRC-IRE 
2002b:7). 
In all RIS-NAC projects, the first step is to formulate an innovation strategy for the region. 
In the Silesian Voivodship, this strategy was developed between March 2002 and May 
2003 and was finally adopted by the regional parliament in August 2003 as the "Innovation 
Strategy of the Silesia Voivodship for 2003-2013" (lRC-IRE 2004b: 10-11). The Strategy is 
the result of the input of more than 600 organisations and summarises work undertaken in 
workshops, seminars and conferences. Besides SMEs, (regional) state agencies, 
municipalities and higher education facilities also participate in RIS-Silesia which is seen 
as the main regional development tool by the Vice Marshal (INT: Jarosz, 15116.07.2003) 
and includes nearly the whole regional development infrastructure of Silesia. J32 
131 Beside this geographical extension, the IRE network also established thematic networks, which bring 
together a number of regions with common interests, including at least one from CEE. The thematic network 
includes topics such as 'knowledge management', 'innovation culture', 'R&D', 'technology transfer', 
'supply chain' and 19 other topics (lRC-IRE 2004). 
132 Besides the 'mentors', the regions of Limburg and Nord Pas de Calais, following Silesian organisations 
are involved in the consortium of RIS-Silesia, with different, sometimes overlapping tasks (in brackets): 
some departments of the Marshal's Office (supervision, organisation), GARR (direct contacts with SMEs), 
GAPP (direct contacts with organisations), RIG, ICHPW etc. The Steering Committee is headed by the 
Marshal. 
179 
One chapter of the Strategy concerns the implementation system, including a co-ordination 
and management unit - the Steering Committee - as well as nine regional groups and two 
implementing programmes. More than 200 individuals are organised in regional groups, 
which work along different topics. As a next step, the first "Implementing Programme 
2004-2008" will be conducted, which defines nine priorities and includes concrete actions 
for the participants, "an empowering impact on the organisations, confronting them with 
key questions on how and for whom projects should be prepared" (IRC-IRE 2004b: I 0) and 
to tackle in particular "a lack of constructive co-operation" in Silesia (ibid: 11) and the 
perceived overall poor management of local development actions in Central East European 
countries (Radosevic 2002:91). 
The project manager of RIS-Silesia, the Belgian Luk Palmen from the Limburg region, 
characterises the fabric of Silesian companies as "10 per cent innovative, 30 per cent 
closed/stagnating and the rest as in between" (INT: Palmen, 27.06.2003). For him, the 
main problems of the region are a lack of competition, and trust between companies as 
well as a lack of risk taking by entrepreneurs (ibid.). The "neutral outsider" who "helps to 
focus on economic and not political questions of the region" (lNT: Waluga, 11.07.2003), 
perceives the 'closeness' of Silesian SMEs not as a legacy of socialism, but connects it to 
the current "unstable economic situation, the lack of planning security, and stable laws", all 
attributes of a "survival economy" (INT: Palmen, 27.06.2003), where bills are not paid by 
business partners. Palmen describes the first step of RIS-Silesia (motto: 'imagination 
creates reality') as "awareness building", where "we are focusing on systems and not on 
structures", with the simple task to bring possible stakeholders together through "learning 
by meeting", which is supposed to raise the level of trust and interaction between 
companies and organisations. Besides a critical evaluation of few participants of RIS-
Silesia, the following sections focus on the some of the abovementioned problems of 
SMEs in the region from the perspective of the firms. 
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The Managing Director and co-owner of Ispik in Gliwice, a company with about 20 
employees that develops and implements spatial and cadastral systems for municipalities, 
has been a member of one of the regional and thematic groups of RIS-Silesia (and a second 
programme called Prelude) since its inception. The niche market of cadastral systems 
forces the company to look for "non-standard ways of doing business" (lNT: Sambural 
Weslowska-Tannenberg, 02.06.2003), and RIS-Silesia is exactly that. where he has the 
chance to meet potential customers, in particular decision makers from the bigger cities of 
the region. While the cities of the region do not have the financial resources to invest in 
state-of-the-art cadastral systems, RIS-Silesia is perceived as an opportunity because the 
project has direct links to EU-funds. Despite the fact that his thematic group is directly 
engaged in his core business (cadastral systems), the outcome of RIS-Silesia is so far seen 
by him in a rather negative way, because "during this period nothing really happened and 
we have not heard about any money, which came that way" (lNT: Sambural Weslowska-
Tannenberg, 02.06.2003). The initial idea was that interested parties, such as SMEs and 
public administrations, would meet through the thematic group and develop an idea and a 
project to apply for EU-funds, which could be used for the modernisation of local and 
regional cadastral systems. Asked about the reason for this failure the manager, who lived 
more than 15 years in Australia before he came back to Poland in the 1990s, leaves no 
doubt about the quality of RIS-Silesia and the actors who are involved. 
"The group of people in the voivodship, in the Marshall Office, who are in charge of RIS-Silesia and Prelude 
are only small bureaucrats. These people have no business experience and no business vision or feeling [. . .] 
and a lot offears. They look to the problem from the bureaucrat position; they are nol actively lookingfor us. 
I think they are trying 10 do something because somebody asked them to do something I think we have a 101 
of lost opportunities in these programmes. These programmes should be run much more actively" (INT: 
Sambural Weslowska-Tannenberg, 02.06.2003). 
181 
Certainly, Ispik is quite an unusual Silesian SME and belongs to that group of businesses, 
which are classified as 'innovative' by the RIS project leader Luk Palmen. Due to the 
managing director's experience in Australia, the firm has been adopting 'western style' 
management practices and perceives co-operation between SMEs not only as important. 
but also as crucial in its business. Apparently, the cautious 'awareness building' and catchy 
'imagination creates reality' strategy of RIS-Silesia is not addressed to firms like I.\pik, 
which has long internalised aspects of mutual trust, innovation and the meaning of business 
relations. The question arises here, whether it is sensible to concentrate on companies, 
which are 'closed/stagnating' to address regional innovation ideas. Instead, the few 
proactive SMEs should rather be key participants in projects like RIS than to vanish in the 
mass of average firms. The critique of the general manager should be taken quite seriously, 
in particular because the firm is specialised and experienced in co-operating with public 
administrations, an aspect which will be further developed in the next section regarding 
public-private-partnerships. 
The next two sections give examples and evidence of a lack of sufficient formal 
institutions - the banking sector and private-public-partnerships, which are not addressed 
in projects like RIS-Silesia, but perceived as main handicaps for business relations and 
innovation efforts by the interviewed companies. 
The Lack of Capital 
All political and economic actors in the region (except TNCs) are faced with a lack of 
capital, but SMEs in particular hardly have a chance to sufficiently invest in their 
businesses, which is important for the development of indigenous (product) innovation. 
The main reason for this is the fact of extremely high interest rates for bank loans (usually 
around 20 per cent per annum) and the sheer impossibility of accessing capital caused by 
the bank's perceived high risk in lending money to those kinds of businesses, even when 
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the decision-making process in Polish banks is about to change (Feakins 2004). Here 
Poland's accession to the EU is also seen as a step forward in terms of the still existing 
"financial wires", "because there will be much more competition in the banking sector" 
(INT: Sambural Weslowska-Tannenberg, 02.06.2003). 
"There is a very odd thing with the banking system in Poland The banks do not support small husinesses at 
all. Even to get an overdraft on your account is difficult. It's so difficult to get any money that .}lOU .leelthey 
don't have a supporting policy [ ... ]. They treat us as the highest possible risk. ({you don't have a security in 
form of a property'/orget about it (INT: Sambural Weslowska-Tannenherg, 02.06.2003). 
A very similar statement was made by one of the biggest employers of the region, the 
manager of Huta Katowice. Like large state-owned companies, SMEs are faced with a lack 
of capital for their businesses. Additionally, the domestic market is too unprofitable and 
too many players are in a similar situation of having too little financial resources. either to 
invest or to pay business partner for their services or products. The case of I.\pik reveals 
that the main strategy for by-passing this handicap is (as in the case of steel producer PHS, 
which is increasingly focusing on export markets) to search for external resources, 
especially for EU-funds. Similarly, the three-man company ICC, specialising in electronic 
control systems and cards has been searching for external financial resources for their 
investments and found them with the help of the regional development agency GARR in 
the pre-accession EU-fund Phare. Quite unusual for this business size, about 80 per cent of 
ICC's clients are transnational corporations, such as Fiat in Tychy, but the owner remarks 
that without his own capital (in form of estate property) the set-up of the business would 
not have been possible, because the "banks don't give credits" (INT: Czuber, 27.05.2003). 
Public Private Partnerships 
Not only in post-socialist settings, PPPs are seen as a key for the unsolved problem of 
insufficiently endowed public funds, in particular at the local level. In the West, the 
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delivery of infrastructure projects is increasingly conducted on the basis of public-private 
co-operation. The case of post-socialist settings reveals that possible and useful co-
operational projects can hardly be realised, because of a lack of sufficient formal 
institutions - regulations, which define these kinds of partnerships. In particular, the 
selection process of bidders in a tender and the process of how the companies involved will 
profit after the realisation of a PPP project is not regulated (lNT: Palqk-Gruszczynska, 
10.07.2003). As a consequence, interested communes refrain from doing business with the 
private sector, especially on a small-scale level involving (local) SMEs. This is partly 
because they fear legal consequences and partly due to a general suspicion of corruption 
and bribery involved in these kinds of business relations, as the head of the city 
development department in Sosnowiec stated (lNT: Pal~-Gruszczynska, 10.07.2003). 
Indeed, "the truth is in between" (ibid.), and "a lot of money is paid under the table" (INT: 
Sambural Weslowska-Tannenberg, 02.06.2003), but simply the atmosphere of (possible) 
accusations is enough to act as a deterrent, even for players who want to co-operate legally. 
The manager of Ispik, a company dependent on these partnerships, perceives this 
'intoxicated atmosphere' as an enormous handicap for local and regional projects. 
"[..] probably you are aware of the political situation in Poland with a lot of scandals and corruption {. . .]. 
All these problems are based on the improper relationship between the private industry and public 
administration. At the moment the situation is like this: people in public administration are extremely 
reluctant to go into any relationships with private industries, because of the scandals, the negative 
atmosphere and the potential improper relationships. This is totally sick. It ties hands, absolutely. What is 
happening: one of your competitors writes a leller to a public administration saying that what they are doing 
is illegal. These administrations do not check whether it's really illegal, but it's enough to create this kind of 
negative atmosphere. They say: "oh, we better don't do anything with the private sector ". As a private 
company working with public administrations you are always suspected [of bribery]; The clerks, the 
appointees are suspected as well because they support a particular company. Nobody checks whether [a 
possible co-operation between a private company and a public administration] this is just a good idea, may 
be it was a good choice" (INT: Sambural Weslowska-Tannenberg, 02.06.2003). 
184 
The next two sections give examples of how one Silesian firm is trying to by-pass typical 
problems of post-socialist markets. The first example provides evidence of the importance 
of being in reliable networks and efforts to extend these stable contacts. The second 
describes how small firms try to tackle the problem of developing and acquiring state-of-
the-art technology. Both aspects - creating networks and the development of innovative 
technology - are heavily dependent on informal institutions. In the first case, the local and 
the regional level are an important base for trusting co-operation, whereas the connectivity 
to the outer world can be sometimes seen as a mental extension of the local, or the 
necessary effort to widen the foreseeable horizon. The second case gives evidence of the 
opportunities for SMEs to participate in informal international networks of technology 
transfer. 
Old and New Networks 
Most of the shareholders of Ispik studied at the University of Gliwice and many business 
partners are as well known from this time: "I strongly believe in personal contacts and in 
working with people who I know and I can trust" (lNT: Sambural Weslowska-Tannenberg, 
02.06.2003). It is not to say that these contacts are exclusively local or regional. Indeed, 
some of the partners and former colleagues are based in other Polish cities, but they share a 
common way of interpreting the difficult market and strategies for how to by-pass this 
situation. The local and regional level is not only a material geographical entity defined by 
boundaries and constructions of inside/outside, it can also be seen as an incubator of 
untraded interdependencies and thus facilitates environments of trust which can be 
geographically extended and continued over time. Besides the participation in local EU-
linked projects like RIS, the management of Ispik is active also on an expert level in 
Warsaw and Brussels, contacts that could be promising in terms of new clients and other 
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players, even on an international level (Sambura/ Weslowska-Tannenberg, 02.06.2003). m 
For SMEs, the opening-up of the 'regional world' is perceived as difficult, because "it is 
not easy to be known, active and to get supported, if you are not in Warsaw" (ibid.), a 
problem which reflects the "re-centralisation" efforts of the Polish state, the "time-
consuming process of getting in touch with decision makers" and the concentration of 
leading companies in the capital. 
Being Innovative 
The main challenge for SMEs in emerging markets is the provision of innovative and 
affordable products for potential clients. The lack of public and private capital forces 
SMEs to look for unconventional technical and organisational solutions which are reliable 
and competitive. A company such as lspik could never survive in this environment without 
developing their own technical solutions as opposed to acquiring western standard 
technology, because this technology is too expensive for the post-socialist market. In doing 
so, innovative SMEs rely on well qualified workers: in the case of I.\pik all of them are 
graduates of the Gliwice Technical University. It is worth to noting that the co-operation-
in particular the absorption of graduates - between firms such as Ispik and the local 
university is much more intense than between GM Opel and the university. The costly 
western technology creates an incentive for eastern companies to be innovative. Firms such 
as lspik draw heavily from the latest developments in 'open source' technology, which is 
freely available on the internet. With this strategy, the firm acquires a 'semi-finished' basic 
technology (e.g. in form of a programme) which was created by another, probably similar 
company and provided to any other interested player. The idea is that Ispik develops 
further this technology, modifies it along its needs and combines it with specific own 
133 Mr Sambura is participating in an expert group called INSPIRE (Infrastructure for Spatial Information in 
Europe), a recent initiative launched by the European Commission and developed in collaboration with 
member states and accession countries. It aims at "making available relevant, harmonised and quality 
geographic information to support formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Community 
policies with a territorial dimension or impact" (http://www.ec-gis.org/inspire/ - last accessed in September 
2004). 
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solutions. The product and provisional results will be again provided for free on the web. 
In doing so, Ispik can be seen as an internationally well-connected firm which draws from 
the latest developments in information technology - and at the same time creating state-of-
the-art products which can compete not only on the domestic market but also beyond. 
"At the moment we are basically developing our own technology, which has already proven as efficient and 
cheap in many projects - and that's the best. This is not our own provincial parochialism loo .].Ifeel that our 
solutions in the spatial information systems area are already on a top level within the EU. We are hUilding 
solutions which are absolutely standard and can be easily adopted to any condition of a European country. 
loo,], I must say there is nothing we have to be ashamed of We can compete on the open European market. I 
am lookingforward to it" (INT: Sambural Weslowska-Tannenberg, 02.06.20(3). 
Certainly, these innovative product developments happen on a small-scale and on niche 
markets, but nevertheless it strengthens the argument of supporting SMEs in order to create 
regional (product) innovations. It turns out that a certain number of Silesian firms is ready 
for international competition and far away from being 'closed' or even 'claustrophobic', as 
stated by a director of the regional chamber of commerce. The question remains, however, 
how firms with a different level of innovative activity can be integrated into projects such 
as the regional innovation strategy (RIS), without overcharging the less innovative and 
undercharging the progressive ones. Apparently, projects such as RIS-Silesia are more 
designed for the newly established administrative actors, who have to become familiar 
with economic players of the region and to create first the cautious relations between the 
region and the local. First outcomes might be disappointing for rather innovative and 
already well-connected firms, but at least such a project creates a feeling of regional 
identity amongst participants and helps to find common understandings of constructed 
realities, a way to level different untraded interdependencies between different regional 
actors. 
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5.3 Private and State-Owned Firms and the Post-Socialist 
Market 
In a survival economy, business relations are not easy to create or to maintain. The lack of 
sufficient formal institutions in a 'survival economy' leads - as other examples of this 
chapter revealed - to 'non-standard' ways of doing business in post-socialist territories. 
where informal routines are becoming more important than the standard way of doing 
business. The most successful routines of the 'survival economy' are trusted co-operation 
between partners at a local and regional level and the search for external resources and 
markets, a two-tier strategy which seems to be contradictory, but is apparently a promising 
way how to survive in transformation markets. Where formal contacts and relations are 
badly regulated, the recourse to well-functioning old networks helps to balance the lack of 
stable formal institutions in the present and to structure business relations in order to 
survive in unstable emerging markets. Indeed, it can be said that Storper's 'reflexive 
human actor', who interprets and constructs 'unreal' images of reality on which individual 
or collective action may be based, leads to 'real' effects in the economy (Storper 1997:29-
31). In the case of unstable post-socialist markets the effects are the persistence of well-
established networks of actors who share untraded interdependencies from the (socialist) 
past. These legacies make sense for the time being when other relations are perceived as 
risky or unprofitable, but they fail when at the same time the actor does not widen his/her 
"worlds of purposive reflexive action" (ibid:245), and thus opens up the self-constructed 
image of how to do business in a survival economy. 
This chapter has shown that a number of old routines still survive in the new era of the 
capitalist market. The objective was to show that these routines - or untraded 
interdependencies - are not an obstacle for the creation of a 'functioning' market 
capitalism, but crucial to survive in it, particularly in a time of unstable formal institutions, 
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uncompleted reforms, and a difficult market situation, which has been described as a 
survival economy. The capacity to survive in this transformation market can be directly 
linked to the capacity of the player to combine and reconfigure old routines with new 
strategies, an innovative behaviour of brico/age. 
In the case analysed of the steel industry, a way has been found which allowed Hula 
Katowice to restructure, to modernise its production facilities and at the same time to 
extend the market for their products. The search for export markets in the West can be seen 
as a learning process for this steel mill, an experience important for familiarisation with 
international standards of quality and a preparation for global competitiveness. At the same 
time the steel mill has survived on the unprofitable Polish market with 'socialist-style' 
barter deals, a substantial part of its business. Here, the regional knowledge and contacts of 
the former time are crucial to minimise transaction costs, typically much higher in these 
kind of non-monetary deals. In the end, the international boom of the steel industry, 
triggered by China's industrialisation efforts, helped to privatise the firm at the last minute, 
just before Poland's accession to the EU. Interestingly, the new owner, an Indian 
businessman, made a fortune restructuring steel companies in former socialist countries, a 
strategy that could be seen as 'counter-globalisation'. Against international advice - to 
privatise this sector much earlier (and thus to lower its privatisation revenues) - Poland's 
strategy of a 'late privatisation' (with the help of public subsidies for the restructuring 
process) turned out to be successful. 
In contrast, the Silesian coal industry is still declining. The former socialist 'show industry' 
could not innovatively combine old and new routines of doing business in a transformation 
market. Certainly, the depth of the mines and the poor quality of the coal are the main 
reasons for the unprofitability of Kompania W~glowa, the biggest coal company in Europe, 
which includes the most intractable of Polish coalmines. Here, the routines between ailing 
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trade unions and management lead to lock-ins and conflicts which have not been solved, 
despite several efforts since the early 1990s. Moreover, the influence of political actors is 
still dominant in this sector and hinders the still necessary downsizing of output and 
workforce. The only way forward is to 'buy-out' work places, financed also by 
international organisations such as the World Bank. Unfortunately, the lump sum 
settlements have not been used for investments into new businesses, but have been spent 
on consumption, an aspect which has raised profits in particular for multinational 
corporations which invested in Poland. 
Multinational corporations such as GM Opel benefit in post-socialist settings not only from 
substantially cheaper labour costs (about 15 per cent of a western wage), but also from 
their insertion into already existing - and in this case functioning - local economic and 
political networks. In order to strengthen the local political elite, they gain access to these 
kinds of circles and profit from tailored services relating to the creation of near-to-perfect 
production environments in tax-free green field zones. Additionally, TNCs tend to select 
positively perceived legacies and routines for their own business and work practices. In 
contrast to the local sphere, the region is perceived more as a potential market for products, 
rather than as a political sphere. The GM Opel management tends to connect either to 
national or local decision makers. The region is perceived as an unnecessary level of co-
operation. 
In contrast to multinational corporations and state-owned old industries, SMEs have 
neither access to sufficient capital nor access to political supporters, who could facilitate 
their business. Despite the establishment of SME-addressed projects in Silesia - controlled 
and mainly owned by the regional administration and co-funded by the EU - many typical 
problems of SMEs remain unsolved, particularly in tenns of fonnal institutions such as the 
regulation of public-private partnerships or a functioning banking system. This lack of 
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functioning formal institutions causes non-standard ways of doing business, both legal and 
illegal. Similarly, old local and regional contacts and networks are refreshed and facilitate 
co-operation between well-known partners in a difficult and hostile market environment. 
New networks are created and open up the regional world, virtually and materially. The 
incentive of 'being innovative' is a response to costly western technology and the 
knowledge of stiff competition outside familiar markets. IT-SMEs profit from local labour 
markets and well-qualified workforces and contribute substantially to the restructuring of 
old industrial areas. 
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6 Doing Politics in a New Capitalist Territory 
his chapter focuses on local and regional administrations and their players. As 
T OUtlined in chapter 4.2, the newly established and elected level of regional administration, the self-government, so far only has limited power in key policy 
areas, such as the privatisation efforts of major industrial sectors or financial agencies. 
Moreover, the two-tier system of the regionally elected Marshal and centrally appointed 
Voivod (governor) undermines the possibility of a coherent regional economic policy. 
Nevertheless, the regional self-government (the elected Marshal and his administration> 
tries to control the region's efforts to attract foreign investment with the help of tax 
exemption zones or to support emerging SMEs with a number of projects, already outlined 
in chapter five. This chapter summarises in a more detailed way the lines of conflict that 
occur in a newly created region, the Voivodship of Silesia. 
First, the problematic administrative structure - the two-tier system - will be discussed and 
evidence given for the 'struggle for control' within the regional administration and its 
institutions. Second, the territorial reform of the Voivodship in 1998/99 leads to questions 
of intra-regional conflicts between the main agglomeration around Katowice (which until 
the reform constituted its own Voivodship) and the new northern (Cz~stochowa) and 
southern parts (Bielsko-Biala) of the new Voivodship, which have a different economic, 
historic and cultural pasts to the core. Third, examples of local development efforts are 
presented to provide an overview of the relationships between the different cities and their 
perception of the newly constructed institutions of regional self-government. 
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6.1 The Region as a Nexus for Transformation 
The first part of this chapter introduces the complex historical context of (Upper) Silesia -
exploring the path-dependent legacies not only of its socialist past, but also of the interwar 
period and its struggle for autonomy since the 19th century. The purpose of this overview is 
not to focus on past political events in order to determine the present and future of this 
region, but rather to look at the potential for strong self-governance and economic 
transformation. It is suggested that the regional struggle for control over the pace and 
direction of post-socialist transformation reflects the (actively) memorised strong regional 
identity as well as past experiences of cultural and political conflict. The reinvention of a 
regional identity understood and explored as a socially constructed political idea which has 
developed as a tool for becoming or contructing a capitalist territory. It is argued that the 
recombined untraded interdependencies of different actors and their political networks play 
a crucial role in understanding the political-economic process of a region being made ready 
for adaptation to the capitalist mode of production. 
6.1.1 Historical Legacies 
The political and economic struggle between centre and periphery has a long tradition in 
Upper Silesia. In the following, a short overview of this historical legacy is used to 
contextualise this struggle for today's economic and political transformation, as well as to 
increase the understanding of the meaning of self-governance in the region. In terms of 
changing political borders over time, Silesia and in particular Upper Silesia can be seen as 
one of the most complicated regions in Europe, where - between 1795 and 1918 - three 
empires met at one point, near the city of Myslowice (East of Katowice). Indeed, today's 
Voivodship has areas which once belonged either to the Russian Empire (the Northern 
parts around the city of Cz«stochowa and the D~browa Basin, East of Katowice), to the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire (in the South around Bielsko-Biala) or to the German Empire 
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(the mam agglomeration in the centre of today's Voivodship between Gliwice and 
Katowice). This historical fact leads raises questions about the ways in which the past -
and here the pre-communist past - which positions Upper Silesia as a (former) borderland 
informs the area's contemporary economic and political development (Rykiel 1993; 
Blasiak 1993). 
Many commentators suggest that the different historical legacies can still be recognised in 
some aspects of social and political life, such as voting behaviour, religiosity, or the 
attitude towards self-government. In the former Russian parts, it is suggested that the lack 
of self-governance during the tsarist centrally imposed administration (in which no Poles 
could participate) has left a continuing legacy of a lower level of engagement in the 
concerns of city development and self-administration. The former Austrian parts are by 
contrast perceived as dynamic and lively regional sub-centres, endowed with an engaged 
class of politicians and other actors who have an interest in good governance and economic 
development as a consequence of the relative high level of political participation by Poles 
in the 19th century. In the former German parts of the Voivodship - the core 
agglomeration of Upper Silesia - political and administrative participation was only 
possible if Poles spoke fluent German and were willing to adapt to 'cultural norms'. 
Nevertheless, the legacy of the 'well-organised German-Prussian administration' (which 
was in fact inherited from Napoleonic France) is today perceived as a regional asset, but 
nowadays rather associated with 'Silesian' peculiarity, than with the German heritage. 
The Prussian province of Silesia, with its capital BreslaulWroclaw, developed quickly as 
an industrial powerhouse during the second half of the 19th century, with Upper Silesia as 
the heavy industrial core of the Kingdom. After the establishment of the German Empire in 
1871, the Rhine province - and here in particular the Ruhr area - became more important 
in terms of size of population and production output. At the end of the 19th century the 
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wages of a miner in hard coal production were in average about 36 per cent lower than in 
the Ruhr, a fact, which accelerated migration from Silesia to this West Prussian province 
(Fuchs 1994:561) and led to a lack of labour force in the region, which was balanced 
through labour migration from the Russian parts. The main reason for the relative decline 
in the importance of Upper Silesia can be seen in its relative geographical distance from its 
(potential) markets: The Russian and the Austrian Empires imposed high custom duties on 
Prussian products throughout the 19th century and thus forced Silesian producers to sell 
their goods in other parts of Prussia, in other western European countries, as well as in 
other German countries. This was facilitated through the creation of a common market by 
the Deutscher Zollverein [German Customs Union] (1834-1871). By contrast, the Rhine-
Ruhr area's favourable geographical location as well as easier access to markets -
improved through the establishment of the German Reich - underpinned its economic 
boom. 
In the interwar period, the Polish part of Upper Silesia enjoyed a degree of autonomy, 
which was unrivalled in Europe. This was in part a result of the struggles for independence 
from the German Empire, which led to three risings in Upper Silesia after the First World 
War, but also of the emergence ofa 'Polish-Silesian identity', which developed in the early 
20th century, fuelled as a reaction to increasing efforts at 'Germanisation'. In 1918, when 
Poland gained national independence after more than 120 years of partition between the 
three empires, the struggle for independence continued in Upper Silesia. At first the 
League of Nations administered the region and organised a disputed plebiscite for the 
region's final national affiliation. In 1921, about 30 per cent of Upper Silesia 
(incorporating 46 per cent of its population) went to Poland, while three industrial cities of 
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the agglomeration - GleiwitzlGliwice, Hindenburg/Zabrze, and BeutenlBytom (besides the 
rural western parts of Upper Silesia) - remained part of the German territory.1J4 
After the League of Nations decided to divide Upper Silesia, the Polish Silesians achieved 
the highest possible level of autonomy within Poland, with some influential groups even 
discussing the possibility of full national (Silesian) sovereignty (Tooley 1997). In the short 
interwar period, the region managed to widen its financial autonomy with its own treasury 
and political autonomy with - in comparison to the rest of Poland - a completely ditlerent 
set of laws regulating mining, labour relations and land ownership as well as the complete 
control of the regional governor, the Voivod, over regional administration and schooling. 
This development prevented full legal and political integration of Upper Silesia into the 
rest of the country and has caused some historians to speak of a "de facto union of two 
nations" and of "civizational divides that lay between the region and the rest of the new 
Polish state" (Bialasiewicz 2002: 114). 
While Upper Silesia was in former time part of a geographically remote Prussian province, 
after 1918 it became a mentally remote part of Poland, which was even reflected in its 
unique, so-called 'organic' status. During the first years after the plebiscite, some 
influential political actors of the region - most of them Catholic conservatives, the so-
called Silesian chadecja - stressed the region's idiosyncrasy with its rather well-organised 
educated elites, the functioning rule of laws and its 'egalitarian' society. In this way Upper 
Silesia was portrayed as model of development for the rest of the state due to its high level 
of industrialisation and urbanisation - while, after Marshal Pilsudski's putsch in Warsaw 
1926, other groups - the sanacja - gained (not only) regional influence and insisted on the 
134 In the plebiscite area, almost 60 per cent of the Upper Silesian popUlation voted for Germany and the rest 
for inclusion within the new Polish state. About 79 per cent of the coal mines and 75 per cent of the steel 
mills were located in the new Polish territory (Fuchs 1994:635). 
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full integration into the new Poland and the rejection of Upper Silesia as a multi-cultural 
'borderland' (Davies 2001:108-110; Bialasiewicz 2002:116). 
The ongoing 'Polonisation' of Upper Silesia in the years up to the Second World War 
weakened the common feeling of a special regional belonging, which previously had 
united Silesians, regardless of their national (Polish, Gennan, or Silesian) identification. 
Nevertheless, the Gennan occupiers, who conducted a census in 1941, estimated that over 
60 per cent of the population had a 'labile' national affiliation, what showed that mixed 
identities still survived (Bialasiewicz 2002: 117). After the Second World War, when the 
last remaining German parts of Upper Silesia and Lower Silesia became Polish territory 
under the Potsdam Treaty (with the new borderline of the rivers OdraJOder and 
Nysa/Neisse), Gennans were expelled or left voluntarily with the help of family-
reunification programmes in the following decades. It is estimated that more than one 
million Gennans left for the Federal Republic between 1955 and 1989 (ibid.). 
Additionally, millions of Gennans were expatriated from Silesia and other former German 
territories in the immediate post-war time. In the communist time, these 'gaps' were filled 
with Poles from the eastern territories which were lost to Ukraine after the western shift of 
the Soviet Union. 
The multi-ethnicity of the region came to an end and, instead, Upper Silesia became GOP, 
the G6rno-Slqski Okr~g Przemyslowy, or the Upper Silesian Industrial District. The main 
identity pattern was not cultural-historically inscribed anymore, but marked exclusively in 
an economic way, as the model region of socialism with a 'human face'. Nevertheless, the 
region was still perceived as different from the rest of the nation - and again in a negative 
way, because of the many privileges workers enjoyed not only in better housing and 
vacation homes, but access to scarce goods through the network of special shops for 
miners. The Katowice journalist Krzysztof Karwat notes that "The image of the region in 
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the rest of the country was that of servile conformists, opportunists, the guiding force of 
the nation - we were nothing but workers [ ... ] loyal to the authorities and just thinking of 
filling our always empty stomachs" (quoted in Bialasiewicz 2002: 118). 
The region's demand for autonomy and independence is still apparent in the enormous size 
of the building of the Sejmik (the Silesian parliament built in Katowice in the I 920s), with 
the main protagonist of the Upper Silesian uprisings - Wojciech Kort~mty (1873- t 939)"5 -
standing as a monument in front of the building. 
The idea of a broader autonomy for the region and even separatism remains powerful, even 
though these movements are not taken seriously any more or have no political power 
respectively. The last Polish census in 2001 reveals that 173,000 Poles characterise 
themselves as 'Silesians' rather than of Polish nationality. JJo This surprising outcome 
caused the 5000-member Movement for an Autonomous Silesia to call for the official 
recognition of the 'Silesian nationality' with the help of the European High Court in 
Strasbourg, because "the central government in Warsaw does not understand Upper Silesia 
[ ... ] and the bonds of its people with the territory" (lNT: Gorzelik, 21.07.2003). The 
critical attitude towards the capital Warsaw and centrally enforced regulations is not only a 
matter of sectarian political movements, but can be found throughout all political parties 
with their continued demand for increased authority for the regional self-government. 
135 Wojciech Korfanty was Christian Democrat, an ex-Prussian deputy as well as member of the German 
Reichstag in Berlin. It is believed that Korfanty was murdered by the Polish intelligence service while on a 
trip to Warsaw shortly before the start of the Second World War. Interestingly, Korfanty's main antagonist 
after 1921, Marshal Pilsudski, Poland's head of state between 1918/19, who launched a putsch in Warsaw in 
1926, stands as a monument on the other side of the regional parliament. The juxtaposition of both historical 
figures can be seen as an expression of the continuing 'double identity' of being Poles and Silesians at the 
same time. 
136 Somewhat surprisingly, research about ethnic identities in Poland conducted during the first 
transformation period and the first census after 1989 revealed that by far the largest minority group were 
'Germans' - more than 75 per cent of all ethnic minorities - a fact which was officially suppressed during the 
communist regime (L~ckilW6dz 1997:276). Most of the Polish 'Germans' live in the rural parts of Upper 
Silesia ('West Upper Silesia' or 'Opole Silesia'), which is characterised by an extensive network of small 
towns and villages, where the population structure remained widely untouched by the assimilation and 
migration dynamics which influenced the social and cultural fabric of the industrial core over decades 
(KOhnemann 1993:260). The latest census in 200 I 'displaced'the former strongest minority - the 'Germans' _ 
to second position, as only ca. 153,000 Poles declared themselves as Germans. 
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6.1.2 The Re-Emergence of a Regional Identity 
After more than forty years of centrally organised administration in the socialist period, a 
revival of 'regional thinking', the demand for decentralisation and a proper division of 
competences between various levels of territorial governance and their relation to the 
centre not only took place in Silesia, but also in many other regions of Poland and CEE, 
which are believed to have a 'strong regional identity'. m The reform movement -
supported both by civic groups and state representatives - reflects the call for participatory 
democracy and the revival of historical-cultural regional and local peculiarities within a 
country which was characterised as 'homogenous' during the communist rule 
(Bialasiewicz 2002). Moreover, the new regionalism in CEE must be seen in the light of 
EU efforts - the Europe of Regions - and the accession process. The larger size of the new 
Polish voivodships after 1999 was heavily influenced by the need for larger territorial 
units, capable of absorbing and distributing EU funds (see chapter 4.2). 
The first elected Marshal of the Voivodship of Silesia, Jan Olbrycht, who was in office 
between 1998 and 2002, describes the initial role of the regional administration in the 
restructuring process of heavy industry as "observers" who were treated like "outsiders" 
and "out of discussions" by actors of the central government and managers of steel and 
coal companies (all quotes: INT: Olbrycht, 18.07.2003). The original influence of the 
region as an active participant in the restructuring process was limited to the imposition of 
fees for environmental damages caused by heavy industry - penalty fees which were never 
paid, in particular by the coal mines. Besides the regional administration's task of 
providing basic public services such as transport infrastructure, the health system, 
137 In Poland, besides (Upper) Silesia. in particular the Voivodship of Wielkopolska (Poznan) and Pomorska 
(Gdansk) have strong regionalist movements (Cymbrowski 2004:53). 
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schooling, and environmental issues the main function is and was seen to be the co-
ordination of regional development measures. 
At the beginning of Olbrycht's period of office, the instruments to undertake this task had 
first to be created, but the 'development function' is still better described as "programming 
than governing" and inscribed in the "Development Strategy 2000-2015", a document 
which is the outcome of discussions between several social partners, NOOs, experts, and 
trade unions but does not include the role of coal mines for example, because "we do not 
have influence on this industry". Instead, this document includes only topics which are or 
can be controlled by the region, such as the support of SMEs (chapter 5.2.2) and the 
attraction of new technologies. Not surprisingly, limited control of the region's economic 
trajectory leads to a limited material and non-relational definition of 'development', where 
transport infrastructure is perceived as the "base of development" and "highways are 
important for investors" (INT: Olbrycht, 18.07.2003). At the beginning of Olbrycht's time 
in office, interested investors directly contacted the regional administration - as in the case 
of Hula Baildon in Katowice, which was liquidated in 2002 - "despite new technology". 
because "we were not the partners". Today, possible investors are more likely to contact 
the Upper Silesian mayors than the Marshal, because "we do not have enough 
instruments", a fact which makes "mayors very strong" in the political arena of the region. 
notwithstanding their political background. 
The main selling point for 'development' is the region's historical past as a cultural diverse 
territory, which "was always more open than other Polish regions" (INT: Jarosz, 
15/16.07.2003) and so presented as fitting in well the new EU of25 members. The former 
Marshal Olbrycht specifically identifies the voivoidship's 'cultural variety' as an "asset for 
regional development", which could be positive in the long-term (see also INT: Jarosz, 
15/16.07.2003 ). 
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The accentuation of different • sub-regional identities' is reflected in the "Development 
Strategy 2000-2015" in terms of the creation of four sub-regions which are responsible for 
the formulation of an own interpretation of their development needs.1]8 Especially the 
northern and southern parts of the new voivodship, which persistently opposed their 
(centrally imposed) integration into a new entity before the reform took place in 1999, lost 
many authorities in favour of the new voivodship capital of Katowice. The establishment 
of sub-regions can be seen as a channel for the (local) maintenance of political power - or 
an off-set deal for lost influence. The new voivodship and its invented 'sub-regional 
traditions" 'identities' and 'varieties' is in practice a meaningless shell, mainly created in 
order to become a 'proper' capitalist territory, which has to attract international investors 
or to absorb EU funds. The formulation of 'cultural diversity' as a regional asset seems to 
be rather pragmatic in terms of public relations and a symbolical counterbalance to the still 
mono-structural regional economy. This is not to say that intra-regional differences in 
identities do not exist, but rather that these socially constructed differences have a more 
important function in the political mobilisation of the electorate and the regional actors' 
widening of political and economic power on several geographical scales with ditTerent 
modes. The division of 'identities' between Poles and Silesians, one of the main topics in 
the interwar time, no longer exist. However it is possible, as reflected in the plebiscite of 
Poland's EU-accession, that Poland's and thus Silesia's access to the European Union 
could recreate identity divisions, caused by different regional 'degrees of openness' 
towards western Europe (McManus-Czubiilska, Miller et al. 2003: (38). 139 
138 Initially. six sub-regions were proposed around the main cities of the voivodship: Gliwice. Katowice. 
Dotbrowa Gornicza (Zagl~bie Dotbrowskie), Cz~stochowa, Rybnik. and Bielsko-Biala. After long 
negotiations, the industrial core (the central agglomeration between Gliwice and Dotbrowa Gornicza) was 
established as one sub-region ("the central area of development policy") instead of three different ones, 
because "we did not want to maintain the traditional division, but to concentrate on economic change" (INT: 
Olbrycht, 18.07.2003). In addition to the central area, a northern sub-region (Cz~stochowa). a southern area 
(Bielsko-Biala), and western area (Rybnik) of development policy were also established (Slotskie Voivodship 
2000: 92). 
139 The Voivodship of Silesia had the second highest turnout of all Polish voivodships (59.9 per cent) with 
84.5 of the electorate voting for Poland's accession to the EU. and the second highest 'yes' result in Poland 
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6.1.3 The Struggle for Regional Power 
While the former Marshal Olbrycht points to the lack of 'instruments' and exclusion from 
discussion circles in the early days of the establishment of regional self-government, the 
SLD-administration (centre-left; 'post-communists', elected in 2002) summarises the 
influence of the region in the shaping of policies quite clearly in noting that "the power 
follows the money" (lNT: Jarosz, 15/16.07.2003). No doubt. the newly established 
Marshal's Office could widen its political influence to the disadvantage of the centrally 
appointed Voivod, but it is usually regarded as under-financed. Until now, 80 per cent of 
the region's budget derives from Warsaw as a 'donation' which has to be applied for on an 
annual basis for 'target-oriented' projects (ibid.). In the end. the regional self-government 
of Silesia - a region with nearly 5 Mio inhabitants - has a budget which is only as high as 
e.g. the budget of Katowice which can be seen as "a serious barrier to the region's 
economic independence" (Cymbrowski 2004:59).140 New legislation is being introduced 
nationally which will change this financial relationship - identifying a different proportion 
of taxes for the voivodships and communes (gminas) respectively. Under the new 
legislation, the voivodship's budget would consist of 40 per cent allowances from Warsaw 
with 60 per cent being generated directly by the region with a new distribution formula of 
property and 'personal' taxes (INT: Jarosz, 15/16.07.2003). 
The SLD Marshal's Office is planning to extend its political and economic influence in 
areas which where until recently 'closed' to their involvement. The new programme for the 
restructuring of the mining industry provides that both - the voivodship and the communes 
(gminas) - have a stronger influence on the implementation of the programme. The 
(highest consent: adjacent Voivodship ofOppole, 84.9 per cent; lowest consent: Voiovodship of Lublin, 63.3 
per cent) (wprost, 22 June 2003: 24-26). 
140 It turns out that the financial situation of the communes (gminas) is even worse, despite - or because - of 
the 40 per cent of income that they are expected to generated for themselves. "Practically. the voivodships 
have to financially support the gminas" (lNT: Jarosz, 15/16.07.2003). 
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proposed PLN 2 billion (about GBP 330 million) programme, partly financed by the World 
Bank, includes regional and local control of about PLN 200 million (120 million for the 
affected gminas) which will be spend on re-qualification measures, the "creation of new 
workplaces" as well as for loans (PLN 80 million) to SMEs (INT: Jarosz, 15/16.07.2003). 
The rest of the budget will be used for the (physical) renewal of the coal mines, a process 
which takes usually up to three years. The Vice Marshal, who supervises the regional 
economic policy of Silesia, stresses that the region is determined to "avoid the mistakes, 
which have been done in the past" in offering redundant workers of the heavy industry 
high settlements which were mainly used for consumption, but not for investment into new 
businesses. While it remains unclear how the regional self-administration succeeded in 
widening its influence in the restructuring of the ailing and centrally controlled coal 
industry, it can be assumed that the shared party affiliation of the parties in government at 
regional and central level played a crucial role. However, the regional self-administration 
has not only strengthened its political standing and bargaining power with respect to the 
central level, but the mining communities affected have also been given a greater role. In 
particular the incorporation of the gminas into the region's restructuring process transfers 
authority to affected local administrations and will contribute to the learning process of the 
these cities, instead of leaving them as passive and 'helpless' observers of their own 
decline. The future will show whether this programme will be actually realised or whether 
it will be just another' good idea' on the list of numerous efforts over the last 15 years. 
The regional struggle for power - between the central administration in Warsaw and the 
newly established regional self-government - also finds an expression in the two-tier 
system of parallel administrations of the Voivod and the Marshal, sharing the same 
building - the Sejmik (owned by the Voivod) - in central Katowice. 141 Both heads belong to 
141 The exclusive characterisation of the Voivod as a 'central organ', appointed and controlled by Warsaw and 
installed in the region is rather difficult, because of much more complex de jure relations and de faCIO 
practices, in the socialist past and in the post-socialist present. For example. in particular during the 
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the same party (SLD), a fact which "helps in terms of co-operation" and private 
interaction, but "in the end it's a matter of lost power for the Voivod, who has a boss" 
(INT: Jarosz, 15/16.07.2003). While the Voivod (and the central government behind him) 
is, as indicated earlier, powerful in terms of financial provision and its distribution, the 
main function of this administration is the complete supervision of the self-government and 
its decisions, in particular regarding national laws and their implementation in the 
voivodship, the districts (powiats) and communes (gminas). The director of the Voiovod's 
Office for EU Integration, Elzbieta Soltysek, describes the interrelation between the two 
administrations quite pragmatically: "they [the Marshal's Office] are the hosts, select and 
propose the projects and we [the Voivod's Office] are controlling them and give the 
money. In the end, we all play the same game" (lNT: Sohysek, 02.07.2003). 
If the Marshal is 'programming' (Olbrycht) and the Voivod is 'supervising', who is 
governing the region, who has the power to shape the region's future? It is suggested here, 
that both administrations are (still) in a dynamic period of transformation. So, the de jure 
power of the centrally appointed Voivod is decreasing, but it is gaining a stabilised defacto 
power with the help of supervision functions and financial provision. At the same time. the 
elected Marshal with his office is trying to extend his political-economic control. but his 
efforts are enormously limited by the political goodwill and financial feasibility of the 
central administration. Both offices are in a learning process regarding new responsibilities 
and authorities since 1999, but it must be doubted whether the parallel world of two 
administrations can be an effective solution for the active shape of the region's (economic) 
development. 
'transition periods' in the interwar time and after 1989, the central government showed a "respect for regional 
opposition", with the appointment of 'Silesian' Voivods instead of 'outsiders' (Majcherkiewicz 2000: 145). 
Thus, the following sections have rather an analytical purpose, trying to understand general political and 
economic interrelations between local, regional, and (inter-) national levels. 
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Like the practices and routines of regional economic actors, the organisation of regional 
administration in total is characterised by old and new elements, in this case a bricolage of 
administrative competencies and levels, which results in recombinant routines of a new 
character. The outcomes of these recombinant routines have different causes and - both 
positive and negative - effects in the world of economic actors, as suggested in chapter 
five. The recombination of the regional political world is best understood as a political 
compromise between the advocates of a strong centre and the regionalist movements who 
support the de-centralisation of the state and point to Upper Silesia's legacy as a far-
reaching autonomous region in the early 1920s. In this case, 'old' is not (only) a code for 
the region's communist past and the legacy of centrality, but the pre-communist past, a 
history which is newly discovered, modified and defined by current actors and their 
political and economic interests - and used as a starting point to control and organise the 
region's transformation. 
6.1.4 The Divided Regional Power 
In the following, an example is given of the Voivod's influence in shaping the region's 
economic transformation - without any co-operation with the Marshal's Office -, a mode 
of power which reaches behind abovementioned authorities of supervision and financing. 
Surprisingly, this regional shaping power has largely been neglected by recent research, 
which has rather been concentrated on the newly established self-governments and their 
programmes since 1999. The Voivod as the representative of the Council of Ministers and 
thus also the State Treasury, is involved in regional privatisation measures "until this 
function is commissioned to the Treasury Minister" (Cymbrowski 2004:57). Indeed, the 
minister is directly involved in the privatisation of the steel industry (in the case of the coal 
industry it is also the Minister of Economy). In the case of smaller and middle-sized state-
own assets (depending on turnover and number of employees), it is the Voivod and his 
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administration who organise the privatisation process in the region, together with the so-
called 'un-unified' administration, a Ministry of the State Treasury organ in form of a 
(Voivod-independent) permanent delegation, based in this case in Katowice. Additionally, 
the Voivod works together with the Upper Silesian Agency for the Restructuring of State 
Companies (GAPP), a state agency specialised in providing consultancy support.142 The 
'process of privatisation' is started by the Voivod, who decides which state-owned 
enterprises will be privatised. This happens with the preparation of a feasibility document, 
on which basis the Katowice-based Ministry of the State Treasury Delegation decides 
which form of privatisation is suitable (INT: Miazek/Zar6d, 22.07.2003). 
The process of privatisation of state-enterprises is either conducted through direct or 
indirect privatisations. Indirect privatisation (or so-called commercialisation in the form of 
shares belonging 100 per cent to the state) is the initial common form for larger state 
enterprises (see chapter 5.1.1 for the case of HUla Kalowice; see also Ministry of the 
Treasury 2000). The most common form of direct privatisations in the voivodship has been 
the 'leasing model', where an interested investor first leases a whole company with its 
employees and machinery for a period of up to ten years, before the state-owned asset will 
be completely privatised, a model which is popular because of less capital demand for the 
new owner. While the biggest chunk of state-assets was 'regionally privatised' between 
1990 and 1997, the process has been substantially slowed down since the year 2000, with 
no privatisation in 2002 and only two in 2003 (INT: Miazek/Zar6d, 22.07.2003; Kowarska, 
11.07.2003), in total about 20 "successful privatisations since 1999" (lNT: Boron, 
04.07.2003).143 The remaining 'untransformed' assets (neither privatised nor 
142 At the time of the fieldwork, only one person in GAPP. Stanislaw Lesniowski. had responsibility for the 
task of consultancy in state-owned enterprises while new - EU-funded - fields for the agency have been 
found. such as the Centre for Innovation and Technology Transfer. a department of GAPP. This 
organisational development suggests that either the demand for this consultancy is not accepted anymore or 
that the organisation has been searching for more 'profitable' tasks. 
143 Since 1990, 435 state-owned enterprises of the Voivodship of Silesia have been 'transformed', which 
represents 66.9 per cent of the regionally based state-owned companies (July 2003). 108 of these assets were 
directly privatised: 25 were sold, 74 leased and 9 transformed into companies owned first by the State 
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commercialised) are mainly communal based assets of the energy or water sector (15), 
local and regional transport providers, but also small and middle-sized industrial 
companies, in total about 65 enterprises. 144 
The reason for the privatisation slowdown is the "lack of profitability of the remaining 
assets", for which no investor can be found, or the low bids offered by interested investors 
and the worsening of the overall economic development since the beginning of the decade 
(INT: Boron, 04.07.2003). Privatisation is "only possible if those enterprises have own 
property assets and are in a good economic shape", but a number of enterprises which meet 
these preconditions are still not privatised, because "the Voivod has not made a decision 
yet and probably does not want to privatise them, because there is no need for action" 
(INT: Boron, 04.07.2003). Additionally, problems with the restitution of real estate are 
mentioned, but "in any case, it is not a political question, but a question of formal 
problems" (INT: Kowarska, 11.07.2003). The expert for the privatisation of state 
enterprises in GAPP also notes the "strategic value" of some of these assets, such as parts 
of the energy of armament sectors, as a reason for the privatisation slowdown (INT: 
Lesniowski, 15.07.2003). 
Nevertheless, the last government programme, conducted with the help of the EU, 
schedules the complete privatisation (or liquidation) of smaller assets by 2006, a 
programme over which the Voivods have not been consulted. Here, two remaining 
privatisation strategies will be implemented. First, the 'commercialisation' model, which is 
mainly an alteration of the type of company, from state to private, but where the shares are 
Treasury and an investor, with a 15 per cent share donated to the work force after two years, and the rest of 
the State Treasury-shares will be sold to the investor within the next years. The remaining 327 'transformed' 
companies (either liquidation or indirect privatisation, 'commercialisation') were either liquidated (168), 
transferred into companies fully owned by the communes (48), the State Treasury (88) or transferred to 
agricultural agencies of the State Treasury (23) (INT: Kowarska, 11.07.2003). 
144 Examples are given for heavy machinery production, including machinery for the coal mining industry, 
wire production, and a match factory (INT: Boron, 04.07.2003), or concrete production, agricultural 
machinery trade and trade in metallurgical products (INT: Kowarska, 11.07.2003). 
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still completely owned by the state. This model has the advantage of greater • flexibility', in 
particular towards labour representatives, who do not have a right of co-determination 
under the new type of company and the possibility of selling (all) the shares to a private 
investor in the future. 145 Second, the complete liquidation of especially unprofitable 
enterprises which "do not have a chance on the market" (lNT: Boron, 04.07.2003). While 
the commercialisation process includes a limited right of co-determination for the affected 
labour force, complete liquidation - usually conducted through a state representative - does 
not (INT: Lesniowski, 15.07.2003). The models may also be combined. First, the state-
owned enterprise will be liquidated and then re-established under private company law - as 
in the case of the regional tramway system. The appearance of a state liquidator in a 
company is often used as a tool to reduce the salaries of the workforce and to "break their 
resistance", because "when the representative comes, the workers know that the situation is 
serious" (ibid.). After an enterprise is liquidated, the remaining physical shell - premises 
and land - incurs further costs for the state, if a buyer who would 'revitalise' the land 
cannot be found. In such cases the Voivod and his partners (the ministry delegation and the 
consultant) usually start to negotiate with the municipality to transfer property and derelict 
land to them, in many cases for free, as a compensation for lost and unpaid taxes (ibid.). 
The example of regionally conducted privatisation and the liquidation of small and 
medium-sized state assets underlines the lack of influence exercised by the political 
145 Until now, mixed state/private ownership has been possible. The new government programme requires a 
complete one-off selling of the former state-owned shares to a private investor (INT: Boron, 04.07.2003). 
Indeed, the case of Welux, a mixed ownership (40 per cent state-owned) venture-capital enterprise reveals the 
strange dynamics of 'recombined' ownership where the state participates in the speculation and liquidation of 
ailing state assets, "because the State Treasury is interested in profits" (INT: Ldniowski, 15.07.2003). In the 
case of Welux, the former wool producing state enterprise (originally established in Bielsko-Biala in 1828) 
was partly sold to the son of a former influential regional communist leader in 1996/97, who helped in this 
cheap transaction. The complete machinery and the estate property were immediately sold and 300 
employees (offormer 1000 in 1989) were dismissed. The profits were used to speculate in other ailing state 
assets, such as the clothing industry ("buying -liquidating - selling") and were additionally invested into TV 
cable production and the recycling of auto spare parts. The co-owner differentiates between five types of 
Polish enterprises: I) SMEs in the consumer products sector, 2) companies which export to the West, 3) new 
companies in the IT sector, 4) "Political companies" (the state-owned sector), 5) Western companies. In 
particular the first three 'types of companies' are interesting because they offer the chances of generating 
profits. The co-owner in~icates !hat Welux will m~ve.t.o t~e Netherlands, Hungary, or Slovakia after Poland's 
EU accession, to avoid hIgh Polish taxes (INT: GaJdztnskl, 26.06.2003). 
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legitimised Marshal's Office in a crucial area of the transformation process. In fact. the 
commission which is responsible for this privatisation process is appointed by the Voivod 
and usually includes representatives of the company's management, the State Treasury 
Delegation, GAPP, works council, trade unions - and the mayor of the affected city (lNT: 
Kowarska, 11.07.2003). Where privatisations are successful in terms of the creation of 
newly owned profitable companies, the central state actively supports the economic 
transformation process of the region, but by-passing regional programmes and strategies 
which have been developed under the auspices of the elected administration. 
It is argued here that the lack of involvement of the Marshal's Office in this process and in 
particular its absence from networks responsible for privatisation efforts lead to a 
disconnection from the local problems of economic transformation and highlight the extent 
to which it is not accepted as a partner for local development in the region. While the new 
elements of the post-socialist regional administration are focusing on the creation of 
regional innovation clusters - an enormous task in an old industrial area - with the help of 
the EU, the real shaping power of transformation is still held by the central government in 
Warsaw, not only through the creation of formal institutions, but with the de facto 
authority to transform even small state companies into private ones - or to liquidate, 
depending on national interests and not regional ones. The old element (the centrally 
appointed Voivod) is not sufficiently connected to the new element; the recombination of 
the two elements ensures that they undermine each other in some cases, and are at least 
ineffective in others. 
The formulation of regional interests is supported by the EU, which acts as an external 
intervening actor. Not surprisingly, the rather weak elected regional body has tended to 
increase its influence with the help of EU funds and advisory support from West European 
regions, such as North-Rhine Westphalia (Germany) or Nord-Pas de Calais (France), with 
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which Silesia is twinned. This international strategy can be seen as a means of balancing its 
rather weak position with respect to the central state administration, of opening up the 
former 'isolated' region, and of supporting the learning process of a new capitalist territory 
which connects with former historical experiences of a region leaning to the West. 
6.2 The Post-Socialist City as an Economic Actor 
In this section a more detailed overview of the local leeway for shaping post-socialist 
transformation is presented. While the regional self-government is limited to programming 
the restructuring, the municipalities are the places where possible new investments are 
negotiated and planned. It is argued, that the post-socialist city has gained authority and 
widened its political influence in the new capitalist era. On the other side, the new 
possibilities are limited by an increasing competition between cities and in particular by 
the race to attract scarce foreign investment. Additionally - as in all cities - local economic 
restructuring is highly dependent on formal institutions at the national level and is faced 
with external developments such as the internationalisation of capital and production. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that even the ordinary post-socialist city has a 'window of 
opportunity' to shape local restructuring, although the 'successful' process is not only 
highly dependant on the time-limited cost advantage of low production (labour) costs, but 
also dependant on powerful political-economic networks and the existence of well-
connected actors who are willing to formulate and capable of formulating local visions and 
to lead their cities through a 'transformation learning process'. In this reflexive process of 
risk taking, winners and losers are produced, while the question arises which circumstances 
and routines are either contributing or impede successful starting points of necessary local 
restructuring. 146 
146 The following examples of local restructuring strategies of cities located in the agglomeration of Upper 
Silesia is highly selective. Indeed, most of the cities that are considered can be characterised as 'successful' in 
terms of recent economic change, in particular in comparison to adjacent cities which have been much more 
dramatically hit by the downfall of heavy industry. Despite similar economic starting points. those cities have 
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6.2.1 Katowice - The Lack of Vision 
The capital of the Voivodship of Silesia - Katowice - is characterised by its functional 
centrality and size as an administrative capital as well as by the visual decline of old 
industrial industries and a number of unsuccess ful white elephants after 1989. 147 The most 
important city projects are presented and the potentials for restructuring are di scussed in 
order to have an example of typical ongoing problems faced by ordinary post-socialist 
cities. 
Photo 3: Katowice, 2003 
Source: K. Koc 
Higher education is seen to be as one of the maIn assets of the city, with the Silesian 
University as the biggest educational organisation of the whole region, whereas the city's 
character as an old industrial place is described as a weakness (TNT: Zych, 29.05.2003). 
Indeed, many of the initiatives taken by the departments of the city council focus on 
until now not been able success full y to transform their cities and adapt the capitalist routines which are 
necessary to attract a significant number of investors. These are cities such as By tom , Zabrze, or D<l,browa 
G6rnicza; all of the mayors refused to be interviewed. 
147 While the mayor of Katowice, Mr Uszok, refused to be interviewed despite month-long effort , many 
municipal departments were willing to be interviewed. The general picture which derives from these 
interviews is a lack of vision and proj ects, which are suitable and competitive to support local restructuring, 
in particular in comparison to other cities of the region. This has been confirmed by other informants, who 
were wi lling to criticise the politica l leaders in Katowice (INT: DOl1ocik, 28.07.2003; INT: Kallloch, 
18.07.2003 ; INT: Smolorz, 14.06.2003). 
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changing of this image, supporting cultural activities and the development of leisure 
facilities, the support of smaller service businesses and even the establishment of Katowice 
as a regional banking capital. The city's dense geographical position in Upper Silesia -
surrounded by many other cities - does not allow for growth, thus any new project can 
only be realised on derelict land (INT: Luczak, 03.06.2003). 
In the earlier transformation period, the city invested in a centrally located derelict area (of 
the former steel mill Hula Baildon) with the aim of establishing a banking area with 
additional office space for banking related services. This high-profile project collapsed 
after the near completion of the first building phase, leaving most of the office buildings 
still unfinished and empty. In comparison to other cities of the region, the council has not 
developed a city programme or 'vision', because "we have no time to think about the 
future" (Lidwin, 18.06.2003). Indeed, the department of city development is solely focused 
on single, unconnected mid-term infrastructure projects, such as the establishment of a new 
sewage and gas system (required under EU legislation), and the extension and 
improvement of the road network, in particular the new regional highway between Gliwice 
and Katowice, "which will attract investors" (lNT: Zych, 29.05.2003). This optimistic 
estimation does not match the fact that the city has not yet succeeded in attracting a high-
profile investor, in comparison to their neighbour cities. 
The journalist Michal Smolorz who was mayoral candidate in 2002, describes the current 
mayor of Katowice as a village mayor ("SchultheiB") with a lack of visionary thinking or a 
European perspective (INT: Smolorz, 14.06.2003).148 The Upper Silesian local political 
scene is, he suggests, dominated by small-minded people who lack intellectual capacity, in 
comparison to cities such as Wroclaw or Krak6w, which are "less politicised, and more 
148 Smolorz describes himself as an 'official jumping Jack' ("dienstlicher Hampelmann") and 'Polish Upper 
Silesian' who stood as a mayoral candidate only for provocative reasons and to encourage discussions in 
Katowice. 
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personified". Even the Silesian University in Katowice, a former "communist and anti-
Jewish bastion", which was established in the end of the 1960s, is now described as "rather 
unimportant" in comparison to the Technical University of Gliwice. The "lack of modern 
elites and middle-class" as well as the persistence of the 'homo sovieticus' who still thinks 
in "old categories of centrality" is, in the journalist's perception, responsible for the failure 
to build up a "modem local and regional identity" which connects to the historical past of 
different cultural influences, but embeds this heritage and asset into a diverse European 
context of openness. 
The liberal member of the city council of Katowice, Halina Kantoch, - opposed to the non-
party mayor Uszok - suggests that "people with ideas have no chance in Katowice" and 
also criticises as well the mayor's lack of vision for the city (lNT: Kantoch, 18.07.2003). 
Moreover, insufficient formal rules led in recent times to an increase of corruption cases, in 
particular concerning public tenders. While the parties in opposition to the mayor - PO 
(liberal) and SLD (,post-communist') - do not co-operate which each other in a formal 
way, on certain fields such as recreation and health (the municipalities are responsible for 
hospitals), "solution-oriented" policies have been agreed beyond party affiliations, in a 
"non-politicised" atmosphere. Due to Katowice's functional centrality as the Voivodship 
capital and the maintenance of a lower level of unemployment, the financial situation is 
characterised as rather good, in comparison to other cities of the region, but "profits of the 
companies are transferred to outside of the region" (INT: Kaittoch, 18.07.2003). 
It is suggested here, that the city of Katowice 'rests on its laurels' as an administrative 
capital, where responsible political leaders hardly feel a need for innovative ideas and 
visions for city development. Proposed projects concentrate on infrastructural measures 
only - such as the beautification of the Rynek (the central 'market', in the case of 
Katowice in the unique shape of a traffic roundabout) or the extension of the street 
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network. It turns out that contacts to or support of local businesses is rather weak and only 
at a formal administrative level (chapter 5.2.2; INT Donocik, 28.07.2003). Concerning the 
local economic transformation, no 'big plans' can be identified, except the vague idea of 
changing the image of an old industrial city, but without a guiding or binding concept. 
Additionally, the provincial city governance seems to be rather closed and disconnected, so 
that the city's position in the 'new Europe' is by far not formulated. This lack of horizon 
becomes clearer in comparing other regional cities, which are much more active and 
dynamic than Katowice - in terms of attracting foreign investments and in the formulation 
of international oriented strategies. 
6.2.2 Gliwice - Being on the Map of Europe 
The city of Gliwice, which "had a bad starting point" at the beginning of the 
transformation period (INT: Morski, 23.06.2003) meanwhile belongs to one of the most 
successful Polish cities in terms of the attraction of foreign investment and is frequently 
ranked as number one in terms of 'investment environment' .149 Asked about the reason for 
this success, the deputy mayor of Gliwice, Janusz Moszynski, states three sets of causes, 
connected with the city history, its "human resources" and current political activities (lNT: 
Moszyilski, 08.07.2003).150 In comparison with other Upper Silesian cities, Gliwice is an 
old city, founded more than 750 years ago and thus has a 'tradition' which differentiates it 
clearly from much younger adjacent cities. But even Gliwice's industrial heritage is 
presented as an asset and as evidence of its innovation capacity, since it is where the first 
blast furnace on the European continent was constructed in 1796. All in all, the deputy 
149 The city of Gliwice has about 208,000 inhabitants. In comparison to other Upper Silesian cities, the 
unemployment rate is lower, 14.3 per cent in September 2002. 
ISO The administrative structure of the council is rather unusual with two strong deputy mayors who can act in 
a quite 'independent' fashion and supervise different strands of the city administration. The deputy mayor 
who was interviewed is responsible for local economic development, in particular for the attraction of foreign 
investment. The council is organised in a citizen-friendly way, where the clients are serviced by staff in one 
location. The city hall is located in the former 'Haus Oberschlesien', a mundane hotel built in the interwar 
period, which functioned as a secret military headquarter of the SS for the planning and attack on 'Sender 
Gleiwitz' [Radio Gliwice] on the eve of WWIl, 31.08.1939, described in Horst Bienek's novel 'The Last 
Polka'. 
214 
mayor takes a historical vIew of the world, where path-dependent developments are 
presented in a long and linear way, where ' post-sociali sm' is not the outcome of 
'socialism', but where the recent past must be seen in a much wider context of historical 
persistence. 
"Once when I was in DuesseldorjlGermany, one oJ the city historians showed I/S the riverhank of the i?lJine 
and spoiled to some hills oJ the opposite side oJ the river. He told us that on these hills were the 1II0.l't 
Northern camps oJthe legions oJthe Roman Empire, with the river Rhine as its hordeI'. He said that we can 
see the traces oJ this cultural division until today. After that trip I realised that when YO II can see cllltllral 
differences even after two thousand years, you can find these differences oJ course also in closer historical 
contexts" (INT: MOS=)"1Ski, 08.07.2003). 
In doing so, Moszynski constructs a cultural identity which pos iti ve ly connects to the 
hi storical past as a Prussian and German city (until 1945) and thus mobili se thi s hi story as 
an asset for its current development. On the other side, the mobilisa tion of cultural 
relativism is clearly applied with the aim of distinguishing the city from the rest of the 
region. 
Photo 4: Gliwice High Street, 2003 
Source: C. Weis 
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This notion becomes very clear in the claim that the "human resources" of Gliwice are one 
cause of its success. The deputy mayor recalls the history of the Technical University of 
Gliwice, which was relocated from L'wow (today in Ukraine) after Poland's Westward 
shift in 1945, a higher educational facility which "was not established from 'zero', but on 
the base of an old and good traditional university" and where "the generation of the old 
professors transferred the spirit of L'wow" (lNT: Moszynski, 08.07.2003). Gliwice is the 
only city of Upper Silesia which received a significant number of urban elites after the 
war.' 5 1 In the mayor's eyes, the existence of well-educated and foreign languages-speaking 
graduates is one cause for the labour force's higher flexibility and the establishment of 
more private enterprises in comparison to other cities of the region. As it has been 
suggested earlier (chapter 5.2.l), in addition to the settlement of academic elites after the 
war and their intellectual input into the city, the political-economic network which was 
created through this relocation seems to have been a more important factor. The majority 
of local decision makers studied at this university and are until now linked with this 
organisation. 152 
The former director of the local development agency in Gliwice. Wojciech Napierala, 
directly links this university network to the process of attracting GM Opel to Gliwice, a 
network which could be mobilised on a short-term basis in the mid 1990s. because the 
director at the time, today's deputy mayor Moszynski, "knew many people of the 
151 The majority of L'w6w's intelligentsia went to Wroclaw after 1945. The situation after the war can be 
described as a competition between Polish cities to attract these elites. While the social and intellectual fabric 
remained relatively untouched only in few cases (such as Krak6w), other cities such as Szczecin suffered 
from an intellectual gap, caused in particular through the war atrocities with millions of Poles killed. the 
extermination of Jewish Poles in German concentration camps and the expulsion of ethnic Germans after the 
war. In particular in the new Polish territories. the majority of city inhabitants were replaced by peasants and 
workers from East Poland (Lizak 2003). 
152 There is certainly a danger of overstating the importance of the Technical University or to selectively 
penetrate certain local circles linked to this organisation. Nevertheless. it cannot be a coincidence that. first. 
all top decision makers of the municipality (the mayor and all deputy mayors) studied at this facility and 
know each other from this time and. second. that many interview partners of the region referred to the 
university as an elite organisation. 
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university's environment, many of them in decision-making positions of the municipality" 
(INT: NapieralalSzymborski, 12.06.2003). 
The idea of attracting a big investor was actually born in this agency. It can be described as 
a local think tank, which has developed and implemented innovative ideas in the first 
transformation period much earlier than in other Upper Silesian or even other Polish cities. 
For example, the first Polish 'business incubator' was established in Gliwice by the local 
development agency (and is still its main business area, sharing the same building). Asked 
about the decision to establish a business incubator and provide consultancy for small and 
middle-sized innovative companies in the early transformation period, the former director 
outlined the features of his business career which had already started in the early 1980s. 
In these days, he established a privately-owned cooperative, which imported American-
made personal computers illegally via Taiwan into Poland in order to work for the Polish 
defence industry with western high-technology on an informal contractual basis (INT: 
NapieralalSzymborski, 12.06.2003). The informality of doing business and the necessary 
mutual trust connected to this routine during the communist era apparently produced a set 
of closely linked and well-trained actors, who later went into local politics or city 
development. It is worth noting that the city's success in the capitalist era is, from this 
perspective, an outcome of socialist routines of informality and kombinowac (see FN 130). 
The example of how some of these actors attracted the GM OpeJ investment to Gliwice 
provides evidence for the functioning of a network, which is probably the reason for 
Gliwice's unique position in Poland and the region of Upper Silesia. Asked about the 
process of negotiations with GM, the deputy mayor describes two "milestones", which in 
the end led to the investment in Gliwice, following stiff competition between ca. 100 
European cities. The first "milestone" was associated with the first arrival of the GM 
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delegation in Gliwice in the mid 1990s. The delegation was on its way from Radonska 
(CZ) to Krak6w, in order to visit some of the possible investment locations and only 
planned a very short stay in Gliwice. Less than 48 hours before the delegation sent a 
detailed "questionnaire as thick as a book" to the municipality of Gliwice in order to 
discuss important points relating to the possible investment. The municipality and the 
development agency managed to organise a task force very quickly from different city 
departments and other experts who worked on this document without break until the 
delegation arrived in "a cold winter night". The negotiations started immediately and 
apparently the first test proved "that we can do something and that we could talk to them 
without using interpreters" (all quoting INT: Moszynski, 08.07.2003). 
"The second milestone happened one and a half months later. We went together with one of today's deputy 
mayors to Warsaw and presented the GM delegation the exact time table of the process. For example. we 
provided them with information concerning the change of the master plan. the building permits etc., an exact 
day-by-day commitment we made regarding the legislative procedure. They were shocked. It was the first 
time that a city showed them that the change of a master plan takes at least jive and half months. because of 
the legal procedure inscribed in the national law [oo.}. They said to us that we were the first to say honestly 
how long it will take" (INT: Moszynski, 08.07.2003). 
Today's deputy mayor and his municipal team convinced the GM delegation with their 
commitment, level of reliability and realistic appraisal of the legislative procedure to invest 
in Gliwice, where other mayors promised unrealistic time schedules. Asked about where he 
learned this kind of professional attitude he showed during the negotiations, the city leader 
admits that this can only be learnt by doing it: "If you are thrown into a swimming pool. 
you will discover that you can swim". But the municipality had at least one more trump 
card, besides its human resources, historical heritage and of course the establishment of the 
local tax exemption zone and its newly erected infrastructure, fully financed by the city. 
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In 1993, a conference of regional city mayors came together, co-ordinating transport 
issues. Before the mayors met, the Ministry of Transport in Warsaw proposed the 
construction of a new North/South highway. The line of construction was to be thirty 
kilometres away from Gliwice, leading through the voivodship's capital Katowice. The 
director of the Upper Silesian Union of Municipalities. Ferdynand Morski, who was 
present during that meeting, describes the conference as a 'coup' for Gliwice, which is 
"excellently managed" (INT: Morski, 23.06.2003). Shortly before the meeting happened, 
the city council of Katowice decided that it would reject the proposed location line, 
probably because of scarce space available in the city. In knowing this decision, the 
Gliwice administration prepared a draft proposal, suggesting that the location line could 
pass nearby their city and surprised the whole conference with this suggestion. In the end. 
the decision was made and later confirmed by Warsaw, that the only Polish North/South 
highway, connecting the Baltic Sea with Slovenia, will lead through Gliwice. Additionally, 
years later, the decision was made that the WestlEast highway A4, to be completed in 2008 
and connecting Germany with Ukraine, will also lead through Gliwice, crossing the 
North/South highway. In attracting this highway crossing, Gliwice will be the only Polish 
city with such an international crossing point. 
"You will find us on the map of Europe. When you look for the strategic communication [transport] 
corridors in Europe. you will find two of them meeting in Gliwice and this crossing will be named after one 
of our municipal districts - Sosnica [oo.}. On the main map of Europe where you see the country borders. the 
capitals and the motorways. we will be visible on that generated map. In fact. if this map does not show the 
voivodvodship capitals. we will be the only city of the region which will be shown" (INT: Moszynski, 
08.07.2003). 
This level of self-confidence must be seen as outstanding in the region. Indeed, for the 
deputy mayor the region itself has no wider meaning, because adjacent cities do not quite 
play in the same league and "the region cannot help us, because we have the authority." 
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The vice-mayor compares the assets of Gliwice with Krak6w or Wroclaw rather than with 
Zabrze or Katowice, although he also recognises that some are not yet as strong - "I can 
understand that we cannot offer this kind of cultural life and will therefore lose 
investments". The international orientation of the city administration is also apparent. 
Poland's access to the EU - and the impact for the city of Gliwice - is viewed rather 
critically, because the mayor fears an immense brain drain of a few thousand well-trained 
workers, an assessment which was unique among the mayors interviewed. This also 
contradicts current fears in the West, which led to special EU arrangements regarding 
labour migration after the 1st May 2004: "All these stories about floods of un-skilled 
workers to the West are a big misunderstanding; the question is what are the dangers we 
are confronted with and what are our possibilities to avoid this [brain drain]" (lNT: 
Moszyilski, 08.07.2003). 
Asked about the flow of capital, which might in future neglect his city and head further 
towards East, the deputy mayor remains realistic in assessing the possibility of avoiding 
this development, because he admits that tax levels and labour costs are controlled 
nationally and thus not controllable with the help of city policies. However, he doubts that 
countries such as Ukraine and Russia, which have in the latter case a corporate tax level of 
only 13 per cent, will be significant partners for investments from the West, as corruption 
is much more wide-spread and political instability notorious, "a fact we profit from". In the 
end, "we can make the city nicer, but what counts are not the soft points, rather the hard 
facts we are faced with on the national and international level". 
6.2.3 Sosnowiec - Risky Public Investments 
The young city of Sosnowiec (about 240,000 inhabitants), which received its city rights 
only about 100 years ago is located adjacent to the city of Katowice on former Russian 
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territory, on the fringe of the D/:lbrowskie Coal Basin. Since the mid 1990s, the city 
administration has been developing city programmes, aimed at suspending the 
restructuring process of the steel and metallurgical sector as well as providing support for 
SMEs in the city (INT: Paj*-Gruszczynska, 10.07.2003).153 The decision to undertake 
comprehensive development planning, which includes not only infrastructural activities, 
but a wide range of social, cultural, and economic goals, was made to avoid "'quickly 
changing political options" and a planning stability for the administration. The experience 
of constant programming led to the formulation of an incremental "Vision 2015", an 
operation and financing plan, which is detailed every four years. The most important aim 
of this vision is the re-claiming and re-use of enormous derelict areas, near the city centre, 
created through the closure of four (out of five) coal mines in the mid 1990s. Like other 
cities of the dense agglomeration, a further expansion of Sosnowiec is not possible, thus 
green field developments like those undertaken in Gliwice cannot be realised. What 
remains are vast derelict areas, usually extremely polluted, requiring costly regeneration 
measures, before any public infrastructure investments can be realised or the search for 
private investors started. 
The proposed projects - all of them in planning - can be described as ambitious. The 
highest-profile plan is the 'Euroterminal', an area at the fringe of the southern city border, 
approximately as large as the whole inner city. It is proposed that the former sand-pit of an 
adjacent coal mine should become an international train and road transport hub. In the 
neighbouring city of B~dzin, an important goods train line terminates, which until recently 
connected the former Russian part of the region with Russian iron ore mines in the far 
East. While this goods train line is not in use anymore, it is proposed that the track should 
be extended for a few kilometres and end at the former sand-pit in Sosnowiec. Russian 
trains use a different gauge than western European trains, which complicates train transport 
IS3 The city has one of the highest (official) unemployment rates in the region, exceed.ing 25 per cent (July 
2003). The mayor estimates the real unemployment rate around 50 per cent (lNT: G6rskl, 10.07.2003). 
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between West and East. In fact, only two train lines with Russian gauges reach from the 
former Soviet territory into countries of CEE, which are now member states of the EU. 
What is proposed now is that the Euroterminal and the revitalised train line becomes the 
main trade artery between western Europe/CEE and Russia! Asia. Other planned projects 
include the establishment of an industrial park, focussing on innovative engineering 
companies of the recycling sector, the creation of a 'technopark', where old coal mining 
buildings will be reused for a newly founded higher technical college and the 
establishment of a newly built refuse incinerator. In particular the Euroterminal project 
reveals in what ways the otherwise negatively perceived socialist and even Russian pre-
WWI legacy may be redefined and transformed into capitalist assets, even if the economic 
outcome of a project in such a dimension is not clear. The Russian gauge which is 
everywhere seen as handicap for the easy flows of bulk commodities becomes a unique 
asset and its former meaning as a colonial symbol recycled in new economic and political 
circumstances. 
Between 1998 and 2001, the city of Sosnowic spent PLN 103 million (about GBP 18 
million) on renovation measures in the city centre, mainly financed through communal 
obligations, which have to be repaid by 2007 (INT: G6rski, 10.07.2003). In comparison to 
other cities of the region, co-operation with the Marshal's Office in Katowice is seen as 
very important and fruitful in terms of the acquisition of EU funds for some of the 
ambitious projects. The regional self-government is described as the only Marshal's Office 
in Poland, which expects local development proposals from the gminas and powiats, and 
co-ordinates these projects in line with the regional development plan and for further 
applications within funds of EU's 5th framework programme (lNT: Pajqk-Gruszczynska, 
10.07.2003). Not surprisingly, the current Marshal of the Voivodship is the former mayor 
ofSosnowiec (since 2002). 
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Photo 5: Sosnowiec Central Square, 2003 
ource: C. Wei 
The economic situation of the local special economic zone, part of the regional KSSE, is 
described as "di ffic ult", and in compari son to Gli wice, even as a fa ilure, despite the fact 
that fi fty per cent more people are employed in this area than in the Gliwice special 
economic zone. The reason for this development is seen in the area itse lf, a former coal 
mine, with dangerous underground movement due to unfilled former tunnel near the 
surface. Bes ides these infrastructural problems, most of the investors attracted onl y offer 
low-skilled jobs, as in the case of the biggest investor of the site, a meat factory. 
Apart from the many innovative and ambitious idea developed through the council , the 
question arises in what way all these projects can be co-financed with city funds or 
communal obligations respecti vely. The city is taking enormous ri sks that public 
investments ma turn out to be misguided, while at the same time the city income i 
fa lling. The hi gh debts already accumulated by the city are a burden for the budget and will 
- if any new projects are to be realised - even increase. At the same time, the city is 
reluctant in searching fo r pri vate investors to use the form of a Public Private Partnership, 
because of unc lear legislation and possible corruption accusations (TNT: Paj llk-
Gruszczynska 10.07.2003). 
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6.3 Regions and Cities in the Process of Transformation 
This chapter has presented Upper Silesia's regional and local efforts to become a capitalist 
space. It is argued that without analysing the social, political and economic idiosyncrasy of 
the region and its cities the learning process towards a capitalist space is not 
comprehensible. The practical leeway at the regional level remains weak and is limited to 
programming policies, which focus on the creation of a more diverse fabric for its 
economic space, in particular with the support of structural and pre-accession funds of the 
EU. The shaping power of the regional self-government is restricted by the supervising 
central state, which is the main actor not only in tenns of the privatisation of ailing large-
scale enterprises, but also of smaller state-owned firms with high local/regional 
embeddedness. However. it has also been argued that the mobilisation of the region's 
historical experience as a contested political space, which gained a high degree of 
autonomy in the interwar period, provides evidence of the re-emergence of a regional 
identity. The socially constructed picture of a coherent spatial-cultural identity aims at 
preparing the region for its path of economic transformation towards the capitalist mode of 
accumulation. The historical identity of cultural diversity is politically mobilised as a tool 
for the region's vision of becoming an economically diverse space. Not surprisingly, the 
question of a spatial identity becomes a political battleground in the formulation of the 
region's future. The learning region in post-socialist contexts is a region that is capable of 
becoming a distanciated space, which connects and learns from other regions and 
organisations, mostly from well-established western countries. This learning process is 
highly shaped by path-dependent historical experiences and a set of traded and untraded 
interdependencies which also reach back into the socialist era. 
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The selection of a few examples of Upper Silesian cities and their social-economic post-
socialist paths only gives a snap shot of regional differences in shaping restructuring. But 
the local level shows in what ways economic transformations may have different impacts 
and successes. While the difficult formulation of a common regional identity and vision is 
an ongoing dispute, the cities have fewer difficulties in mobilising the local past for future 
projects. In particular the examples of Gliwice and Sosnowiec provide evidence that the 
suggestion of urban elites falls short in explaining local economic success, if their 
networks are neglected. It is not overstated to claim that these urban political-economic 
networks reach into the past and that their existence is an important factor for local 
restructuring and the attraction of transnational corporations, which profit from well-
established network properties. Cities such as Gliwice are not closely linked with regional 
decision makers, but have the (human) resources to directly connect to the national and 
international levels and are thus confident enough to face stiff competition. In the case of 
Sosnowiec, which has a very similar industrial legacy to Gliwice, and lost its economic 
base early during the first transformation period, the outcome of policies aiming on a 
competitive space cannot yet be assessed. But at least this example shows the difficult and 
risky path cities apparently have to take, if they want to restructure their local economies. 
The regional capital of Katowice, with an old industrial base as declining as in other cities 
of the region, may profit from its function as a central place in terms of administration and 
emerging small and middle-sized firms. But it can be argued that this functional advantage 
will diminish, if the city authorities hold on to un-linked (infrastructure) projects and an 
attitude of closed and provincial governance. Even a superficial glimpse at the other cities 
of the region gives evidence of greater dynamism and more ambitious efforts to challenge 
old industrial decline. However, Katowice's endowment with a growing service industry, 
main educational facilities such as the Silesian University and a large and young 
population at least has the potential to facilitate the restructuring process. 
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7 Conclusion: Inventing a Capitalist Region 
t has been argued in this thesis that the economic transformation process in Upper 
I Silesia is not a linear one of transition from a socialist to a capitalist market system, which started in the year 1989 (see also Pickel 2002:108; Dingsdale 1999:147). On 
the contrary, the transformation process is shaped by path-dependent decisions and 
legacies which even stretch beyond Poland's socialist past. This focus has been labelled 
'continuity in change' and integrates the dimension through which actors utilised strategies 
and formal/informal solutions borrowed from the old system (Stark/Bruszt 1998; Tatur 
2004:23). This chapter embeds the empirical outcomes into the theoretical framework and 
shows in what ways these legacies are necessary for the transformation process. It is 
argued that the creative recombination of economic (and political) routines not only 
supports industrial restructuring, but is often an important precondition for its 'success'. 
Moreover, these routines - or untraded interdependencies - are not seen as a hindrance to 
becoming a functioning capitalist territory, but as a necessity of the transformation process. 
However, these inherited routines are not sufficient in shaping a capitalist economy. Here, 
it is contended that economic and political decision makers draw from 'useful' aspects of 
the region's identity to mobilise its capacity of transformation. The process of recreating 
and recombining institutions has been identified as a major force in becoming a capitalist 
territory, but its success is highly dependent on external, in particular international currents 
and (internal) regional elites being willing to formulate and negotiate a sustainable future. 
Whether this 'trial and error' strategy - a brico/age of new and old elements - will result in 
a western-style market economy or whether the interim 'outcome' might be rather an 
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elusive 'mixed economy' can still not be answered at this point (Stark 1992:52-53 ).154 The 
capacity of experimentation and local/regional piecemeal approaches at least otTers new 
opportunities and widens the scope for surviving in new economic and social contexts. At 
the same time the threats increase both for companies and regions faced by the putative 
logics of neo-liberal time space realities. 
7.1 Learning to Become Capitalist 
The concept of the 'learning region' seems to be fruitful as a starting point in 
understanding post-socialist transformation processes (chapter 2.2.1). In this context it 
must be asked in what ways (and to what extent) these regions actually are learning 
regions. This perspective reveals all kinds of economic and political actors who are 
learning to redefine their socialist past and to acquire knowledge in order to learn how to 
become capitalist. Additionally, the "tracing oftrans-Iocal connections" (Smith 2004:22) is 
necessary to open-up regional analysis in order to understand the processes of knowledge 
acquisition and the continuing establishment of post-socialist institutions. As well as this 
more general systemic change, the case of an ailing old industrial region highlights the 
interwoven learning processes which are exerted in restructuring a former monotype 
economy. The case of post-socialist territories which are at the same time old industrial 
territories emphasises the difficult nature of the post-socialist transformation of the 
learning region. The processes involved - socialist to capitalist and old industrial to 
technical innovation - are highly interdependent and may be understood as a double 
learning process in which each informs and influences the other. 
154 Altvater notes that the possible emergence of a mixed economy or "a 'third way' between capitalism and 
communism is viewed as a theoretically unjustified idea" (Altvater 1998:592), although many such mixed 
economies do doubtless exist. 
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The growing interest in learning has been associated with the emergence of a knowledge-
based economy, with an increased importance for R&D and related investments as well as 
a qualitative change of production patterns (Malmberg 1997:574). 'Knowledge' and its 
economies is certainly a fashionable and under-theorised term, but at least it offers a 
concept focusing on "competencies to competitive success and of the economy as 
dependent upon knowledge, learning ( ... ), adoption, and evolution" (Hudson 2001 :35). In 
the following, a more detailed analysis of the regional 'learning actors' is intended to lead 
to a better understanding of the role of learning and knowledge production in post-socialist 
transformation processes. Additionally, the meaning of certain kinds of knowledge (tacit, 
codified) and external pressures plays a role in the analysis in order to assess the driving 
forces of a 'learnt transformation' . 
7.1.1 Local and Regional Self-Governments 
The case study has shown that the elected regional actors are still in a process of coming 
into being regarding their political shaping powers and de faCIO authority. While their 
political influence in restructuring huge old industrial and still state-owned companies is 
very limited, the most promising room for manoeuvre is the attraction of EU funds and 
thus the widening of the regional administration's economic and political influence. These 
monies are provided for programmes, which aim at regional innovation. following certain 
regional economic strategies, such as the strengthening of small and middle sized firms. A 
number of regional organisations (and departments) were precisely established with the 
aim of attracting these EU funds and implementing the programmes associated with them. 
The attraction of EU funds, their absorption and expenditure, can be seen as a regional 
learning process, establishing this territory as a part of the European Union, supporting the 
restructuring process and increasing the region's capacity to act economically. External 
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actors - on behalf of the EC - act as animateurs to improve endogenous regional capacities 
(Landbaso/Reid 1999; Cooke/Morgan 1998: 17 -24). 
Furthermore, the organisations and actors involved in this process draw from western 
European experiences to handle and implement these funds. organised in networks where 
ideas are exchanged - and outcomes are controlled. All these measures and experiences are 
aimed at enabling the regions to become capitalist territories. through a process of 
organisational learning - how to apply for and how to spend scarce public capital in order 
to 'develop' the region. While formal institutions and their organisations already exist. but 
the institutional infrastructure is far from 'complete'. so it must be asked in what way 
informal institutions, attached routines and traditions inform this process of learning. 
The thesis argues that the lack of formal institutions or their insufficient establishment is 
often balanced by the use of informal routines. for example in the case of public private 
partnerships, where illegal actions such as corruption occur or might occur. As a matter of 
course, not all of these practices are illegal. But certain semi- and illegal routines are not 
only an 'unpleasant' heritage of the past. which "distort the workings of the political 
system" (Karklins 2002:23) or even "threaten[s] to undermine the functioning of many 
public spheres" (EU Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession 2002. 
quoted in McManus-Czubinska et al. 2004: 1 07). These routines are economically 
understandable in times of change. On the other hand, if some of these routines do not 
become (re-)combined with new practices and sediment themselves in newly created 
formal institutions, they might fail to establish reliable social networks and to connect with 
other new and old regional actors - a relational capacity of paramount importance in order 
to reach 'institutional thickness' (AminlThrift 1994:14). 
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The making of new capitalist territories is highly dependent on a set of formal institutions 
which are capable of transforming former socialist economic sets and mediating capitalist 
relational modes. The establishment of newly created organisations, such as development 
agencies or commercial chambers, can be seen as transmission belts for this enormous 
task. As the case study has shown, these organisations are not only 'teaching' their clients 
in terms of 'good capitalist practice', but are themselves learners. But the 'curriculum' is 
mainly written in 'successful' regions with West European contexts. The process of 
becoming a capitalist territory is thus dependent on functioning and deepened co-operation 
between newly created organisations and western partners. While these relationships have 
not been studied in detail yet, it seems to be obvious that these partnerships are crucial for 
understanding post-socialist transformation. Western actors and regions are taken as 
models for this process. In this way, the learning region is a set of co-operative 
relationships between well-established actors from the West and their newly created 
counterparts in CEE, with the aim to 'trickle down' innovative organisational procedures 
and strategies in post-socialist areas. 
The matter of 'region learning' - co-operating actors - which is a main asset of the 
region's capacity to innovate itself, is still in an early state. Indeed, a number of EU-funded 
programmes (RIS Silesia, Prelude) seek to address this issue by 'awareness building' 
among small and middle sized companies, local administrations and research organisations 
(chapter 5.2.2.). Besides the over-bureaucratic organisation of this project, the main 
problem seems to be the existence of 'different languages' among the participants. While 
some of the members have already internalised the need of co-operation and interaction, 
others are still in an earlier stage or have no understanding of the needs of business 
partnerships or even a lack of 'economic thinking'. 
230 
Moreover, the implementation of 'western-proofed best practices' in post-socialist settings 
is highly questionable, precisely because the crucial aspects of informality and inherited 
socialist routines are not addressed in these kinds of programmes. This means they are 
likely to fail because they merely aim to imitate well-established western capitalist routines 
and to streamline actors into that direction. 'Best practices' could be labelled as learning-
driven "channels of convergence" (Gertler 2001 )155, but in the form of certain EU regional 
restructuring programmes or the implementation of innovation strategies they lack what a 
region most urgently needs in terms of successful innovation: the focus on specific 
regional assets which distinguish this region from other areas. 
This copycat attitude has been identified as "the most common tendency" (Amin 
1999:371) in so called cluster programmes of industrial areas in Europe and is probably 
caused by a lack of alternatives or imagination. In the case of Upper Silesia the formulation 
of regional or local strategies reveals the gawky vision of responsible decision makers. 
which are all guided by one dominant concern: the attraction of (foreign) capital through 
the improvement of material 'infrastructure'. These hard assets are seen as the main tool of 
development, which "have traditionally also tended to be central to the normative 
aspirations of planners, reformers, modernisers and social activists to define their notions 
of desirable urban order: the good city" (Graham/Marvin 2001 :12). By contrast, 'soft 
concepts', such as the establishment of learning networks in a knowledge-based economy 
must be rather seen as a decoration in regional and local development strategies, which are 
likely to receive additional funding of the EU, but in terms of regional budget allocation, 
regional innovation programmes are only secondary, not only in Upper Silesia (Hudson 
1999a:61). 
155 Gertler does not explicitly mention EU programmes as 'channels of convergence'. but rather refers to more 
general institutions (e.g. media, education), trade regimes. FDls or practices of management consultants 
(Gertler 200 I :9). 
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As well as the provision of newly built transport infrastructure, higher educational facilities 
have been repeatedly described as a major tool for development in the Silesian Voivodship 
with the objective of creating "new political, cultural and managerial-technocratic elites -
which ( ... ) spread the values of restructuring projects" (BlasiakiNawrockilSzczepmiski 
1994:89; see also SzczepaJiski 2003:A 14). It is understandable that a mono-structured 
region, defined for at least 150 years by its workforce and 'hard-working ethos', should see 
the need to widen its intellectual potential and human capital by extending its educational 
network. Indeed, the magic formula for the region and its cities is 'education'. Thus, many 
efforts can be seen to establish new higher education schools, like in Tychy, Rybnik or 
Sosnowiec. The model of this strategy is not drawn from external experiences, but from the 
city of Gliwice which has been very successful in establishing and developing its 
Technical University since 1945. The educational level of Upper Silesians is still 
considerably lower than in other parts of Poland, which certainly affects levels of 
entrepreneurship and the extension of the private SME sector (Cybula 1998).156 
Nevertheless, there is a danger that an over-supply of higher educational facilities may lead 
to a misallocation of scarce public resources. The Statistical Yearbook 2002 of the Silesian 
Voivodship itemises 33 higher education facilities with an increasing number of students 
between 1999/2000 (150310) and 2001/2002 (185989), an increase of 23.7 per cent in only 
three years (Statistical Office in Katowice 2002: 125-133). The decreasing population of 
the region suggests that the establishment of new facilities is in the interest of local 
political actors who use these efforts for the extension of their influence, rather than for 
any wider economic purposes. In the territory of today's Voivodship the population has 
fallen from 4.957 million (1990) to 4.830 million (2001) (ibid:28) and the projection for 
the year 2030 estimates 4.606 million inhabitants (ibid:42). 
156 Cybula notes that "Protagonists of free enterprise like to say. that market losers should be given a fishing 
rod. instead of a fish. They should always add, that the losers are to be taught fishing as well" (Cybula 
1998:214). One might add to this accurate observation that first, a lake or river with fish is needed to 
empower the market loser and second, that not everybody has the talent and patience to fish. 
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But this 'best-practice' attitude, in which every city leader suggests the establishment of a 
new or extended educational organisation, leads to increased competition between the 
cities over 'scarce' students. It must be doubted whether the sheer quantitative extension of 
student numbers will secure a high quality education. Quite the contrary, increasing work 
loads of lecturers - who often work at several universities - often leads to lower quality 
standards of the courses (INT: Gorzelik, 21.07.2003). However, it might also be argued 
that decreasing population levels in the voivodship - in particular the emigration of the 
most dynamic parts of the population such as young people - could be at least stabilised. if 
incentives like good educational facilities are created. 1~7 In the end, any efforts to widen the 
educational networks in this region should be balanced and not overwork regional budgets. 
The concept of 'development by modernisation' is actually the continuation of the socialist 
development idea, a concept which has also been influential in western thinking, at least 
until the early 1970s. These similarities - or better shared common sense - should not 
surprise us since, "By adopting the capitalist heavy-industry definition of economic 
modernization ( ... ) Soviet socialism had no alternative but to try to produce a utopia out of 
the production process itself' (Buck-Morss 2000: 115). The similarities of thinking 
between capitalist 'comprehensive planning' and the socialist pendant are obvious -
despite different scales and extents. It can be argued here that socialist planning routines, 
or at least the idea of the 'good plan' survive in the post-socialist world, for example, in the 
restructuring models of the coal industry or the regional development plan, which have 
strong technocratic notions. This heritage must be seen as a major obstacle to creating 
comparative economic advantages in the age of the 'network society', because these kinds 
of routines block the development of creative thinking and experimental efforts. The lack 
1~7 This statement is optimistic. The case of the Ruhr/Germany is instructive in this regard. The establishment 
of an enormous higher education system in this region since the 1960s. with universities and technical 
schools in nearly every bigger city. could neither prevent the economic decline. nor the creeping exodus of its 
population. 
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of risk taking and the search for alternative economic pathways is also undermined by the 
European Union, which is rather interested in the unproblematic outflow of funds and their 
measurable impacts by the implementation of 'best practices'. 
7.1.2 Firms and Corporations 
While elected regional bodies only administer' innovation projects', the companies are the 
organisations within which innovation actually happens in the form of technological 
innovation - and even more important in this context - in the form of organisational 
innovation such as the development of a firm as a 'superbrain', which is constantly forced 
to perceive, interpret, evaluate information and has to learn how to connect and becomes 
part of networks - with the help of "cognitive and conative (action-oriented) capabilities" 
(Nooteboom 1997:68). Without these efforts, the restructuring of the regional economy in 
terms of diversification, product development and technological progress would fail. 
The case study has shown that a homogenous economic picture of this old industrial region 
does not exist. Some of the state-owned industries (now privatised), in particular of the 
steel sector, are - despite the popular understanding of the structural difficulties they face -
capable of innovating and ready for international competition. On the other hand, small 
and middle sized companies, which are presented in certain development strategies as the 
Holy Grail of future developments - often fail to innovate or to co-operate in the new 
business environment. 
This description is certainly only a simple black/white picture of 'real' processes, but at 
least it shows that the distinction between 'state-owned' and 'private' or state and market is 
sometimes questionable. Apparently, state enterprises are capable of operating efficiently 
at a micro level and conversely, the (transformation) market is not always capable of 
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generating viable businesses. This rather evident - but anti-mainstream - reflection 
signifies the role of ideologies (not only) immanent in the study of post-socialist territories, 
where "scientists, ideologues and dogmatists use their scientific credentials to pronounce 
on issues that are beyond the scope of science in general or beyond the scope of their 
disciplinary knowledge" (Pickel 2002: 11 0). Indeed, while neo-liberal economists still 
follow the advisory-relevant 'systemic change by design' paradigm, geographers and other 
social scientists are "perceived as not possessing knowledge particularly relevant to the 
practical problems of transformation" (ibid: 112). Whatever 'practical' means in this 
context, the following sections at least inform the reader about some very practical 
implications for firms in transformation territories; whether these observations contribute 
to a further understanding of post-socialist transformation in general may be uncertain, but 
at least they "challenge many of the comfortable assumptions unleashed by the euphoria of 
democratisation and the triumphalism of market capitalism ( ... )" and give evidence of 
"complex and highly differentiated regional systems of adjustment" (Smith/Pickles 
1998:20). 
Both, state-owned and private firms, have one aspect in common - the lack of capital - and 
both sectors try to by-pass this difficult situation with strategies or routines which are 
traceable to the socialist past, for example the re-establishment of barter deals or the 
reactivation of old networks which guarantee mutual support in times of a declining 
economy. However, the application of old routines or the remobilisation of supporting 
networks is only sustainable in short temporary periods and must be combined with new 
efforts to open up social relations. 
In particular within a (passing) survival economy, where these routines seem to be 
important, proximity advantages of the agglomeration play an important role. Thus, the 
geographical, social and cultural space of doing business must be seen as decisive in 
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'survival times', no matter whether for state-owned or private companies and despite 
different hierarchies and strategies. A main problem of economic regeneration in the case 
of an old industrial area in a post-socialist setting, is exactly that these both worlds -
'monostructural old industries' and smaller/middle sized companies are in no way 
positively connected. Quite the contrary, the disconnection of these 'regional worlds' is a 
main obstacle in the formulation of sustainable economic development, particularly if these 
firms operate in different realms of production and knowledge acquisition. 
For both worlds, finding and implementing strategies of survival in transformation periods 
can be interpreted as a learning process. This learning process is in fact an adaptation to a 
new capitalist mode of doing business. In contrast to the biologistic notion of the 'survival 
of the fittest', this capacity is, rather, dependent on the creative use of functioning social 
networks which mutually support its members as well as the creative recombination of 
routines. 
Multinational firms are also engaged in a process of learning. While these firms are the 
main protagonists of economic regional change, their interaction with • indigenous' firms or 
actors is highly selective. Investment decisions are not only dependent on geographically 
well situated places and cheap labour costs, but the existence and identification of well-
functioning local networks, which provide a certain guarantee for the profitability of their 
investments. Besides aspects of reliability, existing political and economic local networks 
provide a communication channel pivotal for their interaction in transformation spaces. 
The 'implantation' of external, globally connected firms in post-socialist settings is 
actually dependent on a well-skilled and flexible workforce, which is willing to quickly 
adapt capitalist modes of production and to overcome 'old routines' which are assessed as 
negative, such as the internal organisation of labour interests. Both, the discipline of the 
workforce and at the same time its rather unorganised structure (in terms of union 
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organisation) make multinationals interested in investing in CEE. While trade unions such 
as Solidarity were on the forefront of democratic change and market reforms before 1989, 
their "contradictory position with regard to the transition" (Herod 1998:206) - advocating 
neo-liberal policies and at the same time seeking to minimise job losses in the declining 
industries created by these policies - has certainly weakened the political bargaining power 
of these organisations. The contrasts of labour processes in Upper Silesia - capital-serving 
unorganised employees of multinationals and hierarchy-opposed street-fighting miners on 
the other side - provides evidence of a micro-cosmos of the spatial division of labour, and 
shows in what ways historical and geographical specifity results in social and spatial 
process, which cannot be separated from each other because "there are no purely spatial 
processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes" (Massey 1984:52). 
Multinationals additionally tend to identify positive aspects of the old system and try to 
connect to the region's identity with the main purpose of presenting themselves as an 
'indigenous' or, at least, newly rooted firm, interested in and engaged with the region's 
historic and economic heritage. In taking this path, multinationals significantly influence 
the region's search for a newly interpreted identity and considerably shape the 
transformation process as "it is precisely because areas have different histories that the 
arrival of a new form of economic activity has in each case distinct social and economic 
results" (Massey 1984:121-122). 
Indeed, economic change and processes of innovation are measured by the influx of 
foreign capital (Altomonte/Resmini 2001). It is believed that these investments not only 
create new workplaces or modem infrastructure (RadosevicNarblane/Mickiewicz 2003), 
but also work as capitalist 'lighthouses', which guide the region and its actors through the 
uncertainties of economic transformation and thus provide stability (Waresa 2004). But 
this capitalist 'godfather' -role is in no way a one-sided process. While 'indigenous' players 
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are learning from multinationals how to do capitalist business, multinationals are learning 
how to make profits in transformation markets; in this way it is a mutual process of 
learning - but with completely different sets of power, not always to be interpreted as 
domination. 
A possible weak point of the concept of knowledge/learning/innovation is the lack of 
engagement with modes of power and their influence on spatiality expressed in current 
institutionalist work. These approaches offer "a rather one-sided view of power, 
privileging processes of interflrm cooperation and collaboration (power to) over the 
relations of conflict and dominance (power over) which were recognised (if not 
conceptualised) within the older tradition of insitutionalism" (Cumbers 2003:328). This 
dominance (power over) has been also recognised in the case study region, where 
multinational car producers control vertical production networks and thus creating 
hierarchical spatial structures with enormous consequences in terms of inequalities not 
only for the region of interest, but the international reconfiguration of the whole .Ii1iere and 
its geographical context (see also Massey 1984:85-93). On the other hand, other modes of 
power are also in play, including 'seduction', where the irresistible fascination of 
international players and their management professionalism plays a role in teaching small 
and middle-sized companies 'good practices'. The matter of 'innovation' and 'economic 
knowledge' draws heavily on a cognitive "monolithic" discourse in economic institutions, 
focused on how to define and produce codified (cosmopolitan) and tacit (non-
cosmopolitan) knowledge in order to create a 'knowledge-based' economy, a discourse 
which is linked with "the power to make itself 'true' by association with those activities 
which legitimize it" (Allen 2000:18). It is probably the 'obliviousness' of 'innovation' and 
how to reach it what makes it difficult for political or economic actors to step aside from 
this discourse and to try new paths and experiments, embedded in a "symbolic economy" 
(ibid:22-24 ). 
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This quickly changing economic environment is a learning laboratory for multinationals 
(BockmanlEyal 2002). In these kind of settings new routines between management and 
workforce are tested which may later be applied in well-established production places in 
the West. These eastern laboratories are already being used to put pressure on wages and 
privileges in the West. From this perspective, the eastern laboratory is a 'learning' facility 
for western capitalists and a useful instrument to limit the power and opportunities of 
labour relationships which have been established within the last decades in the West. The 
notion of 'globalisation', which is explicitly handled as an inevitable process of 'new 
realities' is in fact a well controlled new set of labour relationships, tested and expanded in 
new capitalist spaces in CEE which re-draws the production map of Europe, offering "new 
opportunities to both companies and regions, but they also pose potential threats to both" 
(Hudson 2002d:3). The relocation of production (or the threat to do so) is, of course, not a 
new phenomenon. What is new is that the receivers of foreign investments are post-
socialist areas close to the established western markets, where it seems to be easier to 
maintain and expand the interests of multinational corporations. The geographical and 
cultural proximity of these areas is from this point of view a useful and very concrete tool 
to keep in check western standards of labour relations on the one side and to create new 
forms of uneven development on the other (Hudson 1999a). 
Understanding post-socialist economic transformation is precisely the study of spaces 
where old and new networks constitute themselves and socially interact. The outcome of 
these interactions generates new sets of actors, redefined and recombined routines, which 
are significantly different from that what has been analysed in similar western regions. The 
main argument of this thesis is that the process of redefinition. in fact the reflexive 
application of bricoiage, is most important for a 'successful' transformation. This means 
that old elements are tested in new circumstances and survive when their social and 
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economic value and usefulness is positively assessed. This process of testing is in fact a 
learning and adaptation process and might lead to innovation. On the other hand. old 
elements that are not productive will die a 'natural death' or - in the worst case - survive 
artificially because certain interest groups are still powerful enough to prolong their 
existence. The latter case is not a learning process, but a matter of hierarchies and reaches 
into the political realm of transformation. If this sort of routine continues its life. possible 
lock-ins occur and hinder regeneration and innovation processes, because economic actors 
do not stand the "fitness test" (GrabherlStark 1997:535). Old and new elements are in a 
constant process of re-combining; both worlds are equally important in this perspective. 
While the old elements help to avoid cultural • shock-effects , and alienation from the 
capitalist project, the new elements help to adapt to the necessary sets of economic 
relations. 
7.2 Trust and Networks in 'Emerging Markets' 
The existence of social and cultural capital, in particular a set of cultural norms and 
routines, spatially embedded in networks, has been widely linked with regional economic 
development (chapter 2.2.2), also in Upper Silesia (CybulalSzczepanski 1998). Apparently. 
the existence of informal institutions facilitates co-operation between organisations and 
political or economic actors. Indeed, this social interaction is spatially embedded, 
supported by geographical and cultural proximity, usually practised by face-to-face 
contacts within certain networks. The case study has actually shown that networks, as a 
base of building up trusted relations, do exist or are about to be created. While recent 
studies on Upper Silesia tend to focus on a specific set of cultural norms such as the 
Catholic faith, family values or a strong working ethos as a common sense shared by 
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interacting networks and people, less has been said about specific routines of 'doing 
business' in post-socialist contexts. 158 
7.2.1 Identities and Histories 
Moral values and traditions seen as important assets - or obstacles - to the region's 
capacity for innovation and restructuring have been regularly defined as strong cultural 
aspects, which distinguish Upper Silesia from other Polish regions. Undoubtedly, these 
infonnal institutions do exist and infonn a good part of everyday practices in the studied 
region. But in what way does this social and cultural capital shape economic restructuring 
and innovation processes? Common values or historical legacies are certainly relevant to 
the creation of trusted co-operation or the opposite, but this one-sided approach or, better, 
this cultural and historical detenninism is insufficient for an understanding of post-socialist 
transfonnation. 
It rather seems to be that the claiming of 'traditions' is connected to a pre-socialist time 
period or a re-discovery of regional identity which has long passed away (and never 
existed in that homogenous sense anyway). It is suggested that in the case of post-socialist 
territories the concept of 'the region' (and all places) "as open, discontinuous, relational 
and internally diverse" (AllenlMassey/Cochrane 1998:143) offers an insight into the 
process of becoming a capitalist space, even if this definition is a "possible approach but 
not the only one" (Hudson 2003:584). 
158 In the case of Upper Silesia, the sociologists Cybula and Szczepaflski identified three reasons why "social 
capital is both weak and incongruent with the requirements of the adaptation to change" (CybulalSzczepanski 
1998:218). First, the 'cultural norms' of the region do not support entrepreneurship and adaptation of workers 
faced with quickly changing circumstances. Second. the communist heritage with its patron-client 
relationships considerably weakened social ties and demolished civil society as a whole. Third. the influx of 
migrants during the socialist era "additionally weakened Upper Silesian communities" because of a lack of 
efforts at integration of the migrants after the war. which led to an "ethnic and cultural mix" (ibid:219). This 
pessimistic estimation is probably based on a very restricted definition of the 'the region'. which is seen as a 
rather closed and homogenous spatial entity. endowed with a well-defined set of indigenous people 
conveying 'regional traditions'. 
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The process of re-discovery of historical implications (e.g. the legacy of elected regional 
self-governments) and the re-definition of cultural assets is definitely part of the cultural 
and economic transformation process of a post-socialist region. From this perspective, the 
'identity project' is a political and self-legitimating tool for creating trust and self-
assurance among the electorate and among emerging political and economic networks in 
uncertain (economic) times and thus focuses on the mobilisation of the region's population 
and its actors. The definition of a region incorporates in this sense its social relations and 
refers to "a complex and unbounded lattice of articulations with internal relations of power 
and inequality and punctured by structured exclusions" (AllenlMassey/Cochrane 1998:65). 
The reconstruction of social, cultural and historical implications in Upper Silesia is in fact 
an ongoing dispute over the sovereignty of definitions, the articulations of political and 
economic interests and thus a political, power-imbued project which very much refers to 
the negotiation of possible futures of the region. The group of actors with the best 
adaptation and learning capacities, capable of recombining the routines of the past with the 
demands of neo-liberal thinking will in the end succeed and extend their networks of 
action. 
The assertion of 'hard working people' as a typical regional tradition is in fact drawn from 
the region's legacy of being old industrial. Ironically, this asset is now conveyed to give 
evidence of the labour force's commitment for 'modernisation' and the whole region's 
capacity to innovate itself through its social capital and by the means (and attraction) of 
foreign direct investment. The process of re-inventing a former socialist region is actually 
driven by certain groups and their interests, a project which focuses on political legitimacy 
and the creation of trust - trust created by formal and informal institutions in a relational 
way and not, as Putnam might suggest by, the society itself (MohanlMohan 2002: 195); 
whether these networks are actually linked and whether these networks and their socially 
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constructed norms are more "likely to serve broader interests" (as Putnam also suggests) 
will be discussed in the next section. 
7.2.2 Connectedness and Embeddedness 
The building of vertical and horizontal networks and their openness, their density and 
intensity of internal and external interaction has been described as a key indicator for the 
capacity of regional innovation and development (chapter 2.2.2). While 'weak ties' or 
'loose coupling' are helpful for the purpose of quick adaptability and learning, where ties 
are too strong, or there are 'lock-ins', this has the opposite result (Cooke/Morgan 1998:72-
76; Grabher/Stark 1997:537-540). Certain networks, endowed with specific sets of 
conventions fail to communicate and interact with outsiders. 
The restructuring process in Upper Silesia is a useful case study of analysing existing and 
emerging networks, as well as their interaction and spatial-cultural embeddedness. One of 
the assumption of this thesis was, that the political and economic transformation process in 
post-socialist territories generates a distinctive set of actors, who are actually embedded 
and organised in strong networks, an asset deriving from the socialist past (StarklBruszt 
1998:122). Indeed, these networks could have been identified, but the de facto political 
support for innovation networks has been described as insufficient window-dressing or as a 
top-down attitude which rather sediments the routine of patron-client relationships 
(Cymbrowski 2004:69-72). 
It has been argued that the reconfiguration of post-socialist power structures leads to a 
process which has been labelled as 'plan to clan', an economic transformation process 
generating 'involution', "[in the case of Russia] - an imploding world in which a merchant 
bourgeoisie forged from the old nomenklatura raided the economy to produce primitive 
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disaccumulation, a return to peasant society, a retreat to self-provisioning, the expansion of 
petty commodity production and of primitive barter" (Burawoy 200 I: 112). Burawoy uses 
the Russian example to challenge StarklBruszt's claim that "communist origins are 
critically important to post-communist outcomes" (ibid.), a claim which has also been 
taken up in this thesis. Evidence in support of Burawoy's extreme assessment of post-
socialist transformation cannot be found in the case study, at least not in a regional context. 
The reason for this absence of regional mafia-like structures can be explained with the help 
of an analysis of economic-political power configurations. 
The restructuring (and privatisation) of Upper Silesia's heavy industry is centrally 
controlled by the state. It has been shown that regional self-governments are in no way 
involved in this process, except with the social-economic impacts due to the enormous 
increase of unemployment and derelict polluted land. Apparently, non-regional networks in 
charge of privatisation of the main state-owned assets are isolated from regional decision 
makers. But the outcome of this 'isolation' - from the perspective of evolutionary 
economics this would probably be seen as a hindrance to innovation - is actually the 
avoidance of excessively close ties between regional and national groups of actors. The 
emergence of political-economic and regional embedded networks (or 'unholy alliances') 
who would (also illegally) privatise public profits could not be identified; a regional lock-
in does not happen in the case of the state-owned sector, because it followed a '''vertical' 
orientation ( ... ) towards the centre in terms of institutionalisation and networking, which 
was preferred to developing 'horizontal' relations within the region" (Cybula 2004:270). 
But this general picture has to be detailed. It is not being argued that illegal or 
intransparent proceedings within privatisation efforts of the heavy industry do not exist (of 
course they do, but these networks have a national base), but in terms of network 
constellation, the disconnectedness of regional and national networks seems to have been 
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an advantage in the restructuring process, which is implemented 'anonymously' - or, more 
precisely, without a local or regional political legitimacy159 - a fact that certainly allows 
'less hesitant' action and quicker adaptability to the needs of the market, which strengthens 
the position of the person or agency engaged in restructuring. but not the worker. What has 
to be said is that unlinked networks are not an obstacle for regional restructuring or 
innovation in every case. From this perspective, the centrally organised state (in contrast to 
the federal system, where these 'holy alliances' would be more likely to evolve) seems to 
provide an advantage, at least in terms of restructuring/privatisation of state-owned assets. 
Discussing the restructuring of Bulgarian state enterprises, Pickles sets out some possible 
outcomes of this process: 
"(a) an extension and deepening of horizontal networks and barter arrangements that were typical of the 
classical model of state socialism; (b) residual forms within inefficient industries that will. in time. give way 
to more formal market arrangements based on prices and economic rationality; or (,~ new or old hyhrid 
forms that signal an alternative. emergent model of industrial organisations. what Michael Burawoy calls 
'merchant capitalism n. (Pickles 1998: 187). 
In the case of Upper Silesia, it must be pointed out that the networks of state-owned assets 
of the heavy industry are and were rather vertically organised in terms of control and 
supervision. However, in terms of barter arrangements- business relations - these 
networks are horizontal or regionally formed. The outcome of restructuring for Upper 
Silesia is closer to the variant outlined in Pickles' point (b) - but with the mechanisms and 
routines described in point (a). 
159 Cybula stresses that this un-connectedness "left regional actors in relative peace to do what they saw as 
appropriate" (Cybula 2004:270) and thus empowered local/regional "non-heavy industrial communities" 
(ibid:27I ) as well fuelling a free public discourse about the condition and future of the region. 
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The case study has shown that the coal and steel sector in Upper Silesia has generated 
varying outcomes of an ongoing restructuring process. While some parts of the steel 
industry could be successfully restructured and privatised. the major part of the still 
existing coal industry is 'lagging behind', as production remains unprofitable. 
internationally uncompetitive and thus partly threatened with closure. The resistance 
identified in the coal industry must be seen in the light of what has already been reached in 
terms of downsizing and entrenchment. It would. however, be an exaggeration to speak of 
a lock-in, as causing these 'delays'. 
In the case of the steel industry it has been shown that' lagging behind privatisation' was a 
key to its success and that the strategy 'restructuring before privatisation' was in the end 
the most appropriate. Certainly, the international boom of steel prices has helped the 
restructuring process of this industry and its partial privatisation. That means that just as 
the initial starting points of the coal and steel industries - in terms of possible market 
success - have been different, so are the outcomes. The discussion of the coal sector (in 
chapter 5.1.2), identified 'traditions' and conventions of networks. including political 
decision makers, strong trade unions and the managements which can be probably defined 
as 'closed', but the introduction of an outsider as the head of the biggest European coal 
company has not led to improved communication between these groups -at least it shows 
that this restructuring process is also open to non-members of these interlinked networks. 
In the end, it is the enormous task and its national and international implications. in 
particular politically, which makes the restructuring difficult and not the existence of 
excessively strong internal and external ties among the actors. However. it must also be 
acknowledged on the basis of this case that the 'embeddedness' of regional networks does 
not create either a guarantee or remedy for innovation or the capacity to restructure. 
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Like the state-owned (or privatised) industries, the multinational corporations are also 
disconnected from 'the region' and its political actors, but rather tend to link up locally and 
nationally. It turns out that regional contacts are simply not perceived as necessary. One 
reason for the lack of these connections is that regional self-governments are a rather new 
phenomenon, until now only endowed with basic authorities and thus not a useful co-
operation partner for firms that want to invest locally and not 'regionally'. Indeed, in the 
case of regional economic policy, the elected government tries to act more like a mediator 
between different groups of actors than an independent actor who sets out binding and 
respected procedures, and this is probably all that can be expected. This emerging 
'mediation' or programming role is mainly addressed to regional or local development 
organisations, higher educational facilities and small and medium-sized companies. 
Analysing these kinds of emerging networks, suggests that the absence of effective 
linkages between regional administration and multinational corporations tends to hinder 
the sustainable implementation of economic related projects and the achievement of 
deepened co-operation. While the absence of regional linkages to the state-owned sector 
has probably been helpful in the restructuring process, in the case of multinational 
corporations the assessment is the opposite. 
7.2.3 Regions as Economic Actors 
It has been argued that "regions are not real actors" (BatheltlGIUckler 2003: 121). because 
economic processes are shaped by the action and interaction of firms and networks of firms 
(and not by 'regional actors'). Thus the core of a theoretical framework in economic 
geography should not focus on space and spatial categories, but be focused on the 
understanding of economic actors and their organisations (ibid: 124). It is argued here that 
this statement is at least misleading. 'Regions' are inhabited by human actors, not only in a 
political sense, endowed with (limited) authorities and legitimacy, but also in an economic 
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sense and in particular in a social sense which makes them capable of linking up with other 
actors and building networks that have multiple intentions and interests. While their 
capacity to act economically is definitely restricted to the formulation of non-binding 
strategies and policies, at least 'regions' try to extend their influence on projects which 
focus on 'the economy', thus a willingness to control is observable. While 'the region' is a 
socially constructed and abstract spatial entity, the consequences of this (re-}invention are 
very comprehensible. In the case of Upper Silesia, Amin states that identity building and 
the articulation of a regional economy are combined processes which are being used to 
foster integration into the EU (Amin 2004:35; see also Bialasiewicz 2002:124-125). 
Even though the impact of these 'regional actions' are limited, it would be too far reaching, 
if the "core of a theoretical framework" in economic geography were to neglect political 
and in particular formal and informal institutional processes at a regional level, such as the 
extension of authority (e.g. the ongoing decentralisation process) or the recombination of 
economic routines. Moreover, co-operation partners of 'regions' are increasing 
international. As this case study has shown, an understanding of economic transformation 
processes in post-socialist territories would not be possible without incorporating external 
effects, in particular the European enlargement process with its networks, partnerships and 
institutional straight jackets. In this case study, the 'spatial category' plays a crucial role in 
understanding (subjective-) rational decisions of economic actors, such as barter trade. 
While this non-monetary transaction routine might be a special case in 'emerging markets', 
it is actually heavily dependent on geographical and social proximity and thus a spatially 
embedded routine which helps to reduce transaction costs. 
While economIc geography (and mainstream economICS In general) has long been 
neglecting decision processes within firms, it is fair enough to stress the necessity of 
extending the ontologies with the objective of better understanding spatial-economic 
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change, because "what is needed is research into how complex production systems are 
organised in time and space which recognizes that business enterprises play a central role 
in this process" (DickenlThrift 1992:288). Indeed, it is agreed that the 'real' economic 
actors of a given region are firms with their economic interactions. But it would be an 
overstatement to assume that firms are the only players, in particular in post-socialist 
settings where political and other actors are actively engaged in the process of (re-
)inventing and socially constructing capitalist regions and their 'identities'. While this 
construction might be 'unreal' (and loaded with political interest), the outcome has 
certainly 'real' consequences on economic transformation. In transformation economies 
and their "strange geographies of 'emerging markets'" - actually driven by a "combination 
of interests and agents" (Sidaway/Pryke 2000: 194-195) and mainly organised on a global 
level - the colourful and multi-folded economic dynamics are definitely not only shaped by 
one actor group. Thus, it is necessary to incorporate and to identify as many as possible. 
This multitude is not aimed at constructing a comprehensive, complete or "whole" (see 
AllenlMassey/Cochrane 1998:65) picture of a region and its economic processes, it aims 
rather to identify unexpected but important social linkages between actors and networks 
and their spatial articulation, definitely a crucial point in relational economic geography. 
7.3 The Holy Trinity in a Post-Socialist and Old Industrial 
Region 
A regional economy, defined as "an assemblage of heterogeneous, broadly rational agents, 
with imperfect learning and information" (Storper 1997:64), which is capable of 
technological innovation and spillovers produces a specific knowledge base, formal and 
informal institutions and organisations which are "highly regionalist and necessarily 
dependent on geographical proximity" (ibid:66). All these traded and untraded 
interdependencies, such as a highly qualified labour force, research institutes, state 
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agencles, embedded rules and routines, m particular business and public-private 
relationships, have played a crucial role in the analysis of the case study region. 
While Upper Silesia was once a 'core region', endowed with a collection of firms with a 
significant concentration in complementary industries, its position at the forefront of 
technical innovation has been declining as industrial knowledge has become 
'cosmopolitan' and stopped being dependent on this specific area. As a result. Upper 
Silesia can now be seen as an important non-core region which has to compete with firms 
in other regions, using technology which can easily be imitated (Storper 1997: 78-80). 
Superficially seen, the evolutionary trajectory of this old industrial region is, of course, by 
no means unusual, as this 'process of modernisation' has taken place in similar heavy-
industry regions worldwide. 
From this perspective, only the artificial maintenance of these industries during Poland's 
socialist period prolonged the survival of some of its most inefficient parts as capitalist 
mechanisms such as market competition or the necessity of technological innovation were 
replaced by a hollow political (or rather ideological) and cultural image of being on the 
forefront of socialist progress, a model region of socialism with a 'human face' which will 
in the end "overtake ( ... ) the industrial successes of the corrupt West" (Krawat 1999. 
quoted in Bialasiewicz 2002: 118). But the case of an old industrial and post-socialist 
region is significantly different to what might appear to be similar trajectories in the West, 
as the opening-up happens in a certain space/time context that distinguishes central 
European economic transformation from western 'structural change'. It is not only the 
time-parallel political, economic and social transformation in post-socialist territories 
which affects questions of restructuring or technological change - recognised in this thesis 
as a very dynamic recombination of regionally and locally embedded sets of actors and 
routines. The currents of neo-liberalism - embedded in the ideology of globalisation and 
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open markets - are additionally necessary to understand processes of (economic) 
transformation in post-socialist countries, and thus help to conceptualise and distinguish 
peculiar processes. As the political and economic processes in Upper Silesia have shown, 
almost every main issue of restructuring and transformation refers to this region as a space 
of 'actually existing neo-liberalism', identified in "the deregulation of state control over 
major industries, assaults on organized labor, the reduction of corporate taxes, the 
shrinking and/or privatization of public services, ( ... ), the enhancement of international 
capital mobility, [and] the intensification of interlocality competition ( ... )" 
(Brenner/Theodore 2002:350). 
Thus, the analysis of a post-socialist region cannot be limited to its internal sets of actors 
and decision makers, but must also focus on the region's external connections. The 
analysis of external interactions not only makes clear a certain degree of openness and 
'willingness' to learn from outside experiences, but also emphasises the region's 
vulnerability and dependency in terms of outside pressures and thus determines a limited 
leeway for action. Despite these external frameworks and space/time constraints, the 
emergence of a peculiar way of 'doing business' can be observed, which raises the 
suggestion that business routines of new capitalist regions do not (entirely) converge with 
the routines of old capitalist regions in times of neo-liberalism, but that the post-socialist 
context produces an idiosyncratic technique of becoming a part of globally linked networks 
and flows. 
7.3.1 Reflexivity and Bricolage 
At this point it is suggested that Storper's claim of the 'reflexive turn' as being one of the 
major capitalistic meta-forces of recent years proves to be embedded in the analysed post-
socialist case. Reflexivity refers to the possibility of actors "to shape the course of 
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economIC evolution" (Storper 1997:29) which includes 'unreal' interpretations and 
constructed images of reality on which individual and collective actions may be based -
actually the motor of capitalist evolution such as markets or prices - while the outcomes of 
these social constructions have a 'real' impact on the economy. The 'invention of a 
capitalist region' is precisely rooted in these mechanisms of reflexivity (e.g. the 
establishment of a region as an 'actor'). But the new opportunities are of course heavily 
limited by external straight jackets, for example, through the adaptation of EU legislation or 
the locational decisions of global corporations and intra-regional hierarchies, such as 
access to certain political-economic networks. Indeed, Storper stresses that reflexivity is 
not free from constraint - which reflects a long-lasting discussion within social sciences 
and philosophy revolving around issues of free will and determinism, but in the end he 
acknowledges that the "variety of concrete empirical possibilities for the organization of 
markets, firms, and other institutional spheres of economic and social life have been vastly 
increased" (Storper 1997:30) by the metacapacities of capitalism, in particular by reflexive 
interaction. 
Storper's emphasis on reflexivity, and the 'loose constraints' on economic actors 
incorporates a strange silence on the uneven power of economic and political actors, which 
affects all regional trajectories. In contrast to this absence, chapter 6 of this thesis has 
provided evidence of the diverse local developments in selected Upper Silesian cities and 
the historical legacies which are politically used to redefine the region's economic identity. 
It is argued that this process is characterised by a struggle for economic and political power 
which makes it possible to speak of an emerging competitive and capitalist urban 
environment. Alongside this "instrumental" form of power (the 'power over'), 
"associational" power ('power to') as a form of collective empowerment, is clearly 
evolving in post-socialist contexts. Moreover, it is argued that the latter form of power 
might be at least as important in defining the mode of transformation, because in post-
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socialist contexts the collective capacity and the interlinked mobilisation of resources are 
the most reliable and trusted assets in 'surviving' the hardship of system change. Storper's 
concept of the holy trinity does not really focus on aspects of power and politics, in part 
because of a general tendency in institutional and evolutionary approaches to neglect 
aspects of dominance (the power over) or the shaping of economic discourses and 
identities as one form in which such power might be exerted. However, one consequence 
of this is that the significance of political power relations and their construction is 
underplayed and this is particularly apparent in the making up of Upper Silesia as a post-
socialist region. Although other forms of power are core aspects of institutional analyses. 
in particular the co-operation and collaboration between economic actors. they are often 
presented in a rather 'clean' and technical manner, neglecting the transformative politics of 
deliberate association. 
The argument of this thesis has also linked the process of 'doing' politics in post-socialist 
regions with the politics of identity and the recovery of a regional identify. The reflexivity 
of this process and the actors involved might have been expected to yield an identity of 
mixed, diverse and alternative fragments, but the contrary, the actual political presentation 
of Upper Silesia as a coherent cultural space aims at preparing the region for its path of 
economic transformation towards the capitalist mode of accumulation with clear neo-
liberal values - and this is definitely not a coincidence. In this way, a variety of 
possibilities is not given, but determined by those political and economic networks which 
have the power to define or shape such a socially constructed picture. 
On the other hand, this 'variety of possibilities' is what has been observed in an emerging 
new capitalist territory, where the recombination of old and new elements or the heritage 
of 'socialist' routines blends with new and capitalist routines, which has been identified as 
a bricolage of formal and informal institutions. Introducing the term hricolage incorporates 
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the danger of adding another 'fuzzy concept' to the realm of relational economic 
geography (Markusen 1999). But, there seems to be no alternative than of accepting 
fuzziness as a necessary stage in developing ideas, seen as a collective project of scientific 
learning. 
The quality of economIC change and restructuring, the nature of post-socialist 
transformation itself with its underlying social interactions is - for the time being -
something significantly different from what has been described in western contexts and 
this process is the result of reflexive interactions embedded in an idiosyncratic spatial post-
socialist context. In this context, reflexivity is the driving force of testing old and new 
elements for their effectiveness and appropriateness in an emerging market, within which 
the 'survival' of the old is mostly dependent on its creative blending with adapted capitalist 
techniques and routines. From this perspective it is possible to think of post-socialist 
economic transformation as a process of reflexive and creative recombination of traded and 
untraded interdependencies. 
Post-socialist untraded interdependencies, seen as conventions and the relations in which 
they are effective, are in a constant and flowing process of re-configuration of old and new 
elements, here labelled as bricolage. Michael D. Kennedy claims that a similar idea of 
recombination and thus a concept for understanding the dynamics of post-socialist 
capitalism in general was first introduced by J6zsef Borocz, who described 'fusion' as a 
"creative reinterpretation of old and new elements, creating substantively distinguishable 
qualities of social experience" (Borocz 1995, quoted in Kennedy 2002: 145). However, the 
connotation of 'fusion' suggests an irreversible process of generating a routine where its 
different elements are becoming indistinguishable. On the contrary. in this thesis it is 
suggested that the process of recombination is a constant and ongoing search, through 
which the elements that are mobilised happen to be tested and possibly rejected after a 
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while, if they turn out to be inappropriate. The idea of the bricolage of conventions is 
consistent with Storper's understanding of reflexivity and the possibilities of rational 
bounded actors who socially encounter each other, but reinterpreted for the case of post-
socialist transformation. 
It has been shown that in some cases the process of recombination could be explained as 
the subjective rational behaviour of economically and spatially acting persons or networks 
of actors, despite the fact that in 'transition culture' every aspect of the socialist heritage 
and thinking is rejected and must be avoided by 'East Europeans' '"for fear of being tarred 
with that label" (Kennedy 2002: 147). The French term bricolage captures the idea of 'do it 
yourself-practices', a constant process of learning how to construct or to alter a house in a 
rather semi-professional or even amateurish often incomplete fashion, oriented towards 
feasibility concerning materials, financial resources, know-how and the helping hands at 
the do-it-yourselfer's disposal. It is not suggested that the economic transformation process 
in CEE is undertaken in an 'amateurish' way, thus reproducing the misleading argument of 
the "continuity of backwardness", (Wydra 2000:ch.4), but rather that the process of 
becoming a 'proper' capitalist territory can be understood as a pragmatic and creative 
application of recombined routines by individual and collective actors, with some of these 
redefined routines drawing (necessarily) on the historical experience of 'real existing 
socialism' . 
The reading of lanos Kenedi's "Do it Yourself' recalls the complicated informal process 
and manner in which a private house was planned and constructed in Hungary during the 
socialist period (Kenedi -1981). For some 'westerners', many of these conventions and 
practices (e.g. how to purchase land or how to 'organise' building materials) appear to be 
absurd or at least inefficient, as they would not make any sense in a capitalist institutional 
environment. But in socialist times, 'unusual' practices were necessary to realise certain 
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aims, in particular in an informal way. In the case of Upper Silesia, many informants 
identified this practice with the slightly euphemistic Polish term of kombinowac which 
could be translated with a pragmatic (sometimes illegal) way of 'organising' or muddling-
through. The case study reveals that the know-how of kombinowac still plays a crucial role. 
in business relations too, and certainly compensates for the absence of functioning formal 
institutions so that it helps actors to survive economically in uncertain times of 
transformation. From this perspective, kombinowac points to the existence empowered 
actors (in contrast to the 'victims of transformation') who shape transformation processes 
actively by the application of learned skills in the 'real existing capitalism'. 
7.3.2 Uncertainty, Risk, and Relationality 
Following Storper, who borrows from Frank Knight's seminal work "'Risk, Uncertainty. 
and Profit" (1921), products and thus their frameworks of action are either amenable to a 
market which is predictable in the case of generic products or uncertain in the case of 
dedicated products. 160 In Knight's take on institutional economic processes, the main role 
of the entrepreneur is to reduce uncertainty. In fact many tasks of company management 
are faced with uncertain outcomes, such as the discovery of new markets. the 
implementation of new production techniques or internal labour relations (North 1990:77). 
Thus, information must be acquired to reduce all kinds of uncertainty and transaction costs 
and to increase control over adequate investments. For Knight, profits and losses of firms 
exist only because of existing levels of uncertainty, thus "all profits would vanish, if the 
winning person or company could be indicated ex ante" (Brouwer 2001 :93). The ability to 
160 See chapter 2.3.1 for a discussion of the World of Production, including Figure I. Storper gives several 
examples for his take on 'uncertainty' and 'predictability' for certain products. For example. generic-
standardised products such as cars or steel of the Industrial World are usually faced with a predictable market 
"in the sense that its appeal to a large number of potential buyers at any given moment allows producers to 
estimate fluctuations of the market and plan their investments and allocation of resources (the law of large 
numbers)" (Storper 1997:\09). On the other hand, dedicated products such as highly specialised IT products 
face uncertain markets. "because the ratio of number of products to number of clients reduces the feasibility 
of probability estimations of demand; the law of large numbers no longer works" (ibid: 110). 
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predict a certain outcome is dependent on adequate information, but in the end decisions 
are rather based on 'educated' guesses and what Knight calls 'perception'161 or subjective 
rationality of entrepreneurs or investors (instead of Weber's objective rationality), because 
information is always incomplete (see ibid:102). While Knight formulates these 'intuitive' 
aspects of 'doing business' in a rather non-relational way of game-like sportsmanship the 
outcome of this thesis suggests that SUbjective rationality is deeply embedded in socially 
constructed and spatially applied conventions of collective frameworks of action. 
Storper's market distinction between predictability and uncertainty in the World of 
Production might be justifiable in well-organised and functioning markets, but is this the 
case for transformation or 'emerging' markets, too? Indeed, the case study reveals a 
domestic market which is characterised by predictability, in particular for generic products 
such as steel and coal or for products with a 'semi-high-technology' input such as cars. The 
predictability of this domestic market is still characterised by rather low private 
consumption patterns and low levels of state expenditure. It is precisely the lack of private 
and state capital liquidity which leads to what has been labelled in this thesis as a 'survival 
economy', with a rather less profitable, but at least a predictable unstable market. 162 
This is one reason why many Upper Silesian companies are looking at new markets 
abroad, a fact which will certainly accelerate in the wake of increasing integration with the 
EU. However, these foreign markets are apparently characterised by a certain level of 
uncertainty, even for generic products. For example, the highly profitable boom of steel 
products in recent times - triggered by external industrialisation efforts in China - was 
161 'Perceptiveness' is in Knight's work strongly related to the choice of investment projects and their timing. 
Investments are undertaken with the prospective of profits. Innovation can only be reached if investments are 
used to create new resources (Brouwer 200 I :92). 
162 Focusing on the supply side, even if an entrepreneur has enough imagination to predict market 
expectations and thus the use of adequate investments, the lack of financial means in transformation 
economies (at least for 'indigenous' players) must be seen as a decisive hindrance in delivering these 
expectations. The scarcity of finance significantly shapes input/output relations but weaknesses may be 
compensated for by the application of informal or trusted relationships. This has been shown elsewhere in 
this thesis. 
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hardly predicted by this industry, at least not to this extent (the Indian entrepreneur Mittal 
seems to be an exception), otherwise more efforts would have been undertaken to rescue 
more of these industrial residues - not only in Poland, but elsewhere in Europe. 
It can be argued here that the distinction between predictability and uncertainty of markets 
- and thus the proclamation of different product-oriented frameworks of action for 
innovation - needs more attention regarding access to uncodifiable information which is in 
the end interpreted by collective actors and their interpretation matrix (conventions) and 
not only aspects of quantity. as Storper suggests with the law of large numbers - as the 
main guiding force of uncertainty/predictability. For companies in post-socialist settings. 
the ability to extend their markets via learning seems to be a guiding element of becoming 
innovative, as this risk-taking is a precondition of survival in transformation periods. 
Following North, innovations are not only related to the development of new, superior 
products, but are also related to organisational and institutional innovations aimed at 
reducing transformation costs. Writing about the economic rise of the 'western world' in 
the early modem period, North argues that "the final innovation was the transformation of 
uncertainty into risk" (North 1990: 126).163 Like Knight (and John M. Keynes), North 
sharply distinguishes between uncertainty and risk. The former condition is not calculable 
and thus unpredictable, "because it depends on the exercise of human jUdgment in the 
making of decisions" (Brouwer 2001:92), whereas risk is calculable a priori and can be 
treated as costs, e.g. in the form of insurance. l64 Many unexpected events might be 
163 North specifies three major innovations which fuelled Europe's rise of long-distance trade in the early 
modern period: first, innovations that increased the mobility of capital; second, innovations lowering the cost 
of information; and third "those that spread risk" (North 1990: 125). 
164 This formalistic distinction clearly touches philosophical questions, which cannot be discussed in detail at 
this point. Economic processes such as investments are based on expectations, e.g. in the form of future 
revenues, which are socially constructed and dependent on particular cultural and psychological contexts. We 
might be able to imagine the future and to adapt our actions to this imagination, but the imagination of future 
developments in the present is limited to what we (think we) know at this time and actual processes can only 
be controlled (and explained) to a certain extent. The introduction of calculable risks is in the end just a 
mathematical trick that can hardly hide the fact that economics is not a natural, but social science. 
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insurable (e.g. fires), but the outcome of investments are not, because calculations can only 
be done ex post. The analysis of transformation economies in the case of Upper Silesia 
reveals a high degree of uncertainty, caused by incomplete (or, rather, new and untested) 
formal institutions and recombinant informal institutions. But many of the regional firms -
whether formally state-owned or newly established private firms - have learned to cope 
with this situation by learning and adapting to uncertain conditions. From this perspective, 
an organisational innovation process can be identified which aims at reducing 
transformation costs by applying tacit local knowledge and drawing on external 
economies, such as a well-trained labour force or proximity advantages in agglomerations. 
The nature of transformation economies is precisely characterised by a high degree of 
uncertainty, or in the words of North by a low transformation level of uncertainty into risk. 
Only those economic players will survive who find a way to reduce uncertainty with the 
help of reinvented and recombinant conventions, embedded and applied in their direct 
environment. Additionally, those firms are forced to extend familiar economic activities 
and contexts to 'unknown territory' by investments with an unpredictable outcome. It is 
argued here that this move, e.g. in form of search for new markets or the development of 
new products or qualities, is to a certain extent safeguarded by a set of locally embedded 
untraded interdependencies and non-cosmopolitan knowledges, which reduce 
transformation costs and thus increase economic scopes of action, also on a global level. 
Following Storper, risk in the economic world is also the outcome of increased reflexivity 
of economic activity, thus "manufactured by the reflexive learning of others" and 
"expressed through the redefinition of competition" (Storper 1997:31 +30). Economic 
activities and the conditions where these activities are embedded are rapidly changing, 
"creating a moving target for success and a shifting minefield of risks and failure" (ibid.). 
In other words, different economic activities and decisions which determine failure or 
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winning have never before been closer to each other. While new opportunities and chances 
to succeed have doubtless risen with the help of reflexive capitalistic meta-capacities and 
'reflexive modernisation' , so have the risks of failure, not only in an economic sense (Beck 
1992). This trend can be clearly recognised in post-socialist territories, probably even 
better than in established capitalist regions. The opening-up of former socialist and rather 
self-contained territories to the capitalist world has indeed created new sets of 
opportunities, which not only change the mode of production in these regions, but in the 
rest of Europe. While the relocation of production from the West to the East helps the 
restructuring process in particular in old industrial regions such as Upper Silesia, it also 
changes western well-established labour relations in favour for the employers. The quick 
learning process on how to attract and absorb western capital in former socialist areas has 
doubtless increased and redefined competition in all Europe. 
In the case of Upper Silesia, this foreign capital influx creates at least four new major risks. 
First, as most foreign investments are automotive based, the danger occurs that a new 
mono-structural industry will be established in this region - endowed with 'vertical 
network power' - which makes it (again) vulnerable to global and macro-regional shifts in 
production and consumption patterns. Second, distinctive location advantages such as low 
wages for rather well-qualified workers are, alongside the geographical location of the 
region, a major incentive to invest for global corporations, but the risk arises that 
production will move on when wages adapt to EU-15 standards in the future and public 
bodies have not used time-restricted windows of opportunity in creative ways to hold fast 
foreign capital. Third, new intra-regional qualities of competition between different cities 
already exist and will further increase inequalities in future, a fact that will lead to 
accelerating depopulation in those places which have lost the race over foreign capital. 
Fourth, while the adaptation to new formal institutions such as the EU acquis 
communautaire and linked standards of production certainly create 'indigenous' winners 
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who are capable of learning quickly and extending or redefining their business relations, 
other companies will disappear from the market - even when their product is competitive -
because an inappropriate set of untraded interdependencies exists or there are missing links 
to mutual supporting networks. 
While these general macro risks are formulated, the question arises in what way 'the 
region' and its actors will use the suggested window of opportunity and contribute the 
technical innovation necessary to support industrial and regional restructuring. An 
emerging key 'co-evolutionary' process - seen as an intra-regional organisational and 
technological dynamic which incorporates the 'holy trinity' - is mostly acknowledged for 
'core regions', while this kind of evolutionary dynamic needs much more effort in mature 
and cosmopolitan industries in 'non-core' regions (Storper 1997:69+80). In the following, 
the elements of the trinity and its linkages are discussed in more detail, to allow a deeper 
understanding of the economic transformation process in post-socialist contexts. 
7.3.3 Technologies, Organisations, and Territory 
Following Storper, 'technology' should "be thought of both as physical asset and as a 
cognitive framework that allows access to knowledge in the form of a practice or 
technique" (Storper 1997 :69-70). While most of the physical assets in the form of technical 
know-how have long become cosmopolitan in old industries, it is suggested here that 
practices and techniques (the cognitive framework) are heavily dependent on a non-
cosmopolitan and geographically bounded knowledge base - at least in the context of post-
socialist economic transformation. 16s Some of these techniques are in fact learned skills 
which have their origins in the socialist command economy. Practices such as barter trade 
(chapter 5.1.1) have not only been continued in the transformation economy, but have to be 
16S It is acknowledged here that non-cosmopolitan knowledge is "not necessarily associated with proximity of 
localisation" (Storper 1997:71) and thus that the relationship between this kind of knowledge and 
geographically proximity should be assessed and analysed from case to case. 
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seen as crucial spatially embedded practices helping to reduce uncertainty under the 
condition of complexity and dynamic changes in production and trade. This kind of non-
monetary transaction is a 'hard' exchange-based relationship between business partners, in 
this way an input-output relationship or traded interdependency. At the same time, the 
opening-up of such a locally and regionally bounded relationship is unthinkable without 
drawing from underlying untraded interdependencies - the soft aspects of 'doing business' 
with commonalities, mutual trust (conventions) and precisely the complex technique which 
is necessary to minimise usually high transaction costs in these kinds of exchanges. While 
this technique is dependent on locally and regionally bound knowledge (e.g. knowledge 
about barter goods and partners), it also increases the reflexive possibilities for future 
relationships in the form of proper monetary exchanges. For the time being, is must be 
doubted that survival techniques such as non-monetary transactions increase technological 
regional innovation, but at least they offer the pospect of becoming part of this process 
when 'times are getting better'. 
Storper argues that "organizations of actors are necessary to supply the product's demand 
for innovative capacities" (Storper 1997: 122), and suggests that different forms of 
organisation have to be established for different kinds of products and internal innovative 
capacities. In developing this argument, Storper acknowledges that the 'network firm', 
which is usually associated with the emergence of western-style technology districts and a 
high degree of co-operation is not simply replacing the 'hierarchical firm' organised in 
oligopolies, and usually characterised by a classical spatial division of labour, which is the 
outcome of industrialisation and mass production. But the acknowledgement of the need to 
discriminate among organisational forms is also the acknowledgement that both worlds of 
organisation have a distinctive raison d 'etre in themselves, determined by their different 
needs for innovative product development, modes of production or their connectedness and 
different sets of action frameworks. There is no doubt that "networks are the fundamental 
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stuff of which new organisations are and will be made" (Castells 1996: 168), but certainly, 
this reflexive quality and know-how is not an invention of the capitalist information age, 
but has been practised under socialism as well, admittedly in a completely different spatial-
economic and social context. Without these abilities and underlying conventions - which 
have been adapted and extended in a creative process of recombination - many firms 
would not have survived the transformation period or would not have been newly 
established. 
The connotation of an 'old industrial' region implies the smoke-stacked picture that such 
kind of regions are 'lagging behind', are incapable of innovation or are just to be doomed 
in the process of downsizing and entrenchment. All of these characteristics can certainly be 
found in the analysed region and have been subject of many studies in similar regions 
around the world. On the other hand, it is also necessary to identify processes which 
challenge the prejudices connected with such regions. First, besides de-industrialisation, 
current re-Iocational dynamics in Europe and elsewhere provide opportunities to the newly 
established territories in CEE - in form of re-industrialisation. Second, some large 
companies of the old era which survived the first transformation period in the early 1990s 
and afterwards with the help of state-subsidies were indeed able to restructure and to 
initiate organisational innovation - with increasing success. Third, a number of newly 
established SMEs of the IT sector at least give some reason for not thinking of it as an 'old 
industrial' region, but a region of change. 
In the following four paragraphs, the different product worlds which can be found in this 
allegedly mono-structured region will be discussed with the help of Storper's holy trinity 
in general and the conception of his World of Production, seen as collective and reflexive 
action for innovation, in particular (Storper 1997: ch.5; chapter 2.3.1 of this thesis). 
Embedded into the case of Upper Silesia, the following sections might interpret some of 
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the current economic transformation processes in post-socialist territories in terms of their 
conventionally-based and regionalised frameworks and scope for action, the regional 
worlds of production and innovation. 
Probably one of the most surprising outcomes of this thesis is the nature of territoriality for 
firms of the Industrial World, defined by standardised products for generic markets. 
Storper characterises this world typically by long-term contracts over large geographical 
distances, caused by predictable market fluctuations (Storper 1997: 125).166 Indeed. the 
corporations of the automotive sector which operate in this Industrial World as well as the 
steel producing sector are indeed defined by this action framework. But the case of Hula 
Katowice, the biggest steel mill in Poland, has revealed an additional, more informal 
picture of business relations. In contrast to Storper's view that the nature of 
interdependencies of such kind of firms are few and traded (ibid: 123) and thus hardly 
dependent on territorial proximity, the opposite has been discovered with the example of 
non-monetary external transactions. One reason for this 'deviant' behaviour certainly lies 
in the dynamic of transformation economies and their unstable, uncertain or emerging 
market relations. Another reason can be found in the internal process of restructuring and 
outsourcing - which aims to lead to complete privatisation in the best case. The former 
nearly completely vertical integrated steel mill, which has lost some of its production and 
service parts in the wake of restructuring has been forced to set up quasi-formal exchange 
arrangements (also with facilities that used to be part of the complex) drawing on 
geographical and social proximity to safeguard continuous profitable production, because 
of the constant lack of liquid capital (before the privatisation). 
166 Only during the first few years - in "the breaking-in stage for truly new standardized-generic products" 
(Storper 1997: 129) - are high levels of proximity supposed to be required. when brands and markets are 
created and found. and the technological trajectory of the product started. 
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In Storper's Market World, characterised by the supply of standardised products for 
dedicated markets, the main drive for product innovation is described as a "continuous 
rapid differentiation of standardized outputs, the key to which is rapid and expanding 
recombination of differentiated standardized inputs" (Storper 1997: 125).167 In this world. 
"territorial proximity can be of help, and both traded and untraded contractual and hybrid 
interdependencies are likely to be found" (ibid.). In CEE. the automotive supply industry 
can be identified as a player, which operates in a world where "immediate availability of 
vertical and horizontal suppliers is required, with little secure future promised to them" 
(ibid.). The typical spatial characterisations of the Market World are specialised production 
regions with a large number of firms. Indeed, the establishment of the automotive supply 
industry in Upper Silesia - which followed car manufactures mainly operating in the 
Industrial World - can be seen as a nationally supported project to diversify the economic 
basis of this region which used to be solely dependent on its former mono-structured coal 
and steel based industries. Most of the investments in this newly established specialised 
production region are foreign and direct, attracted by low tax and wage regimes in special 
economic zones - a process which is opening up the region not only to stiff competition 
with several regions within CEE that are following a similar path of re-industrialisation. 
but which also accelerates intra-regional competition among its cities. The characterisation 
of capital used in this process of re-industrialisation is crucial to understanding how the 
firms and corporations that are involved shape and define not only their territoriality but 
also their organisational structure, labour relations and capacity for technological 
innovation - an estimation that is largely absent form Storper's conception of the holy 
trinity, but which has to be acknowledged not only in the analysis of new capitalist 
territories such as in Central East Europe. In transformation areas, in particular, which are 
faced with drastic and quick changes of their social. economic and political fabric, the 
167 Examples for companies of the Market World, which follow markets "extremely closely" are groups of 
SMEs such as central city garment or furniture firms in the US or flexible high-volume companies centred on 
large firms, which can be found in the Japanese consumer durables industries (see Storper 1997: 1 12-1 13). 
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discrimination of capital helps to identify and understand different and simultaneous 
dynamics, because the "Characteristics of scale and ownership can influence a company's 
response to changing macroeconomic conditions, its relation to policy formulation and its 
ability to respond to policy initiatives, its degree of locational flexibility and its locational 
requirements" (Massey 1984: 18-19). 
The Intellectual World has been described as an 'innovation model' within which 
specialised and varied products compete on generic markets via learning and not via price 
or quality (Storper 1 997:i.a. Ill). As the name of this world already suggests, the action 
framework heavily depends on R&D specialists who might be also part of the 
Interpersonal World in the form of dedicated communities in which they deepen their 
knowledge. The possible 'hybrid membership' of innovative actors in this world of 
production implies a high degree of external relationships which have a distinctive spatial 
quality: these communities are shaped by informal interpersonal ties or through formal 
interfirm alliances in a usually highly territorialised manner (Storper 1997: 131). A main 
action capacity problem is the establishment and maintenance of these innovating groups, 
which share the same conventions and routines: "They must have their place as 
communities, and not simply as representatives of firms, whose interests are frequently too 
narrowly identified with particular product lines, not with whole technological spiIIover 
fields" (ibid., original emphasis). Indeed, territorialised R&D communities have been 
identified in Upper Silesia - or more precisely - in Gliwice, where many graduates of the 
highly influential Technical University maintain close relationships in the intersection of 
politics and business. As the case study has shown, members of this scientific community 
are not only responsible for the establishment of start-ups in IT technologies, but use their 
interpersonal relationships for the development of a common good - the economic 
restructuring of the city of Gliwice - in the form of the first Polish business incubator or 
the highly successful attraction of foreign investments. 
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While this - localised - community of specialists with a regional impact refers directly to 
the common ideals they share (e.g. the agreed convention of high quality scientific 
research), a critical point is how this group of people can be retained not only in the region, 
but also in Poland, when the salaries offered abroad are much higher. This exit option has 
been widely neglected in current discussions of the EU enlargement, which has been more 
preoccupied with the dangers of low-paid labour migration to the western parts of the EU. 
In fact, the danger of brain drain - and, for example, the provision of necessary income 
incentives for highly specialised innovational groups - should be a main concern of 
regional policies and newly established or existing firms of all sectors or sizes, if these 
localised communities shall survive. Paradoxically, the current spatial cost advantages of 
low wages and salaries in transformation economies of CEE could become a disadvantage 
in the middle and long run, when established innovating groups would start to migrate to 
better paid jobs in western Europe or elsewhere. 
For Storper, the Interpersonal World is heavily associated with the emergence of high 
technology or industrial districts of the Marshallian model, as in the US or western 
Europe. l68 This world of production is characterised by a constant innovative invention and 
development of specialised low scale/high variety products for dedicated markets where 
"actors must have the capacities to increase the dedicated qualities of the product by 
deepening the application of their specialised knowledge" (Storper 1997: 126). Indeed, the 
main capacity problem of the interpersonal World is process- and not production-related, 
which refers to the development of communities in which such knowledge is defined and 
created. While close territorial relations between specialised producers and between 
producers and users are crucial in this world, the economic dilemma comes from the low 
168 Indeed, in Storper's work 'The Regional World', the most detailed examples discussing regional worlds of 
production mainly refer to the Interpersonal Worlds of high-tech sectors (or at least highly specialised 
sectors) such as those in California, the 'Third' Italy (Emiglia-Romana, Tuscany). and greater Paris region (fIe 
de France). all 'successful' regions of established western territories (see Storper 1997: ch. 6). 
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scalelhigh variety mode of production which generates high overhead costs and a constant 
danger of theft by the Industrial or Market World, as specialised products become subject 
of standardisation due to more profitable production methods (ibid.). 
It would certainly be overstated to interpret Upper Silesia as a technology district in the 
Marshallian sense, but surprisingly, elements of this world can be found in this part of 
Poland, which has traditionally been characterised as a declining core region of the 
Industrial World. Most obvious is not necessarily Upper Silesia's quantitative endowment 
of highly flexible and closely related start-ups, for example of the IT sector, but the 
regional policy and the financial and organisational EU support to establish and to develop 
this sector with the help of dedicated regional programmes, such as PRELUDE or RIS-
Silesia (chapter 5.2.2). Indeed, these programmes have been described by the main 
political actors as their most important policy tool to initiate restructuring in the region 
with the purpose of promoting the capacities of specialist communities by deepening their 
knowledge. Such forms of diffusion-oriented economic policy have been identified as most 
appropriate for the Interpersonal World, because they "encourage horizontal relations 
between governments and firms" and "provide collective goods (services, especially) for 
clusters of products and producers, at a focused territorial level (e.g. the region)" (Storper 
1997:126). 
While the members of these programmes who were interviewed have regularly hinted that 
the static and bureaucratic organisation, a lack of initiative and risk-taking (not only of the 
state actors) as well as a 'different language' between economic actors, administrators and 
R&D organisations block progress and 'real' outcomes, the question arises why the 'right 
policy' has not (yet) succeeded in Upper Silesia. The answer to this question probably lies 
in the persistence of conventions and routines which were appropriate during the region's 
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era in the socialist Industrial World, but have lost their meaning and usefulness in the era 
of capitalist transfonnation. 
While some economic actors - state owned and private - and political decision makers 
have creatively recombined their stock of conventions, the region as a whole, seen as a 
collective enterprise of reinvention undertaken by all kinds of actors, is a ship which reacts 
only slowly to changes of directions. The ambitious and sympathetic policy to initiate a 
metamorphosis from a smoke-stacked old industrial region to a high-tech district is 
doomed to fail, if the peculiar set of uotraded interdependencies which have structured the 
region for decades are not strategically integrated into the economic policies. One might 
ask whether such a metamorphosis is actually feasible or just the dream presented by 
elected decision makers, who are more concerned to extend their political power at a 
regional and national level. Certainly, the economic and spatial problems of such a former 
functionally integrated region are too manifold, the level of entrepreneurship too low, the 
built persistence of the industrialisation too high. Nevertheless, it is definitely worthwhile 
seeking to initiate innovation and change at the fringes, even if the outcome is less than 
clear and success a lengthy business. At least the (growing) number of SMEs which 
actually operate in the Interpersonal World of a post-socialist territory legitimise the 
statement that economic change is even possible in such mono-structured areas, in which 
variety is an asset that needs to be developed. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Early debates about economic transfonnation in fonner socialist countries revolved around 
the 'right remedy' to guide those countries through a process of system change. 
Accordingly to the advice of international consultants, Poland embraced shock therapy, 
instead of a gradual path of incremental institutional change. The outcome of this path 
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dependent decision were unexpected and surprised many commentators, as neo-liberal 
policies with a focus on macro-economic issues resulted in 'slumpflation' in the early 
1990s, instead of stabilisation and a growing economy. International finance organisations 
remain preoccupied with looking at formal institutional issues and the 'right policies' that 
are capable of transforming previous command economies into functioning market 
economies. The main perspective is to build a capitalism by design, drawing from western 
models and assuming a short 'transition' period, with an outcome comparable to long-
established capitalist spaces in the West. Instead, the existence of manifold modes of 
capitalism, even in Europe, suggests that the 'outcome' of system change might be 
something different, a 'mixed economy' and a process which is an economic 
transformation to something new. Without a doubt it can be said that the Anglo-American 
model of capitalism and its neo-liberal version of free markets and deregulation has seen 
an increasing political support in Europe over the last years, particularly in countries 
labelled as the new Europe - former socialist territories. At the same time it is safe to say 
that the impact of such policies transpires in different ways with different spatial and social 
effects - and this has been the topic of this thesis. 
The up and downs of macro-economic national data applied to compare the 'progress' 
towards 'transition' does not help in the development of an understanding of how this 
system change might work, particularly at a regional, local and firm level. Following an 
increasing academic and political interest in regions as a nexus for economic 
'development', a case study was chosen which can be identified as a microcosm of post-
socialist economic, social, and political processes. 
The distinction between formal and informal institutional change has been proven to be a 
useful concept in understanding ongoing processes on micro and meso levels. The 
identification and analysis of these informal institutions, also labelled as untraded 
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interdependencies, such as unwritten rules, conventions, and routines between different 
economic and political actors of the region has shown that economic transformation 
processes are more than the mere introduction of free markets and their accompanying 
legislations. It has been argued in this thesis, that a creative process of recombination 
brings together different sets of conventions, some of them reaching into the past. In 
contrast to many other studies, it is argued that old conventions and routines are not only 
helpful in times of economic uncertainty, but geographically and economically 
explainable. In this perspective, the transaction cost approach has shown how economic 
actors try to lower costs with the help of proximity advantages and embedded economic 
networks, even in the case of large-scale enterprises. 
This process of recombination, or bricolage, has also been observed in the establishment of 
economic and political networks. The application of evolutionary concepts such as the 
identification of network properties and ties between different sets of actors provides 
evidence of dynamic and complex systems of learning. The learning region and 
organisation in post-socialist contexts learns how to transform practices into capitalist 
routines. This learning is supported and demanded by external players, often western 
regions and organisations, functioning as models of best capitalist practices. However. this 
is not a simple relationship of domination as between teacher and pupil, but a mode of 
power pointing to seduction prior to Poland's accession to the EU and the absorption of 
structural funds. 
Not surprisingly, the analysis of socially constructed untraded interdependencies has been 
criticised for being 'fuzzy' and elusive. Indeed, the meaning and impact of routines on 
economic and political processes, embedded in local and micro-contexts such as in firms 
and public administration is difficult to capture. This research process relies on 
interpretation which might be hard to understand inter-subjectively. On the other side. 
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there can be no doubt that long neglected analysis of 'soft' economic and political practices 
are important for understanding how individuals, organisations and their networks interact 
and shape economies. It can be said that in quickly changing post-socialist societies this 
aspect is even more crucial than in 'settled' western territories, because of a faster change 
of formal and informal institutions. 
The identification of non-standard business solutions has been an aspect in this thesis in 
terms of survival strategies, and the creative application of existing resources. However. 
'non-standard' involves the interpretation of the western observer and needs thus a careful 
assessment. The identification of non-monetary transactions, such as the emergence and 
maintenance of barter markets and their impact on geographical spaces needs further 
research. The research has pointed to first possible reasons for this practice, but a more 
detailed analysis is desirable. 
Although the employment of dichotomies such as West/East, socialist/post-socialist, (post) 
socialist/capitalist. state/market has been regular in this thesis, a few examples tried at least 
to question a sharp distinction between these terms. The question why it still might be to 
justified to speak of post-socialist spaces after more than 15 years into transformation is 
tricky to answer. But the continuation of elements reaching into Poland's socialist past are 
not only undeniable, but probably a necessity for the ultimate success of this process. 
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Appendix: Methodological Choices 
As already indicated in chapter 1.2.2, the following main research foci frame the design of 
this thesis. First, the thesis seeks to explore the limits of Michael Storper's interpretation of 
the 'reflexive turn' in economic geography, in particular the interrelations of organisations, 
technologies, and territories in old industrial and post-socialist contexts. Second, the 
present and future of territories is not only dependent on the meshed interplay of reflexive 
economic actors, but also the functioning of formal political and administrational 
institutions and their peculiar geographical modus. Since the political realm of former 
socialist territories is as much the subject of transformational processes as 'the economy', 
it is necessary to conceptualise this interrelated part of the transformation - and, in 
particular the relationship between the political and economic actors in a region. In doing 
this, the thesis follows a two-tier strategy which departs from Storper's holy trinity 
approach by focusing on these two aspects of change, although it is questionable whether a 
clear-cut distinction between 'the political' and 'the economic' is always possible or 
desirable, particularly in countries of CEE. 
In order to explore the main research foci, it was necessary to identify a post-socialist and 
old-industrial territory. The initial idea to conduct research in Upper Silesia was developed 
during a study trip to another old-industrial region in the year 2000 - the Donetsk Basin in 
Ukraine. During this trip the author met the friend of a researcher, Or Kerstin Zimmer, 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitiit Frankfurt am Main, who at this time was involved in 
an international research project on the "making of regions in post-socialist Europe" (Tatur 
2004). Zimmer, who was undertaking research in Donetsk, facilitated contact with one of 
the project partners, responsible for the case study of Upper Silesia, Or Adrian Cybula, 
Sociology Department of the Silesian University, Katowice. After an exploratory field trip 
to Upper Silesia in December 2002 and first interviews with selected administrational 
bodies, the author concluded that this region was indeed suitable and attractive for an in-
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depth research, providing a case of an older industrial region in transition and offering 
good access to key regional actors and documentation. 
The Region 
Upper Silesia has frequently been identified as a 'disaster region' of Europe which is faced 
with an ongoing process of decline and thus a severe transformation of its economic, 
social, and political fabric. Certainly, a number of similar 'mono-structured' regions exist 
in many European countries. However, Upper Silesia is one of the biggest agglomerations 
of its kind on the continent and can be seen to be a model in microcosm not only for the 
analysis of industrial change, but also of potential transformation into a post-socialist 
territory. After more than 15 years of this process a good part of its heavy industrial base is 
still faced with the threat of, or in the process of, privatisation, substantial restructuring and 
downsizing of industrial output. At the same time new spatial economic dynamics are 
clearly emerging which have been identified as typical features of post-socialist change: 
first, the rise of substantial foreign direct investments mainly from the automotive sector 
and second, the emergence of small and middle-sized firms, not only in the IT sector, but 
also in 'innovative' and technology-ridden industries. These parallel processes of 
economic change and transformation make it possible to speak of Upper Silesia as an old-
industrial area becoming a post-socialist space. 
Processes of transformation from an authoritarian one-party state and its centrally-planned 
economy to a liberal democracy and market relations are frequently linked with the 
emergence of 'politics of identity'. This socio-cultural dimension of transformation is often 
identified as an important aspect and motor of becoming a post-socialist space. The 
selected region is particularly suitable for studying this dynamic. (Upper) Silesia's rich and 
complicated history has generated differentiated mindsets of spatial identity over the last 
few hundred years. The historical impact of diverse political powers has left still 
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identifiable traces of localised identities and mental affiliations. During the post-1989 
transformation a rediscovered and socially constructed cultural diversity has been used 
politically as a vehicle for public mobilisation, legitimisation and facilitator for accepting 
the pitfalls of capitalism. The selected region and its spatial-cultural peCUliarity is a model 
case for analysing the social-political aspects of becoming a post-socialist space, not only 
because of its strongly presented regional identity and its political instrumentalisation, but 
also because of the dominant Polish understanding (at least outside the region) that, in 
some sense, the region is 'un-Polish'. 
For these reasons a senes of interviews have been conducted, covering the recently 
reformed regional two-tier administration of Upper Silesia, the Marshal and Voivod and 
their departments. After years of de-centralisation and a new momentum for regional 
thinking, in particular the creation of new institution, the administration of the Marshal was 
analysed in order to identify the power relations between the local level and the region, but 
also to consider the reform efforts in terms of their possible impact on strengthening the 
economic and political leeway for regional-based action. Moreover, 'the making of a 
region' and its re-imagination in terms of attractiveness for foreign investors were closely 
investigated during the research in order to assess the region's efforts to compete for 
capital investment (FDI) with other regions in CEE and the rest of Europe. Interviews were 
conducted not only with officers and politicians in the regional administration, but also 
with key actors in regional and business development agencies to clarify their 'indigenous' 
strategies and visions. Most of these interviews were set up with the help of the 
information department of the Marshal's administration. 
The Cities 
As well as looking at the regional scale in terms of political, social and economic 
developments, it is also necessary to relate these developments to those taking place on a 
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local scale. Analysis of the diverse and complex relations between the local and the 
regional level is crucial in developing an understanding the peculiarity of post-socialist 
transformation. In this particular case such an approach is still more necessary, because 
post-socialist regions have only recently gained a new set of authorities so that 'regional 
thinking' is a relatively new development, even ifin the case of Upper Silesia it is based on 
historical parallels. In other words, post-socialist regions are still in a weaker position than 
their cities and communes, although the region's power base and possibilities of 
intervention are without doubt growing with the help of EU funds. Upper Silesia is made 
up of a series of interconnected cities all of which are faced with similar problems and 
challenges. Despite having a similar economic fabric and the same point of departure in 
1989, differences in the urban development of these adjacent cities are quite noticeable 
(and rather surprising). This is the second reason why, in this thesis, cities are analysed in 
order to understand the interplay between strong mayors on the one side and the emerging 
regional administration on the other side. 
Since it was not possible to integrate all cities and their development into the analysis, a 
selection of cities was necessary. First of all, the regional centre, the administrative capital 
of Upper Silesia, Katowice, was selected in order to obtain a more detailed picture of the 
local development of this city, which is regionally important in terms of economic and 
political strength. Although it was not possible to conduct an interview with the mayor of 
Katowice, several interviews with directors of the city administration and the political 
opposition made it possible to construct a sufficient overview of the main development and 
political issues facing the city. Alongside Katowice, the cities of Gliwice and Sosnowiec 
were selected for a more profound investigation of local-regional relations. Gliwice was 
selected for a local case study because it is one of the Polish cities with the highest rate of 
FDIs, making it possible to explore how the local authorities managed to reach this status 
of being 'successful'. In contrast to other cities, the contact to one of the mayors, who was 
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also personally in charge of the attraction of GM Ope/ to the city, was relatively easy as 
local decision makers are well connected through a network of alumni of the Technical 
University. The contact to the city hall was facilitated by the director of the local 
development agency, who also once belonged to the team in charge of the GM Opel 
investment project. 
While Gliwice might be a case of 'successful local restructuring' through the attraction of 
foreign investment, Sosnowiec is by contrast a low-profile case, or, in other words, an 
ordinary regional city. The inclusion of Sosnowiec, a city without an obvious 
distinguishing characteristic (Katowice: regional capital; Gliwice: 'Polish capital of FDls'), 
was also helpful because of its historical affiliation to the Russian Empire and the 
Dqmbrowa Basin. In this way, the case contributed to the author's reflections on cultural 
differences between the 'proper' Upper Silesia (west) and the adjacent Eastern region, the 
complex politics of identity in the region. The interview with the mayor of Sosnowiec, 
together with a delegation of directors of the city hall and the head of department for urban 
development was facilitated by the director of the Silesian Union of Municipalities. The 
high-profile interviews in Gliwice and Sosnowiec impressed the author not only because 
all interviewees appeared to be very well prepared and interested in the research, but also 
because the author's inquiry was directly handled and co-ordinated by the mayors offices. 
Thus, the author and his research was taken seriously, a fact which might have positively 
influenced the overall picture in contrast to the city of Katowice where the mayor refused 
to be interviewed despite months-long efforts, approached by different channels. 
In the end, the author is fully aware that the cities included as cases in the research are 
highly selective and of course not representative. Nevertheless, they offer a range of 
experiences, making in-depth analysis possible. It might also have been desirable to 
undertake fieldwork in cities which might be placed in the category of 'unsuccessful' cities 
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in the region. Not surprisingly, however, many of those city halls which were contacted, 
refused to be interviewed. The benefit of focusing on more 'successful' cities is, in any 
case, that it makes it possible to escape from stereotypical representations of older 
industrial regions in CEE as economically hopeless and unsuitable for development. 
The Industries 
As explained in the main text of the thesis, it was decided to focus on three particular 
industries in order to interrogate Storper's assumptions of the holy trinity of organisations, 
technology, and territory. First, the old industrial heavy industries were selected. not only 
because they still shape the image and character of the region and many of its cities. but 
also because they are subject to the most dramatic downsizing, restructuring, and 
privatisation processes, probably in the whole of Europe. As a result, the coal and steel 
industries of Upper Silesia are not only a focus of national concern as part of the process of 
fostering Poland on its path to a functioning capitalist country. but are also subjects of 
international concern because they directly touch on the country's relations with the EU as 
well as with the World Bank as one major source of finance for the restructuring process. 
The setting up of interviews was not the easiest task, as the 'politicisation' and high public 
profile of these industries make actors suspicious towards outsiders. Thus, in the case of 
the former chief of Kompania W~glowa, the biggest European coal company, the interview 
could only be arranged through informal personal channels in Katowice. In the case of the 
executive director of the steel mill Huta Katowice, which was in the process of 
privatisation during the field research in 2003, an interview could likewise only be realised 
with the help of an employee of the Silesian regional administration, who was personally 
engaged in setting it up. 
Second, the automotive industry was selected as a case study in order to analyse the second 
major economic dynamic in CEE in general and Silesia in particular: namely, the influx of 
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foreign direct investments. The highest proportion of FDIs in Central and Eastern Europe 
has been realised by this industry and its suppliers. In the case of Poland, the highest single 
foreign investment was realised by GM Ope/ in Gliwice, Upper Silesia. There is no doubt 
that other industrial sectors could also provide evidence of interesting and dynamic 
developments in the region where the fieldwork was undertaken, but it is safe to say that 
the automotive industry makes it possible to explore the most sophisticated supply chain 
networks in CEE and the rest of Europe in comparison to other industries with high 
investments, for example the food industry, retail, banking and financing etc. From this 
perspective, the automotive industry was selected to make it possible to develop an 
effective overview of the region's connectedness to the outside world and, at the same 
time, to analyse the intraregional relations of this sphere of production. After months of 
seeking to arrange a meeting with the GM Ope/ CEG, the interview only took place just 
view days before the end of the field work with the personal help of the mayor of Gliwice. 
The interview with Tenneco was facilitated with the help of a regional development 
agency, because this supplier is integrated in a regional programme for the fostering of 
entrepreneurship. However, when the author asked questions dealing with other issues (e.g. 
the company's strategy in CEE and supply chain issues), the interviewee immediately 
asked to switch off the recorder and later decided to terminate the interview early, because 
she was not prepared to answer those questions. 
Third, a number of small and medium-sized companies, in particular of the emerging IT 
sector and their intraregional and interregional strategies, were analysed. Support for small 
and medium-sized companies has been identified as a main political topic, as it is stated in 
the regional development programme of the region. It is the most important economic 
policy field directly controlled by the Marshal's administration through a number of EU-
funded projects. Thus, an analysis of activities in this area gives a picture of indigenous 
strategies to strengthen regional capacities and to become a capitalist territory with an 
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'innovative stocking' of economic actors, a 'species' which tends to be missing because of 
the 'mono-structured' economic fabric of Upper Silesia. The interviews with some 
companies involved in the regional projects were facilitated by the regional development 
agencies. Moreover, other interviews were conducted with the regional administration 
which controls the projects and the regional agency which implements them. 
The Interviews and Research Material 
In total, about 60 interviews were conducted. 51 interviews were recorded with a 
conventional dictaphone, more than 60 hours of data. In around nine cases either the 
interviewees rejected the use of a tape recorder or in a few cases the recording failed for 
technical reasons. Sometimes interviewees rejected the use of a tape recorder in the course 
of an interview, or the author offered to turn the dictaphone off, in particular when 
sensitive infonnation was given. Most of the interviews were semi-structured, following 
the key questions and, depending on the interview partner, were supplemented with 
specific questions related to the context of the organisation. Comprehensive notes were 
taken of all interviews and have additionally infonned the transcriptions and the 
interpretation of the data. A good part of the data has been transcribed, in particular 'key 
interviews', which have been used for direct quotation, and non-transcribed data has also 
been used in order to strengthen arguments. 
Most interviews were conducted between May and July 2003, in English, Polish or 
Gennan (decreasing frequency), sometimes with professional interpreters or with the help 
of (voluntary) assistants of the organisation within which the interview was taking place. 
As neither the author, nor the interviewees were native English speakers, considerable 
effort has been placed on ensuring the accuracy of particular sensitive or significant 
infonnation during interviews held either with or without interpreters or assistants. Direct 
quotations in the text have only been slightly corrected regarding their grammatical and 
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semiotic correctness, in order to preserve the idiom and to understand the content. All 
interviews in the Polish language were conducted with the help of interpreters or assistants, 
as the author's command of the Polish language is still insufficient for that level of 
communication. Surprisingly, a number of the interviewees offered the author the 
opportunity to conduct the interview in German. 
As well as the interviews, the thesis is informed by the extensive review of literature 
covering the origin and latest development of relational economic geography approaches, 
theories of transformation and institutional change, as well as the specific transformational 
processes in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, and Upper Silesia. Moreover, 'grey 
literature' was analysed in order to supplement the gained information with 'internal' data 
such as newsletters, reports, working papers, theses, government, regional and municipal 
documents, bulletins, fact sheets, conference proceedings, and statistical material. 
The Research Process 
The research process was realised in three major steps. During the first year, the author 
conducted a comprehensive literature review which led to the identification of the main 
theoretical and analytical framework suitable to handle the research questions and the main 
thesis. After the first main literature review and time of consideration, it was decided to 
focus on the work of Michael Storper and his interpretation of the 'reflexive turn' in 
economic geography. It is fair to say that his body of work currently represents the most 
comprehensive approach to relational economic geography. Because it draws on the 
experience of the developed capitalist countries of the 'West', in taking Storper's work 
further it is necessary to verify his assumptions in other, non-western contexts. It was 
hypothesised that his approach offered a spatial perspective likely to be helpful in 
understanding transformational processes in Central and Eastern Europe, but that some of 
his reflections on major terms might have to adapted to the specific contexts in those 
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countries and regions. For example, it can be assumed that Storper's notion of 'reflexivity' 
has a different meaning and occurrence in transformational countries, as the recently 
established set of formal institutions is not (yet) functioning or at least works in a different 
mode than in the west. Thus informal networks and their routines play a crucial role in 
substituting the lack of formality. 
Storper's concept of the 'holy trinity' - organisations, technology, and territory - was used 
as a major analytical framework in this thesis. For this reason, his seminal book 'The 
Regional World' was extensively studied and reflected on. In contrast to Storper, it was 
necessary to persevere with a clear-cut distinction between 'organisation' and 'institution' 
in order not to lead to confusion because of the ways the terms are used in the second 
major body of literature which was used in the research - that is theories of (post-socialist) 
transformation. In this thesis, organisations are understood to include all kinds of economic 
and political actors, in particular enterprises, agencies, departments, etc. At the same time, 
the second concept, technology and linked notions of innovation, was used in a rather 
broad sense. So, for example, in the thesis, it is assumed that a government department or 
old steel mills may be capable of acting innovatively, even if this acting is not necessarily 
based on the use of technology, at least as commonly understood. In this context, 
'technology' is also interpreted as a process of learning, and combines in particular the 
'know-how, know-who, know-what, and know-why'. The examination of Storper's 
analytical framework together with the extensive literature review on transformation led to 
the elaboration of research questions and a research plan for the field work. 
It was not the aim of this thesis to deliver a sharp-lined spatial definition of the area of 
Upper Silesia (so, for example, some rural parts of the historical Upper Silesia are not 
covered in the research while other parts have been included). Rather, the arguments of the 
thesis are rooted in the assumption that regions are open and internally diverse and is rather 
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focussing on the permanent tension between the global and the local without confronting 
the two scales irreconcilably. 
The second step of the research was the field research. During a first exploratory research 
trip to Katowice in December 2002, the main economic and political organisations of the 
region were identified also with the help of Or Adrian Cybula, who works in the Sociology 
Department at the Silesian University. Preliminary preparatory interviews were conducted 
and contacts with other potential interviewees were made during this first trip. The main 
research visit took place between May and July 2003. The concept of the 'holy trinity' 
guided most of the interviews. This means that an attempt was made to gain information 
relevant to all three major parts of the concept. Thus, the questions focused on the 
organisation interviewed, how and with whom they worked, for example, or questions 
related to current and past projects. Another main aim was to identify connections to and 
relations with other organisations and territories. The topic of 'technology' was regularly 
covered in the sense of concrete innovation processes and the tools the organisation used to 
establish, to learn or maintain these processes. 
The third research step involved the analysis of the field work data, the elaboration of the 
thesis and the writing-up phase. Many of the interviews were transcribed, classified, and 
analysed according to the research plan and the research questions. Moreover, research 
literature was revisited, supplemented and scrutinised towards issues which were 
discovered during the field work. This comprehensive examination led to the in-depth 
development of the argument of the thesis. Many of the assumptions of the pre-field work 
could be revised and/or expanded. First results of the thesis were presented during the 
AAG2004. 
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